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- 


BOSS PLATT AND HIS 
NEW YORK MACHINE 


A STUDY OF THE POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
OF THOMAS C. PLATT, THEODORE 
ROOSEVELT, AND OTHERS 


By 


Harotp F. Gosnecy 


Instructor in Political Science in the University of Chicago 


With an Introduction by 


Cuartes E. MerrRIAM 


Professor of Political Science in the University of Chicago 





THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS 
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 


CopyricutT 1924 By 
THe UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 


All Rights Reserved 


Published January 1924 


Composed and Printed By 
E. R. Andrews Printing Company 
Rochester, New York 





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BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK 
MACHINE 


THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS 
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS 


THE BAKER AND TAYLOR COMPANY 
NEW YORK 


THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS 
LONDON 


THE MARUZEN-KABUSHIKI-KAISHA 
TOKYO, OSAKA, KYOTO, FUKUOKA, SENDAI 


THE MISSION BOOK COMPANY 
SHANGHAI 


PREFACE 


In this study the author has endeavored to describe the 
social background, the personal qualities, and the technique 
of a typical state political boss. The boss system was in a 
particularly flourishing condition during the late nineties in 
the northeastern part of the United States. Thomas -Col- 
lier Platt of New York was selected for this analysis because 
there is a wealth of material available upon New York 
politics. In calling Senator Platt a “boss” the author does 
not wish to pass judgment upon the man. The endeavor 
is to give some objective meaning to the term. Platt hap- 
pened to be the man who was recognized as the leader of 
the Republican party in the state of New York at the time 
when Theodore Roosevelt was coming into national notice. 
Platt’s relations with Roosevelt would make an intensely 
interesting biographical study. The author has attempted 
to touch upon some of these relations. But only in part 
of this book is the chronological method followed. The 
organization of the book sometimes does violence to the 
sequence of events, but it is hoped that the arrangement 
adds to the understanding of the boss and the machine in 
actual operation. 

In gathering material for this analysis, the writer was 
aided by the following New Yorkers: Hon. Frederick M. 
Davenport, state senator from Clinton, Col. D. A. Alexan- 
der, former congressman from Buffalo, Hon. C. H. Betts, 
state assemblyman from Lyons, Hon. B. B. Odell, former 
governor of New York, Hon. Chauncey M. Depew, former 
United States senator, Hon. Herbert P. Parsons, former 

vu 


Vili PREFACE 


congressman from New York, Professor R. C. E. Brown 
of Columbia University, formerly on the New York Trib- 
une, Mr. W. T. Arnt, secretary of the New York Citizens’ 
Union and formerly on the New York Evening Post, Mr. 
E. G. Riggs, formerly on the New York Sun, Mr. L. J. 
Lang, of the New York American, and Mr. Hagedorn and 
Mr. R. W. G. Vail, of the Roosevelt Memorial Association. 
These men and the many others, librarians, newspaper men, 
and politicians, who rendered valuable assistance to the 
author are in no way responsible for statements made in 
this book. In organizing the material, the writer is under 
great obligations to Professor C. E. Merriam, of the Uni- 
versity of Chicago. Valuable counsel was also furnished by 
Professors A. C. McLaughlin and W. E. Dodd, also of the — 
University of Chicago. In spite of this help, the author is 
aware that many imperfections remain for which he alone 
is accountable. 

Harotp Foote GosNELL 


UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO 
NoveMBER, 1923 


TABLE OF CONTENTS 


PAGR 
INTRODUCTION .........«.... By Charles E, Merriam xiii 


CHAPTER 

t-—I. SocrAL AND EcONOMIC BACKGROUND .....+..- ol D 
pee TRY ORE—SCHOOL OF POLITICS: 3.) o. tc tobe 12 
III. PovtiticAL UPHEAVAL IN NEw YORK ....<.:e- 39 

DTV. Prarr’s “SuNDAY SCHOOL CLASS” ....ceeeeeee 55 
V. NoMINATING RooSEVELT FOR PusLic OFFICE... 73 


Party Committees—Primaries—State Conven- 
tions—National Conventions. 


bevf Evectine ROOSEVELT GOVERNOR OF NEw YorxkK 124 


Witte CONTROL. OVER. LAW/MAKING «. $7 ij. cca ene 150 
The State Legislature—Platt’s Relation to 
Congress. 


\ VIII. GovERNoR RooSEVELT AND Boss PLATT’........ 182 
Legislative Functions—Appointments— Gen- 
eral Executive Duties. 


Dk. Tue DIsTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS .......+.+-- 219 
Local Patronage—State Patronage—Federal 
Patronage. 
See et EHR. CORRUPT “ALLIANCE” . 65. hes 0 sees Oe ee 
lke XI. Pratr’s DectineE AND RooSEVELT’s CAPTURE 
Dest ete ORGANIZATION ©.) cevyic.s eachy Cae. ore 6 0hehs 291 
XII. PeRsoNAL QUALITIES OF PLATT AND ROOSEVELT 317 
XI. THE TECHNIQUE OF ParTyY MANAGEMENT ..... 334 
feey CONCLUSION ©...¥.7- aR een yeas Ree Re 350 
TA Se SR ARR pace” i ae aN eels ae eh tees COOL 
ix 





LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS 


FACING 

PAGE 

SP MMAPAGCCILLIER: PEAT! oc ccc bk AF ea bee oe DUG iii 
MEM OEPCATORIAT,. SUICIDES: 6 S60s Poe nied ore oe ae PH 
prearmereATIOAT 49 BROADWAY weve oo cGlaclc ale 71 


“We HAve DISCOVERED IN Mr. RoosEVELT THE MIss- 


PRR ICEN Rees oe Fe a ord bo tLe Q7 
THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTION oF 1900... 121 
ROOSEVELT CAMPAIGNING IN 1898 .......0... ccc cece 121 
MarR DORR OOSEVELT:. 5. oo Sidcdie Silat oa re oo hes 185 
(eee lar LAND) «ssi «ais /awiets PONE Sane 209 
BITRE UBD ds Sf eiehécmneOtic dans Pee ae en ae . 299 


xi 





INTRODUCTION 


The most widely known study of a political leader or 
boss is Machiavelli’s Prince, which has stood for four hun- 
dred years as the classic type of a critical analysis of polit- 
ical character and methods. The work of the observing 
Florentine was anticipated, however, by the remarkable 
analyses made by Aristotle in his Politics, nearly 2000 years’ 
in advance of the Italian; and Aristotle was in turn antici- 
pated by his great teacher, Plato, in his attempt to make 
a psychological pattern of the despot and the just man in 
the political world. By mathematical calculations, the basis 
of which I confess I am unable to follow, the great Greek 
philosopher reached the conclusion that the despot was 
precisely 729 times less happy than the just ruler, this figure 
being the cube of nine. We cannot say that the study of 
leaders was not begun early by the students of government, 
or deny that it was well begun by these illustrious inquirers. 

In the meantime, however, new types of leaders have 
appeared, and new forms of analysis and appraisal. Mod- 
ern democracy has produced novel situations under which 
leaders may develop, and modern political science and 
psychology are developing new modes of more critical and 
accurate analysis of the traits of the leaders and the habits 
of those who are led. In every part of the field of social 
science, there is beginning a wide movement toward the 
more intimate understanding of those qualities of human 
nature that underlie social and political control. The eco- 
nomic man, the social man, the political man cannot con- 
tinue to be the product of arm-chair speculation or a type 

111 


xiv INTRODUCTION 


~ of general reasoning with chief regard to logical consist- 
ency in the line of arguments, but in increasing the degree 
the political man submits to the more objective tests of 
actual observation of behaviour and to specific measure- 
ment and analysis. 

Using the new tools of survey and comparison, of sta- 
tistics and psychology, the modern investigator is penetrat- 
ing farther and farther into the recesses of that “human 
nature,” which for a long time stood guard at the end of 
the world, barring the way to further discovery. Long ago 
we ceased to believe that rulers governed because they were 

the sons or blood relations of gods; or even that they ruled 

by special divine right. “The mystery that doth hedge 
about” a king has largely been dispelled, and with it the 
lesser mysteries that were worn by the lesser lights around 
the throne. It may still be assumed, however, that there 
is some other kind of a mystery that surrounds a leader 
of men, some magic that grows out of mysterious “human 
nature,’ and defies human analysis and understanding. 
Political leaders, some believe, are super-men, inscrutable, 
insoluble types, to be accepted as in the earlier times earth- 
quakes, volcanoes, storms, or other works of nature were 
accepted. 

“Human nature,’ however, is no: more of a defense 
against modern science than “divine right” in the earlier 
period of human development, for the whole trend of mod- 
ern social science is toward the discovery of the secrets or 
‘rather the sequences of “human nature.’ We no longer 
look upon the human beings who may be our masters with 
superstitious awe, but rather with scientific curiosity as to 
how they are constructed and how they operate, and with 
determination to reduce the mysterious to its very lowest 
terms. The “great man” is not merely a hero to be wor- 
shipped, as if in some occult way endowed with semi- 


, 


INTRODUCTION XV 


divine attributes, but he (or she) presents a problem, a 
situation to be analysed and explained. His biological in- 
heritances, his social environment, his social training, his 
life experience, his developed traits and characteristics, 
measured as closely as may be and with increasing pre- 
cision ;—these are the factors from which the great man may 
be understood; and with them the less great and the near 
great. This is as true of the great man or the leader in the 
political world as in any other field of the larger social world. 

In the last generation increasing attention was given to 
the examination of the social origins and environment 
of leaders, following Carlyle’s period of hero worship and 
great man adoration. In the present generation increasing 
attention is being given not only to the social entourage out 
of which the leader comes, but also to the analysis of the in- 
dividual qualities of the leader, and finally to the inter-’ 
relation of these qualities to the environment. We want 
to know what sort of an environment makes a Lincoln or a 
Roosevelt, and also what the special qualities of these 
types are, as they may have come out of inheritance or 
been shaped by environment and experience, and to know 
how these special traits or types of behaviour react upon 
the environment. 

Inevitably the study of leaders involves the study of 
followers as well, and, indeed, the whole question of the 
political interests of man. How these interests originate, 
develop and decline; what determines their strength and 
direction ; within what limits they may be adapted and ad- 
justed ;—these are all questions which must be answered 
before we can solve the riddle of leadership. For the 
attractiveness of the leader and the attraction of the fol-. 
lower are the same phenomena, viewed from different sides. 
They are types of reciprocal forces, producing political 


¥ 


XVI INTRODUCTION 


tropisms, which are the worthy subjects of scientific inquiry, 
however difficult the precise approach may be. Why men 
obey or do not; why they incline toward conformity or dis- 
sent; why they tend to lead or follow in certain circum- 
stances ;—these are fundamental questions of politics, and 
they are likely to be given the most thorough examination 
within the next few years. They are problems lying at the 
‘basis of any system of government, whether aristocratic, 
democratic, or communistic, and only upon a thorough un- 
derstanding of the political side of human nature can a 
science of politics or a prudent art of government and 
statesmanship be built. 

It is true that party leadership is not a thing apart, and 
that it has many intimate relationships with other types of 
leadership in other fields of social life. Perhaps there is 
“much of kin in the general, the cardinal, the magnate, and 
‘the political leader or boss. The development of psychology 
is likely to throw much light upon this subject in the next 
few years, and, of course, the literature of political leader- 
ship will be correspondingly enriched. But the special study 
of the political types of leadership will always remain an 
object of inquiry by the political scientists. 

The problem of leadership has not been wholly neglected, 
_although very imperfectly considered thus far. Notably 
Robert Michels? in an inquiry based chiefly upon social 
\ democratic leaders in Italy and the Germanic states, made 
a brilliant study of the “metamorphosis” of party leaders, 
and of some of the typical characteristics of political leader- 
ship. As significant traits of leaders he enumerated the 
‘following: 1. Force of Will; 2. Wider extent of knowl- 


1See my American Party System, pp. 32-49, for a summary of the 
literature on this subject; see also Park and Burgess, Introduction 
to Sociology, pp. 854-55. 


2 Political Parties. 


INTRODUCTION XVii 


edge than ordinary; 3. Catonian strength of conviction; 

4. Self-sufficiency ; 5. Reputation for goodness of heart and_ 
disinterestedness ; 6. Some form of celebrity. In my vol- 
ume on the American Party System (1922) I traced in 

passing some of the qualities of leaders and outlined some 

of the high points in the subject. But that analysis was not 

designed to be an exhaustive examination of the topic, 

but suggestive of the possibilities of more minute research 

in this field. In addition to the possession of certain other 

qualities I suggested the following as a working list of, 
the attributes of the political leader. 

1. Unusual sensitiveness to the strength and direction | 
of social and industrial tendencies with reference to their’ 
party and political bearings. 

2. Acute and quick perception of possible courses of com- 
munity conduct with prompt action accordingly. 

3. Facility in group combination and compromise—polit-, 
ical diplomacy in ideas, policies and spoils. é 

4. Facility in personal contacts with widely varying 
types of men. 

5. Facility in dramatic expression of the sentiment or 
interest of large groups of voters, usually with voice or 
pen—fusing a logical formula, an economic interest and a, 
social habit or predisposition in a personality. 

6. Courage not unlike that of the military commander , 
whose best laid plans require a dash of luck for their suc- 
cessful completion. 

This was intended, however, only as a temporary scaf- 
folding, and has been so used by others and by me. It will 
be necessary to accumulate many individual studies before 
much substantial progress can be made. A series of care- 
ful studies would make possible much more minute analysis 
than has hitherto been possible and would pave the way for 
more careful comparison. Such studies will make possible 
the construction of categories that may be more definitely 


xviii INTRODUCTION 


bpplied than is now the case. What these tests or traits 
of types of behavior may be we do not know, but we shall 
-be in the way of finding out, if we project a long series 
of these inquiries and watch carefully for similarities and 
dissimilarities. | 

We need to know the hereditary influences affecting the 
individual. We need to have the most thorough knowledge 
‘of the social environment in which the phenomena of leader- 
ship develop. We need to have the most careful data re- 
ygarding the physical organization of the leader, an organic 
survey which we are likely to have available in the near 
future, and which may contain the explanation of many 
_types of leadership. We need to have a thorough survey 
of the intellectual qualities of the leader. We need to have 
‘an analysis of the social qualities of the leader. We need 
to have traced the patterns of his traits and dispositions in 
which may be found some of the springs of his power. 
It is clear that leadership lies not only in intelligence, but 
in sympathy, in determination, in social savoir faire, in a 
set of traits which we are just beginning to appraise and 
very roughly to measure. The interesting attempts of 
Moore to measure aggressiveness, of Downey to measure 
will or persistence, of the army authorities to evaluate the 
character qualities necessary to military leadership; all 
these and others are interesting illustrations of the types of 
inquiry that are likely to give us within the next generation 
“the necessary mental and temperamental measurements of 
individuals on the basis of which we understand the situa- 
tion we term leadership. When these patterns are com- 
pleted, it may easily be found that leadership is a relative 
term, and that the same individual will be found a leader 
“in this field and a follower in that. 
_ It will also be found useful to examine the achievement 
record of the leaders in various walks of life, and to find 


INTRODUCTION xix 


the relations between these achievement records and po- 
litical leadership, for here again in the experience of the 
individual, and the circumstances under which he has de- 
veloped political interests and prestige may be found part of 
the secret. Another significant field is the decline and 
disintegration of leadership, and the circumstances under 
which this occurs, using again the same categories and 
standards of equipment, achievement, situation or qualifica- 
tion. 

Likewise, the study of various kinds of groups will de- 
velop much material of value for the understanding of 
leadership. In the midst of the group arise those who appeal 
with greatest magnetic attraction to its members, and in 
proportion to our intimate knowledge of the processes of 
collective behaviour will come insight into the nature and 
limits of the leader’s pre-eminence. Leadership is a func- 
tion of collective action, and cannot be fully understood 
outside of its special setting. Possibly some persons of un- 
usual force or versatility would be leaders anytime or any- 
where, but most are peculiar to their particular social situa= 
tion, and all are conditioned by the surrounding social and’ 
political forces which they express and interpret. In this 
connection we may look for interesting analyses of groups 
among the forthcoming studies of the sociologists. More- 
over, social psychology, thus far little developed and main- 
taining a precarious existence, is likely in the not distant 
future to come to the aid of the student of government by 
making clearer the nature of the interaction that goes on in 
the complex social process. There can be no doubt that 
political attractions and aversions are intimately related to 
the elaborate cycles that appear and disappear in the shifts 
of social behaviour, and which can be fully understood only 
when the group process and social psychology are more 
thoroughly studied and more fully comprehended. 


Bc INTRODUCTION 


I have no doubt that the development here suggested may 
be deemed by some fanciful and impossible of realization, 
at any rate in the near future. A reviewer of my American 

‘Party System raised his eye-brows at my use of the phrase 
“nsycho-biological”’ qualities of party leaders, especially, 
said he, “coming from one who has sat in the City Council 
of Chicago.” Curiously enough, however, my analysis of 
party leaders on a scientific basis began precisely under 
‘these circumstances, by watching the behaviour and traits 
‘of city hall leaders, and by observing the insufficiency of 
the analyses ordinarily made by those who abhor the scien- 
tific terminology. It is common practice to classify party 
leaders as “good” or “bad,” and let the analysis stand there. 
I am quite capable of making such classifications and have 
frequently done so, although often with many misgivings 
‘as to just what was “good” or “bad.” In many instances 
the “worst” type of party leaders are breaking one com- 
mandment, but are keeping others broken by their critics; 
and on the whole it may be difficult to decide in some cases 
~ whether the critic or the culprit is the more anti-social in 
his conduct, judged by the broader standards of social prog- 
ress. Genuine progress will be made by more intensive 
study of the situations under which so-called “good” and 
“bad” leaders develop and operate, and by the most minute 
analysis of the qualities of the leaders and the followers, 
including the psycho-biological qualities that sound so 
strangely in the ear of the unsophisticated.? There is to 
be sure no magic in terminology, but there is distinct scien- 
tific value in the development or more precise analysis and 
the beginnings of accurate measurement. 
— Dr. Gosnell’s study is sa generis among the examinations 
of political leaders, a novel attempt at closer analysis. Past 


8 See my article in the National Municipal Review on “The Next 
Step in the Organization of Municipal Research,” September, 1922. 


INTRODUCTION XXi 


studies of policital leaders have usually been built upon 
treacherous ground. They are likely to be the work either 
of the enthusiastic adherent or of the bitter foe, and both: 
are likely to distort the facts and twist the conclusion. In 
any event the student of one particular person cannot make | 
a scientific appraisal of him without reference to a con? 
siderable number of like persons, and for this work the 
material has been lacking, or more accurately the detailed 
analysis of comparative qualities has been wanting. Ac- 
cordingly the intensive study of the comparative qualities 
or traits of leaders has not been developed to anything like 
its full possibilities. 

/ The autobiographies of political leaders are always in- 
/teresting and generally useful if taken with care. But the 
/ political leaders who can successfully analyse his own traits. 
fs unusual. Like other successful men, it is quite probable 
‘that he will be unable to appreciate the very causes that 

have contributed most to his advancement, but will find the~ 

sources of his strength in some trivial circumstance little 
connected with the real springs of power. The leader’s 
rationalizations of his power are not safe guides. 

Two notable examples of this are the autobiographies of 
Platt and Roosevelt. Senator Platt’s story of his own 
political life is obviously a crude explanation of what hap= 
pened—a wholly inadequate study of the character and 
tactics of a powerful political manager. President Roose- 
velt’s study is the best of the kind ever written, by reason 
of the dramatic life of the author and his scholarly and 
literary qualities. However, there are many very notable 
omissions in the record, as the mayoralty campaign of 1886 
and the presidential campaign of 1912, both of which are 
passed over with only a few words, although they were 
both significant events in his career. As a study in motives 
and interests, it is likewise very incomplete. In short we 


XX1i INTRODUCTION 


can scarcely expect from the leader a volume of confes- 
_ sions; we are more likely to find the material for epitaphs— 
gilded. This is not intended to disparage the use of auto- 
biographies. Quite the contrary, they are immensely 
valuable sources of information, and could be used much 
more effectively than they have been, with the necessary 
care in interpretation, and avoidance of the spell of hero 
worship. Dr. Gosnell has used all of such material that is. 
available (and much more has been published regarding 
New York State than in most of our commonwealths) and 
has gleaned from it many suggestions of great value. But 
he has gone farther in the direction of analysis than any 
one has before. 

In the present study, Dr. Gosnell has blazed a new trail. 
He has examined the social, economic, and political back- 
ground of Mr. Platt; he has studied as carefully as material 
permitted his personal equipment ; he has traced his training 
and his achievements; he has examined the weapons at his 
command, and the strategy and the tactics of his political 
warfare; he has shown how the power that was so built up 
began to decline and disintegrate; and he has made an 
estimate and appraisal of this particular leader from the 
point of view of individual technique and social significance. 

This is pioneer work of the very greatest value and 
significance to every student of party phenomena. It is the 
kind of solid investigation that must underlie the advance 
of genuinely scientific politics, and as such it is worthy of 
the most careful study by the observer of American political 
life as well as by the special student of technical political 
science. ) 

The list of leaders yet to be studied might well include 
the greater national figures of the type of Tilden, Blaine, 
Garfield, Reed, Cleveland, Pettigrew, LaFollette, Debs; the 
types of political bosses, rural and urban, such as Croker, 


INTRODUCTION XXill 


Tweed, Ruef, Cox, Quay, Brayton, Penrose, and many 
others of the same type; and in addition to this scores of 
key men in the local situations who manifest exactly the 
same qualities of leadership except upon a smaller and per- 
haps more familiar scale. An adequate inquiry would of 
course include all the varied types of leaders developed in 
different situations and under different backgrounds, the 
effect of the urban, the rural, the racial, the religious, the 
economic, environment in shaping the type of leader and 
determining his tactics. There is indeed no more fascinating 
field in the study of American political life, or in the 
development of modern democracy in fact; and in none is’ 
there greater need for an objective attitude and for scien- 
tific methods of inquiry, yet to be shaped and developed. 

It goes without saying that inquiries in the field of leader- 
ship cannot well be isolated expeditions apart from other 
advances in political science. Leadership is in the last 
analysis a cross section of human nature on its political 
side, and it cannot be studied with entire success except as 
a part of the whole political process. Omly a new era of 
scientific inquiry in which more sweeping studies of the _ 
political nature and behaviour of men based upon more 
fundamentally scientific methods are employed can maké 
completely successful investigations of leadership possible. 
There are many indications that a revival of genuinely 
scientific interest in politics is likely to develop in the near 
future, and that we are drawing near to a new epoch in the 
study of the political nature of man.* 

Government is weak today because it has lost the power © 
that once rose because force or unreflecting custom was its~ 


#See my article on “The Present State of the Study of Politics” 
in the American Political Science Review, May, 1921, also “Progress 
Report of the American Political Science Assn’s Committee on 
Political Research.” Ibid. May, 1923, 


XXIV INTRODUCTION 


base, or because of the assumed divinity that hedged about 
‘the throne, or from the easy generalizations of the natural 
Jaw philosophy that ruled the minds of men in the Revolu- 
tionary period. The future security of government lies in 
\the introduction of a measure of science that will give 
government the recognition accorded to other obviously 
useful agencies, and further in scientific inquiry into the 
_ fundamental bases of government as they are found in the 
constitution of human nature. Neither custom, nor re- 
ligion, nor logic, nor force will supply the future basis of 
obedience and command, of leadership and following. The 
roots of political organization will be found in general ap- 
preciation of the scientific basis and uses of the governing 
process. 

| CuHarves E. MERRIAM. 


CHAPTER I 


SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 


Thomas Collier Platt and Theodore Roosevelt had politi- 
cal relations with each other from the middle of the eighties 
until well on toward.the end of the first decade in the 
twentieth century. These relations can hardly be under-_ 
stood apart from the social and economic changes which” 
were taking place in the state of New York during that 
period. Both Platt and Roosevelt took great pride in hav- 
ing something to do with the politics of the “Empire State,” 
the state which surpassed all the other states in ere eae 
wealth, commerce, finance, industry, and the arts.’ : 

The most outstanding soci e_.in.the..state—-during 
the period under discussion..was.the.great-increase-in- popu- 
lation. In 1890 there were some six million people in the 
state; ten years later there were seven and a quarter mil> 
lion; and in another decade there were over nine million. 
Thus, in twenty years the state added to its population a 
number of people equal to the entire population of Switzer- 
land in 1900 or that of the entire United States in 1790._ 
Startling as these figures are, even more striking was the 
shift of population from the rural to the urban communities. 
In 1890 sixty-five per cent of the population lived in cities 
and towns of 2,500 inhabitants or more and two decades~ 
later nearly seventy-nine per cent of the population was 


1 There is no satisfactory social history of the state for this 
period. The chief sources here used are: New York State De- 
partment of Labor, Growth of Industry in New York, 1904; 
Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1912; and the Eleventh, 
Twelfth and Thirteenth Censuses of the United States. 

1 


—cpinand 


2 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


classed as urban. The greatest contributing factor to the 


“growing preponderance of the urban population was the 
‘rapid-expansion—of_ New York City. The population of 


the metropolis nearly doubled « during the two decades and 
in 1910 it comprised over half of the population of the entire 


,state. Aside from New York City, the state would have 


taken medium rank with the other states in population, but 


‘nevertheless the forty-eight cities north of the Bronx in- 


creased in the aggregate about one and a half times during 
this period. This meant that the population of the state 
outside of New York City was losing its predominant rural 
character with the passing of the century. In fact, in twenty- 
two of the sixty-one counties of the state there was an 
actual decline in population resulting from the shift of 
population from the country to the cities. It was a vague 
dread of this change which led a rural delegate to the New 
York State Constitutional Convention of 1894 to say: 


But numbers are not the only things to be considered in 


making a just and right apportionment. Territory has 


something to do with it. . . . I cannot look with com- 
placency upon the fact that a little territory in the southern 
part of the state is likely to have in the near future a pre- 
ponderance in the legislation of this state.? 


The deep rooted antagonism between the urban and the 
rural sections of the state~was~more Clearly expressed by 
another delegate to the same convention who said: “The 
average citizen in the rural district is superior in intelligence, 


“superior in morality, superior in self-government to the 


average citizen in the cities.” It is little wonder that the 


inhabitants of the up-state regions, with their Protestant 


faith, their native parentage and their local traditions run- 


~ ning back a hundred years or more, looked with condescen- 


2 Record (unrevised), IV, 1882. 
3 Jbid., p. 1984. 


Se 


SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 3 


sion upon the polyglot population of the great city. By 
reason of its natural advantages and the peculiar character 
of its site, New York City had long been the chief gateway 
for the immigrant tide which flowed into the entire nation: 
In 1890 about two-fifths of the inhabitants of New York 
County and one quarter of the state’s entire population 
were foreigners. Chief among the immigrant groups at 
that time were the Germans, the Irish, the English and the 
Swedes. During the next twenty years a million and a 
sixth persons of foreign birth were added to the state’s 
population, for the most part of Slavic or Latin origin? 
These newer immigrant hordes, from Russia, Poland, 
Bohemia, Bulgaria and other parts of southeastern /‘urope, 
settled in the slums of the great city where their old habits 
tended to break down. Scarcely any of them owned their 
own homes and many of them could neither read nor write. 
Since the newer immigrants presented more difficult prob- 
lems of assimilation than those which arose in connection 
with the earlier immigration and since the addition their 
numbers made to the ranks of the Catholic and Jewish wor- 
shippers undermined the primacy of Protestantism in the 
state, the gulf between the inhabitants of the metropolis 
and the up-state grew constantly wider during the period 
under discussion. 

The abundance of cheap, unskilled labor, in consequence 
of_the-large immigrant population, ‘partially “explains the 
rapid industrial development of the state during this period. 
It was to be expected that an increase in the urban popula- 
tion would make possible greater industrial activity, but ~ 
who, in 1890, would have prophesied that during the next 
twenty years the number of wage earners in the manufac-_ 
turing industries of the state would increase one and a half 


Report of the New York State Cc:nmission of Immigration, 
1909, Appendix V, 


4 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


times, the value of the products manufactured annually in 
‘the state would double, and the amount of capital invested 
in the industries of the state would increase two and a 
half times? In 1909, the 44,935 manufacturing establish- 
“ments in the state, representing practically every industry 

- found in the country, gave employment on the average to 
1,203,241 persons during the year, and paid out in salaries 
and wages $743,263,000. The significance of these changes 
was pointed out by Governor Roosevelt in his annual mes- 
sage to the legislature in 1900: 


For almost every gain there is a penalty, and the great 
strides in the industrial upbuilding of the country, which 
have on the whole been attended with marked benefit, have 
also been attended by no little evil. Great fortunes are 
usually made under very complex conditions both of effort 
and of surrounding, and the mere fact of the complexity 
makes it difficult to deal with the new conditions thus 
created. The contrast offered in a highly specialized indus- 
trial community between the very rich and the very poor is 
exceedingly distressing, and while under normal conditions 
the acquirement of wealth by the individual is necessarily of 
great incidental benefit to the community as a whole, yet 
this is by no means always the case.® 


A characteristic feature of this industrial expansion was 
the growth of the corporate form of business organization, 
a device which greatly facilitated large-scale production and 
the concentration of control in the hands of a few men. 
While the larger trusts were engaged in exploiting the 
resources of the nation, their interests within the boundaries 
of the state itself were not insignificant. One after the 
other, the railroad kings, the oil magnates, the steel monarchs 
and the other leaders of industry, went through the ex- 

“perience which the great steel magnate, Andrew Carnegie, 
has described: 


5 Public Papers of Governor Roosevelt, 1900, p. 20. 


SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 5 


Our business continued to expand and required frequent 
visits on my part to the East, especially to New York, which 
is as London to Britain—the headquarters of all really im- 
portant enterprises in America. No large concern could 
very well get on without being represented there.® 


The industrial leaders were attracted LON New_York in 


part by the facilities which the city “and the state furnished 
for manufacturing. Thus, some of the more important 
trusts, like the American Sugar Refining Company, the. 
Standard Oil Company, the United States Steel Corpora- 
tion, and the American Tobacco Company continued and 
expanded their manufacturing operations in the state dur- 
ing the period of plant consolidation. Another cause for 
the attractiveness of New York was its importance as a 
commercial center. In 1901, the foreign commerce of New 
York, imports and exports combined, equalled that of the 
rest of the country.’ The rapid growth of giant industrial 
and commercial combinations within the state during these 
years inevitably presented a series of highly complex political 
problems. New adjustments in the taxation system of the 
state were needed, and there was a demand for the elimina-= 
tion of unfair methods of competition. In the solution of-. 
these and o‘her problems the directors of the great cor- 
porations demanded and secured a prominent part. 

The transportation system of the state developed during 
the period to keep pace with the progress in manufacturing’ 
and corimerce. Although the increase in railroad mileage 
in the state was not as great as that of some other states, 
the total number of passengers carried annually upon the 
steam roads more than doubled during the years from 1890 


6 Andrew Carnegie, Autobiography of Andrew Carnegie (Boston, 
1920), p. 149. 
7™New York State Department of Labor, op. cit., p. 10. 


6 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


to 1906 and the total number of tons of freight carried each 
‘ year increased one and a half times during the same years.® 
As a result of a policy of consolidation, nearly one-third of 
the 8,416 miles of railroad in the state in 1910 was owned by 
ithe New York Central and Hudson River Railroad (the 
Vanderbilt system). Along the line of this railroad were 
to be found the most populous cities of the state and during 
the period under consideration the company spent vast sums 
of money improving its terminal in New York. City, one of 
its most valuable assets. In this and other ways the railroad 
increased the lead it had gained over the Erie Canal, a rival 
system of transportation, and strengthened its grip upon the 
industrial and agricultural interests of the state. The other 
railroads of importance in the state were the Erie, the Penn- 
sylvania, the Lehigh, and the Lackawanna, all of which ran 
through the southern counties of the state and were engaged 
for the most part in the transportation of coal and steel 
from Pennsylvania. The men who controlled these rail- 
roads, although they were constantly seeking government 
favors, were loath to come under government control. On 
the other -hand, increasing demands were made on the part 
of the shippers, the farmers and the merchants for adequate 
railroad regulation. To adjust these conflicting views was 
one of the tasks of the politician and the statesman. 
While there were no railroad scandals in the nineties like 
those which had occurred during the “Erie War” of the 
seventies, there were traction scandals which aroused the 
public and paved the way for more thorough regulation of 
municipal utilities. The growing population of the urban 
centers created a need for better facilities for transportation, 
lighting and communication. Thus, in 1890 there were only 
1140 miles of municipal railway in the entire state; twenty 


8 New York Railroad Commissioners, Report, 1890, II, 64, and 
Report, 1906, II, 60. 


SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 7 


years later this mileage had nearly quadrupled. During the 
year, 1910, the traction lines of New York City alone car- 
ried over a billion and a half passengers, double the number 
carried in the city during 1898.9 The growth of gas com- 
panies, electric lighting and power companies, the ramifica- 
tions of the American Telephone Company, were all equally 
phenomenal. Since the private corporations which operated 
these utilities were dependent for their very existence upon 
franchise privileges granted by the government, they were 
banded together into state associations for the protection 
and furtherance of their interests in dealing with the gov- 
ernment. The conflict between the private and public inter- 
est in the operation and management of these utilities fur-. 
nishes the background of many of the political struggles 
described below. 

This rapid expansion of the industrial and transportation 
facilities in the state demanded. unprecedented amounts of? 
capital and credit, and the concentration of these necessities 
occurred in New York City. The money lenders, the pro- 
moters, the underwriters, and the investment bankers_be- 
came the most “articulate” element in the economic life of 
the” state. ~ This group, “perhaps more clearly ‘than any other 
best professional brains of the country in carrying out its 
schemes. The remarkable career of J. P. Morgan illustrates 
the strategic position which an influential member of this 
group came to occupy. A recounting of a few of Morgan’s 
financial connections will show the tendency of the times: 
In the eighties he became a director and the sole fiscal agent 
of the New York Central Railroad; in 1895 he became one 
of the three voting trustees of the Erie Railroad; in 1901_ 
he helped organize the United States Steel Corporation; — 


9New York State Public Service Commission, First District, 
Report, 1910, I, 22; Second District, 1910, I, 67. 


8 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


and so on, his affiliations with producing, trading, utility, 
‘insurance, trust and banking companies might be multiplied 
at great length. Another powerful financial group was the 
Rockefeller or Standard Oil group which extended its 
operations into the railroad, the utility, and the banking 
fields. Among the lesser lights of Wall Street were the 
Havemeyers of the Sugar Trust and the group headed by 
William C. Whitney and Thomas F. Ryan which controlled 
the Tobacco Trust and many municipal utilities. A congres- 
sional committee investigating the “money trust” in 1912-13 
came to the conclusion that “there is an established and well- 
defined identity and community of interest between a few 
leaders of finance, created and held together through stock 
‘ownership, interlocking directorates, partnership and joint 
stock transactions, and other forms of domination over 
banks, trust companies, railroads, and public-service and in- 
dustrial corporations, which has resulted in great and rapid- 
ly growing concentration of the control of money and credit 
in the hands of these few men.’”?® While these few men 
were not always united among themselves, most of them 
came to think with Morgan that the immediate future of the 
country was safer in the hands of the business men than in 
those of its politicans and chosen representatives. 

The growing dependence of labor upon capital for the 
tools and machinery of production and the growing cen- 
tralization of control among producers and merchants in 
part led the workingmen of the state to organize for protec- 
tion. It was perhaps this developing group consciousness 
among certain classes of workers found in the great cities 
which caused the rural voters and representatives to view 


10U. S. Congress, House, Committee to Investigate the Concen- 
tration of Control of Money and Credit, 1913 (Pujo Committee). 

11W. S. Rainsford, Story of a Varied Life, An Autobiography 
(New York, 1922), p. 290. 


SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 9 


with alarm their own declining numbers. In 1894, the low, 
water mark for organized labor in many sections during 
the nineties, the membership of all trade unions in the state, 
totalled some one hundred and fifty thousand.4* This was 
about ten per cent of these gainfully employed in transpor-, 
tation and industry. One third of these trade unionists were 
in the building trades, one fourth in the clothing and textile | 
industries, while less numerous but still powerful unions 
were found among the railway employees, in the machine 
shops, in the printing trades, and among the cigarmakers. 
Nearly three fourths of all these organized workers were 
found in New York City. Seventeen years later the mem- 
bership of labor organizations in the state had more than 
trebled. Most of this increase occurred in the clothing 
trades which were changing over from the deplorable sweat-_ 
shop basis of the early nineties to a factory basis. Al- 
though in comparison with the total number of wage earn- 
ers, the number of trade unionists was still comparatively - 
small, politically, the labor organizations became more and 
more important factors. Following the example of Samuel 
Gompers in national affairs, the Workingmen’s State Fed. 
eration confined itself to exerting pressure upon the exist- 
ing party organizations. A careful student of labor organi- 
zation in New York came to the conclusion that “in securing 
the enactment of the labor laws of the state, labor or- 
ganizations have taken a very active interest and that as 
compared with other organizations, they have exercised the 
greatest and in most cases the determining influence.” ¥ 

In contrast with the tendency among industrial workers 
to combine, the farmers of the state seemed disinclined to 


12 New York State Department of Labor, Annual Report of the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1910, p. xlix. 

13G, G. Groat, Trade Unions and the Law in New York (New 
York, 1905), p. 39. 


10 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


abandon their old individualistic and patriarchal system. 
‘To be sure there were county agricultural societies, but these 
societies did not work out any schemes for group co-opera- 
‘tion nor make the farmer any less of an individual pro- 
ducer, each competing against his neighbor. In disposing of 
his products, the farmer came more and more to occupy a 
disadvantageous position. He had to meet not only the 
sharp competition of the western farmers but also the united 
front of the so-called “Beef Trust,” 44 the Consolidated Milk 
Exchange,” the New York Poultry Dealers’ Protective As- 
sociation.!® and other combinations of merchants and users 
of farm products. In spite of these conditions, the total value 
‘of the farm products produced annually in the state did in- 
crease about fifty per cent from 1890 to 1900 and about 
twenty-five per cent during the next decade. While this in- 
crease was not as great as the corresponding increase made 
in industry, it was sufficient to keep the farmers in a fairly 
complacent mood. Although only thirteen per cent of those 
_engaged in gainful occupations in the state in 1900 were en- 
gaged in agricultural pursuits, the farmers still made up an 
important group as far as political affairs were concerned. 
Living in similar environments, their views on such matters 
as the tariff, taxation and the control of transportation 
tended to be alike. Long accustomed to political power, 
they successfully asserted their claim to territorial represen- 
tation. 

_ There were many other social groups of political impor- 
tance with which Platt and Roosevelt had to reckon. The 
chambers of commerce, the real estate dealers’ associations, 
the merchants’ associations, the educational societies, the 


14U. S. Commissioner of Corporations, The Beef Industry, 1905. 

15N. Y. Legislature, Sen. Doc., No. 45, 1910 (Report of the At- 
torney General in the Matter of the Milk Investigation). 

16 People v. Dwyer, 145 N. Y. Supp. 748. 


SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC BACKGROUND 1] 


philanthropic clubs, the sporting clubs, and an infinite num- 
ber of other more or less coherent groupings all had some 
stake in the activity or inactivity of the government. While’ 
the combinations of capital and labor were probably the 
most active in bringing pressure to bear upon the govern- 
ment, these other associations were not inactive when their, 
particular interests were involved. The task of the poli- 
tician and statesman was confined largely to the adjustment 
of the demands, often conflicting, which these various 
groups made upon the party organization which controlled, 
the government. Ina political community of seven millions 
of inhabitants, of great wealth, of widely varied industries 
and with a population singularly diversified, not merely in* 
occupation but im race origin, in religious beliefs, in habits 
of life and ways of thought, this task was not an easy one. 


CHAPTER II 
NEW; YORK ‘SCHOOE J OFRAPOLIRIGS 


In the late eighties when Thomas C. Platt attained a posi- 
tion of leadership in the Republican party of the state of 
New York, he was in his fifties, while Roosevelt was just 
past thirty. Platt’s leadership rested not only upon the geo- 

_ graphical, racial, economic, and social conditions outlined in 
the previous chapter but also upon the fact that he had had 
-a long period of rigorous political training. The methods 
which the older man used to maintain his control over the 
Republican party organization were not new. From the 
time of Burr and Van Buren, party organizations in the 
state had been compact centrally dominated bodies.! Platt’ 
was primarily a keeper and guardian of a set of political 
traditions, to which by a natural process of selection he had 
fallen heir. Practically every device that he used in 1888 
when his political star was on the ascendency, he had seen 
tested and exploited at some time during the previous thirty- 
two years of his political schooling. At this time Roosevelt, 
as one of the most vigorous representatives of the new gen- 
eration, had already shown himself to be somewhat of an 

_ iconoclast. 

\.\ In his Autobiography, Platt wrote that he “drifted into 
politics—just drifted.” ® He came to his majority at a time 


1H. L. McBain, DeWitt Clinton and the Origin of the Spoils Sys- 
tem in New York (New York, 1907), passim. 

2T. C. Platt, The Autobiography of Thomas Collier Platt (com- 
piled and edited by Louis J. Lang, New York, 1910), p. xxi. Mr. 
Livingston Platt, Platt’s grandson, informed the writer on Septem- 


NEW YORK—SCHOOL OF POLITICS 13 


when it was extremely easy for a young man of his training 
and temperament to drift into politics. Thomas Collier 
Platt was born in the village of Owego, Tioga County, on 
July 15, 1833. This meant that the election of 1856 was the 
first national election at which he voted. This election came’ 
two years before Theodore Roosevelt was born. John C. 
Fremont, the first Republican candidate for president, 
aroused peculiar enthusiasm in the country towns of central _ 
New York like Owego. As early as 1854 “Republican” mass’ 

meetings had been held in all the old Whig counties of the 
state.8 During the next two years the Republican cause was 
aided by the climax of the Kansas struggle and by the ap- 
peals of the clergy and the religious press. Platt’s father, 
William Platt, a lawyer of local importance whose forebears 
“fitted into the Revolution,’ was a rigid Presbyterian and 
especially susceptible to these influences. It was William - 
Platt’s ambition to make his son Thomas a clergyman and 

‘to this end Thomas was sent through the local academy and™ 
later to Yale. Although the dutiful son said in his later 

years, “I had such a surfeit of church going in my youth that> 
if it could be averaged up and spread out, it would do for all 

my life,’ * and although he was compelled to leave Yale at 
the end of his freshman year in 1850 on account of ill healthy. 

he did take his schooling seriously, for he was awarded a 

copy of Scott’s works inscribed by President Woolsey for 

winning third prize for translation from Latin into Eng- 


ber 27, 1922, that the Autobiography was not entirely satisfactory 
to the family. The writer has found many inaccuracies in the book; 
but the book is valuable for the light it throws upon Platt’s motives. 
and point of view. 

8G. S. P. Kleeberg, The Formation of the Republican Party as 
a National Political Organization (New York, 1911), p. 18. 

4New York Sun, March 7, 1910. This obituary was written by 
Edward G. Riggs, a political correspondent who had friendly rela- 
tions with Platt. 


ae 


14 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


lish.8 At Yale, the slavery question in all its phases was the 
subject of discussion on the campus, in the literary socie- 
ties, and in frequent lectures in the halls. In 1856 it was. 
therefore the most natural thing for Platt to take an active 
part in the national campaign as an organizer of the new 
party in his county. He was not an orator but he had “‘de- 


veloped some ability as a writer” at Yale and he “could sing 


some,” so he composed campaign ditties and appeared upon 
the stump as the chief of the Owego Campaign Glee Club.” 
The excitement of those days made a deep impression upon 
his mind and furnished the root of that unquestioning loyal- 
ty to the Republican party which he displayed in later life. 
In 1856 Fremont carried the state and two years later a Re- 


_ publican governor was elected. In both of these elections 
\ Platt could point with pride to fact that two-thirds of the 


voters in Tioga County had endorsed the Republican ticket.® 

Thomas C. Platt started his business career as a clerk in a 
drug store, and this occupation as well as his later vocations 
became closely linked with his political education. Regard- 
ing this period of his life, he wrote: “While at the drug 
counter I studied assiduously the speeches and acts of Thur- 


low Weed, William H. Seward and Horace Greeley, about 


whom the New York State Whigs and the ‘Conscientious 
Democrats’ rallied, and longed to be in their confidence.” ® . 


_In studying the methods of Thurlow Weed, a young poli- 


tician had special advantages in that Weed’s paper, the 
Albany Evening Journal, was the leading Whig and later 


Pe sth. Ott. Dns. 

6C. M. Depew, My Memories of Eighty Years. (New York, 
1922), p. 15. Depew was three classes behind Platt at Yale. 

7 Platt, op. cit., p. 8 On page 25 some of his verses are repro~ 
duced. See also C. M. Depew, Speeches, Orations and Addresses 
(New York, 1910), II, 194. 

8 New York Tribune Almanac for 1858, p. 45. 

9 Platt, op. cit., pp. 7-8. 


NEW YORK—SCHOOL OF POLITICS 15 


the most influential Republican organ of the up-state. By 
1860 Weed was rounding off thirty years of political leader- 
ship, during which he had been a maker of senators, gover- 
nors, and state officers, a dictator of all but three state con- 
ventions, a distributor of state and federal patronage, and a 
director of legislation. Weed’s personal magnetism was so 
great that Samuel Bowles regarded him in 1860 as “one of 
the most remarkable men of our time—one whom I had 
rather have had such an interview with than with any presi- 
dent of our day and generation.” !® County leaders who 
went to Albany during those days looked with longing eyes 
at the members of the legislature gathered around the editor 
of the Evening Journal for counsel and advice, and careful 
readers of the Evening Journal made mental notes of such 
things as the confession, appearing in the issue of August 27, 
1860, that funds for the presidential campaign had been 
made available because Weed had been instrumental in se- 
curing the passage of certain city railroad bills. Knowing 
observers in New York City during the Civil War glanced 
with awe and admiration at Room No. 11, Astor House, 
where Weed presided over the conferences which made and 
unmade measures and men. 

Platt was fitted by his natural endowments to play a role 
similar to that of Thurlow Weed. In Owego, as in many 
other small towns of New York, saloons were frowned upon 
in the fifties and the drug store or the general store was the 
center where the “elder statesmen” congregated to discuss 
politics and the questions of the day. By 1856 Platt and a 
friend of his named Hull had established a drug store of 


10G. S. Merriam, Life and Times of Samuel Bowles (New York, 
1885), I, 302. 
_1 Cited by S. D. Brummer, Political History of New York State 
During the Civil War (New York, 1911), p. 23. See also T. Weed, 
Autobiography and A Memoir of Thurlow Weed by T. W. Barnes 
(Boston, 1883), pp. 105, 584. 


16 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


their own. From then on until 1872 most of the political 
work of the county was done in a little office in the rear of 
this drug store.” The success of this institution, which was 
made possible because of the universal acquaintance, fellow- 
ship, and confidences of village and country life, was evi- 
denced by the fact that Platt was chosen as county clerk in 
1858. It was from this office that he managed the torch light 


. parades which took part in the Lincoln campaign of 1860. 


i 


When the war broke out, he was not able to enter the Union 
forces as an active fighter because of a stomach trouble 
which clung to him the remainder of his life, but as an auxil- 
jary member of the war committee of the state, he was ac- 
tive in raising funds for the maintenance of the troops, his 
drug store being the headquarters for this work. He fol- 


lowed the course of the war closely and in the latter part of 


the sixties he was made chairman of the Tioga County 
Republican Committee. In a small way he was playing the 
part of a Thurlow Weed. 

Because of his position as the recognized political leader 
of Tioga County, Platt took great interest in the course of 
reconstruction after the Civil War. When he perceived the 
overthrow of Seward, Weed and Raymond as the support- 
ers of the conservative policy of President Johnson by the 
alliance between Reuben E. Fenton, the Radical Republican 
governor, and Horace Greeley, the editor of the New York 
Tribune, he hastened to get upon the winning side along 
with the other discerning county leaders.* Fenton, like 
Weed, was primarily a political strategist. He was gracious 
in his manner, keen in his analysis of party sentiment, 


12 New York Sun, March 7, 1910. See also Depew, My Memories, 
p. 43. 

13 Platt, op. cit., p. 340, citing the letter of I. S. Catlin. See also 
the New York Sun, March 7, 1910. 

a5 Platt,op. ctt., p. 52. 


NEW YORK—SCHOOL OF POLITICS 17 


and wise in his distribution of the patronage. His adminis- 
tration of the canal system of the state furnished many les- 
sons for aspiring young political managers. While some of 
the up-state Fenton men were alleged to be members of the 
“canal ring” and while some of the New York City followers® 
of Fenton were called “Tammany Republicans” because of 
their relations with the notorious Tweed, there was little de® 
mand for reform within the ranks of the Republican party. 
The chief danger that Governor Fenton faced was the rise 
of a rival leader within the party.’ The election of Roscoe 
Conkling as United States senator in 1867 was the biggest 
cloud on Fenton’s political horizon. 

“Tt was in 1870,” wrote Platt in his Autobiography, “that 


I really began to know Roscoe Conkling.” “Conkling was 
then,” he added, “one of the handsomest men I ever 
met. . . . His noble figure, flashing eye and majestic 


voice made one forget that he was somewhat foppish in his 
dress.” 28 By this time Platt had become important enough 
politically in the Southern Tier of counties to command the 
attention of the new leader. In business and politics Platt 
had prospered. He was president of the Tioga County 
‘National Bank, a director of the Southern Central Railroad 
of New York, and a holder of large lumber interests in Mich- 
igan. He was known at Albany and was already a dictator. 
of local nominations in his own district. At the Republican 
State Convention held in September, 1870, Conkling and 
Platt came together. Two months earlier Senator Conkling 
had waged a battle with his junior colleague, Senator Fen- 
ton, over the appointment of a collector for the port of New 
York. Senator Conkling successfully backed up the choice 
‘of President Grant and thereby won the president’s favor 


15H. A. Stebbins, A Political History of the State of New York 
1865-1869 (New York, 1913), pp. 150, 411. 
16 Platt, op. cit., p. 55. 
2 


18 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


and confidence, which had been previously shared by Fen- 
‘tion.!”? The Senior Senator, then, at the request of the Presi- 
dent, used his newly gained control over the federal patron- 
age to influence the election of the temporary chairman of © 
the state convention. Delegates were won over by offers of 
‘patronage or threats of removal.4®8 “Conkling whipped Fen- 
ton to a finish,” said the admiring Platt. Platt had joined 
the forces of the victorious senator at the crucial moment, 
so he could say, “I helped him to do it.’’?® This convention 
secured to Conkling the control of the state committee and 
one of his lieutenants, Alonzo B. Cornell, also Platt’s friend, 
was made chairman. At the next state convention, Cornell, 
“risking grave bodily injury,” refused to put a motion which 
was favorable to the Fenton faction, and again Conkling dic- 
tated the work of the convention. As a delegate and a mem- 
ber of the inner ring which ran these two state conventions, 
Platt was learning the formal and informal rules which gov- 
erned the operation of the state nominating machinery. 

Platt was especially interested in the presidential cam- 
paign of 1872, because he himself was running for Congress 
that year. He had refused to accept a nomination for Con- 
gress in 1870 because he had pledged his support to Mylo 
W. Goodrich. When Goodrich turned Liberal Repub- 
lican and accepted the Democratic endorsement on a ticket 
_ which was headed by Horace Greeley, Platt felt absolved 
from all obligations. Conkling was always hostile toward 
_ “independents,” and in 1872 his contempt for Greeley knew 
no bounds because the federal patronage and his leadership 
depended upon the re-election of General Grant. 


17 Nation (New York), July 14, 1870. 

18 A. R. Conkling, Life and Letters of Roscoe Conkling (New 
York, 1889), p. 328; New York World, September 8, 1870; Depew, 
My Memories, pp. 77-79. 

19 Platt, op. cit., p. 56. 


NEW YORK—SCHOOL OF POLITICS 19 


During the campaign the New York Sun hinted a gross 
and wholesale briberies of congressmen in connection with 
the building of the Union Pacific Railroad. After the elec- 
tion, these charges were investigated by the outgoing Con- 
gress. It was into this atmosphere that Platt entered as a 
member of the House of Representatives. ‘“‘Statesmanship 
in Congress,’ wrote Thurlow Weed toward the close of 
1873, “is now so low that it will take many years to build it 
up to a higher tone.” ?® In 1874 the disclosures of the 
Whiskey Ring, involving United States internal revenue 
officers and even the president’s private secretary, necessi- 
tated careful treatment by the congressional investigating 
committees. Shortly afterward a cabinet officer was 1m- 
peached because of his connections with the notorious Indian 
frauds. As a member of Congress, Platt also had an oppor- 
tunity to hear that remarkable burst of emotional oratory in 
which Blaine defended himself against the accusations that 
he had used his official position to aid questionable railroad 
transactions. Platt’s attitude toward these matters is well 
illustrated by his eulogy of Blaine, who was then speaker of 
the House of Representatives: “What I liked about him 
then, as always, was his bold and persistent contention that 
the citizen who best loved his party and was loyal to it, was 
loyal to and best loved his country.” ! Regarding Platt’s 
loyalty to his party in Congress, there can be no doubt. Dur- 
ing his first term he was on the Committee on Post Offices 
and Post Roads and in his second on the Pacific Railroads 
Committee. In 1874 he was made a member of the National 
Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, a com- 
mittee whose methods were so partisan that they later 
aroused agitation for reform. Platt performed his political 


20 Op. cit., p. 501. 
1Platt, op. cit., p. 185. 


20 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


tasks in Congress so well that Blaine could later write of 
him: 


Thomas C. Platt came from the Binghamton district of 
New York. He had been an active man of business and had 
gained personal popularity. He developed an aptitude for 
public affairs and soon acquired influence in his state. He 
was not a trained debator, nor had he when he entered Con- 

. gress, official experience of any kind. But he was gifted 
with strong common sense, and had that quick judgment of 
men which contributes so essentially to success in public 
life.” 

In 1876, the year that Roosevelt went to Harvard Univer- 
sity, Platt attended his first Republican national convention 
‘as a delegate from the “Southern Tier” of New York. The 
main feature of this convention was the rivalry between 
Conkling and Blaine. Both men were candidates for the 
presidential nomination, Conkling being the first choice of 
the Stalwarts or that faction of the Republican party which 
had held Grant’s favor, while Blaine was the candidate of 
the Half-Breeds, the group which had become dissatisfied 
with Grant’s administration. Resolutions had been adopted 
by the New York delegates in a preliminary state convention 
presenting Conkling as the choice of New York for presi- 
dent, but after the first ballot it was apparent that Conkling 
‘had no chance of winning the nomination. Blaine’s lead 
over the other candidates was considerable but he did not 
have the necessary majority. Conkling, mindful of the day 
-when Blaine referred to his “haughty disdain, his gran- 
diloquent swell, his majestic, supereminent, overpowering, 
.turkey-gobbler strut,” ? combined with Cameron from Penn- 
sylvania and with the other Stalwart leaders to prevent the 
nomination of Blaine. The sixty-one delegates from New 


2J.G. Blaine, Twenty Years of Congress (Norwich, 1886), p. 542. 
3 Cong. Globe, April 20, 1866, Vol. XX XVII, Part 3, p. 2298. 


NEW YORK—SCHOOL OF POLITICS 21 


York were brought in line for Hayes, who proved to be the 
“dark horse” of the convention. In this convention Platt 
was learning the methods by which the national nominating 
process could be controlled; in the campaign which followed 
he was edified by the novel devices employed by Tilden, the 
Democratic candidate. Blaine’s claim to the Republican’ 
nomination and Tilden’s claim to the presidency made little 
impression upon the loyal young Stalwart.* 

At the Republican State Convention held in Rochester in 
September, 1877, Platt gained wide-spread notice as a faith- 
ful follower of Senator Conkling. The Senator had taken 
his defeat for the presidential nomination “much to heart.” 
The first events of the Hayes administration did not improve 
his temper. The appointment of William M. Evarts as sec-' 
retary of state was regarded as a “straight-arm blow at the 
regular organization” not only because of Mr. Evarts’ inde- 
pendence but also because the friends of Conkling had urged 
that Conkling be offered the appointment.’ Furthermore, 
Conkling had suggested Platt for postmaster-general, but the 
proposition had been “rather contemptuously declined.” & 
The crowning offense of the Hayes administration, from the 
standpoint of the New York Stalwarts, was the investiga- 
tion of the New York Customs Office, supervised by John 

herman, the secretary of the treasury. This inquiry was 
digging at the foundations of the Conkling organization in 
New York, and the executive order that no federal officer 
should participate in party politics seemed to be directly 
aimed at Alonzo B. Cornell, who was both the naval officer 
of the port of New York and chairman of the Republican 


4In Congress, Platt made a speech in favor of the Electoral Com- 
mission Bill: Cong. Record, January 25, 1877, Vol. V, Part 3, App., 
p. 59. 

5C. R. Williams, Rutherford B. Hayes (Boston, 1914), I, 514-15 
Governor Hayes’ diary for December 17, 1876. 

6 Platt, op. ctt., p. 83. 


22 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


state committee.” The views of the New York “regulars” 
regarding these matters had not been expressed at the time 
that Platt was selected as temporary chairman of the con- 
‘vention. There was a story that he prepared two speeches 
for the occasion, one full of vindicative hostility and the 
other mild and non-committal. Conkling read them both 
and selected the “Stalwart” speech.§ Platt referred to the 
speech which he delivered as a “scorcher.” In it, he put the 
eminent secretary of state in a class with “demagogues” 
and referred to those who disagreed with him as “political 
pecksniffs and tricksters.” Civil service reform was called a 
“shibboleth,” a “sweet morsel,” which a certain journalist 
(George William Curtis) ‘rolled under his tongue and 
daily blurted in the face of a nauseated public.” ® While the 
New York Nation called the speech “silly and abusive” and 
some partisan organs doubted its propriety,!° the Stalwart 
delegates applauded it loudly and Conkling indicated his 
satisfaction by making Platt the permanent chairman of the 
convention. The second feature of this convention was the 
reply which Conkling made to Curtis’ attack upon the report 
of the resolutions committee. In his recollections, Platt 
wrote that “Conkling was rarely in more superb form.” }! 
Curtis was one of the advisers of the President who had 
stood for the principle of civil service reform. In the course 
of his speech, Conkling turned toward his opponent and ex- 
claimed: “When Dr. Johnson defined patriotism as the last 
refuge of a scoundrel, he was unconscious of the then unde- 


7V.L. Shores, The Hayes-Conkling Controversy, 1877-1879, pas- 
sim. 

8 Utica Press, March 7, 1910. 

9 Platt, op. cit., pp. 85-93. 

10D. S. Alexander, A Political History of the State of New York 
(New York, 1909), III, 376. 

11 Platt, op. cit., p. 85. 


NEW YORK—SCHOOL OF POLITICS 23 


veloped capabilities and uses of the word reform.” The | ‘ 
similarity in tone between Platt’s speech and Conkling’s in- 
vective shows how well the former had caught his chief’s 
spirit, and it is needless to say that as presiding officer of thié 
convention, Platt followed the customary rules and carried. 
out the prearranged plan. 

About a year and a half after the Rochester Convention, 
President Hayes succeeded in removing Chester A. Arthur 
and Alonzo Bb. Cornell from the New York Custom-house, 
but this Stalwart defeat made little impression upon Platt.’ 
Conkling, in a fit of insolence had forced the nomination 
of Cornell as the Republican candidate for governor in 1879~ 
and had made Platt national committeeman from New York 
in Cornell’s place. Political and business success was com- 
ing to Platt. On August 1, 1879 he was elected general 
manager and secretary of the United States. Express Com- 
pany, an association which had been created in 1854 to do 
the express business of the Erie Railroad.* Upon assum- 
ing his new duties with this company, he moved to New 
York, although retaining for voting purposes his Owego 
residence. This move was characteristic of his usual astute- 
ness, for he knew that he would still be a powerful figure 
politically and commercially in Owego long before he gained 
influence in the great metropolis. The following year he was 
made president of this express company, a position which he 
retained until his death in 1910. From this strategic center, 
he became one of the chief dispensers of favors to rural edi- 
tors, politicians and legislators in those counties touched by 
the Erie Railroad. As his fortunes rose, his relations with 
Conkling grew more close and confidential ; he was first made 
chairman of the executive committee of the state committee 


12 Conkling, op. cit., pp. 538-49. 
18 This fact is not mentioned in the Autobiography. 
14 Platt, op. cit., pp. 548 ff. | 


24 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


and later chairman of the committee proper. Both of these 
positions were high up in the committee hierarchy of the 
party and required the services of a man who was sensible, 
close-mouthed, devoted, always useful and never trouble- 
some. Evidently Conkling regarded Platt as such a man. 
The chairman of a state committee in a doubtful state like 
New York was a most important figure during a national 
campaign. In the Republican National Convention of 1880, 
the Stalwarts had suffered a signal defeat; their attempt to 
gain control of the national administration by renominating 
Grant for a third term had not met the approval of a major- 
ity of the delegates. Although Conkling made a stirring 
speech for Grant and although the Stalwart managers exhib- 
ited great skill in lining up the “Old Guard” solidly for 
Grant, James A. Garfield, a Half-Breed, was nominated. 
Conkling’s disappointment was great, and it seemed in no way 
to be alleviated by the nomination of Chester A. Arthur, a 
New York Stalwart, for vice-president. What would the at- 
titude of the New Yorkorganizationbeduring the campaign ? 
The state committee remained inactive in the campaign until 
Garfield “came down” to make terms. Platt claimed that 
Garfield promised in return for the Stalwart support to con- 
sult the Conkling organization and to regard its wishes as 
“paramount with him touching all questions of patronage.” 
Whatever the agreement, Platt took an active part in the 
campaign after the Garfield conference. Levi P. Morton, 
who was close to Wall Street, took charge of the main 
finances of the campaign, but Platt sent a letter to the federal 
employees in the state, suggesting that they would doubtless 
consider it a “privilege and a pleasure” to contribute to the 


15 Platt, op. cit., p. 131. The claim is also made here that Gar- 
field offered Morton a high office in return for his campaign serv- 
ices. : 


NEW YORK—SCHOOL OF POLITICS 25 


campaign fund.'® A special train over the Erie was ar- 
ranged, from which Garfield addressed enthusiastic tho 
sands ; business men’s parades were organized and the work- 
shops flooded with “arguments.” Garfield carried New 
York and was elected president of the United States. No 
one could accuse Platt of not being “regular.” This same 
year, young Theodore Roosevelt, a Republican by bringing 
up and convictions, cast his first ballot for the Republican. 
ticket.1? 

In the meantime Platt was not neglecting his own political 
fortunes. One contemporary account asserted that in the 
handling of the campaign funds he had put at least thirty 
members of the Assembly under implied obligation to him. 
This account goes on.to describe his patronage dispensing 
activities as follows: 


He puts men under obligation to him and commands their 
friendship and services. Why, he has secured places for not 
less than seventy-five persons in public offices. He has ap- 
pointees in the New York Custom House, in the New York 
Postoffice, and in the New York City government. He has 
practically ‘run’ Cornell’s administration; and the canal of- 
ficials, from Superintendent Dutcher down to the boat in- 
spector at Syracuse are under obligations to him. He made 
Jones the agent and warden of Auburn prison, and he put 
another Tioga County man as clerk in the assistant super- 
intendent of public work’s office at Syracuse. And so it is 
all along the canals and in the government offices. Platt 
men are plenty in all the state departments at Albany. *® 


Soon Platt heard himself “talked about for the United 
States Senate.” At least we have his word that “friends in- 
sisted” he should declare himself a candidate.® Richard 


16C, R. Lingley, Since the Civil War (New York, 1920), p. 157. 

17 Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography (New York, 1919, 
De4 5a 

18 Syracuse Journal, January 13, 1881, 

19 Platt, op. cit., p. 139. 


26 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


Crowley was the candidate of Vice-President Arthur, Speak- 
er Sharpe and the other confirmed Conkling men for this 
position. Rumors were whispered that Platt was “setting 
up house for himself.’ Chauncey M. Depew, the Half- 
Breed candidate, came to Platt and said, “You can have 
my strength if as senator you will support the President.” 
The story goes that Platt replied, “I have done my best to 
elect a Republican president and as senator I will support 
him.” ®° When this was told to Depew’s backers, one of 
them asked, “Even if Judge Robertson’s name should be 
sent in?” To this inquiry Platt was said to have given an 
affirmative answer.t At any rate, Depew withdrew and 
Platt became the choice of the Republican caucus for United 
States senator. 

Platt’s first election to the United States Senate had a 
Stormy and calamitous finish. President Garfield, without 
consulting Conkling or Platt,? sent the name of William H. 
Robertson for that seat of patronage and power, the collect- 
orship of the port of New York. Judge Robertson was the 
Half-Breed who had let the revolt in the New York delega- 
tion against Grant the year before and he was “thoroughly 
detested by Conkling.” Conkling at once appealed to the 
long established custom known as “senatorial courtesy.” 
Platt was in a difficult position; whichever way he turned he 
‘would subject himself to criticism and ridicule. He had 
hoped to avoid such a dilemma by invoking the pre-election 
pact which guaranteed a consultation on all New York ap- 
pointments. The president’s action made it necessary for 
him to face either Conkling’s fury or the Half-Breeds’ scorn. 


20 Depew, Orations, II, 213. 

1 Alexander, op. cit., III, 468. 

2R. Cortissoz, The Life of Whitelaw Reid (New York, 1921), 
II, 62. 





) aie v 1a rad a 
vers OF ILLINOIS 























DAE SERNA TORTAI SULGLDE 
(Cartoon by Thomas Nast, Harper’s Weekly, July 2, 1881, Harper and Brothers) 


NEW YORK—SCHOOL OF POLITICS 2] 


According to Depew,? he braved the former by stating that 
if Robertson’s name came up he would vote for it. How-* 
ever, while Conkling was using every means he had to make 
a deal with the Democratic senators to refuse consent, Platt ” 
patiently sought to avoid the issue by arranging matters be- 
tween Conkling and the President. After a two months’ 
struggle, Garfield sent a message to the Senate withdrawing 
all the nominations for positions in New York except that of 
Robertson. When this message was read in the Senate, 
Platt was said to have hung his head.* - Before a vote was 
taken, Platt suggested to Conkling that they both resign. It 
was a desperate remedy, but it would technically absolve 
Platt from his promises and furnish Conkling an expression 
for his pent up irritation. The possibility of a re-election 
and a “vindication” by the Republican legislature at Albany 
did not then seem remote inasmuch as the Stalwarts con- 
trolled a majority of the caucus. When their resignations 
became public, the obvious interpretation was that Conkling 
had forced Platt to resign with him. “I have been portrayed 
as a ‘Me, too,’ an ‘Echo’ and ‘Dromio’ of Conkling,” wrote 
Platt. ‘In editorial and cartoon I was pictured as a small 
boy sticking out of Conkling’s pocket, with a card labeled 
‘Me, too!’ tied to one of my hands.” ® The affair was called 
the “senatorial suicide” ® and the incomparable Nast pictured 
Conkling and Platt as having “lost their heads.” 7 

In the struggle that followed at Albany, Platt and Conk- 
ling lost in the initial skirmish. It was expected that Gov- 
ernor Cornell would send a message to the legislature an- 
nouncing the resignation at once, but by adroit action on the 


8 Statement to the writer on September 25, 1922. 

4M. P. Breen, Thirty Years of New York Politics (New York, 
1899), p. 656. 

5 Platt, op. cit., pp. 150-59. 

6 New York World, May 17, 1881. 

7 Harper's Weekly, XXV, 357, 404, 421. 


28 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


part two Half-Breed senators the Senate was adjourned be- 
‘fore a message could be received.2 This gave the Half- 
Breeds time to organize and to agree not to enter the Repub- 
lican caucus. The first ballot showed that Conkling and 
_ Platt were playing a losing game. Louis F. Payn, one of 
Platt’s close advisers, prophesied defeat. Even some of the 
Stalwarts did not approve of Conkling’s “rule or ruin” policy 
and the Half-Breeds evidently thought that Platt had not 
lived up to his pledges. A majority of the legislature refused 
to believe that it was “dishonest” or “dishonorable” for 
President Garfield to reward Robertson for his services at 
Chicago at the expense of the “regular’’ New York organi- 
zation. However, Conkling and his friends did not give up 
without a struggle. Vice-President Arthur appeared in the 
lobby of the capitol on behalf of Conkling and Platt. After 
a month’s balloting without results, Platt withdrew his name. 
The next day the Albany Argus made the following com- 
ment: 


_ Mr. Platt’s withdrawal as a candidate is significant. From 
the first, Mr. Platt has known he could only be an obstacle. 
Suddenly he learned he could not continue to be even that. 
His escapade, whether he was innocent or a guilty victim, 
diverted the scales in his case to the side of ridicule, an in- 
clination which his association with Mr. Conkling alone pre- 
vented them from taking long ago.® 


On the same day that this article appeared, President Gar- 
field was shot by a half-crazed, disappointed Stalwart office- 
seeker. It looked as though Garfield’s enemies would profit 


8C. R. Skinner, “A Memorable Senatorial Contest,” State Service, 
EM 27: 

9 July 2, 1881. The New York World for the same date said: 
“The gosssip of the day at Albany charges Mr. Platt with unbe- 
coming conduct in a matter lying quite outside the field of politics. 
The charge is reputed to rest upon evidence collected, according 
to a Brooklyn contemporary, by a half-breed committee of inspec- 
tion established on step-ladders in the hotel at Albany.” 


NEW YORK—SCHOOL OF POLITICS Pag 


by his death. “Dark suspicious and angry threatenings filled 
the public mind,” said one observer, “and for the moment 
there was doubt—grave doubt and imminent peril that the 
- orderly succession of power under the Constitution might 
not take its peaceful course.” ?® This calamity made Platt 
more emphatic in insisting that he had “lost all interest in 
the contest at Albany.” ™ Finally the Half-Breeds and the 
Independents agreed to hold a caucus. Warner Miller was 
then elected to fill Platt’s place and Elbridge C. Lapham, one, 
of the first “deserters,” was elected to succeed Conkling. 
This humiliating defeat ended a chapter in Platt’s life. He 
had lost the friendship of Conkling,” he had lost the respect 
of the party workers, and he had become an object of general — 
ridicule and scorn. A consuming desire upon his part to re- 
gain his old position may in part explain the indefatigable 
energy with which he pursued the game of politics in the 
ensuing years.8 

In the hour of Platt’s disgrace and temporary retirement 
from politics, Theodore Roosevelt was just beginning to take 
an active interest in “practical politics.” In 1880 he had 
joined the Twenty-first District Republican Association in 
the city of New York, an act which brought him under the 
tutelage of Jacob Hess, a New York politician who later 


10 Elihu Root, address delivered at the unveiling of President Ar- 
thur’s statue in Madison Square, New York, June 14, 1899, cited in 
Breen, op. cit., p. 61. 

11 Op. cit., p. 164. 

12“Ror Conkling it was worse than defeat. The humiliation of 
having gone to Albany, of being deserted by friend after friend, 
of enduring the taunts of an inhospitable press and, finally, of hav- 
ing his place taken by one, who, in his opinion, had proven most 
faithless, was like the torture of an unquenchable fire.”—Alexander, 
op. cit., III, 482. 

13 For an elaboration of this theory, see W. A. White, “Platt,” 
McClure’s Magazine, XVIII, 148. 


30 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


became identified with the “machine” which Platt built up.™ 

In the fall of 1881 young Roosevelt was nominated and 
‘elected to the lower house of the New York State Legis- 
lature from his district. Although the youngest man in the 
legislature, he soon displayed those qualities which later 
brought him world wide distinction. He was fearless in at- 
‘tacking the old spoils régime, even going so far as to demand 
the impeachment of a judge whom he deemed guilty of 
“corrupt collusion” with a wealthy stock gambler. He was 
also active in suggesting reforms for the government of the 
city of New York. From the start, he was tremendously 
successful in getting his name upon the front page of the 
newspapers. 

Thoroughly discredited and neglected, Platt remained in 
seclusion for a time. The State Convention which met in 
September, 1881, was almost completely under the control of 
the anti-Conkling wing. In the November election which 
followed many of the Stalwarts “knifed” the Half-Breed 
candidate for state treasurer, and factional quarrels in the 
assembly districts resulted in the election of a Democratic 
legislature. In the following year Conkling demonstrated 
how a state convention could be run in the face of adverse 
circumstances. Governor Cornell sought a renomination and 
his conciliatory policy and efforts toward efficient administra- 
tion had been aimed in that direction. President Arthur, 
however, had objected to Cornell’s attitude during the sena- 
torial contest, and Charles J. Folger was his choice for the 
nomination. Conkling was “out of politics” but he was ac- 
tive in Folger’s canvass as Jay Gould’s “legal adviser.” 
Governor Cornell had refused to sign some bills which fa- 


14J. L. Heaton, The Story of a Page (New York, 1913), p 326. 
15 All the Republicans on the state ticket were elected by plurali- 


ties around 13,000 except the candidate for state treasurer who was 
defeated by 20,000 votes, 


NEW YORK—SCHOOL OF POLITICS 31 


vored certain Gould interests.‘° The “administration” 
packed the convention with federal office-holders and was 
aided by a forged telegram in its effort to secure control over 
the temporary organization of the convention.” Folger was 
nominated, but the Conkling organization had failed to read 
the signs of the times. A feeling of public indignation was 
rising against high-handed “machine” methods, the boss- 
despised civil service reform was gaining in popular favor, 
and the Democrats had chanced upon a new leader, Grover 
Cleveland, a man who regarded “public office as a trust”? and 
who was not afraid to appeal over the heads of the poli- 
ticians to the people. Cleveland received a majority of over 
190,000, the largest majority ever given a candidate for gov- 
ernor up to that time. Conkling was down and out. Conk- 
ling was a man of undoubted ability, a keen lawyer, and an 
orator of great power but he had been caught in the meshes 
of the party spoils system,!® his voice was heard with de- 
creasing frequency in the councils of the nation,!® and he 
put his intellectual powers more and more at the command 
of those primarily interested in pecuniary gain.?® To Platt it 
seemed that these Republican disasters were the result of 
party discord and from then on he stood for “harmony.” 
Roosevelt was more inclined to take the view toward politics 
sponsored by Cleveland, but he also recognized the “neces- 
sity of party harmony.” 

The stand which Platt and Roosevelt took in the Conven- ~ 


16 A bill regulating the taxation of the elevated railroads in New 
York City. See Appleton’s Ann. Cyc., 1882, p. 600. 

1% Nation, September 28, and Oct. 15, 1882. Platt alleges that the 
recipient of the telegram honestly believed it to be genuine, but he 
does not assert that the telegram was in fact genuine. Platt, op. 
ch, op 171-76. 

18 Depew, My Memories, p. 82. 

19 New York World, January 23, 1879. 

20C. A. Beard, Contemporary American History (New York, 
1914), pp. 51 ff. 


os 
be 


32 BOSS/PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


tion of 1844 was a sign that the bitter factionalism of Conk- 
ling’s day was passing. Until his dying day, Conkling main- 
tained a hostile attitude toward Blaine. Conkling was not a 


delegate to the Republican National Convention of 1884, but ~ 


Platt went as a delegate from his old home district after a 
‘bitter primary struggle. Roosevelt also attended this con- 
vention, having made several concessions to the organiza- 
tion.! In the convention, Platt seconded Blaine’s nomina- 
tion, saying: “I second this nomination, believing as I do, 
that his turn has come; believing as I do, that the Republican 
people of the Republican states that must give the Repubh- 
‘can majorities want him.”® Platt’s grounds for changing 
his attitude toward Blaine were that the “organization was 
not disposed to forgive Arthur for refusing to get rid of 
Collector William H. Robertson” and that the “organization 
was wrathful at Arthur . . . because he did little or 
nothing as president to cure the sores from which the Repub- 
licans of his state were smarting.” 8 In other words, he was 
not so set against Blaine as he was against the New York 
Republicans who had deserted him at Albany, Arthur could 
not be used to punish these “deserters”; much less could 
George F. Edmunds, the candidate supported by Roosevelt 
and other “independents.” The old Stalwart forces were 
completely disorganized and without any outstanding leader. 
Platt decided to cast his lot with the dominant elements in 
his party. Roosevelt made a like decision, arguing that the 
“future of the country was safer under Republican con- 
trol.” * Platt’s stand was not approved by Conkling nor was 
Roosevelt’s by his independent friends. It was a strange 


1jJ. L. Heaton, op. cit., p. 325. 
2 Official Proceedings, p. 103. 
3 Op. cit., pp. 178-80. 


*#D. S. Alexander, Four Famous New Yorkers (New York, 
1923), p. 27. | 


NEW YORK—SCHOOL OF POLITICS 33 


coincidence that these two men of such dissimilar tastes 
were found on the same side of such an important issue. — 
The conciliatory attitude which Platt and- Roosevelt 
adopted in 1884 was not immediately successful. It is use- 
less to conjecture what would have happened if Blaine had 
been elected. The Republicans were disheartened by the 
Democratic victory and many of the old leaders lost their in- 
terest in politics, but neither Platt nor Roosevelt lost interest, 
in the game. In 1885 Platt was active in securing the elec- 
tion of G. Z. I‘rwin as speaker of the state Assembly. The 
same year Platt and Roosevelt backed different candidates 
for the United States senatorship. The year following the 
two men joined hands in the New York mayoralty cam- 
paign. Roosevelt consented to let Platt’s district managers | 
nominate him for mayor on a straight Republican ticket to 
run against Henry George and Abram S. Hewitt. Those 
who were opposed to George’s theories were amazed at 
Roosevelt’s action. In the election Roosevelt ran a poor | 
third, probably much to his own and to Platt’s chagrin.? In 
1887 while Roosevelt was out touring the West, Platt was 
trying to speed up the movement to elect Levi P. Morton 
United States senator in Miller’s place. Platt was not a 
member of the legislature but he was “influential” in the 
Southern Tier where the local organization had been loyal 
to him even in the dark days of 1881 and he had “helped” 
many legislative candidates in doubtful districts. The sen- . 
atorial contest turned out in the first caucus vote to be a 
three cornered struggle between Miller, Morton and Frank 
Hiscock, with Hiscock far in the rear. When the Morton 
forces saw that the Hiscock supporters could not be moved, 
they managed to switch their entire strength to Hiscock who 


5 Neither Platt nor Roosevelt mention this campaign in their | 
respective autobiographies. \ 
3 


34 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


was selected by a vote of one over Miller. Muller was at 
‘least defeated and the gratitude of the new senator secured. 

Platt first attained a position of what might be called rec- 
ognized leadership in 1888. For the first time he was se- 
lected as one of the delegates-at-large to a Republican 
national convention. The New York delegation went to the 
_ convention in a harmonious mood supporting Chauncey M. 
Depew for the presidential nomination. Depew withdrew 
his name after the third ballot and suggested that the New 
York delegation throw its support to Harrison of Indiana.® 
In a posthumous account, Platt claimed that Stephen B. El- 
kins “stated he was authorized to say that if the New York 
delegation would give General Harrison their support, the 
latter would appoint Mr. Platt secretary of the treasury in 
case of his election and allow him to control the federal 
patronage in the state of New York.” 7 The account goes 
on to state that the pledge was not made in those exact 
words, but everyone present so understood it. J. Sloat Fas- 
sett, one of Platt’s lieutenants who was in the conference, 
said that the story was “substantially correct.” Mr. Elkins 
insisted that “Tom Platt never was promised the secretary- 
ship of the treasury.’ President Harrison also positively 
denied he had ever made any such promise to Platt.2 What- 
ever the truth may be, it is clear that Platt thought he had 
made some such arrangement, for he devoted the remainder 
of his time in the convention to bringing the New York dele- 
gation solidly into line for Harrison. On the fourth bal- 
lot fifty-eight of the New York delegates gave their votes to 
Harrison and continued voting for him to the end. This 


6 Depew, My Memories, pp. 131-33 

7 Elmira Advertiser, March 10, 1910, citing the Washington Even- 
ing Star’s story written by Mr. William E. Curtis. 

8 New York Tribune, March 10, 1910. MHarrison’s letter to W. 
H. H. Miller. 


20 Op. cit., p. 501. . 
1 Platt, op. cit. p. 185. 


NEW YORK—SCHOOL OF POLITICS 35 


was the “corrupt bargain” which John Sherman believed 
was responsible for his defeat in the convention.? Platt’s 
hostility to Sherman dated back to the customs-house strug 
gle of the late seventies, when Sherman was secretary of the 
treasury. While the action of the New York delegates was» 
probably not the sole cause of Sherman’s defeat, it did 
greatly contribute to Harrison’s final success. The New 
York managers were then allowed to name the candidate 
for vice-president and they chose Levi P. Morton. Platt 
had become an “active operating force” in the national coun-_ 
cils of his par 

Mathew S. Quay was the chairman of the naticnal com- 
mittee in 1888, and but for his “masterful conduct of the 
campaign in New York State,” Platt tells us, “Harrison 
never would have been president.” ?® Quay had _ been 
through a course of training in Pennsylvania under Don 
Cameron, quite similar to that which Platt had received in 
New York tnder Conkling. The friendship between Platt 
and Quay from this time on was very close. The first step 
in the New York campaign was a “harmony” move, the 
nomination of Warner Miller for governor. It has been al- 
leged that Platt foresaw that “with Miller as a beaten can- 
didate before the people, his claims of strength would be 
regarded as mere humbug pretensions.” 4" During the cam- 
paign, Miller made some radical speeches on the liquor ques- 
tion which lined up the liquor interests with Hill, his Demo- 


9“T believed then, as I believe now that one of the delegates 
from the state of New York practically controlled the whole dele= 
gation, and that a corrupt bargain was made on Sunday which 
transferred the great body of the vote of New York to General 
Harrison, and thus lead to the nomination.”—J. Sherman, Recol- 
lections of Forty Years in the House, Senate and Cabinet (New 
York, 1895), IJ, 1029. 

10 Op. cit., p. 210. 

11 New York Sun, September 26, 1889, 


36 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


cratic opponent.!® Clubs were formed which floated the 
’ banner, “ Harrison and Hill.” All that Platt had to do was 
to concentrate his attention upon the national campaign. 
Harrison carried the state but Miller was defeated. Al- 
though Platt was not made secretary of the treasury, Ben- 
jamin F. Tracy, the law partner of Platt’s son, was selected 
as secretary of the navy and Platt was given considerable 
“recognition” in the making of minor New York appoint- 
ments. This blow at Miller’s prestige sent the county lead- 
-ers to Platt for “advice” and soon the papers were proclaim- 
ing the rise of the “Easy Boss.” 

Roosevelt did not attend the National Convention of 1888 
nor did he take an active part in the campaign of 1888, but 
Harrison recognized his political talents by appointing him 
civil service commissioner, a position which was bound to 
bring him in conflict with Platt. 

At the beginning of the last decade of the nineteenth cen- 
tury, Platt and Roosevelt both became active participants in 
New York politics. The older man was a seasoned poli- 
tician: he had witnessed the decline of Thurlow Weed’s 
power, he had seen Fenton come and go as a state leader, he 
had lived through Conkling’s victories and defeats, and he 
had been responsible in a measure for the disintegration of 
Miller’s influence in the Republican councils of the state. 
He had also learned many lessons from his political enemies, 
the Democrats. He studied the methods which brought suc- 
cess to Samuel J. Tilden and David B. Hill, and when he 
came to New York City he found much to admire in the ef- 
ficient working of that great urban organization, the Tam- 
many Democracy. During his years of training the tech- 
_ nique of political management had become refined and 
specialized and required years of actual experience. Begin- 


12 Nation, November 15, 1888, 


) 
: 
: 


NEW YORK—SCHOOL OF POLITICS 37 


ning as a county committeeman, Platt had held in turn prac- 


tically every position in the Reeiaceet = hierarchy of his is Own 
party; chairman oF Wi county committee, national congres- 
sional campaign committeeman, state committeeman, chair- 
man of the executive committee of the state committee 
chairman of the state committee, and national committee- 
man. The great number of county, assembly district, con- 
gressional district, judicial and state conventions that he had 
attended taught him the elements of convention strategy. 
Besides, he had attended four national conventions, where 
he had met and matched wits with leaders from all over the’ 
country interested in problems of party organization and 
machinery. His participation in nine presidential campaigns 
and in nearly four times that many state campaigns, had 
brought him in touch with every sort of campaign method 
from the ditty of the campaign glee club to the “business 
insurance” plea of a Wanamaker. Not only had he been in- 
terested in nominations and elections but he had also fol- 
lowed closely the methods of controlling legislation and ad- 
ministration and had put these methods in operation. The 
younger man had served three terms in the state legislature, 
he had attended one national convention and he had made an 
unsuccessful campaign for the mayoralty of the city of New. 


yYork. 


The experiences through which Platt and Roosevelt passed 
during their respective periods of political training deter- 
mined in large part the nature and scope of their subsequent 
political activities. Conkling’s failures had taught Platt the 


t } dangers of an overbearing attitude, and the factional quar- 
_rels between the Stalwarts and the Half-Breeds had taught 


_him the imperative necessity of party “harmony.” The 
passage of the Civil Service Law in 1883 had given him 
some conception of the power of reformers like Dorman B. 
Eaton, George W. Curtis and Theodore Roosevelt. Never- 


+ 


38 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


theless, the great number of political victories that he had 
seen won by those who controlled the patronage and the 
party funds convinced him that he must control these 
sources of power. He had learned that party funds were- 


available to those who were regar¢ rded “safe” by the big-busis 


asa As ce an express company, he had 
hes ee to avoid sfiwidite them. All that Platt. needed in 
1899 was a favorable opportunity to put his expert knowl- 
edge into practice. On the other hand, Roosevelt was just 
gaining momentum as a popularizer of a new order. His 
experiences as a law maker had shown him the evils of the 
party spoils system, and his rather unsuccessful convention 
and campaign history had taught him some hard lessons in 
the game of “practical politics.” These lessons, however, 
did not dampen the enthusiasm with which the younger man 
joined battle with the old régime. 


CHAPTER III 


POLITICAL UPHEAVAL IN NEW YORK. 


Although in 1889 with the coming of the Harrison admin- 
istration at Washington, Thomas C. Platt was elevated to a> 


position of leadership in the Republican party of the state of. - 


New York, his control was no where nearly as complete then 
as it came to be in the middle of the nineties. In his Auto- 
biography, Platt said: “I did contribute toward transform- 
ing a once Democratic state into an impregnable Republican 
stronghold.” ? A brief survey of the political history of the 
state from 1889 to 1896 will show that Platt’s contribution 
to the political upheaval in the state was slight. The victo- 
ries of the Republicans in 1894 and 1896 were not due so 
much to the efficient Republican organization as they were to 
the disorganization of the Democratic party, national, state 
and local. It is necessary to review the industrial and po- ) 
litical events which led to the breakup of the Democracy in 
order to understand the rise of Thomas C. Platt to a position 
of undisputed leadership in the councils of his party in the 
state, a position which he held when Roosevelt was made 
governor. 

It has already been pointed out that David B. Hill was re- 
elected governor in 1888 although Cleveland failed to carry 
the state as a candidate for the presidency. An analysis of 
this election will show the weak and strong points of the 
Democratic state organization. Mr. Hill, the Democratic 
candidate for governor, was an able man, a prominent 


1[ntroduction, p. Xvii. 


39 


40 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


lawyer, and a skilled political manager.2 Like Platt, Hill 
‘had been trained in the practical school of politics. Starting 
at the age of twenty-one as a ward leader in the city of 
‘Elmira, he rose gradually to power, holding successively the 
positions of corporation counsel of Elmira, member of the 
‘state legislature, delegate to the Democratic National Con- 
vention of 1876, chairman of the Democratic State Conven- 
tion of 1877, member of the Elmira Common Council, mayor 
of Elmira, lieutenant-governor of the state and governor. 
The last mentioned position he held continously from 1885 
‘to 1892. He-had studied the methods, successes, and failures 
of Democratic leaders like William M. Tweed, the notorious 
Tammany chief; Samuel J. Tilden, the reform governor and 
victim of the presidential “fraud” of 1876; Daniel Manning, 
the leader of the up-state Democrats and able manager of 
Cleveland’s campaign in 1884; and William C. Whitney, one 
of the organizers of the New York County Democracy and 
the successor of Manning as Cleveland’s campaign manager. 
When Cleveland became president of the United States, Hill 
was elevated to the governorship to fill Cleveland’s unex- 
pired term and Manning and Whitney were both called to 
Washington to take places in the first Democratic cabinet 
formed since 1860. As governor, Hill distributed the state 
patronage so skillfully that he attracted all the county leaders 
who had been dissatisfied at the way President Cleveland 
disregarded their recommendations for federal appoint- 
ments.? His rapid rise to state leadership in 1885 also de- 
pended upon a close alliance between the “Big Four;” the 
veteran leader of the Brooklyn (Willoughby Street) Dem- 


2G. F. Bixby, “David B. Hill, Statesman and Politician,” State 
Service, IV, 89. 

8W. C. Hudson, Random Recollections of an Old Political Re- 
porter (New York, 1911), pp. 252 ff. 


POLITICAL UPHEAVAL IN NEW YORK 41 


ocracy, Hugh McLaughlin ;* the chief of the Tammany Dem- 
ocracy, Richard Croker;® the vigorous organizer of the 
Buffalo Democrats, William I*. Sheehan; and the Trojan 
warrior, Edward Murphy.® Hill, himself, cared little for 
money, though he philosophically accepted the greed of 
others as a fact with which a practical politician must deal. 
Like Platt, he was an enemy of civil service reform and a 
meticulous student of the minutiae of New York politics. 
The tactics of these leaders in the election of 1888 clear- 
ly illustrate the character of their party organization. At 
tention has already been called to the fact that Warner Mil- 
ler, the Republican candidate for governor, was an advocate 
of high license. About that time there was forty thousand 
saloon-keepers in the state organized for purposes of secur-_ 
ing legislation favorable to their business and of preventing 
the enactment of laws restricting it.7 In addition there 
were the powerful wholesale liquor dealers and the liquor 
manufacturers. Those who were interested in the liquor 
traffic and in its perpetuation naturally turned to the Demo-~ 
cratic party in the state, the party which drew most of its 
strength from the great cities where most of the liquor was 
made and consumed.’ Besides appealing to the liquor vote, 
the Democrats also tried to attract the labor vote. Through- 


“Hudson, op. cit., p. 260. 

5 The Democratic Party of the State of New York, edited by 
James K. McGuire (New York, 1905), II, 228. 

6 Breen, op. cit., p. 740. 

7 City Reform Club, Annual Records of the Assemblymen and 
Senators from the City of New York, 1891, p. 23. 

8 The Wine and Spirit Gazette, the organ of the wholesale liquor 
dealers, said on April 28, 1891: “Do you deny that the liquor vote 
controls the situation in this state? What defeated Warner Mil 
ler and elected Governor Hill? What gave the Democratic party 
its present majority in the Assembly? What elected the Tams 
many ticket in this last year? Was it not the united strength 
of the liquor vote?” 


42 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


out his administrations, Governor Hill posed as the cham- 
‘pion of the labor interests. Confronted as he was with a 
hostile Republican legislature, his constant recommendations 
for laws ameliorating the conditions of labor may have had 
some political if not legal effect. During this campaign, he 
proclaimed -his famous slogan, “I am a Democrat,” which 
was supposed to imply that he was a thorough partisan 
whereas Cleveland with his civil service reform notions was 
not. After the election Hill was accused of having made 
a “deal” with Platt whereby the presidency was “traded” 
for the governorship.1!. In an interview published some 
years later, Cleveland denied that he ever had any idea that 
the presidential ticket was the victim of treachery in this 
election, and he further stated in effect that the disparity be- 
tween his vote and that of Governor Hill could be accounted 
for by the liquor vote.” It was Hill’s own opinion at the 
time that the result of this election would be a prejudice to 
his political future.¥ 

Governor Hill naturally desired to have a legislature in 
political accord with him. On account of the rotten bor- 
ough system in the state which favored the rural districts, 
there seemed to be little chance of this desire ever being ful- 
filled, but in 1891 a nation-wide reaction against the Mc- 
Kinley tariff resulted in the election of a Democratic As- 
sembly with a majority sufficient to override the Republican 
Senate upon a joint ballot. This made it possible for the 


8C. Z. Lincoln, Messages from the Governors, VIII, 35, 163, 303, 
315, et passim. 

10H. T. Peck, Twenty Years of the Republic, 1885-1905 (New 
York, 1907), p. 161. 

11 Nation, November 15, 1888, XLVII, 385. 

12G, F. Parker, Recollections of Grover Cleveland (New York 
1909), p. 342. 

13 Jbid., p. 344. A. B. Parker’s recollection of a conversation with 
Governor Hill in November, 1888. : 


POLITICAL UPHEAVAL IN NEW YORK 43 


Democrats to elect Governor Hill to the United States Sen- 
ate. However, Hill finished his term as governor and took 
his seat in the Senate on January 1, 1892. At the Demo- 
cratic State Convention of 1891, Roswell P. Flower, a’ 
wealthy banker who had always been a favorite of Tammany, 
Hall,1* was nominated for governor and William F. Sheehan 
was nominated for lieutenant-governor. In the fall election 
the Democrats carried the executive offices, a majority of 
the assemblymen and enough of the senatorial seats to leave 
the final composition of the state Senate in doubt. The way 
in which this doubt was resolved in favor of the Democrats™ 
was one of the events which made a deep inroad into Hill’s 
political strength. One of the contested seats hinged upon 
the returns from an election district in Dutchess County. It 
is unnecessary here to go into the intricacies of this election’ 
tangle. The act which attracted attention was the seizure 
from the mails of an election certificate which favored the 
Republican candidate. This episode involved Isaac H. May- 
nard, one of Hill’s lieutenants, who asserted that the seizure 
was legal. The Democratic officials considered that the 
Court of Appeals in a series of decisions supported their 
claims and a legislative investigating committee which 
later met was of the same opinion,® but the State Bar Asso- 
ciation severely censured Maynard and the Republican and 
Independent newspapers talked about the “theft of the 
Senate.” }7 Hill was destined not to profit greatly by the 


14\f{cGuire, loc. cit. 

15 People ex rel. Daley v. Rice, 129 N. Y. 449; People ex rel. Sher- 
wood v. Rice, 129 N. Y. 391; People ex rel. Nichols v. Board of Can- 
vassers, 129 N. Y. 443. 

16 New York State Legislature, Proceedings and Testimony be- 
fore the Joint Committee of the Senate and Assembly, 1892, (In- 
vestigation of certain documents and letters of Judge Maynard in 
regard to Senate election cases in the Fifteenth Senate District). 

17 New York Tribune, January 6, 1892 and March 22, 1892; Na- 
tion, January 28, 1892, LIV, 63. 


44 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


Democratic control of the legislature. From his new posi- 
‘tion he could not keep the same watch over state affairs 
that he had maintained while at Albany, and Richard Croker 
was drawing his lines closer over the Tammany representa- 
tives at the state capitol who comprised nearly forty per 
cent of all the Democratic legislators.18 “System” and “di- 
rect responsibility’ were the rules which guided the Tam- 
‘many chieftain. The old professional lobbyists were super- 
seded by the “boss” who delivered the party vote in return 
for contributions or services to the party.2® The Democratic 
legislature of 1892 thus became one of Hill’s stumbling 
blocks. 

Like other governors of New York, Hill had presidential 
ambitions, but the method which he employed to obtain a 
solid delegation pledged to his support in the Democratie 
National Convention of 1892 reacted unfavorably upon his 
candidacy and political career. He gained absolute control 
of the state committee by un-seating the regularly elected 
anti-Hill delegates to the State Convention of 1891 and this 
committee early in 1892 issued a call for a state convention 
to elect delegates to the national convention. The date set 
for the convention was so early that protests were imme- 
diately heard from all sides. The New York Reform Club 
styled it a “snap” convention? and the New York World, 
which had been a fairly consistent supporter of Hill up to 
this time, printed the warning, “Don’t,” and furnished the 
Cleveland supporters with many valuable arguments. In 


18 City Reform Club, op. cit., 1893, p. 11. 


19Croker interview published in the New York Tribune, Dec. 
17, 1893. 


pes B. Bishop, “The Price of Peace,” Century Mag., XLVIII, 


1E. P. Wheeler, Sixty Years of American Life (New Beet 
1917), p. 203. 


2New York World, February 3, 1892. 


POLITICAL UPHEAVAL IN NEW YORK 45 


spite of admonitions from his party press, Hill persisted in 
carrying out his scheme. Not only was the convention 
“sprung upon the party” so that the Anti-Hill elements had 
no time to organize, but the caucuses were also sprung upon 
the voters. Primaries were held with insufficient notice or 
no notice at all regarding the time and place of meeting.’ 
As a part of his plan, Hill had recognized Tammany Hall 
as the “regular”? New York organization because it was op- 
posed to Cleveland. Although Hill obtained a solid delega- 
tion from the state of New York, his high handed methods 
caused unfavorable comment among the delegates from the 
other states, and whatever chances he might have had to se- 
cure the presidential nomination were ruined. Cleveland’s 
supporters, skilfully marshalled by William C. Whitney, 
won upon the first ballot. 

While the year 1893 was a lean one for the Republicans in 
New York, it was far from being a fortunate one for the 
Democrats. The Republicans had been turned out of the 
national offices in time to avoid public disapproval on ac- 
count of the panic of 1893. The Democratic organization 
which had to bear the brunt of this misfortune was dis- 
united. The Cleveland administration had recognized the 
Anti-Snappers in the distribution of the New York patron- 
age. Democratic blunders within the state greatly increased 
the party’s demoralization. One of the first of these was the 
promotion of Edward Murphy to the United States Senate, 
where he was looked upon as the representative of the mak- 
ers of collars and cuffs at Troy and an echo of Hill.* An- 
other blunder was perpetrated by Lieutenant-Governor Shee- 
han when he “jammed through” the legislature some Buffalo 
charter amendments which greatly enhanced the power of 


$F, W. Dallinger, Nominations for Elective Office (New York, 
1897), p. 124. 
#Wheeler, op. cit., p. 255. 


46 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


his henchmen over the government of the city. The passage 
of these “ripper’’ bills caused great excitement in Buffalo 
-and many business men’s exchanges, professional societies, 
and political clubs held indignation meetings.? The next in- 
‘cident which injured the standing of the Democratic state 
organization was the nomination of Isaac H. Maynard by 
the state convention for the Court of Appeals. The general 
‘opinion was current that Hill forced Maynard upon the con- 
vention in order to reward Maynard for his services in se- 
curing a Democratic Senate. Many years later a letter from 
Hill to Maynard was revealed which showed that Hill on 
‘the eve of the convention had urged Maynard to retire,® but 
this he refused to do and his candidacy was looked upon 
by many of the voters as an act of brazenness and insolence 
on the part of the “bosses.” 7 In a vituperative campaign 
‘speech Hill called those who controlled the Bar Association 
a “brainless set of namby-pambys.” ® These were the tactics 
of desperation. “Boss” McLaughlin also confronted an 
uprising in his domain. William J. Gaynor unearthed a 
scandal in connection with the purchase of the Long Island 
Water Supply Company by the city of Brooklyn. Many 
civic and business organizations united to “smash the ring” 
and prosecuted a vigorous and bitter campaign. The elec- 
tion of 1893 was nearly everywhere disastrous to the “or- 
ganization’? Democrats. Maynard fell considerably behind 
his ticket and was defeated by an overwhelming majority. 
During the election a riot occurred in Gravesend, a town on 
the outskirts of Brooklyn ruled by the petty John Y. Mc- 


5 City Reform Club, op. cit., 1893, pp. 106 ff. Statement of Mr. 
Ansley . Wilcox. 

6 New York Legislature, Memorial of David B. Hill, p. 17. Ad- 
dress by A. B. Parker. 

7J. L. Heaton, The Story of a Page (New York, 1913), p. 98. 

8 New York Tribune, Oct. 24, 1893. 

9 McGuire, op. cit., pp. 252-53. 


POLITICAL UPHEAVAL IN NEW YORK 47 


Kane. The report of McKane’s high handed and fraudulent 
methods helped the cause of the reformers in Brooklyn. An‘ 
election brawl and homicide in Troy had a similar effect 
upon those opposed to Senator Murphy’s local nomination. 
The Democrats lost control of the governments of Brooklyn 
and Buffalo, the minor state executive officers, the constitu- 
tional convention and the state legislature. “Divine Provi- 
dence did it,” said Platt,!° thus admitting that the victory* 
was not achieved by any effort on his part.4! The result 
was summarized in Harper's Weekly in the following 
words: “The selfish tyranny of the Democratic party bosses 
in this state has of late years been so audacious in its wicked. 
ness that at last in the most rigidly disciplined of political 
parties the outraged dignity of human nature asserted itself 
in open revolt.” 

The Tammany Hall Democracy was not disciplined until 
the following year. Although the Rev. Charles H. Park-> 
hurst had begun his crusade against the “damnable pack of 
administrative bloodhounds” in his famous philippic of Sun- 
day, February 14, 1892,}* tangible inroads upon Tammany’s 
strength were not made until 1894. In the meanwhile, the 
Society for the Prevention of Crime, of which Dr. Park- 
hurst was president, was collecting evidence upon the open 
connection between the Police Department and the resorts 
of vice and gambling and arousing public opinion. The mat- 
ter came to a head when the New York Chamber oi Uom- 
merce submitted a resolution to the state legislature request- 


10 Op. cit., p. 267. 

11“The victory was won almost without organization or plan, 
and with so little money that the Tammany leaders jeered at the 
straightened circumstances of the Republican committees.”—New 
York Tribune, November 9, 1893. 

12 November 18, 1893, XXXVII, 1094. 

138C. H. Parkhurst, Our Fight with Tammany (New York, 1895), 
p. 10. 


48 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


ing an investigation of the department. Four days later, 
‘Clarence Lexow, one of Platt’s lieutenants, introduced a 
resolution in the state Senate providing for the appointment 
of an investigating committee. When the bill providing for 
the defraying of the expenses of this committee was vetoed 
“by Governor Flower, the Chamber of Commerce came to the 
rescue and raised the necessary funds. Political influences 
were manifest in the early work of the committee. William 
A. Sutherland, an up-state lawyer and politican, was ap- 
pointed counsel for the committee while it investigated 
Democratic election frauds.* The real work of the com- 
mittee began when John W. Goff was chosen as sole coun- 
sel for the remainder of the committee’s work. Goff was a 
_ Democrat who, as assistant district attorney, had thoroughly 
learned the devious ways of the underworld. He prosecuted 
_his work fearlessly, relentlessly, and with wonderful astute- 
ness. The revelations extorted from the unwilling witnesses 
greatly shocked the community. Certain police officials had 
developed a systematic method of blackmailing ; they levied a 
ratable charge upon all saloons, houses of ill-fame, gambling 
dens, policy shops and green goods swindlers. In return 
these resorts of the criminal classes were given “police pro- 
tection.” Even legitimate businesses were compelled to pay 
tribute; hardly a contractor, a pawnbroker, or a small re- 
tailer escaped. One of the dramatic climaxes of the hear- 
ings was the confession of a police captain that he had paid 
$15,000 to secure his promotion.4® The metropolitan news- 
papers gave wide publicity to the revelations, were practi- 
cally unanimous in their condemnation of the police corrup- 
tion and did not hesitate to designate the heads of Tammany 


14 [bid., p. 291. 
15 New vari State Legislature, Senate Doc., 1895, No. 63, I, 48 


(Report of the committee to investigate the Police Department of 
New York City). 


POLITICAL UPHEAVAL IN NEW YORK 49 


Hall as the chief beneficiaries of the debasing system. Al- 
though absent in Europe, Richard Croker became a target 
for the press.!® It was pointed out that the corruption ex- 
tended to all the city departments and that Tammany chief- 
tains, whose only ostensible profession was politics, hac 
amassed vast fortunes within a few years. These disclosures 
produced a revolt against Tammany similar to that of 1871. 
Even Platt was so impressed that, after some dickering, he 
urged the Republicans to endorse the fusion ticket made up 
by the citizens’ Committee of Seventy. William L. Strong, 
the fusion candidate for mayor, was elected by a majority of 
45,187 over his Democratic opponent. One of Mayor 
Strong’s first official acts was the appointment of Theodore 
Roosevelt as one of the police commissioners. 

The popular upheaval against Tammany was one of the 
contributing factors in the defeat of the Democratic state 
ticket in 1894. Senator Hill presided over the state conven- 
tion which met to nominate a candidate for governor that 
year. Governor Flower had been persuaded to withdraw his 
name from the list of possibilities before the convention> 
It was felt that he was not “available” for a renomination 
because the general impression had grown up that he had 
been a tool of the bosses.18 A Democratic defeat was likely 
whoever the candidate might be. The financial panic and» 
the tariff scandals were reacting against the party all over- 
the nattom;-and in the state the reverses of the year before 
were a warning that desperate remedies were necessary: 
However, the Democratic managers rejected “reform” 
Democrats with little ceremony as they preferred defeat to a 
surrender of their organization. When William C. Whitney 


~ 


16J. D. Townsend, New York in Bondage (New York, 1901), 
passim. 
17 Op. cit., p. 271. 
18 New York Times, April 22, 1892; Heaton, op. cit., p. 101. 
4 4 


50 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


withdrew his name, the Tammany Hall delegates started a 
stampede for David B. Hill. Hill fought the rush vigorously 
but in vain. It was afterward learned that the stampede 
had been carefully prearranged.!® Tammany, floundering, 
had also dragged Hill into the mire. As one journal ex- 
pressed it: “He had repeatedly ridden into power on the 
backs of his mercenary henchmen; now his henchmen 
jumped upon his back, demanding that he carry them to suc- 
cess, and he could not refuse.” 7° All the Democratic blun- 
ders of the two previous years were heaped upon Hill’s head 
and he went down to a defeat so overwhelming that he 
never regained from its effects. Thus Croker’s followers 
played into Platt’s hands by killing off the ablest of the “or- 
ganization”? Democrats. 

The defeat of the Democratic candidates in 1894 was ac- 
companied by the passage of several constitutional amend- 
ments which were designed to shackle the future power of 
the Tammany Democracy. The Constitutional Convention 
of 1894 which the Democrats had hoped to control was pre- 
dominantly Republican and it proposed an amendment to the 
constitution which aimed to eliminate the fraudulent natu- 
ralizations which were so common in the great Democratic 
cities upon the eve of election.’ However, one authority 
has said that the apportionment provision was the only par- 
tisan use of power by the majority of the convention.” This 
amendment made radical alterations in the representative 
system and provided that no county, however populous it 
might become, should have more than one-third of all the 
senators and that no two counties which adjoined or were 


19 Harper’s Weekly, October 13, 1894, XXXVIII, 962. 
20 Tbid., October 6, 1894, p. 938. 


1 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 1. See also New York Tribune, Oct. 
31, 1894. 

2J. H. Dougherty, Constitutional History of New York State 
(New York, 1911), p. 339. 


POLITICAL UPHEAVAL IN NEW YORK 5I 


separated only by public waters should have more than one- 
half of all the senators.2 The Democrats were quick to see 
that this proposal would reduce New York City to a condi- 
tion of partial vassalage and they denounced it unsparingly. 
“The whole object of it,’ said a Tammany delegate, “is to 
maintain the present balance and preponderance of the rural 
counties of this state against the city.” * Another Tammany 
delegate expressed his Opposition in more _ picturesque 
words: 


Should the Republicans entirely disband their organization. 
in the three great cities of the state, and should the Republic~’ 
an party collapse in every county where its organization is 
not now controlled by Mr. Platt, Mr. Platt could continue to 
elect from the counties which he does control a majority of 
both houses of the legislature, and the dictates of the Repub-, 
lican machine under his able and skilful leadership would be 
the sole representative of “The people of the state of New 
York, in Senate and Assembly assembled.” ® 


This amendment was ratified by the people of the state in 
the November election of 1894 when the Democratic party 
was discredited. . 

Some of the amendments adopted at this time imposed. 
limitations upon both of the party organizations and must 
be looked upon as victories for the elements with which, 
Roosevelt was in sympathy. Thus the prohibition placed 
upon the issuance of passes by railroad, telephone and tele- 
graph companies to public officers, the various limitations 
placed upon the legislature, the civil service reform clause, 
and the provision separating municipal elections from state 
and national elections proved to be equally burdensome to 
both of the old line party organizations. Considering the 


8 Constitution, Art, III, Sec. 4. 
4 Record, 1894, IV, 1861. 
5 [bid., p. 1887. 


52 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


general nature of the amendments and the circumstances 
‘surrounding their ratification, it is clear that both Platt and 
-Roosevelt were benefited by the new constitution, although 
neither had expended much effort upon the instrument.® 

So far in the discussion of the part which the Democrats 
played in making Platt and Roosevelts’ rise in politics pos- 
sible, the indiscretions of the leaders of the Democratic 
state organization have been stressed. National issues and 
events were quite as important, if not more so, than state 
issues in bringing about a political revolution in the state. 
In 1892 the feeling regarding national questions was so 
strong that the Democratic state organization was continued 
in power in spite of the talk about the “theft of the state 
Senate” and the “snap convention.” * On the other hand, 
the financial, industrial and labor unrest throughout the 
country contributed to the state upheavals of 1893 and 1894, 
The greatest blow to the state Democracy came in the na- 
tional election of 1896. The New York delegation to the 
Democratic National Convention of 1896 looked aghast at 
the capture of their party by the populists and the free sil- 
verites. The importance of this election to certain powerful 
groups in New York had been pointed out by the able biogra- 
pher of Mark Hanna: “The dominant issue endangered the 
national financial system, and the money must be collected 
in New York, the headquarters of national finance.”® The 
leaders of business and finance in the great metropolis were 
so frightened that over $3,000,000 was raised among them 
for the purpose of defeating Bryan, the “Boy Orator,” and 
his “economic heresies.” ® Mark Hanna, “the business man 


6 New York Tribune, May 24, 1896. 

7 Heaton, op. cit., chap. VI. 

8H. Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna: His Life and Work (New 
York, 1912), p. 219, 

® Ibid., p. 220, 


POLITICAL UPHEAVAL IN NEW YORK 53 


in politics,’ was the guiding genius of the Republican cam- 
paign. He “organized the state bosses.” !® Platt, who had 
bitterly opposed the nomination of McKinley in the Repub- 
lican convention, was placated and entered wholeheartedly 
into the canvass.4!_ The Democrats in the state were com- 
pletely disorganized. The machine Democrats and the re- 
form Democrats were alike broken up by internal revolts. 
David B. Hill had made a strong protest against the plat- 
form adopted by the Chicago Convention, and when he was 
asked during the campaign whether he was a Democrat still, 
he had replied, “I am a Democrat still, very still.” 4* The 
Reform Club led the movement for a third ticket, made up 
of Sound Money Democrats. The leading independent 
metropolitan newspapers which had supported Cleveland in! 
his three contests repudiated the Chicago platform and its 
candidate. Day after day the names of prominent and 
wealthy Democrats who declared their intention to “bolt” the 
ticket were published. One of these was the president of a 
great insurance company who boasted ten years later that 
he had used the policy holders’ money to help the Republi 
cans.4* There was an enormous falling off in the Demo- 
cratic campaign contributions and a general feeling of! 
apathy developed among the party workers. Even Tam- 
many Hall was-quiescent.® The result of the election wag 
an unprecedented Republican landslide in the state. McKin- _ 
ley’s plurality in New York County, the stronghold of Tam- 
many Hall, was over 20,000, and in the state, nearly 270,000.) 

ae A. White, The Old Order Changeth (New York, 1910), 
5 a easieccs News, August 4, 1896. 

12J, A. Woodburn, Political Parties and Party Problems (New 
York, 1914), p. 208. 

133A, K. McClure, Our Presidents and How We Make Them 
(New York, 1905), p. 393; Heaton, op. cit., p. 148. 

14 See chap. X, below. 


15 McGuire, op. cit., p. 173; G. Myers, History of Tammany 
Hail (New York, 1917), p. 281. 


54 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


From this sketch of some of the Democratic dissensions, 
state and national, it is apparent that the assured position 


of the Republican party in the state past 
1897 was attained largely by accide as any 
action upon the part of ee state organization 
was concerned. It was the Bar Association which started 
the vigorous campaign against Maynard and Hill for the 
“theft of the state Senate.”” It was Hill himself, who split 
the Democrats into regulars and Anti-Snappers. It was the 
indiscretion of his lieutenants which led to the disintegra- 
tion of the parts of his up-state “machine.” It was Dr. 
Parkhurst and the Chamber of Commerce that initiated and 
prosecuted the crusade against Tammany. It was the Tam- 
many organization which proved to be the undoing of Hill 
in 1896. Finally, it was William Jennings Bryan, who as 
much as any one, helped to define the issue of 1896, and it 
was Mark Hanna who directed the Republican campaign of 
that year. Such were the influences which lay back of the 
Republican victories of the middle nineties in the state of 
New York. The Republican state organization under the 
leadership of Thomas C. Platt was not inactive during this 
period. It was in a position to reap the benefits of the revo- 
lution in public opinion. Its methods and tactics, however, 
were largely those of self-preservation. The organization 
accepted Roosevelt in 1898 in order to conserve the victories 
which it had done so little to earn. 


GHARTER: LV. 


Peedi SUNDAY oC HOO: Class, 


According to a very suggestive analysis of leadership 
made by a prominent sociologist, the “prime condition of 
ascendency is the presence of undirected energy in the per- 
son over whom it is to be exercised ; it is not so much forced 
upon us from without as demanded from within.” ! Follow- 
ing the withdrawal of Conkling from politics and the Repub- 
lican reverses of the eighties, there was present among the 
Republican party workers in the state, both small and great,, 
a good deal of “undirected energy.” There were bitter and 
prolonged factional quarrels in various parts of the state.’ 
While these quarrels consumed energy, they defeated the 
main purpose of all good Republican workers, namely, Re- 
publican victories at the polls. It is possible to describe 
only a few of the more important political managers who 
finally came to look to Thomas C, Platt for guidance. Their 
gravitation to Platt has been described by one of them in the- 
following words: 


He came into leadership because, at a time when the party 
was weak, when its voters were both listless and broken into 
factions, when its organization was disrupted, and those 
who might have led had given over their opportunity and had 
withdrawn themselves into discouraged retirement, Mr. 
Platt had the motive, the interest, the ambition, and the per- 
sonal force to draw to himself, first in plans to guide the leg-* 


1C. H. Cooley, Human Nature and the Social Order (New York, 
(1902), p. 285. 
55 


56 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


islature, and later in plans to control the state committee, a 
little band of trained, able and adventurous politicians; and 
he held the leadership because of the indifference of the 
‘party and of those who were or might have been its leaders 
in those days of party weakness allowed the plans of this 
small band of politicians to succeed.® 


This “little band of politicans’’ came together at frequent 
intervals for purposes of consultation and conference. It 
was one of these conferences which set in motion Roosevelt’s 
nomination for governor in 1898. The most common meet- 
ing place was the old Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York 
City, the headquarters of the Republican state committee 
and the New York home of Mr. Platt. In the time of Thur- 
‘low Weed No. 11 Astor House had been the common meet- 
ing place for all those who were interested in New York 
politics, but the Fifth Avenue Hotel, opened in 1859, soon 
held out rival attractions to all Republican county leaders. 
When Conkling was at the height of his power, the local 
politicians came to this new center to be informed as to the 
party program and to get the proper “steer.”” In 1889 when 
it looked as though Platt was going to distribute the federal 
patronage in New York,®? he became the guiding spirit of 
these conferences.* In Platt’s own words, “Nobody can take 


2Lemuel E. Quigg, “Thomas Platt,” North American Rew., 
SLO OR CES Osa, 

3 Nation, April 11, 1889, XLVIII, 295. 

#“Tt was from this chaotic condition that these strong and mas- 
terful men, who were jealous of or antagonistic to each other, 
gradually came to recognize and defer to the judgment, the 
sagacity, the skill, and the judicial consideration of Thomas C. 
Platt. They found him always with an open ear and an open 
mind always ready to hear every suggestion. When the case had 
been fully presented by those who had formed their judgments 
in the different localities from different environments and differ- 
ent inspirations and aspirations, he, as a court of last appeal, ren- 
“dered decisions which were universally accepted, and the success 
which followed almost invariably justified their wisdom.”—C. M. 
Depew, Ovations, II, 197. 


fe 


PAP os. SUNDAY SCHOOL CLASS” 57 


away from the Fifth Avenue Hotel the fame that it for 
years enjoyed as the place where from every city and county 
in this state there came, met and conferred the strongest 
minds in the Republican party, and the place from which, 
after their combined judgment had been finally reached, 
there went a sentiment in accordance with which popular, 
judgment was molded and put into effect.” ® It is true that 
the subleaders who came to New York City during business 
hours usually saw Platt at the office of the United States. 
Express Company at 49 Broadway, but this was more or less 
of a continuous performance and did not have the same sig- 
nificance that was attached to the larger confabs at the Fifth 
Avenue Hotel. After Platt was elected to the United States 
Senate in 1897-he was compelled to spend much of his time 
during the week at Washington when Congress was in ses- 
sion. However, he returned to New York City every week 
end and upon Sunday important conferences were held upon 
the affairs of the state at the Fifth Avenue Hotel.6 These 
Sunday conferences, to which the up-state leaders came 
from all parts of the state to join their city “brethren,” were” 
called “Platt’s Sunday school class.”7 The two sofas at 
the end of the broad corridor of the Fifth Avenue Hotel 
upon which the politicians and reporters sat and gossiped 
acquired the significant name, the “Amen Corner.” 8 The 
results of the Sunday executive sessions were given out to 


5 Op. cit. p. 492. 

6 These Sunday conferences began before 1897 of course, because 
Sunday was a convenient day for the up-state leaders to leave their 
business and legislative duties. For typical newspaper accounts of 
some of these meetings, see New York Tribune, Feb. 18, 1895; 
May 5, 1896; Jan. 18, March 22, and April 12, 1897; Jan. 10, 24, and 
Nov. 21, 28, 1898; and the Nation, March 18, 1897. 

-TPlatt, op. cit., p. 489. 

8“Tt received this name because when Senator Platt, during his 
long leadership, after a conference with the party leaders from all 
over the state, would announce the conclusion at which he had 


= 


58 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


the reporters and appeared in the Monday morning papers 
for the edification of all those interested in state politics. 

In an unguarded moment at the reminiscent meeting in the 
Fifth Avenue Hotel just before it was torn down, Senator 


‘ Depew, a friend of both Platt and Roosevelt, described some 
of the meetings of the “Sunday school class” in the follow- 
/ing terms: 


/ ator Thomas C. Platt more men in the state and nation who 


During the quarter of a century of the leadership of Sen- 


amounted to much consulted with him in this corner than in 
any other place. Here were made governors, state senators, 
and assemblymen, supreme court judges, judges of the Court 
of Appeals, and members of Congress. Governors thought 


the capitol was at Albany, but really took their inspiration 


and the suggestions for their policies from the Amen Corner. 
State conventions would meet at Rochester, Syracuse, or 
Saratoga, but the eight hundred members would wait before 
acting to know what had been decided upon in the Amen 


_ Corner.?® 


It may have been that on this occasion of the “wake cere- 
monies,” April 4, 1908, the amiable Depew was paying a 
compliment to his colleague Senator Platt out of sympathy 
for Platt’s position of comparative impotence at the time. 
However, this speech shows at least some of the things that 
were discussed at the “Sunday school.” Another version of 
the same speech adds a significant detail: 


I know speakers who are looked to for the make-up of 
committees from the lower house of the legislature. They 
said they would consult with the members of their families 
in the rural regions, and I have found that the families they 
consulted were Senator Platt in the “Amen Corner.” 2° 





arrived as to nominations, policies, and platforms, there never was 


any dissent, but the waiting magnates sitting on this sofa would all 
say ‘Amen.’”—Depew, Speeches, VI, 285. 

9 bid, p. 282. 

10 Platt, op. cit., p. 494, 
of the liquor vote?” 


PLATS “SUNDAY SCHOOL. CLASS” oY 


One of the chief topics for discussion at these 
Sunday conferences was the course of legislation at 
Albany. 

A fuller understanding of the significance of these consul- 
tations can be obtained from a brief discussion of the train- 
ing and interests of some of the men who attended them. 
The successful military commander of to-day is the one who 
can choose a group of officers of the same mental quality as 
himself and by a combination of intellectual authority, inti- 
mate intercourse, a bold delegation of function, think effec- 
tively of a large body of facts. The members of the Sun- 
day executive sessions might be looked upon as the officers of 
Platt’s political army. 

One of the oldest frequenters of the corridors of the Fifth 
Avenue Hotel was Louis F. Payn, of Columbia County. In 
a way it is an anachronism to mention Payn as a member of 
Platt’s “Sunday school.” “Lou” Payn might be regarded as 
one of Platt’s mentors. Although he was about a year and 
a half younger than Platt, Payn had attended every Repub- 
lican national convention since 1860 with one or two excep- 
tions, and his activity in state politics covered an even longer 
period.44 While Platt was perfecting his control of the Re- 
publican organization in Tioga County in the late sixties, 
Payn was harbor master of New York City, a public of- 
ficer of state and national connections. But “Lou” Payn’s 
chief occupation was in the lobby of the state capitol at 
Albany. In a legislative investigation in 1895, he testified 


} 


11 Nation, March 18, 1897; New York Tribune, April 12, 1897; 
New York Sun, March 7, 1910; Platt, op. cit., p. 469. 


12G. Wallas, Our Social Heritage (New Haven, 1921), p. 60. 


13 G. Myers, “ ‘Boss’ Platt,” National Rev., 1901, XX XVIII, 219; 
White, “Platt,” loc. cit., pp. 145 ff. 


fees History of the Republican Party (New York, 1898), 
Pp. 


60 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


that he had “always, for 35 years been interested in the 
election of speakers, you know, and United States senators. 
and that sort of thing.” ?® In 1868 “Lou” Payn was cen- 
sured by a legislative committee for his activities in con- 
‘nections with the passage of the notorious bills that legal- 
ized certain overissues of stock of the Erie Railroad Com- 
‘pany. Payn boasted that Jay Gould had paid him $10,000 
for his “services” in connection with this bill and that 
Gould later gave him a “tip” on the Wall Street market 
whereby he made $90,000 in four weeks.” Payn was one of 
Platt’s managers in the famous senatorial contest of 1881. 
In the consultations that followed immediately after the 
‘resignations of Conkling and Platt from the Senate, “Lou” 
Payn prophesied that they would not be re-elected. Payn’s 
predictions were usually correct. In the investigation of 
1895 he admitted that he was the salaried legislative agent 
of several undisclosed principals; that he influenced the ac- 
. tion of members of the legislature on bills in which his em- 
ployers were interested, not by arguments before committees, 
but solely by personal conversations of a private and confi- 
dential nature, and that he had no other remunerative occu- 
pation.4® Payn was at the head of a “political machine” in 
his own congressional district * and he took part besides in 
the consultations regarding the nominations made in New 
York City.2? Although Payn did not have the confidence of 
many Republicans in the state among whom Roosevelt was 


15 Sen. Doc. No. 56, 1895, p. 455. (Investigation of the corrupt 
negotiations charged by the New York “Press” in relation to the 
bill for an increase of salaries of the members of the New York 
City Fire Dept.). 

16 Sen.’ Doc. No. 52, 1869, p. 3. 

17 New York “Press” investigation, p. 484, 

18 Jbid., pp. 16, 476 ff. 

19 Tbid., p. 455, 

20 fbid., p. 480, 


PLATT’S “SUNDAY SCHOOL CLASS” 6I 


one,’ he was close to Platt and very influential in the Sun- 
day conferences.’ 

Another one of the ‘““Ameners” to whom Platt was es- 

pecially attached was Colonel George Washington Dunn, of 
- Binghamton, Broome County. Broome County adjoins 
Tioga County and the two counties are part of the congres- 
sional district from which Platt was elected in 1872. Colonel, 
Dunn was one of those Civil War veterans who became the 
leaders of the social, political, and commercial life of their, 
respective communities. Colonel Dunn’s political training 
was of a continuous and rigorous sort. He started out as 
superintendent of public documents at Washington, but he 
kept in touch with Binghamton affairs and was. elected 
sheriff of his county a few years later. At the end of his 
term as sheriff, he became the publisher and treasurer of the 
Binghamton Republican, the leading Republican organ in the 
Southern Tier.? It was in this capacity that he helped hold 
the paper in line for Conkling and Platt during the senatorial 
contest of 1881. In the latter part of 1881 he was appointed 
postmaster of Binghamton by President Arthur. It was 
through the efforts of Postmaster Dunn and other “tried —~ 
friends” that Platt was selected as a delegate to the National 
Convention of 1884.4 Colonel Dunn’s prominence in busi- 
ness circles is shown by the fact that in the early nineties he 
was interested in banking, insurance, manufacturing and 
public utility companies located in his community. He was 
valuable in the Sunday conferences not only because of his 


1 Elihu Root said that Payn had been a stench in the nostrils of 
the people of the state of New York for many years. C. Schurz, 
Speeches, Correspondence, and Political Papers (New York, 1913), 
VI, 381. 

2 Platt, op. cit., pp. 158-163, 514. 

3 Biographical Review, The Leading Citizens of Broome Co. (New 
York, 1894), 

*Platt, op. cit., p. 178. 


62 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


experience at state conventions and on the state committee, 
‘but also because he was in close touch with the substantial - 
men of his district. 

While Platt clung to his old friends, the members of the 
“Old Guard,” he was shrewd enough to see the advantage of 
recognizing rising ability.? In 1887 there appeared upon the 

‘state committee a promising young politician from the city 
of Rochester, named George Washington Aldridge. Mr. 
Aldridge was then about the same age as Roosevelt, and he 
had already established himself as an important political fac- 
tor locally. Four years before he had been elected a member 
of the executive board of the city and during his incumbency 
of this office, the board had charge of extensive improve- 
ments in the departments of water, street, fire, and public 
works. He had acquired his taste for politics and his 
knowledge of construction work from his father who was a 
contractor by profession and who had been active politically 
as councilman and later as mayor. Mr. Aldridge followed 
in his father’s footsteps and was himself elected mayor of 
the city in 1894. While Mayor Aldridge was looked upon 
by some as a “machine politician and spoilsman of the Platt 
type,” 7 there can be little doubt that he represented fairly 
well in the Sunday councils at New York some of predom- 
inant groups in his city, which was the most populous urban 
community along the line of the Erie Canal and the New 
York Central Railroad between New York and Buffalo. 


5 Depew, Orations, II, 197; New York Sun, Jan. 15, 1897. 

6C. E. Fitch, Encyclopedia of Biography of New York (New 
York, 1916), “George Washington Aldridge.” 

7 Harper's Weekly, Feb. 9, 1895, XXXIX, 122. The New York 
Tribune, Dec. 1, 1894, said: “Moreover, the people did not vote 
for the continuation under another name of the old spoils system 
of Hill and Flower. Mr. Aldridge is put forward by the element 
of the Republican party who wish for that kind of administration. 
He has been the local boss of Rochester, and has built up his power 
by the aid of the mercenary Democrats.” 


PLATT’S “SUNDAY SCHOOL CLASS” 63 


The youngest commissioned officer who appeared in Com- 
mander Platt’s councils of war in the early nineties was 
William Barnes, Jr., of Albany. Mr. Barnes had been 
brought up in an atmosphere which was steeped in politics / 
his maternal grandfather, Thurlow Weed, had been an ob- 
ject of admiration and veneration in his boyhood days; 8 
his father, William Barnes, was a lawyer of importance in 
New York and Albany who had been superintendent of in- 
surance for many years and was thus intimately acquainted, 
with the politics of the state;® and his elder brother, Thur- 
low Weed Barnes, was a business man who had mixed in 
the politics of New York City. Unlike the other Platt coun- 
cilors who have been so far mentioned, Barnes had received 
a college education. He graduated from Harvard in 1888 
(eight years after Roosevelt) with high honors in history 
and political science. He was prominent in a class which 
contained men who later achieved distinction along several, 
lines. Thus, he won a public speaking prize in competition 
with E. R. Thayer and R. B. Mahany,! he was a mem~ 
ber of a literary club which included Charles F. Adams, and, 
he was editor-in-chief of the Harvard Crimson. When he 
left college, it seemed as though he wanted to be like his 
grandfather, who ‘‘secured office for ever so many friends, 
but never any- for himself, except a public printer’s place 
which was profitable in revenue but very modest in rank.” 18° 
He purchased with his patrimony in 1888 the Albany Morn- 
ing Express, a Republican paper which had represented the 


8 Albany Evening Journal, Nov. 15, 1897. Weed died in 1882 
when William Barnes was 16 years old, 

91860 to 1870. 

10TLater dean of the Harvard Law School. 

11 Later congressman and editor of the Buffalo Enquirer. 

12 These facts have been taken from an article by W. T. A. (W1l- 
liam T. Arnt, now secretary of the New York Citizens’ Union) 
appearing in the New York Evening Post, Sept. 24, 1910. 

13C. Schurz, Reminiscences (New York, 1907), II, 177. 


64 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


Conkling-Platt faction. Three years later he gained control 
of the Albany Evening Journal, the paper which had been 
founded by his grandfather over sixty years before. The 
Journal had been the organ of the Anti-Conkling wing, so 
the opposition press in Albany called Barnes the “Boy Editor 
of the combined Republican press.” * Under Barnes’ direc- 
tion, the Albany Evening Journal, which later absorbed the 
Morning Express, became one of the most outspoken repre- 
sentatives of the Platt policies in the state.’ In 1892 Platt 
gained the gratitude of Barnes by recognizing his delegation 
to the state convention and by making him a member of the 
state committee, although he was only twenty-five years old. 
When Barnes started his career in politics, the city and 
county of Albany were Democratic strongholds. The “Boy 
Editor” was commissioned to perform a difficult task, but 
he was quick to learn the lessons that were taught at the 
“Sunday school.” William Barnes, the man who entered 
politics “for the purpose of obtaining honest elections in 
Albany and elevating politics,’ ?® must have seen in Platt 
some of the qualities which he had admired in his grand- 
father. 

Platt’s chief of staff and Roosevelt’s right hand man in 
organization affairs in the late nineties was Benjamin B. 
Odell, Jr., of Newburgh. Odell, like Barnes and Aldridge, 
acquired his interest in politics from his father and early in 
life be became an important local leader... His fealty to Platt 
dated from the year 1884 when Platt helped to gratify his 
longing to become a member of the state committee. Odell 


144. N. Fuller, “Albany County” in Official New York, from 
Cleveland to Hughes, edited by C. E. Fitch (New York, 1911), III, 
56. 

15 See below p. 100. 

16 New York State Legislature, Report of the Special Committee 
of the Senate Appointed to Investigate the City and County of Al- 
bany, 1912, p. 116, 


PLATT’S “SUNDAY SCHOOL CLASS” _ 65 


was known as the “business man from Newburgh”’ because, 
after spending three years at Columbia University, he be- 
came interested in various business enterprises in his home 
city, chiefly of a public utility nature? Newburgh was a 
small city situated on the Hudson river near the summer, 
home of E. H. Harriman, the railroad magnate, and as a 
consequence of their propinquity, Odell and Harriman be- 
came friends.® Because of his driving power and his 
business training, Odell was a respected member of Platt’s 
Sunday councils and a valuable counsellor to Roosevelt. As — 
Platt grew old and feeble, and Roosevelt became more in- 
terested in national politics, more and more important mat- 
ters were delegated to Odell. 

So far, several types of regional leaders in the Republican 
organization up-state have been discussed. A description of 
some of the other local “officers” would be more or less of a, 
repetition. However, some of the salient features of the 
training of the more important “garrison commanders” may 
well be mentioned. In 1889 one of Platt’s most promising 
young men was J. Sloat Fassett, of Elmira. Like Barnes, 
Fassett had graduated from college with high honors, he - 
was a good speaker,!® he was the editor and proprietor of an 
important party organ,” and he had to contend with a strong 
local Democratic opposition.1 In the state Senate, in the 
party conventions and upon the platform, Fassett was a 
prominent figure in the early nineties. The representative 
from Buffalo in Platt’s political conferences was John R, 
Hazel, a lawyer by profession, who was bound to be influen- 
tial because of the size of his domain. Shortly after Hazel 


17 New York Tribune, Sept. 9, 1900. 

18 World’s Work (1906), XI, 7342. 

19 Fitch, Encyclopedia. 

20 The Elmira Daily Advertiser from 1879 to 1896. 
1David B. Hill’s home was in Elmira, 


5 


66 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


became a United States district judge he administered the 
oath of office to Roosevelt as president of the United States. 
Judge Hazel’s place in Erie county politics was taken by 
William C. Warren, editor and publisher of the Buffalo 
‘Commercial. In Syracuse, Francis Hendricks, a manufac- 
turer of photographic supplies and a banker, who had seen 
long service as a local administrator anda state legislator, 
upheld the policies which were decided upon in the Sunday 
councils.2 Roosevelt characterised Hendricks as “honest 
and competent.” The representative of the organization 
in Lockport was Timothy E. Ellsworth, a lawyer, manufac- 
turer, and banker; while in Canandaigua the Platt forces 
were marshalled by “Uncle” John Raines, a lawyer and in- 
surance agent. Both Ellsworth and Raines were Civil War 
veterans. Theodore Roosevelt, in describing the “Platt ma- 
chine” as he found it when he became governor, no doubt 
had some of these men in mind: 


_ In the country districts especially, there were many places 
where his machine included the majority of the best citi- 
zens, the leading and substantial citizens, among the inhabit- 
ants. Some of his strongest and most efficient lieutenants 
were disinterested men of high character.* 


The New York City “brethren” had an advantage over 
their country brothers in that they could drop in at the 
“Amen Corner” upon week days. One brother who was 
welcome at any time was Benjamin F. Tracy, a native of 
‘Owego and Platt’s boyhood friend. Tracy was elected dis- 
trict attorney of Tioga County the year that Platt was lead- 
ing the campaign glee club. Following the Civil War in 
which he had risen to the rank of brigadier general, Tracy 
took up the practice of law in New York City and Brooklyn. 


2Who’s Who in America, 1908-9, V, 864. 
3 Op. cit., p. 293. 
4Jbid., p. 278. 


PLATTS “SUNDAY SCHOOL CLASS” 67 


He defended Henry Ward Beecher in the famous trial, and 
he served for nearly thirteen months upon the highest court 
in the state by the appointment of Governor Cornell. When, 
Tracy became President Harrison’s secretary of the navy in 
1889, he left his law practice to a firm of which Platt’s 
son was a member.® It is needless to say that the relations 
between Platt and Tracy were of the friendliest sort. How< 
ever, the case of Chauncey M. Depew, who frequented the, 
“Amen Corner” in the late nineties as an intimate of Platt, 
is not so apparent. Platt and Depew belonged to opposing 
factions of the Republican party for the greater part of 
their early careers, but there were “harmony dinners” in the, 
nineties.© Depew was known for his legal connections with 
the Vanderbilts which started in 1866, and, as the railway 
system attached to that family expanded, Depew’s interests 
and duties also increased. He was president of the New 
York Central Railroad from 1885 to 1898 when he was made 
chairman of the board of directors.? He was extremely use- 
ful in the party councils not only because of his wide busi- 
ness connections ® but also because he furnished the passes 
which brought the local leaders from all over the state to the 
“Sunday school.” ® Another one of Platt’s older friends in 
New York was Edward Lauterbach, attorney in important> 
railway, telephone and maritime cases and a director of the 
Third Avenue Surface Railroad Company.® Lauterbach 
knew the intricacies of New York City politics. These men 


5 Tracy, Boardman & Platt. 

6 Platt, op. cit., pp. 373, 493. 

7 Depew, My Memories, p. 227. 

8In 1901 Depew was a director in 52 railroad companies, 9 finan 
cial institutions, 3 bridge companies, 2 coal companies, 2 terminal 
coinpanies, the Equitable Life Assurance Co., the Western Union 
Telegraph Co., The Audit Company, Directory of the Directors in 
the City of New York, 1901. 

9 Statement of Mr. Depew to the writer on September 25, 1922. 

10 Leslie, op. cit. 


— oe 


68 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


were intimately connected with the economic and social life 
of the metropolis and their advice therefore carried weight 
in the party deliberations. Roosevelt, being a native of the 
city himself, had more chance to know the city “Brethren.” 
He was friendly toward Depew but he was persona non 7 
grata with Tracy and Lauterbach. oe 
Among Platt’s “Young Men” in the great city, two stand 
out prominently, Timothy L. Woodruff and Lemuel E. 
Quigg. “Tim” Woodruff, the captain of the Kings County 
Republican organization, was a man of education™ and 
wealth, and like Fassett, Depew and several other Platt coun- 
cillors, he was in politics because he “liked the game.” 
Woodruff began attending state conventions in 1885, he went 
to the National Convention of 1888, and in 1897 he appeared 
upon the state committee. As commissioner of parks in 
Brooklyn, he acquired great popularity among all classes in 
spite of his reputation as a member of the “silk stocking dis- 
trict.” Because of his interests in grain elevators, manufac- 
turing concerns, and financial institutions in Brooklyn, he 
was well known in business circles. Platt “recognized” 
Woodruff as the spokesman for Kings County and put him 
on the same ticket with Roosevelt. It can hardly be said that 
Lemuel E. Quigg occupied a position in New York anal- 
ogous to that of Woodruff in Kings, but Quigg was never- 
theless influential with Platt and Roosevelt. Quigg was a 
newspaper man but not a proprietor of a party organ like 
Barnes, Fassett, or Warren. From 1885 to 1895 he served as 
an editorial writer and special correspondent upon the New 
York Tribune, and he was then known as one of Whitelaw 
Reid’s “Boys.” In the congressional campaign in 1890 and 
the presidential campaign of 1892, he had written much of 
the “literature” of the Republican party.4* When Platt 


11A.B., Yale University, 1879. 
12 New York Tribune, Jan. 31, 1894, 


PIAT TAS SUNDAY SCHOOL CLASS” 69 


helped Quigg secure a nomination to Congress, Quigg broke 
with his former employer and became the editor for a time 
of the New York Press, a Republican paper which was 
bought by some of Platt’s friends.1* Quigg attracted atten- 
tion when he won an election to Congress and he was valu- 
able to both Platt and Roosevelt as one of the party’s public- 
ity men. 

All the members of Platt’s “Sunday school,” were “influ- 
ential men.” The influence of some depended upon their 
newspaper, their business, or their professional connections, 
while others were influential simply because of the size of 
the vote which they were in the habit of delivering. The 
sessions of Platt’s select “Sunday school,’ were not al- 
ways harmonious. There were personal and sectional con- 
flicts which almost broke up some of the meetings. Thus, 
“Lou” Payn never liked Quigg,* and in 1899 Barnes com; 
plained to Platt about a “characteristically insolent and in- 
sufferable dispatch from Mr. Quigg.” ® The up-state man- 
agers in general thought that Quigg was too ardent in serv- 
ing the interests of his New York constituents. There was 
a clearer case of the conflict of sectional interests in the. 
“classes” which Platt held upon the liquor question. “Uncle” 
John Raines, from the heart of an agricultural section of: 
the state, presented the case for high license and state-wide 
supervision of the liquor traffic. ‘Brother’ Lauterbach 
realized that such a law would be unpopular with his constit- 
uents not only because of their beer-loving propensities but 
also because the revenue producing sections of the law dis- 
criminated against the city in favor of the rural districts. 
When Platt accepted the views of Raines upon this subject, 

13 New York “Press” investigation, op. cit., pp. 22, 41. 

14 Tbid., p. 454. 

15 Barnes v. Roosevelt, case on appeal, appellate division, 4th De- 


partment (New York Supreme Court), p. 1161. Letter of Barnes 
to Platt, July 14, 1899, 


70 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


he had to mollify the chagrin of the metropolitan chieftain 
‘as well as he could.4® Another difference of opinion devel- 
oped whenever the question of canal improvement came up. 
‘Captains Fassett and Dunn, not coming from cities which 
.were on the line of the canal, objected to enormous exped- 
itures in the domains of Captains Hazel, Ellsworth, Al- 
dridge, Hendricks, and Barnes. A similar conflict arose 
over the question of state control of the insane asylums. 
Under the old system of local control the lunatics were half 
fed and wretchedly cared for. Some of the up-state leaders 
objected to state control because it would mean added state 
taxation in the rural districts and lessened local patronage.” 
The general subject of patronage furnished an everlasting 
bone of contention for the “Sunday school scholars,” and 
there was bitter strife over the nomination of Roosevelt for 
governor in 1898. In fact, as Platt’s long experience and 
‘history shows, internal dissensions among the party mana- 
gers was the great danger which his organization faced. 
One of Platt’s main functions as a leader was the mainte- 
nance of harmony among the “Boys” at all hazards. 

A testimonial as to Platt’s success in teaching the “Sun- 
_ day school” and in maintaining order has been given by a 
high authority. Mr. Elihu Root was not a member of the 
“Sunday school” as he was often associated with the reform 
elements of the party, but he knew where the Fifth Avenue 
Hotel was, and his professional work brought him in touch 
with some of the scholars. Mr. Root was counsel for the 
_Havemeyers in the Sugar Trust investigation conducted by 
a committee of the state legislature in 1891,}8 and he was the 
attorney for the New York newspapers in the Senate inves- 


16 Nation, March 18, 1897, LXIV, 194. 

17 Statement of Mr. Depew to the writer on September 25, 1922. 
_ 18 New York State Legislature, Sen. Doc. No. 79, 1891 (Report of 
the legislative committe relating to trusts, especially the sugar trust). 








SENATOR PLATT AT 49 BROADWAY 
(Photograph by Van der Weyde) 


PLATT’S “SUNDAY SCHOOL CLASS” 7\ 


tigation of the charges made by the New York Press against . 
“Lou” Payn and State Senators Raines, Robertson and 
Coggeshall. Mr. Root also made some investigations on 
his own account of the Republican organization in New 
York County. Mr. Root’s distinguished career adds pres- 
tige to the words that he uttered before the New York Con, 
stitutional Convention of 1915 in defense of the short ballot 
amendment : 


Then Mr. Platt ruled the state; for nigh upon twenty years 
he ruled it. It was not the governor; it was not the legislat 
ture; it was not any elected officers; it was Mr. Platt. And 
the capitol was not here; it was at 49 Broadway; with Mr, 
Platt and his lieutenants. It makes no difference what name 
you give, whether you call it Fenton or Conkling or Cornell 
or Arthur or Platt, or by the names of the men now living. 
The ruler of the state during the greater part of the forty 
years of my acquaintance with the state government has not 
been any man authorized by the constitution or by the law; 
and, sir, there is throughout the length and breadth of this 
state a deep and sullen and long-continued resentment at be- 
ing governed thus by men not of the people’s choosing. The 
party leader is elected by no one, accountable to no one, 
bound by no oath of office, removable by no one.? 


It must be remembered that his speech on the “invisible” 
government was delivered to prove a point. It would be 
hard to pick twenty years throughout which it could be said 
that Platt was a “ruler.” He held undisputed sway over 
the Republican organization in the state of New York from 
about 1889 to 1901, the twelve-year period in which Roose- 
velt was making his mark in state affairs.* Even in the hey- 


1Elihu Root, Addresses on Government and Citizenship (Cam- 
bridge, 1916), p. 202. 

2In the following chapters it will be necessary to use some ma- 
terial which came out after 1901, but the bulk of the sources are 
from the period of the nineties. 


72 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


day of his power during McKinley’s presidency, Platt was 
not a “ruler” in any dictatorial sense. Some of his follow- 
ers were more determined and forceful than he was. He di- 
rected their activity by reconciling their differences. Para- 
doxical as it may seem, he was a leader because he knew 
how to follow. 


CHAPTER V 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 
PARTY COMMITTEES 


The hierarchy of party committees was the central frame- 
work of the party machinery by means of which Platt “ruled 
the state.” During his long political apprenticeship, Platt . 
had acquired an accurate knowledge of the structure and 
the functions of these committees and in his “Sunday school” 
he imparted this learning to his under-officers. It is likely 
that one of the first lessons that he taught was the import- 
ance of the state committee in every branch of the party’s 
work. At any rate, a large proportion of those whom Platt 
admitted into the inner circle were sufficiently convinced of 
the importance of this committee to become members of it 
themselves. Thus, in 1898, Odell, Payn, Barnes, Dunn, 
Hendricks, Aldridge and Hazel were state committeemen> 
An impartial observer of the governmental process in the 
state said, ‘““The members of the state committee were far 
more powerful factors in determining what should be the 
policy of the state than any one in the public service of the 
state.” 1 The organization of this committee should be un- 
derstood before taking up the nominating process itself, as 
it had more to do with the nomination of Roosevelt for gov- 
ernor and vice-president than any other body. 

The Republican state committee consisted of one member 
from each congressional district, elected by the delegates to 
the state convention residing in the congressional district 


I H. E. Deming, “Political Organization in New York, 1882-1904,” 
_ New York Conference for Good City Government (1905), p. 314- 
es! 


74 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


which the state committeeman was to represent.? This meant 
that during Platt’s “reign” there were thirty-four state com- 
mitteemen, fourteen of whom came from New York and 
Brooklyn. Although the population of congressional dis- 
trict was required by law to be as nearly equal as possible, 
‘the party vote varied widely in the several districts. As a re- 
sult, Committeeman Dunn represented about 30,000 Repub- 
lican voters whereas several New York committeemen repre- 
sented around 6,000 Republican voters.2 The actual selec- 
tion of the state committeemen was the result of a natural 
process similar to the process by which Platt was selected 
general leader. The committeeman was the one to whom 
the local party workers looked for advice, and usually he 
» was also the man whom Platt “recognized” in the distribu- 
tion of campaign funds, offices, and patronage.* The import- 
‘ance of a committeeman in determining the policy of the 
party depended upon his personality and the strength of the 
“organization” behind him. Whatever the policy adopted, 
it was the duty of each committeeman to carry it out in his 
particular district. The personnel of the committee varied 
little during the period of Platt’s ascendency, thus showing 
the tendency among the local leaders to perpetuate them- 
selves in power.® 

Shortly after the state convention at which they were se- 
lected had adjourned, the state committeemen would assem- 
\ble in the Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York for the purpose 
of organizing the state committee. Before the meeting Platt 
would be seen busily talking in the hotel corridors.6 The 


2Tbid., and R. H. Fuller, Government by the People (New York, 
1908), p. 191. Mr. Fuller was Governor Hughes’ private secretary. 

8 According to the returns of the congressional elections of 1898. 

4See below p. 219. 

5In 1896, ten retired, an unusually large number. New York 
Tribune, Aug. 27, 1896. 3 

6 New York Tribune, May 8, 1898 and Sept. 6, 1900. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 75 


first officer selected was the chairman of the committee. In 
1894 and 1896 this was Charles W. Hackett, of Utica. In 
the latter year Hackett was especially indebted to Platt be- 
cause he had been seated in the state convention in spite of 
the fact that his rivals in Utica had defeated him at the pri- 
maries.” Long before this Platt had said, “My relations with 
Chairman Hackett are of the most cordial nature.” ® Platt 
realized that it was necessary for him to use his influence to 
select a chairman with whom he could co-operate, because 
the chairman often did most of the work of the committee} 
In pronouncing his benediction upon “field-marshals who 
were faithful,’ Platt mentions first the state chairmen.® 
Odell, who succeeded Hackett in 1898, was especially-valu- 
able because he thoroughly systematized the work and in- 
troduced “business methods.” *° Before Odell became gov- 
ernor in 1901, he and Platt maintained the closest of rela- 
tions in the management of the party.4! Following the 
election of a chairman, the committee proceeded to elect a 
secretary, a treasurer, and a chief clerk. The last mentioned 
position, wnich was held by Reuben L. Fox for many years, 
was a Salaried post of a highly confidential character. The 
committee then proceeded to authorize the chairman to ap- 
point two important committees. The first of these was the 
advisory committee, which was made up of men who were 
not members of the state committee but whose advice was 
likely to be sought in party matters. During the nineties, 
when Platt’s congressional district was represented by 
Colonel Dunn, Platt’s official relation to the party was mem- 
bership on this committee. Other members of the advisory 
committee were Chauncey M. Depew, Edward Lauterbach 


7New York Tribune, Aug. 26, 1896 and Sept. 2, 1896. 
8 Ibid., Sept. 8, 1893. 

® Platt, op. cit., pp. 513, 257. 

10 New York Tribune, Sept. 9, 1900. 

11 Platt, op. cit., p. 423. 


76 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


and Frank Hiscock.!® The second committee appointed was 

‘the so-called executive committee, made up of the eighteen 
members of the state committee who were regarded as the 
most active party workers. Odell was the chairman of this 
committee from 1894 to 1898 when he was succeeded by 
‘Barnes who held the office until it was abolished in 1906.18 
The powers of ihe state committee were often delegated to 
this smaller body.** 

While the state committee might reorganize any county 
committee, the county committees were ordinarily supreme 
within their own spheres, exercising constantly a wide con- 
trol over all the other local organizations. Each of Platt’s 
field-marshals in charge of a local division occupied a posi- 
tion with reference to his county committee analogous to 
Platt’s relation to the state committee. In Monroe and Onon- 
daga Counties, State Committeemen Aldridge and Hendricks 
were members ex officio of their respective county commit- 
tees.° In Albany County, the chairman of the county com- 
mittee was a faithful and loyal lieutenant of State Commit- 
teeman Barnes.4® This was the usual relation between the 
local boss or leader and the county chairman although in 
Chemung County, J. Sloat Fassett, was chairman of the 
county committee himself for a number of years.!” No suc- 
cessful field-marshal let his county chairman get out of hand. 

The county committees were selected in various ways; in 
some counties, by assembly districts,!® in others, by wards-~ 


12 New York Tribune, Sept. 1, 1896. 

13 Barnes v. Roosevelt, loc. cit., testimony of April 30, 1915. 

14 New York Tribune, June 11, 1896. . 

15 Rules and Regulations of the Republican Party in the County of 
Onondaga, 1898; Ibid., in the County of Monroe. 

16 Oficial New York, II, 62-63. 

1 The Constitution of the Republican Organization of the County 
of Chemung, addenda, 1901. 

18 Rules and Regulations for the counties of New York, Kings, 
Cayuga, Onondaga and Monroe. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 77 


and towns,!® or by election precinct districts. The dele- 
gates were apportioned in accordance with the number of 
Republican votes cast at the last preceding gubernatorial 
election in the particular unit used as a basis of representa- 
tion. Sometimes the selection was made by the party voters 
directly in their assembly district, ward, township, or election 
district associations. This method was made compulsory in 
counties containing cities of the first class by the primary 
law of 1898.%° However, in some of the less populous coun- 
ties an indirect method was used. The party voters selected 
ward and town committeemen who in turn selected one of 
their number to serve as a delegate to the county committee. 
The actual selection of the county committee, like that of the 
state committee, depended upon the dominant clique or boss 
and the ability of the ward, town, assembly district, or elec- 
tion district leader to hold his association together. 

The other committees of the Republican party in the state 
were closely related to the county committee. In populous 
urban counties like New York, Kings, Erie, Monroe, and 
Albany, the county committee was supreme over and in parts 
identical with the judicial, the congressional, the senatorial, 
the assembly, and the city committees. Thus, in Monroe 
County, the congressional committee was identical with the 
general county committee; the city committee was made up 
of the general committee, representing the several wards in 
the city of Rochester; the two senatorial committees con- 
sisted respectively of the members of the general committee 
representing the several wards and towns in the respective 
senatorial districts of the county; and the four assembly dis- 
trict committees were made up in a similar manner of the 
general committeemen from the respective assembly dis- 


19 Chemung County. 
20 Law 1898, ch. 179, Sec. 9, Committees and Rules and Negulations 


of Parties. 


78 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


tricts.2 This made nine “different,” party committees which 
looked to State Committeeman Aldridge for “advice.” The 
party committees in judicial, congressional, and senatorial 
districts which were made up of two or more counties were 
usually composed of the general or central committees from 
those counties. By integrating the various committees in 
this complicated manner the local leaders were able to con- 
solidate and perpetuate their power. 

The foundation of all these local committees was the elec- 
tion district or voting precinct leader. If the precinct cap- 
tains, even to a slight extent, failed to perform their duties 
in relation to the organization of the voters, there was 
trouble all along the line of the committee hierarchy.* The 
precinct captains in establishing personal and face-to-face 
contacts with the voters were performing the foundation 
work of the party structure. There were around 4,600 pre- | 
cinct captains in Platt’s political army during the late nine- 
ties.© That Platt did not neglect these lesser workers is in- 
dicated by the following testimonial from a Republican 


paper: 


Unlike another diplomatic leader, the late Samuel J. Til- 
den, Mr. Platt wrote letters. Hundreds of men in this state 
of local importance but unknown beyond their homes have 
felt the influence of his master mind expressed in letters 
of suggestion and advice that accomplished in the bulk great 
things. There was a subtle flattery in the deferential com- 
munication of a powerful leader with the modest local poli- 
ticlan in the back town. Mr. Platt seldom humiliated. He 


2 Rules and Regulations of the Republican Party.in Monroe Coun- 
ty, 1898. 

8 Constitution of the Republican Organization in Rensselaer Coun- 
ty, 1901. 

4See C. A. Beard, American Government and Politics (New 
York, 1910), pp. 665-67; C. E. Merriam, The American Party System 
(New York, 1922), pp. 68-70. 

5 Legislative Manual for 1898. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 79 


usually stimulated and developed what was in the man he 
addressed and his advice was usually taken.® 


The political conditions in New York County were so pe- 
culiar that the organization of the Republican party there 
deserves special consideration. As Platt himself wrote: “The 
Democratic majority in New York City is so large, so stolid, 
made up of elements so difficult to reach and convince, that 
an occasional victory on the part of Republican and other 
forces has been found to accomplish little.’? Roosevelt 
had also discovered how little the organization could accom 
plish in the city. The Republican organization in the city 
never gained a grip upon the enormous municipal patronage 
and was therefore compelled to look to those who controlled 
the state and national patronage for political favors. This» 
meant that the president of the New York County Com- 
mittee had to look to Platt for advice more often than some 
of the other county leaders and was therefore looked upon 
as Platt’s deputy rather than as a leader in his own right.® 
Although the presidents of this committee in the early nine- 
ties were Platt’s friends,” the election of Edward Lauter- 
bach as president in 1894 gave Platt a more absolute con- 
trol over the New York County organization than he had 
exercised before.? Nevertheless, it was said that only after 
a “ruthless and brutal” exercise of power was the committee 
induced to re-elect Lauterbach in 1896.!° Platt’s absolute 
control over the Republican organization in the city was con- 
tinued and strengthened under Lemuel. KE. Quigg who suc- 
ceeded Lauterbach as president of the county committee in 


6 Buffalo Evening News, March 7, 1910. 
7 Platt, op. cit., pp. 364-65. 
® Fuller, op. cit., pp. 207-8. 

§ Platt, op. cit., pp. 514, 295. 
10 New York Tribune, Jan. 18, 1896: “A howling burlesque, the 
utter coarseness and brutal horseplay of which had not a single 

redeeming feature.” 


80 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


1897.41. Some of the assembly district leaders who were 
most active in the affairs of the executive committee of the 
county committee were state committeemen and federal or 
state office holders indebted to Platt.1* In spite of Platt’s 
claims regarding a stronger and larger Republican organiza- 
tion in the city during the years from 1896 to 1900, there was 
always a strong anti-machine or anti-Platt minority which 
gave him considerable trouble, especially in municipal elec- 
tions. Although the number of officers elected locally in 
New York City was never a considerable item in Platt’s cal- 
culations, the delegates to the state conventions from the 
thirty-five assembly districts of the city constituted a factor 
which could not well be neglected, and their selection was 
accordingly given proper attention. 

Since the committee hierarchy was the permanent part of 
the party structure, Platt watched its make-up with consid- 
erable care. Local factional fights, which usually took the 
form of a struggle for the control of the county committee, 
were matters of great interest to him. His counsel was 
given freely to committeemen, high and low, and he was al- 
ways ready to lend a listening ear to their troubles. His 
central control over nominations and elections depended 
upon a strong flexible network of committees. 


PRIMARIES 


Theoretically the party committees were chosen in accord- 
ance with the principles of representative democracy. The 
members of the Republican party, organized in assembly 
district, ward, town or precinct associations, came together 
at the primary polling places and selected the committeemen 
who would represent them in party matters. In actual prac- 
tice, however, the committeemen exercised sweeping control 

11 Platt, op. cit., p. 360. 


12 New York Tribune, June 15, 1898. 
5 Tbid., p. 1887. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 81 


over the very associations which nominally chose them. 
Prior to the passage of the primary law of 1898 which af- 
fected only the largest cities in the state, the county com- 
mittees in every part of the state regulated the qualifications 
and tests of party membership in town, ward or assembly 
district associations. The rules and regulations for the con- 
duct of the party primaries were also under their control.¥ 
Thus, the first step in the nominating process, the setting of 
a time and place for the holding of a primary to elect dele- 
gates to the various nominating conventions, was under the 
control of the local committee." 

Ordinarily there were few objections raised against the 
way in which the local committeemen perpetuated their 
power. The indifference of the great body of party voters 
gave the committeemen a free hand. However, in 1897, 
John FE. Milholland, one of the Anti-Platt leaders, said 
regarding the conduct of the New York primaries: 


The vicious practices no longer possible at the polls are 
now employed in the caucus and in the nominating conven= 
tion with an energy unparalleled in the past, although every- 
thing undertaken no matter how villainous, is carried on in 
-a manner entirely in keeping with modern methods. The 
party caucus is today the danger point in American politics: 
The fountain head of power, it has become the fountain 
head of corruption.” 


Mr. Milholland was most familiar with the situation in New 
York City and he went on to mention party enrollments one- 
half fraudulent and caucuses controlled by the worst ele- 


13 Deming, loc. cit., p. 309. 
14The Law of 1887, chap. 265, applicable to counties containing 
a town or city of over 200,000, regulated the primaries to a very 
limited extent and in part recognized the rule making power of 
the party. See C. E. Merriam, Primary Elections (Chicago, 1908), 
Spece~23. 
15“The Danger Point in American Politics,’ Nor. Amer. Rev., 
CLVIX (January, 1897), 93. 
6 


82 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


ments of the party which recognized no rule other than that 
- of the mob. A different view was expressed a year later by 
William Barnes, who said: “I am not one of those who be- 
lieve that primary elections in the state of New York are 
largely fraudulent, and from my experience I know that in 
a very large percentage of instances there are not.” 2 This 
comment upon the primary system of the nineties by one of 
the members of the organization emphasizes the fact that 
when things were well in the hands of the leaders there was 
no need to employ extreme methods to control the primaries. 
The committeemen simply made up the party rolls from 
among those who were their supporters. On the other hand, 
when there was a factional quarrel or when the organization 
was fighting for its existence, the methods employed were 
more open to criticism. One instance in point was the “open 
flagrant proceedings at the Onondaga town caucus on August 
14, 1894” where a “herd of Italians, southern negroes and 
oiher men” employed by a city contractor were “marched to 
the polling place” and were beaten off only “after a fierce 
struggle” in which “the stalwart young Onondaga farmers 
forced the mob back again and barred the door with an old 
plow and a crow bar.” 7 Another case was described by S. 
.E. North, county judge of Genesee County, before the 
County Convention at Batavia in August, 1896, in the fol- 
lowing words: “I openly declare in the presence of this as- 
semblage that the town caucus of Saturday, August 8, as - 
carried or sought to be carried by the use of money and by 
indiscriminate treating, was disgraceful and scandalous in 
the last degree.” 38 

The local committee which did not care to use bribery or 


16 Nat. Conf. on Practical Reform of Primary Elections (1898), 
p. 94. 

17 Syracuse Journal, July 21, 1896. 

18 New York Tribune, March 8, 1898. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 83 


violence to control the party primaries, might still master 
the situation by a skillful use of its power over the procedure 
of the primaries. The “snap caucus,” called by the com- 
mittee long before the customary time, might take the oppo- 
sition unawares. Then, too, the committee might take ad- 
vantage of its power over the temporary organization of the 
caucus. How this could be done is illustrated by an account 
of a primary in a town in Tioga County, Platt’s home dis-~ 
trict, which was called to select delegates to the county con- 
vention, where delegates to the state convention were to be 
chosen. According to custom the meeting was opened by a 
member of the district committee. The rest of the meeting 
has been described as follows: | 


This loyal son of the machine nominated R. D. Van Duzer 
for temporary chairman, immediately upon calling the meet= 
ing to order, and proceeded to declare him elected without 
taking time for the trivial formality of calling for a vote, al- 
though other nominations were offered. Mr. Van Duzer, 
however, was troubled with no qualms as to the method of 
his election, but took the chair with alacrity and.called for 
nominations for delegates. Senator Johnson then presented 
the names of the machine candidates, and J. W. Morgan 
nominated Anti-Platt men. W. L. Watrous, of the Anti- 
Machine men, demanded a ballot. The chairman not only 
refused this, but went on to make mincemeat of parliamen- 
tary law and common decency by ignoring the Anti- Machine 
nominees altogether and calling for a vote of acclamation on 
the first three candidates, those proposed by Senator John- 
son. A viva voce vote was taken, and although the motion to 
elect was opposed by a majority of three to one, the chair- 
man declared the Platt delegates duly elected. 

After this ruling, a Platt man at once moved to adjourn. 
This motion also was opposed by the greater part of the 
house, but the chairman promptly declared it carried, with 
the help of Senator Johnson, and brought the meeting to a 
close 90 seconds after it had been called to order.” 


19 New York Tribune, July 29, 1896. See also issue of Mar. 8 
1898. | 


84 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


Although the rural districts were not free from com- 
plaints about the abuses of the old time open caucus system, 
the city of New York was the center of the primary reform 
agitation. One of the disputed points in the city organization 
was the question of party membership. In 1888, one observ-_ 
er remarked that “membership in the Republican organiza- 
tions was given or denied capriciously, and that the nominal 
qualifications became in practice ‘acceptability to the assem- 
bly leader.’” ®® In 1893, in the face of a great Republican 
victory throughout the state, Tammany rolled up a larger 
vote than ever in New York City. In the light of such 
treachery and inefficiency, Platt “fully realized the impera- 
tive necessity of a reorganization.” + Mr. Milholland, backed 
by Whitelaw Reid, started one of the attempts at reform, 
and he received Platt’s support at first. However, another 
movement, inaugurated by the “heavy respectables” in the 
party under the leadership of Cornelius N. Bliss and a 
Committee of Thirty, received the favor of the state com- 
mittee. According to Bliss, Platt “was only prevented from 
breaking up the party in this county by the shrewder mem- 
bers of the state committee.” * In the reorganization which 
followed, the Committee of Thirty refused to eliminate the 
old leaders and thereby prepared the way for its own “fun- 
eral’ and the selection of Lauterbach as the head of the 
city organization. That conditions were not materially 
changed was indicated by the circumstances surrounding 
Lauterbach’s re-election to the presidency of the county 
committee in 1896. The election was held in the middle of 
January in spite of the protests that it be postponed until 
after the report of a Committee of Twenty-five under the 


20 A. C. Bernheim, “Political Organizations and Their Nomina- 
tions in New York City,” Pol. Sct. Quart., III, 106. 

1 Platt, op. cit., p. 254. 

2Statement in New York Tribune, Jan. 28, 1896. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 8 


chairmanship of Bliss which was investigating the alleged 
enrollment frauds.2 According to the report of this com- 


mittee, which came out after the election, the Republican _ 


enrollment in New York City was from fifteen to forty-five 
per cent bogus and the names of some Tammany Hall lead- 
ers had been placed upon the rolls. Some well known Re- 
publicans declared that their names had been stricken off the 
rolls for no defensible reason. Dr. Parkhurst said: “There 
is a brazen insolence and a colassal dare-deviltry about these 
enrollment frauds which is thrilling.”® Platt placed the 
responsibility for this enrollment upon the Committee of 
Thirty,® but Lauterbach later defended it partly on the 
ground that the organization based upon it achieved a great 
victory that year.”. The evidence seems to indicate that the 
delegates to the committee meeting which gave Platt’s 
“friends” the control of the city organization were elected 
not by primary meetings of the party voters, but by small 
select clubs, “close corporations” composed largely of “hand 
picked machine men.” ® Roosevelt was not at this time a 
prominent champion of primary reform. 

The Republican legislature of 1898 seemingly recognized 
the popular demand for “pure” primaries by passing an elab- 
orate primary law. The skeptics said in advance that the 
“organizations” knew how they could “beat” the law.2 Of 
interest in this connection was the fact that the law was com- 
pulsory only in cities having a population of fifty thousand 


8 New York Tribune, Jan. 17, 1896. For the report see issues of 
Jan. 18 and 31, 1896. E. Root, J. H. Choate, Charles S. Smith and 
Horace Porter were members of this committee. 

National Conference on Primary Elections, p. 124. 

5 New York Herald, Jan. 27, 1896. 

8 Tbid. 

7 National Conference on Primary Elections, p. 115. 

8 Dallinger, op. cit., p. 109. 

9 Nation, March 31, 1898, LXVI, 236. 


86 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


or more.!? It was merely optional in cities or villages con- 
‘taining a population between five and fifty thousand," and it 
did not apply to the rural districts at all. In the debate over 
the final passage of the bill, Senator Tibbits, of Rensselaer 
County, said on this point: 


I heartily agree with Senator Ellsworth in his demand 
for reform of the rural primaries, and I hope the bill be 
amended so as to give every voter in the state, rural or city, 
a chance to express his will at the primaries, and to-have his 
vote honestly counted. The same reasons exist for granting 
rural voters primary reform as there are for granting it to 
city voters. There is the same fraud, the same bribery, at 
rural primaries as at city primaries.” 


Where the law applied, it prescribed the qualifications en- 
titling one to participate in a primary down to the minutest 
details and its definition of party membership was liberal 
enough to include all Republican factions. Party rules re- 
garding party membership were supplanted, and the voter 
was given an opportunity to enroll as a member of one of the 
statutory parties when he registered to vote. In fact, the 
entire primary process was placed under the control of the 
regular election officials. It was supposed that this law 
would greatly increase the participation of the voters in the 
primaries. Under the old system primary elections had been 
held in parts of New York in which less than eight per cent 
of the Republican voters took part.* The new law did not 
change conditions materially. In 1903, in an assembly dis- 
trict which gave a majority to the mayoralty candidate sup- 
ported by the Republican party, only nine per cent of the 


10 New York, Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, Albany and Troy. 

11 Tt could be adopted by a rule passed by the county committee 
or by a referendum vote initiated by the county committee or by a 
petition signed by one-tenth of the voters. 

12 New York Tribune, March 24, 1898. 

13 Fuller, op. cit., p. 44. 

14 Bernheim, op. cit., p. 114. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 87 


Republican voters took part in the primary. In the 
“fashionable Brown-stone district” of New York City, only 
thirteen per cent of the Republicans availed themselves of 
the privilege of participating in the primary election.!® As it 
was remarked in the New York Tribune after the first pri- 
mary under the new law: “The reformers were allowed té 
enroll if they wanted to; the machine men were made to.” 1® 
The first county committee selected in accordance with this. 
law re-elected Lemuel E. Quigg as its president?” 

One of the reasons for the small primary vote in the Re- 
publican primaries in New York City was the growth of the 
non-partisan movement in municipal elections. This move- 
ment was given slight encouragement in the law of 1898 
which provided for a cumbrous, expensive and complicated 
method of making nominations to municipal office, unless 
such nominations were made by organizations that cast at 
least 10,000 ballots for governor at the last preceding guber- 
natorial election.18 In this indirect fashion the law discrim- 
inated in favor of the regular Republican and Democrat or- 
ganizations. The Citizens’ Union of New York City did 
not take part in state elections and consequently did not ful- 
fill the definition of a “political party” as laid down by the 
law. iw 

The new law not only discouraged independent move- 
ments outside of the two regular parties, but it also tended to 
lessen the danger of factionalism within the party. Accord- 
ing to some of Platt’s field marshals, the avowed purpose of 


15H. E. Deming and L. W. Trowbridge, “How the Primary Law 
Works in New York City,” Proc. of N. Y. Conf. for Good City 
Govt. (1905), p. 325. 

16 June 9, 1898. 

17 [bid., June 15, 1898. 

18H, E. Deming, “Municipal Nomination Reform,” Annals of the 
Amer. Acad., XXV, 203. 


88 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


the law was to produce “harmony” in the Republican party }° 
and to eliminate the “malcontents” who “posed somewhat 
_ successfully as the representatives of the people” and re- 
fused to make their contest at the “recognized” time and 
place on account of alleged primary frauds.*° Before the 
law was passed, it had been customary for the party com- 
mittees to present the party voters with a prearranged list 
of delegates to vote for at the primary meeting. After the 
law was passed, the city committees had more power than 
ever over the making up of “the slate.” According to a dis- 
trict committeeman from Buffalo, the law “had a distinctly 
bad effect in putting obstacles in the way of independent 
movements within the parties and in discouraging con- 
tests.’ Inasmuch as the party committees and the dele- 
gates to the various conventions were all elected upon the 
same ticket, a man who wanted to make a contest for any 
one nomination had to obtain the names of the “regular” can- 
didates for the other places on the ticket or put up an entire 
ticket of his own. Since it was difficult for an individual to 
follow either of these courses of action, the usual result was 
that the leaders were left in almost absolute control of the 
whole ticket. It is significant to note that there were no 
contests to report at the first state convention which was held 
after the new law went into effect. “Harmony” reigned 
supreme. 

Platt’s contact with the primary elections which continued 
his committeemen and his delegates in power in the nineties 
was not very direct. Roosevelt’s connection with the primar- 
ies in the late nineties was even more indirect. As long as 


19 Timothy L. Woodruff at the hearing on the bill, cited in Sena- 
tor Tibbits’ speech, New York Tribune, March 24, 1898. 

20 William Barnes, in the National Conference for Practical Re- 
form of Primary Elections, p. 95. 

1H. A. Bull, “The New York Primary Law,” Mich. Pol. Sct. 
Asso. (1905), p. 99. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 89 


the structure of the committee hierarchy was unimpaired, 
both men could watch the primary elections with an air of 
complacency. The local committees saw that the loyal Re- 
publicans were enrolled, that they were furnished with a 
list of loyal candidates and that they were gotten out to vote 
for that list upon primary day. A primary election, like a 
regular election, had many legitimate expenses. Notices and 
ballots had to be printed ; halls had to be hired; and the com- 
mittee had much clerical work to perform. Platt, through 
his relations with the state committee, could give financial 
help to local committees that were confronted with trouble. 
in the primaries.? : 


CONVENTIONS 


The precinct captains who were successful in getting out 
the primary vote looked for their reward to the various 
committees which supervised the party conventions. The 
county convention was the most important local assemblage 
because it formally ratified the decisions and adjustments 
made by the county committee. The local leader, whose ad- 
vice was accepted by the county committee, had under his 
control practically all the important local nominations. This 
was especially true of the more populous counties of the state 
where the Republican leader looked forward to the follow- 
ing conventions: city conventions to nominate city officers, 
county conventions to nominate county officers, assembly dis- 
trict conventions to nominate state assemblymen and to elect 
delegates to state conventions, senatorial district conventions 
to nongnate state senators, and congressional district conven- 
tions to nominate candidates for Congress and to elect dele- 
gates to Republican national conventions.® 


2 For examples of such interference see New York Tribune, Mar. 
8, 1898, editorial entitled “Rural Politics.” 
3“The power of the political ‘boss’ depends upon his ability to 


90 BOSS ‘PLATT ‘ANDiHIS NEW YORK MACHIN= 


. The various party committees exercised autocratic and 
wide sweeping powers over the conventions held within their 
respective jurisdictions. The committee which issued a call 
for a convention also made up the temporary roll of that con- 
\ vention and appointed the temporary officers. Wherever the 
primaries were close and hotly contested, the faction which 
_had control of the party committee could employ this power 
to seat delegates arbitrarily in its own behalf. If this device 
was not sufficient to insure a tractable convention, the 
methods described in the following account of a New York 
assembly district convention might be used: 


The man who was designated by the county committee to 
call that convention to order stood upon a narrow platform, 
with a police captain directly in front of him, called for nom- 
inations for temporary chairman, refused every demand for 
a call of the roll, would not permit a standing vote, but 
simply called for viva voce vote on the nominations made, 
and declared that one elected who was favored by the minor- 
ity of that convention, claiming to base his declaration on his 
perception of volume of sound. The one so declared elected 
chairman was immediately inducted into office, the police 
captain standing in front protecting him in the retention of 
his place upon the platform, and that man in presiding over 
that convention never once allowed a call of the roll or a 
standing vote, but decided everything, even to his declaring 
the close of the convention, on his perception of volume of 
sound—recognized no appeal or any objection or protest 
whatsoever. The real majority of that convention, retaining 
their places on the floor, were obliged to organize the con- 
vention and conduct the proceedings without a platform for 
the real chairman to occupy.* 

oe 
control the primaries and through that control to fill the offices 
with men of his own choosing who will be subservient to him.” 
Fuller, op. cit., p. 34. For an example of the great number of 
conventions within a single county, see Rules~and Regulations of 
the Republican Party of Monroe County. 


4 National Conference on Primary Elections, p. 126. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 91 


Even if a majority of the delegates did organize the con- 
vention in their own way, the minority factional leader who 
had the favor of Platt and the state organization was not 
without his resources. He could hold a “rump” convention 
and appeal to the state committee to recognize the candidates 
nominated by his convention as “regular.”*® In matters of 
party regularity, the state committee usually decided in favor 
of the party management and its decisions were not gener- 
ally subject to judicial review. In fact, the highest court in 
the state said: “We think that in cases where questions of 
procedure in conventions or the regularity of committees are 
involved, which are not regulated by law, but by party usages 
and custom, the officer called upon to determine such a ques- 
tion should follow the decision of the regularly constituted 
authorities of the party.” ® This opinion appeared in the de- 
cision of a case in which the Republican secretary of state 
had agreed with the Republican state committee that a rump 
congressional convention organized in Westchester County 
by one of Platt’s lieutenants was “regular” and that its 
nominee was entitled to a place upon the party’s ticket to the 
exclusion of the nominee selected by the anti-Platt faction.” 
As in the primaries, so in the conventions, the party rules 
and customs helped to conserve the power of the leaders.® 

The New York Primary Election Law of 1898 endeavored 
to eliminate the more flagrant abuses of the old convention 


5 New York Tribune, Dec. 4, 1897. 

6Jn the matter of Fairchild, 151 New York, 359. 

7 New York Tribune, December 2, 1897. 

8F, J. Goodnow, Politics and Administration (New York, 1900), p. 
214, cites another case that arose in Clinton County (48 New York 
Supp. 407). While the regular chairman of the county committee 
was away, a person belonging to the minority faction called the 
convention to order, and declared the election of a chairman and 
clerk who was favorable to his faction. The clerk was directed 
viva voce to cast a vote for the delegates of the same faction, and 
the convention was adjourned. The chairman of the county com- 


92 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


system that were prevalent in the larger cities of the state. 
The law contained elaborate provisions regarding the method 
of apportioning delegates, the election of temporary officers, 
and the decision of questions as to contested seats. It re- 
quired that the temporary chairman should be chosen by a 
roll call and that he bind himself by oath to the faithful per- 
formance of his duties. The purpose of this provision was 
to eliminate such arbitrary proceedings as the one described 
above. However, the law left many important matters still 
within the control of the party leaders. The chairman of 
the committee which issued the call for the convention still 
had charge of the temporary roll, the temporary chairman 
‘still appointed the conimittee on contested seats, and the con- 
vention itself was left as the final authority on questions re- 
garding the seating of delegates. Only certain minor mat- 
ters could be appealed to the courts.? Like other parts of the 
law, the provisions regulating convention procedure did not 
apply to the rural districts where some of the old buses were 
still prevalent. 

Platt was interested in the local conventions which were 
held in various parts of the state inasmuch as he realized 
that his success depended upon the success of his field-mar- 
shals in controlling these conventions, but his main interest 
was in the state convention which nominated state officers. 
According to William Barnes, the party leader in the state 
was the man who, “at the time when state conventions were 
held, seemed to be the most active operating force in ee 
convention.” 2¢ 


mittee then called the committee to order, and it was held by the 
court that those who remanied in the room constituted the regular 
convention, and its nominees were given a place upon the party’s 
ticket, while those elected by the other faction were not. 
8 New York Election Law, 1898, chap. 179, sec. 10 and sec. 11. 
10 Barnes v. Roosevelt, p. 1885. Mr. Barnes’ testimony of May 
131915. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 93 


The call for the state convention was sent out by the state 
committee several weeks in advance. In the call, the time 
and places for holding the convention and the number of 
delegates to which each assembly district was entitled were 
announced. The conventions for nominating the candidates 
for the governorship and the other state offices usually met 
in September in some out of the way town where the danger 
of a popular uprising stampeding the convention was slight. 
During the nineties, the state committee seemed to have a 
special liking for Saratoga Springs, the original convention 
town of the Republican party in the state." The total num- 
ber of delegates was usually around seven or eight hundred 
which meant that on the average there was a delegate to 
every thousand Republican voters in the state. The dele- 
gates were apportioned according to the Republican vote at 
the last gubernatorial convention, so the convention in form 
was a representative body. Among the delegates themselves 
were to be found the most active party workers in the state. 

The nomination of a candidate for governor was the most 
important task performed by the state convention, a task 
which engaged Platt’s attention long before the convention 
actually met. Thus, Platt started to work for the nomina- 
tion of Levi P. Morton a year before the State Convention 
of 1894. In 1900, the nomination of Benjamin B. Odell 
for governor was part of Platt’s program at least seven and 
one-half months before the convention met, while in 1898 it 
seems that Plait reached a decision upon Roosevelt’s nomina- 
tion several months before the convention was called to or- 
der.* In the other state conventions in which Platt was the 


11G. S. P. Kleeberg, op. cit., p. 18. 

12 New York Sun, Sept. 17, 1894. 

13 New York newspapers, Jan. 15, 1900. The convention met on 
Sept. 5, 1900. 

14 Albany Evening Journal, September 2, 1898. The convention 
met on September 28. 


94 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


“most active operating force,” he was unable to reach 
an early decision regarding he gubernatorial candidate. In 
1891, Platt had “sounded out” Andrew D. White regarding 
the governorship several weeks before the convention met,”® 
but when the delegates assembled, it was apparent that J- 
Sloat Fassett was his choice.® Platt’s indecision was even 
greater in 1896 partly because his own name had been 
pressed for the nomination. He characterized this conven- 
tion as “one of the most rousing free-for-all state conven- 
tions the party had had since war days.” 1” In this excep- 
tional gathering, he did not decide to support Frank S. 
Black’s candidacy until after the delegates had been in actual 
session for three days. Since Platt’s preliminary choices as 
announced in the newspapers became the actual choices of 
the conventions, except in the cases noted, it is apparent that 
in considering the procedure of state conventions it is im- 
portant to discuss how “the old man” made up his mind or 
how circumstances made up his mind for him. 

According to the terminology of the professional poli- 
ticians, the chief qualification of a gubernatorial candidate 
should be “availability.” In the “Sunday school classes” 
which Platt held in the nineties, this term was the subject of 
much exigesis. No doubt the first lesson that “Deacon” Platt 
taught was that “available” meant “available under the cir- 
cumstances.” In 1891 and 1898 this lesson was of great im- 
portance. In the other three gubernatorial years, the Repub- 
licans were fairly sure of victory. It has already been 
pointed out that Democratic dissentions made the way easy 
for Platt and his lieutenants in 1894 and 1896. In 1900 the 
issues and personalities of the presidential campaign were 


16 Autobiography of Andrew Dickson White (New York, 1905), 
I, 230. 

16 New York Tribune, September 7, 1891. 

17 Platt, op. cit., p. 329. 





NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 95 


enough like those of 1896 to cause the Republican state lead- 
ers to dismiss their misgivings regarding success. It was be- 
cause 1891 and 1898 were “off-years” that Platt considered 
men like Andrew D. White and Theodore Roosevelt for the 
gubernatorial nomination. On the other hand, whatever the | 
circumstances were, certain minimum requirements were 
laid down. The candidate must have had some experience 
in public life; he should know enough about the party sys- 
tem to appreciate the function of the “organization ;” and he 
must have some distinguishing characteristics which would 
commend him to the electorate. Thus, Fassett had a dis= 
tinguished record as leader of the state Senate }® and as 
national committeeman and collector for the port of New 
York he had become acquainted with the party machinery~ 
whereas Andrew D. White did not “know the boys who did 
the work.” !® These facts taken together with Fassett’s elo- 
quence made him “available” in 1891. Levi P. Morton; 
before his nomination for governor in 1894, had been a 
member of Congress, minister to France and vice-president 
of the United States. Morton was known to the party 
workers because he had once been a campaign fund collec- 
tor *° and among business circles he was known as a success- 
ful financier. Frank S. Black, as a member of Congress 
from “Lou” Payn’s district, was close enough to the organi- 
zation to eradicate the fears of the boys,} and while not 
widely known in 1896 prior to his nomination, he had had 
some notoriety as a prosecutor of election frauds. Theodore 
Roosevelt, with his record as state assemblyman, United 
States civil service commissioner, New York police commis- 


18 New York Tribune, Sept. 10, 1891. 

19 White, op. cit., p. 234. Comments of Professor Jenks of Cor- 
nell. 

20 Harpers Weekly, Sept. 15, 1894, XXX VIII, 867. 

1 Platt, op. cit., p. 330. 


96 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


sioner, assistant secretary of the navy, and Spanish-Ameri- 
can War veteran, easily fulfilled the requirements regarding 
experience in public office and prominence before the public 
eye. The question remained as to his attitude toward the 
organization and this he answered by an interview stating 
that he would not make war on the organization and that 
he would “consult” Platt.2 Besides, it was remembered that 
Roosevelt had always been “regular.” In 1900, no one 
questioned Odell’s loyalty to the “‘organization” or his knowl- 
edge about public office. He was commended to the voters 
as a “successful business man” and a former member of 
Congress. 

It was also impertant that the qualities enumerated above 
were possessed by the candidate in moderation. When 
Platt’s name was being considered by the inner council for 
the gubernatorial nomination, 1896, John Raines had the 
boldness and frankness to say that “the ticket wouldn't 
carry his weight.” Platt’s account of this same meeting 
ran to the effect that he refused to have his name consid- 
ered because he feared that his old time Half-Breed enemies 
would “knife” him in the back. He remembered the fate of 
Miller in 1888 and that of Hill in 1894, and he had no desire 
to be “scalped” in that fashion. Another man talked of at 
this conference was George W. Aldridge, the man who had 
served the organization well as the dispenser of the canal 
patronage, but like Platt he was regarded as weak because 
of his closeness to the “organization.” In like manner, 
Frank S. Black, who was “available” in 1896, was not “avail- 
able” two years later because his administration had been 
tinged with partisanship. Since the elimination of Black 
and the selection of Roosevelt in 1898 illustrate many phases 


2 New York Herald, Sept. 18, 1898. 
3 Alexander, Four Famous New Yorkers, p. 257. 
4Platt, op. cit., pp. 329-30. 











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“WE HAVE DISCOVERED IN MR, ROOSEVELT THE 
MISSING LINK.’—Joseph H. Choate 
(Cartoon by C. G. Bush, New York World, Oct. 7, 1898) 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 97 


of the pre-convention procedure, this event has been selected 
for special consideration. 

“Circumstances” made Theodore Roosevelt an “available” 
candidate for the Republican nomination for governor im 
1898. Platt expressed his views as follows: “I thought at 
the best we would have a hard time to elect a Republican 
governor in 1898. Already the canal appropriations were 
giving us trouble; the frictions between Governor Black and 
some of the state leaders were a source of anxiety.’’® One 
of the “frictions” here referred to was touched upon. by 
Quigg in a letter to Roosevelt in which he said: ‘The Goy- 
ernor’s taunt that I am opposed to him because I was ‘inter- 
ested’ in legislation which he prevented is dishonest talk.” ® 
The situation was still further complicated by what Platt 
called the “ultra-partisan acts of the Blank administration.” * 
Although Platt as the general manager of the Republican 
party in the state had greatly profited by some of these acts; 
he could not help but noting that the newspapers all over 
the state, with the exception of a few party organs, had de- 
nounced in vehement terms the reappointment of “Louw” 
Payn as superintendent of insurance.’ Platt was also having 
trouble in New York City. Many New York papers accused 
him of being responsible for the sweeping Tammany victory 

SOP scH.; p. 364. 

6 Barnes v. Roosevelt, p. 2354. Letter dated Sept. 10, 1898. 

7“ *Starchless’ civil service, which put practically every Demo- 
cratic office-holder out and installed a Republican organization man 
in his job; the appointment of Louis F, Payn as superintendent of 
insurance, and the other ultra-partisan acts of the Black adminiss 
tration, while they popularized it with the organization workers, 
aroused rebellion among the Independents. Black, offering no 
apologies for running a simon-pure party régime, planned a re= 
nomination and secretly nursed a hope that he would land the presi- 
dency.”—Platt, op. cit., p. 367. 

8 New York Herald, Jan. 16, 1897; Utica Press, Feb. 3, 1897 (un- 
favorable). For favorable comment see Binghamton Republican, 


Feb. 4, 1897. 
7 


98 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


in the first election for the control of Greater New York 
held the year before. .The anti-machine Republicans in the 
city were loud in calling for Platt’s “scalp.’’® Besides, the 
Republicans had lost the state-wide election of 1897 and had 
barely retained control over the state legislature. Alton’ B. 
Parker, one of Hill’s old lieutenants, had been elected chief 
justice of the Court of Appeals by a plurality of 60,000 over 
his Republican opponent. All of these events caused Platt 
“to do a heap of thinking” in 1898. The result of his medi- 
tation plus pressure from some of his lieutenants was a deci- 
sion to “turn down” Black for Roosevelt. The abandonment 
of a loyal party man like Black for a man of Roosevelt’s 
reputation was an act which required a good deal of flexibil- 
ity upon the part of Platt. 

Roosevelt has stated that it was Quigg who called upon 
him in August, 1898, at Montauk Point to “sound” him about 
the governorship.” Platt had no fondness for Rvosevelt;_ 
he had clashed with Roosevelt when the latter was civil 
service commissioner and he had opposed Roosevelt’s poli- 
cies as police commissioner.!! However, Platt needed the 
independent vote in 1898 and Roosevelt was the man most 
likely to attract that vote. Already several independent 
movements had begun to use Roosevelt’s name in con- 
nection with the gubernatorial campaign.’ Roosevelt 
did not discourage these movements at first. Quigg was 
quite well known to Roosevelt personally and after his 
visit he carried word to Platt that Roosevelt would not 


8New York World, Nov. 3, 1897; New York Herald, Nov. 4, 
1897; New York Tribune, Nov. 4, 1897; 'Utica Press, Nov.-3, 1897. 

10 Op. cit., p. 270. 

11H. Hagedorn, The Boy’s Life of Theodore Roosevelt (New 
York, 1918), p. 176, Letter of Roosevelt written in June, 1896. 


12 J. B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time (New York, 
1920), I, 110. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 99 


“make war’ upon the organization.4% Quigg afterwards 
wrote, “The Senator (Platt) has acted, to some extent 
at least, on my judgment and advice sufficiently to make 
me feel anxious about the way things turn out here- 
after.” '* It has also been asserted that Odell had a large 
share in bringing about the nomination of Roosevelt. 
Through a mutual friend Odell communicated with Colonel 
Roosevelt, while he was in Cuba, advising him that it was 
his intention to press his candidacy. In conversing with 
Platt, Odell suggested that Roosevelt was the only man with 
whom they could win that fall. After two months of hard 
work, Odell persuaded Platt to waive his prejudice and ac- 
cept Roosevelt as a candidate. Odell had just been elected 
chairman of the state committee and he was very anxious to 
win a victory. According to Roosevelt, Quigg, Odell and 
Hazel were among the foremost of the leaders who “pes- 
tered” Platt, declaring that the sentiment of the Republican 
voters demanded Roosevelt’s nomination and that Governor 
Black could not be re-elected.'® 
It is impossible to ascertain in any exact manner how 
much weight the opinion of these leaders carried with Sena- 
tor Platt. “Outsiders,” like the Rev. F. C. Iglehart, claimed 
that their views influenced the Senator.!” Pressures were 
brought to bear upon the aged chieftain from all quarters. 
On the other hand, it is fairly clear that Platt’s choice, once 
made, did have some influence upon the final choice of the 
organization. The homage which organization men paid to 


13 Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 271. 

14 Barnes v. Roosevelt, pp. 2354 ff. Quigg to Roosevelt, letter of 
Sept. 10, 1898. 

15P, S. Alexander, Four Famous New Yorkers, pp. 304-305. 

16 Op. cit., p. 270. Depew, Memories, p. 161, claims he convinced 
Platt. 

17 Theodore Roosevelt, the Man as I Knew Him (New York, 
1919), p. 131. 


100 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


Platt’s opinion is indicated by the following extract from a 
‘letter Quigg wrote to Roosevelt summarizing the views of 
the local leaders toward Platt: 


We are organization men and we will support you as the 
leader of the organization. We will cast our votes for any 
ticket that you recommend. If you say “Black,” we will be 
‘for Black; if you (say) “Roosevelt ;” we will be for Roose- 
velt. We prefer Roosevelt.'® 


It has always been pointed out that State Committeeman 
Barnes, of Albany, had difficulty in getting along with Presi- 
dent Quigg, of the New York County Committee. After 
Mr. Quigg’s visit to Colonel Roosevelt, several of the district 
leaders of the New York Republican organization came out 
in favor of Colonel Roosevelt for the gubernatorial nomina- 
tion. The Albany Evening Journal then counselled: 


REPUBLICANS BE CALM 


Senator Platt is the leader in that organization recognized 
to be so for many years past. Upon him will rest the respon- 
sibility greater than upon the governor. The extent of his 
influence and the devotion of his large army of political fol- 
lowers should lead him to a calm, wise, dispassionate judg- 
ment, which having been reached should be irrevocable.’® 

Fight days after the above editorial was printed, the Sen- 
ator evidently had made up his mind for the Albany Evening 
Journal then came out with an editorial in which it referred 
to Roosevelt’s nomination as a “foregone conclusion;” ?® 
The Binghamton Leader expressed a similar faith in the 
“words of the oracle” when it said: “From Montauk to 
Lake Erie and from the Pennsylvania line to the St. Law- 


18 Toc. cit. 

19 August 25, 1898. 

20 “Tt would not require a Columbus to discover the man whose 
Nomination is earnestly desired almost unanimously by the Repub- 
lican people of the state.’—Albany Evening Journal, Sept. 2, 1898. 


. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 101 


rence, the ‘great’ G. O. P. of the state of New York is wait- 
ing to hear from the ‘old man.’” A counter view was given 
by the Buffalo Evening News which printed the following 
twelve days before the convention met: 


There is a good deal of nonsense about the oracle utter- 
ance for which the Leader thinks Republicans are waiting 
with shortened breath. Mr. Platt is not so terrible off the 
stage. He is a very efficient listener, and when it comes to 
the matter of band wagons, one of which he is supposed to 
drive, Mr. Platt is about as alert a jumper for the one that 
seems the most likely to lead the procession as the liveliest 
of the younger men. His declaration for a candidate for 
governor is likely to be a result rather than a cause.? 


After the decision to nominate Roosevelt for governor 
was reached by the inner circle, the party machinery was set 
in motion to bring about that result. State Chairman Odell 
undertook a systematic canvass of the state with a view 
toward ascertaining the sentiment of the Republican leaders 
in all parts of the state. He performed this duty in such 
business-like fashion that he was able to report two weeks 
before the convention met that at least 700 delegates would 
vote for Roosevelt.? Senator Platt did all in his power to 
persuade Black and his supporters to withdraw in order to 
produce a harmonious convention.? It was reported that Mr. 
Aldridge, one of Black’s supporters, was offered the privi- 
lege of naming a candidate for the state treasureship, but 
this “peace offering” was rejected. There was nothing left 
for Platt to do but to ride over the opposition ruthlessly. 

In spite of Platt’s failure to secure complete “harmony” 
the Roosevelt canvass moved smoothly until Payn, Lauter- 
bach and some other earnest Black advocates secured “sub- 


1 Sept. 15, 1898. The News was a prominent Republican paper. 

2 New York Herald, Sept. 18, 1898 and Troy Times, Sept. 14, 1898. 
8 Barnes v. Roosevelt, p. 2354. Quigg’s letter to Roosevelt. 

4 Rochester Democrat & Chronicle, Sept. 26, 1898. 


102 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


stantial proof” from the Tammany Democrats that Roose- 
velt was ineligible as a candidate on account of non-residence 
in the state of New York. The proof consisted. of an aff- 
davit made out by Roosevelt on March 21, 1898, in which he 
swore off his personal taxes in New York City on the ground 
that he was a resident of the District of Columbia. Accord- 
ing to the state constitution, the governor must have been a 
resident of the state for five years next preceding his elec- 
tion.® Elihu Root and some other great lawyers were called 
into the meetings of the inner council to propose a way out 
of this difficulty. At first they could find no solution but 
finally Odell asked how the question of eligibility could be 
tested. The reply was that this could be done only by pro- 
ceedings in guo warranto brought by the attorney-general. 
Odell then suggested that, if Roosevelt should be elected, a 
Republican attorney-general would also be elected in all 
probability and he could be counted upon not to bring any 
such proceeding. Platt said that that was the best law he 
had heard on the subject and that Roosevelt’s nomination 
should be carried through.® 

Odell was evidently well acquainted with the methods used 
in the making up of the “slate” for the minor state offices. 
The candidates for lieutenant-governor, secretary of state, 
comptroller, attorney general, and state engineer were 
chosen in accordance with fairly well formulated principles. 
The first of these was the axiom of geographical dispersion. 
-No two candidates appearing upon the same state ticket were 
ever chosen from the same county during the period of 
Platt’s leadership. This meant that the minor candidates 
upon the state ticket were chosen largely on account of their 
standing in certain favored local organizations. These or- 
ganizations could be trusted to name loyal party men. Thus, 


5 Art. IV, Sec. 2. 
6 Statement of Prof. R. C. E. Brown to the author, Sept. 21, 1922. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 103 


in 1896 the Kings County Republicans were united upon the 
candidacy of Timothy L. Woodruff for lieutenant-gover- 
‘nor and the Erie County delegates upon the candidacy of 
William J. Morgan for comptroller. Both of these men 
were “slated.”’ In selecting candidates an endeavor was also 
made to recognize certain interest groups, which were not 
primarily political in character. One or more of the can- 
didates were usually Civil War veterans, prominent in the 
G. A. R.;7 some were high up in the masonic orders,® while 
others were known as leaders in their particular religious. 
groups.? The requirement of fitness for the particular posi- 
tion to be filled was not allowed to interfere with the proper 
“making up of a slate” except that the candidate for attorney 
general must have been a lawyer and the nominee for state 
engineer, an engineer. There were, however, plenty of good 
Republican lawyers and engineers. 

The pre-convention conferences over which Platt presided 
also framed the party platforms. In 1898, for example, the 
platform was drafted by Thurlow Weed Barnes more than 
a week before the convention and submitted to the “Sunday 
school” for revision. This platform, like the other plat- 
forms of the Republican party in the state, devoted about 
one half of its planks to national affairs. Upon state affairs 
it differed from its Democratic contemporary in that it de- 
fended the Republican administration, commended the ex- 
cise law passed by the Republican legislature and praised the 


7Ira H. Hedges, the candidate for state treasurer in 1891, John 
Palmer, the candidate for secretary of state in 1893 and William 
J. Morgan were Civil War veterans. 

8 John W. Vrooman, the candidate for lieutenant-governor in 
1891 and Edward A. Bond, the candidate for state engineer in 1898: 

9J. T. McDonough, the candidate for secretary of state in 1898 
was popular with the Catholics. John Palmer was a prominent 
Episcopalian, A. B. Colvin, the candidate for state treasurer, was a 
Presbyterian. 

10 New York Herald, Sept. 21, 1898. 


104 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


Metropolitan Election Law.1! The Republican platform was 
‘also somewhat more cautious in its taxation program than 
the Democratic, a fact which later led to some embarrass- 
ment on Platt’s part.” 

The next step in the nominating process, the formal ratifi- 
cation of the “slate” and the platform by the delegates, was 
not a difficult one if everything had moved smoothly up to 
this point. The state committeemen, who figured so prom- 
inently in the preliminary secret conferences, had absolute 
control over the makeup of the convention when they chose 
to exercise their power. The credentials of all the dele- 
gates were first submitted to the state committee which made 
up the temporary roll and thus determined what delegates 
would have the right to vote prior to and during the tem- 
porary organization of the convention. The delegation that 
was recognized as “regular” by the state committee was thus 
indirectly given a voice in the final determination of its own 
“regularity,” for it helped select the temporary chairman of 
“the convention who appointed the committee on credentials, 
Was it any wonder that the program of the state committee 
was usually unopposed ? 

The chairman of the state committee called the convention 
to order within a reasonable time after the hour appointed 
and asked the secretary to call the temporary roll. The dele- 
gate from Tioga usually managed to enter the hall in the 
midst of this proceeding. Cheers went up immediately from 
all sides, the band began to play “Hail to the Chief,” and the 
rural delegates crowded around to do homage to the “old 
man.” In 1898 the applause which greeted Platt made that 


11 New York Tribune Almanac for 1809, “Political State Plat- 
forms.” 

12 Tt denounced “all attempts to place socialistic taxes upon the 
fruits of industry and economy.” For an account of the tax strug- 
gle, see below. 

138 Deming and Trowbridge, loc. cit. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 105 


for the hero of San Juan Hill seem feeble.4* After the up- 
roar had subsided and Platt had taken his seat at the head 
of the Tioga delegation, the calling of the roll was usually 
continued in a peaceful manner. In 1896, however, Warner 
Miller insisted upon speaking in spite of the fact that the 
state committee had refused to recognize him as a “regular” 
delegate. Confusion reigned supreme until the gentleman 
from Tioga arose and asked that Miller be given unanimous 
consent to present his claims. After a burst of applause for 
this magnanimous act, the tumultuous delegates were hushed 
and listened in silence.& This was a tribute indeed to the 
will of a single man, but there were more to follow of a less 
spectacular nature. The state chairman finished his part by 
announcing the name of the man who had been selected for 
temporary chairman by the state committee. Other nom- 
inations might be made, but no delegate ventured to break 
party custom by exercising this right while Platt was an “‘ac- 
tive operating force.” 

The temporary chairman then made a “key note” spzech 
in which he alluded to the achievements of the grand old 
party and its prospects in the coming election. “It is with- 
out doubt the unadulterated fact,’ wrote a reporter on the 
New York Sun in 1894, “that Quigg captured his audience. 
In his speech today there were points which pleased mightily 
this great congregation of Republicans.” # In 1896 Frank 
S. Black paved the way for his own nomination for governor 
by his effective speech as temporary chairman of the conven- 
tion.!” In 1898, Sereno E. Payne, the veteran expositor of 
tariff schedules in the House of Representatives, greatly 


14 Nation, Oct. 6, 1898, LX VII, 249. See also New York Herald, 
Mar. 25, 1896; New York Tribune, Sept. 28, 1898. 


15 New York Tribune, Aug. 26, 1896. 
16 Sept. 19, 1894. 
17 New York Tribune, August 26, 1896, 


106 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


amused the delegates when, as temporary chairman, he un- 
ceremoniously passed a typewritten list of committees over 
to the clerk to read. His matter-of fact manner in dealing 
with the cut-and-dried procedure of the convention “tickled 
the fancy” of the delegates.18 While the committees on cre- 
dentials, permanent organization, and resolutions, thus ap- 
pointed, assernbled to do their work, the convention took a 
recess and the band began to strike up popular tunes again. 

The committee on credentials was the first to report. Its 
function was to hear the arguments of contestants for seats 
in the convention and decide what names should make up 
the permanent roll of delegates. In 1894 and in 1896, sev- 
eral contests were heard before this committee. Theoreti- 
cally, the committee was a judicial body which decided each 
case on its merits, but practically it decided as it was di- 
rected by the state committee. “ ‘Pull’ and not ‘merits,’ ” 
wrote the 7ribune reporter, “thus decided the cases of War- 
ner Miller and William H. Robertson and the New York 
delegates who were deprived of their seats in the conven- 
tion.” #8 Delegate Van Allen, one of Platt’s “iron clad” 
New York lieutenants, had been commissioned as chairman 
of the committee on credentials to perform this task. In his 
Autobiography, Platt puts Miller and Robertson in the list 
of men who would not “stand when hitched” and who were 
therefore “mercilessly” punished.*® The refusal of the state 
convention, which was the highest authority of the party in 
the state, to recognize a delegation as “regular” was severe 
punishment, for the delegation was thereby deprived of the 
local rule making powers and the privilege of recommending 
appointments. On the other hand, as in the case of William 


18 Tbid., Sept. 28, 1898. 
19 Jbid., Aug. 26, 1896, 
20 Pp. 504, 507, 508, 

1Fuller, op. cit., p. 67. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 107: 


Barnes, Jr., in 1894, “merit and devotion” were rewarded by 
a favorable decision on the part of the committee.? The 
convention, of course, was not known to go back upon its 
committee during Platt’s days as organization chief. Al- 
though the Primary Law of 1898 produced such “harmony” 
in the urban counties that there were no contest in the Con- 
ventions of 1898 and 1900, still, as Governor Hughes pointed 
out some years later, there was “no limitation upon the 
authority of political state conventions and state committees* 
arbitrarily to exclude and expel honestly elected delegates 
and members.” 8 

No great importance was attached to the reports of the 
other two committees. The committee on permanent organi- 
zation proposed a list of permanent officers, which, during 
the period under discussion, was invariably accepted by the 
convention. The permanent chairman, after he had taken 
the place of the temporary chairman, was supposed to arouse 
the delegates with some more convention oratory. The 
chairman of the committee on resolutions was then called 
upon to read the party platform, which, as it has been pointed 
out, was carefully prepared before the committee saw it. Al- 
though the task of the chairman of this committee was per- 
functory, a strong organization man like Quigg, Raines, or 
Sereno Payne usually performed it.* Like the other work 
laid out for the convention, the platform was adopted with- 
out change. 

The chairman next announced that nominations for goy- 
ernor were in order and by some intuitive process he recog= 
nized the delegate whom the leaders had chosen to make 
an elaborate and eulogistic speech placing the candidate of 


2 New York Sun, Sept. 17, 1894. 

8 State of New York, Public Papers of Governor Hughes (1907), 
ees 

4 Payne in 1891 and 1894, Quigg in 1896, and Raines in 1900. 


10S se pOSs Pisa ie AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


their choice before the convention. When Chauncey M. De- 
pew, the delegate so recognized in the Convention of 1898, 
reached the name of Theodore Roosevelt, a storm of cheers 
and applause burst forth from the “lusty throats” of the del- 
egates. At this same convention Elihu Root “substituted” 
for one of the delegates and made his famous speech in sup- 
port of Roosevelt’s candidacy and eligibility.2 After the 
nominating and seconding speeches, the roll of delegates 
was called for the first ballot. During the time of Platt’s 
domination, the first ballot was the last except in the Conven- 
tion of 1896. It is true that a few Fassett supporters put in 
their protest against Morton’s candidacy in 1894 and that a 
larger number of delegates did the same for Black in 1898 
against Roosevelt’s candidacy, but in both cases the “organi- 
zation” candidate was chosen by an overwhelming vote 
upon the first roll call.6 It is interesting to note that these 
two cases of “rebellion” did not draw their strength from the 
rural districts.’ In 1900 the first ballot showed that Ben- 
jamin B. Odell had the vote of every delegate in the con- 
vention. The candidates for the minor state offices were 
usually nominated by acclamation as the delegates were tired 
out when that part of the program was reached. The dele- 
gates then empowered the state committee to fill all vacancies 
in the ticket that might arise in the future and the conven- 
ion was adjourned. 

It is hard to find in the formal proceedings of the state 
conventions the concrete workings of representative de- 
mocracy. The delegates played a purely passive role, like 
an audience in a theatre. The main purpose of the conven- 
tions seemed to be to arouse enthusiasm among the party 


5 New York Tribune, Sept. 28, 1898; New York Herald, for same 
date. 

6 Morton polled 532 out of 732 and Roosevelt 752 out of 990. 

7 New York Tribune, Sept. 19, 1894 and Sept. 28, 1898. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 109 


workers. Between the regular sessions the delegates 
swarmed the hotel lobbies where they exchanged views and 
gossiped about the program of the leaders. On the other 
hand, it is not to be supposed that the control of the leaders 
was as arbitrary as it seemed. The “Sunday school’ was 
in a measure a clearing house for party sentiment. In criti- 


cal years like 1898, the views of the party voters as pressed | 


upon the precinct captains sifted through the hierarchy of” 


comimitteemen until they reached the inner council which 
made up the program of the convention by and with the con- 
sent of Senator Plait. The state conventions put a seal upon 


Platt’s work. They enabled him to punish the “insubor- 
dinate,” to reward the “meritorious,” and to place the highest® 


officers in the state under “obligations.” 


NATIONAL CONVENTIONS 


The nominating functions of the state party organization 
did not end with the work performed by the state convention: 
According to the apportionment of delegates in the Republi- 
can national conventions of the nineties, the state organi~ 


zation was entitled to seventy-two votes in the body which 


nominated the Republican candidates for president and vice- 
president of the United States and which was the highest 
authority in the party for determining policies and deciding 
questions of “regularity.” These seventy-two delegates 
comprised about one sixth of the majority necessary to make 
a choice in the convention. What an opportunity there was 
here for an astute “boss” who could control these delegates 


and bargain with their votes in order to secure his desired 


ends! What a chance for a state leader to demonstrate to 


his constituents that he could meet equals upon the political” 


tournament ground and outmanoeuver them! 
The New York Republican organization of the nineties 
seemed to have been designed to fit the strategy of national 


y 


110. BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


conventions. The state committeemen were selected by con- 
gressional districts, the unit for representation in the Repub- 
lican national conventions. The successful state committee- 
man controlled the selection of the two delegates from his. 
district in the same way that he controlled other local nom- 
inations. Sometimes he had the congressional district con- 
vention select himself as one of the delegates. Four-fifths 
of the state committeemen did this in 1896.2 At other times, 
he would simply see that some tried and trusted lieutenants 
were selected to perform this important party function. 
Among Platt’s field marshals and “Sunday school scholars,” 
Woodruff, Van Allen, “Lem” Quigg, “Ben” Odell, “Lou” 
Payn, Hendricks, Sereno Payne, “Uncle” John Raines, 
Aldridge, and Hazel were always familiar figures at the 
great national Republican assemblages. 

The four delegates-at-large from New York to Republi- 
can national conventions were selected by a state convention 
held in March or April at either New York or Albany. In 
its organization and procedure this state convention was the 
same as the state nominating conventions which have been 
described. During the period that his advice was accepted 
by Republican county leaders, Thomas C. Platt was always 
chosen as one of the delegates-at-large from New York. 
This act itself, while it was a compliment to the Tioga chief- 
tain, was not a recognition of his absolute supremacy for the 
same honor was conferred upon Chauncey M. Depew as 
many times as it was upon Platt, and in the early nineties the 
genial Depew was not always happily disposed toward Platt’s 
plans. In 1888, 92 and 96 Warner Miller was also chosen 
as one of the delegates-at-large, and in 1900 Roosevelt was 
chosen as a delegate-at-large, showing that the New York 
Republicans in state convention assembled wanted all shades 


8 Official Pi oceedings, 1896, pp. 70-71, for list of New York dele- 
gates. For state committee, see New York Tribune, Aug. 27, 1896. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 111 


of Republican opinion in the state represented at the national 
gatherings of their party. In 1896 Platt called the state con- 
vention a little earlier than usual, and he received a shock 
when nearly one-seventh of the delegates in the convention 
stood up and voted against his very name.? Besides selecting 
the guiding stars for the New York delegation at the national 
convention city, the preliminary state convention chose the 
Republican presidential electors for the state and declared* 
its solemn opinion as to national candidates and _ policies. 
However, its instructions could only bind the four delegates- 
at-large. 

As in state nominating conventions, the pre-convention 
conferences were the most important part of the process of 
selecting delegates-at-large and framing a state platform in 
presidential years. Mr. Edward G. Riggs, formerly on the 
staff of the New York Sum, has given an account of one of 
these preliminaries : 

“Ts Mr. Dana in town?” inquired Mr. Platt. 


“Say to him, please,” continued Mr. Platt, “that we are to 
have our state convention on March 24, to elect delegates at 
large to the national convention, and ask him if he will kind- 
ly write for me the financial plank we should adopt.” 

The message was conveyed to Mr. Dana, who promptly 
took steps to comply with Mr. Platt’s request, and Mr. Platt 
as promptly coincided with Mr. Dana’s views, and this was 
the plank evolved by Mr. Platt, Mr. Dana and Mr. William 
M. Laffan, the present owner of the Sun, and adopted by the 
Republican State Convention of March 24, 1896, held in the 
Grand Central Palace, New York City.!° 


The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, a New York 
weekly devoted to the interests indicated in its title, said that 


9 New York Tribune, March 25, 1896. 

10 “Thomas C. Platt” in O. O. Stealey, Twenty Years in the Press 
Gallery (New York, 1906), pp. 392 ff. The Dana here referred to 
was Charles A. Dana, editor of the Sun, 


112 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


this plank was a “clear and clever method of setting forth 
‘the views of the large body of business men of this state.” 7 
Too much credit, however, should not be given to Thomas C. 
Platt for the adoption of this sound money declaration be- 
cause Theodore Roosevelt, Chauncey M. Depew, and War- 
ner Miller also had “sound” reasons for favoring the gold 
standard.?” | 
In 1892 and 1896 Platt and Roosevelt had decided upon 
different presidential candidates whom they would support 
“long before the national convention was called to order. Be- 
cause of his “refusal to comply with what were deemed rea- 
sonable requests” of Platt and his associates,’ President 
Harrison was not “available” for a renomination in 1892, 
according to Platt’s view.’* Roosevelt, of course, was in 
favor of Harrison’s renomination. Platt picked out James 
G. Blaine, then secretary of state, as the candidate most like- 
ly to defeat Harrison in the convention and schemed to 
bring about this result. Suffering from similar grievances, 
Mathew S. Quay, of Pennsylvania, and James S. Clarkson, 
of lowa, co-operated with Platt in this plan. Blaine was 
failing in health and refused to allow his name to be con- 
sidered, but the Platt-Quay-Clarkson combination per- 
sisted in its endeavor. In the early part of 1896, long be- 
fore the state convention met in March, Platt had shown a 
bitter and determined opposition to the candidacy of William 
McKinley. With such a candidate for the presidency as 


11 March 28, 1896, p. 571. 

12 See New York Tribune, June 14, 1896, for Miller’s and Depew’s 
views. 

13 Platt, op. cit., p. 210. 

14 Tbid., p. 219. 

15 Cortissoz, op. cit., II, 177, gives an account of the way in which 
Platt tried to move Blaine to reconsider. 

16H. Croly, Marcus Alonzo Hanna (New York, 1912), pp. 178-79; 
Alexander, Four Famous New Yorkers, p. 251. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 113 


Levi P. Morton, whose soundness upon the money ques- 
tion was beyond all shadow of a doubt,!” Platt objected to 
the Ohio candidate, an extreme protectionist, whose record 
upon the financial issue was equivocal, and who, besides,‘ 
had refused to allow his manager to talk “business.” 18 Platt 
worked with a combination in 1896 that included Quay, 
Clarkson, and Joseph Manley, of Maine, each of whom 
planned to put forward a “favorite son” of his own in order_ 
to dissipate McKinley’s strength. 

The first outpost of the “enemy’s” lines that the Platt- 
Quay-Clarkson combination attempted to capture was the 
national committee. This committee, like the other party 
committees that have been discussed, had control over the 
making up of the temporary roll of the convention subject 
to its call. In 1892 the “combination” occupied a vantage 
point from which to launch its attack; Clarkson was chair- 
man of the national committee; J. Sloat Fassett, then in 
Platt’s favor, was secretary; Quay was a member of the 
committee ; and a majority of the committeemen seemed in- 
clined toward the candidacy of Blaine. Nevertheless, the 
Blaine forces were defeated in the initial skirmish by the 
superior generalship of John C. New, one of the most adroit 
politicians of Indiana.!® The national committee did not 
arbitrarily seat the Blaine delegates, and the backbone of 
the opposition to the renomination of Harrison was broken. 
Clarkson’s alibi was that “if Ohio had voted with the Blaine 


17 Op. cit. p. 398. Morton had grown up with J. P. Morgan in 
business and finance. 

18 Croly asserts that McKinley refused to consent to any bargain 
with the “bosses.” See also C. S. Olcott, The Life of William Mc- 
Kinley (Boston, 1916), I, 300. 

19 New York Tribune, June 5, 1892 and E. G. Riggs, “Supreme 
Moments at National Conventions,” Everybodys Mag., XI. 80. 

8 


114 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


men, on the Alabama contest, Blaine could and would have 
been nominated, or McKinley might have been.” 7° 

In 1896, Platt and his fellow “conspirators” did not work 
under such favorable circumstances; as Platt explained, 
“Hanna really began his campaign to make McKinley presi- 
‘dent, immediately after the defeat of Harrison in 1892. 
He had the South practically solid before some of us awak- 
ened.” ? Platt was one of those who had been asleep, and 
his trusted lieutenant, National Committeeman William A. 
Sutherland, complained bitterly that he was left without 
briefs or trustworthy information of any sort to make good 
cases of contests which the opponents of McKinley raised 
in the southern states.* The national committee refused 
not only to seat the anti-McKinley southern delegates but 
also four delegates who belonged to the Platt-Lauterbach 
organization in New York -City.2 Platt fumed and talked 
about the justification of a bolt, adding significantly, “The 
nomination of a candidate does not settle the presidency. 
Many things may happen between now and next Novem- 
ber.”* In this way, Platt warned Hanna that McKinley, 
if nominated, would be in danger of losing New York’s 
electoral vote if the New York “organization” was not 
propitiated. It seemed that Platt’s whole campaign of op- 
position to McKinley was designed to bring Hanna to 
Meer inS., 

After consulting Quay,® Platt next began industriously to 
button-hole the delegates regarding their stand upon a radi- 
cal gold resolution. As to who should be given credit for 
the insertion of the word “gold” in the Republican platform 

20 Platt, op. cit., p. 219, citing Clarkson’s memorandum. 

1 Tbid., p. 331. 

2 New York Tribune, June 13, 1896. 

8 Tbid., June 15, 1896. 


4 Jbid., June 13, 1896. 
5 New York Herald, June 13, 1896. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 115 


of 1896 was a disputed point at the time of the convention 
and it has been disputed ever since.6 Platt’s part in the 
framing of the “gold” plank adopted by the New York 
Republican State Convention has already been related. What 
he actually did at St. Louis is not so important as what he 
made others think he did. Contrary to Mr. Croly’s conten-° 
tion,’ Platt was in St. Louis before Sunday, June 14, 1896; 
he arrived on Thursday night and announced at once that he 
“would fight for a gold platform.” ® According to Croly’s 
account, the whole matter was settled, “so far as Mr. Mc- 
Kinley and his friends were concerned, by Friday night.” ® 
All day Friday, Platt was engaged in an “advocacy of an 
out-and-out gold plank.” ?® How much Platt’s champion- 
ship of the gold standard influenced the conferences over 
which Hanna presided is doubtful, but it is at least certain 
that Hanna and his friends were watching closely the senti- 
ment of the delegates upon this question.14 The New York 
and New England delegations worked especially hard among 
the southern delegates in their fight for a resolution em- 
bodying the word “gold.’?* Upon organizing, the New 
York delegation selected Platt as its chairman, and, in mak- 
ing the committee appointments, it chose Edward Lauter- 
bach to serve upon the committee on resolutions. Lauter- 


6 New York Tribune, June 18, 1896; New York Sun, June 20, 
1896; New York Herald, June 19, 1896; Peck, op. cit., pp. 486-87 
note; Croly, op. cit., pp. 192-204; Platt, op cit., pp. 312-326; H. H. 
Kohlsaat, From McKinley to Harding (New York, 1923), pp. 33. 

7 Op. cit., p. 200. 

8 New York Herald, June 12, 1896. 

9 Op. cit., p. 198. 

10 New York Tribune, June 13, 1896. The Tribune was hostile 
to Platt at this time. 

11 Croly, op. cit., pp. 198-99 gives a letter of Hanna to A. K. 
McClure confirming this point. 

122F. E. Leupp, “The Republican Convention,” Harper's Weekly, 
June 27, 1896. 


116 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


bach was on the sub-commitiee which had charge otf the 
final revision of the financial plank and he there acted as a 
check if not as a constructive force. These services, at 
least, Platt and his friends may be said to have performed. 
After the convention, of course, extreme assertions were 
made by several parties. The following shows the devotion 
of the New York Sun to Platt’s reputation at this time: 


After all the hero of the St. Louis Convention has been 
Thomas Collier Platt, of New York, who forced the wab- 
bling McKinleyites into the adoption of an honest money 
plank. The St. Louis plank says what anti-free-coinage 
declarations mean, and it cannot mean anything other than 
what. it says. We do not intend by this tribute to Mr. 
Platt to rob any other anti-Hannaite of deserved glory for 
defeating the Ohio straddle, least of all Hon. Henry Cabot 
Lodge, of Massachusetts. But as all important movements 
tend to center about some one man, we must recognize Mr. 
Platt as the center of the successful fight at St. Louis for 
sound money.” ® 


While this view was ridiculed by the New York Tribune 
and other important Republican newspapers, yet it pene- 
trated into the interior of the state where Platt’s greatest 
claim to power lay.4* Platt’s reputation as a strategist in 
Republican national conventions depended upon his success 
in making some sort of a pose. In 1892 he had not been 
very fortunate; only thirty-five of New York’s seventy-two 
delegates had been held in line for Blaine, and Harrison won 
upon the first ballot by a margin as great as New York’s en- 
tire vote. Although Platt mustered fifty-five votes for 
Morton in the Convention of 1896, McKinley’s margin was 


13 New York Sun, June 19, 1896. 

14 Syracuse Journal, Jan. 15, 1897; Troy Times, Jan. 15, 1897; 
Elmira Advertiser, Jan. 15, 1897; Binghamton Republican, Jan. 16, 
1897, 

18 O ficial Proceedings, p. 141. Harrison, 535 1/6; Blaine, 182 1/6; 
McKinley, 182; Reed, 4; Lincoln, 1. 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 117 


one and a half times greater than Harrison’s four years be- 
fore.!® Platt’s failure to pick winning presidential can- 
didates on these two occasions subjected him to the criticism 
of some Republicans. To counteract this bombardment 
upon the part of his factional opponents, among whom 
Roosevelt might be numbered, it was attempted through’ 
the agency of his organization to magnify his role in the 
formation of the St. Louis platform; conventions cheered’ 
him as the great sound money champion,!” party committec- 
men congratulated themselves on their masterful chief,}® 
and the organization press throughout the state sang his 
praises. This was one of the ways in which the morale of 
the organization was kept up to the proper pitch. ( 

Notwithstanding the importance of the gold plank tra- 
dition, the climax of Platt’s convention career came when 
Theodore Roosevelt, was nominated for vice-president in 
1900. In order to understand the significance of this event 
some incidents will have to be mentioned here which are 
explained more at length in later sections of this study. 
The source of Platt’s opposition to Roosevelt's renomina- 
tion for governor in 1900 has been best summarized by a 
letter Roosevelt wrote to Senator Lodge, February 3, 1900: 


I have found out one reason why Senator Platt wants. 
me nominated for the vice-presidency. The big moneyed 
men with whom he is in close touch and whose campaign 


contributions have certainly been no inconsiderable factor ~ 


in his strength, have been pressing him very strongly to get 
me put in the vice-presidency, so as to get me out of the 
state. , It was the big insurance companies, possessing enor- 
mous wealth, that gave Payn his formidable strength, and 
they to a man want me out. The great corporations affected 


16 Official Proceedings, p. 123. McKinley, 661 1/2; Reed, 84 1/2; 
Morton, 58; Allison, 35 1/2; Quay, 61 1/2. 

17 New York Herald, June 24, 1896. 

18 Platt, op. cit., pp. 319-29, memoranda of Chairman Hackett, 


118 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 
r 


by the franchise tax, have also been at the Senator. In fact, 
all the moneyed interests that make campaign contributions 
of large size and feel that they should have favors in re- 
turn, are extremely anxious to get me out of the state. I 
find that they have been at Platt for the last two or three 
months and he has finally begun to yield to them and to 
take their view.” 

Platt “sounded” Roosevelt upon the question of a nom- 
ination for vice-president in the latter part of 1899; in Jan- 
uary, 1900, he told Roosevelt in very strong terms that he 
ought to take the vice-presidency.?® The next month Lem- 
uel E. Quigg stated that he thought it was “the plan of 
Governor Roosevelt’s friends from outside states to sweep 
the convention with such a wave of public feeling as to 
make it impossible for him to decline.”’! Five days after 
Quige’s statement appeared, Governor Roosevelt issued a 
formal statement to the press in which he declared that 
“under no circumstances” could he, or would he, “accept 
the nomination for the vice-presidency” and that his “duty” 
was in New York.? A little over two months later, on the 
eve of the state convention which was to choose delegates 
at large to the Philadelphia Convention, Roosevelt wrote to 
a friend; “Again, the big corporations undoubtedly want to 
beat me. Of course, they will try to beat me on some en- 
tirely different issue, and, as they are very able and very 
unscrupulous, nobody can tell that they won’t succeed.” % 
Was Roosevelt afraid that the New York State Republican 
organization would beat him in a fight for a renomination 


19J. B. Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time (New York, 
1920), I, 135-36. 

20 Thid., p. 134. 

1 New York Herald, Feb. 7, 1900. 
; She tae 12, 1900 cited in the American Rev. of Revs., XXII, 

3 Roosevelt, op. cit. (1919 edition), p. 316, letter, April 16, 1900 
to Norton Goddard on the pglitical situation, 


: NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 119 
» 
as governor that fall? The state convention endeavored to 
quiet him upon this score; both the temporary and the per- 
manent chairmen endorsed his administration and declared 
that he should have another term, a pronouncement which 
brought forth many cheers from the delegates.* The state 
convention also elected him as one of the delegates-at-large 
to the Philadelphia Convention.® It is interesting to specu- 
late as to whether Platt foresaw the advantage of having 
Roosevelt present at the national convention. | 
In his scheme to “shelve” Roosevelt, Platt had the co- 
operation of Quay as in other affairs of Republican national 
conventions. Platt valued this co-operation very highly as 
he pronounced Quay “the ablest politician this country ever 
produced.” ® At least ten days before the convention met 
Roosevelt had Platt’s promise that he would not be made a 
candidate by the caucus of the New York delegates,’ but 
this promise did not prevent Quay from promoting assidu- 
ously the candidacy of the Rough Rider nor did it prevent 
Platt and-his field marshals from using other methods to 
carry out their plan. Roosevelt was not the choice of Mc- 
Kinley and Hanna for the vice-presidency ;* Hanna rather 
favored Cornelius N. Bliss for the position. In order to 
prevent Hanna from endorsing Bliss’s candidacy, Platt 
made it clear that New York would not present Mr. Bliss’s 
name for vice-president. Bliss withdrew his name? In 


New York Tribune, April 18, 1900. 

5Croly states that Roosevelt went to the convention primarily 
for the purpose of preventing his nomination for the vice-presi- 
dency, op. cit., p. 310. Was “T. R.” unaware of his popularity? 

6 Platt, op. cit., p. 211. 

7 New York Herald, June 10, 1900. Platt added, “He would be 
the strongest candidate who could be named.” 

8 Croly, op. cit., p. 310. For John Hay’s amusing letter to Henry 
White on the administration’s attitude, June 15, 1900, see W. R. 
Thayer, The Life of John Hay (Boston, 1915), II, 342, 


9 New York Herald, June 15 and 16, 1900, 


120 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


the meantime the Pennsylvania delegation pledged itself to 
vote for Roosevelt and continued energetically its work 
among the Southern and Western delegations.!° One of the 
New York delegates also went on a “mysterious” mission to 
the quarters of the Kansas delegation in the Continental 
Hotel. While it is difficult to determine how much of this 
was stage play, it must, at least, be admitted that it was 
clever acting. 

One of the chief obstacles to the consummation of the 
“plot” was the “unalterable opposition of Roosevelt him- 
self to his nomination.” While the New York delegates 
were holding a caucus meeting, Roosevelt had two inter- 
views with Platt, who was confined to his room on account 
.of a broken rib. In the first, Platt insisted that the New 
York delegation should present Roosevelt’s name for the 
vice-presidency, and the latter declared that there would be 
“war.” 2 However, according to Platt’s account, Roosevelt 
finally said, “I will pledge myself not to formally decline 
the New York caucus indorsement, but I shall certainly 
urge the caucus to name another.” “And remember I shall 
pinch you if I see any signs of your getting up and declin- 
ing,” put in Platt’s son.4% Roosevelt went down to the 
caucus and told a few delegates that he was going to issue 
a statement to the press announcing his intention to fight 
for the gubernatorial nomination.4* Such a step would 
have eliminated him as a candidate for the vice-presidency. 
At this juncture, so the Senator claimed, his son Frank 
Platt “pinched Roosevelt in the leg” and said, “Remember 
your contract with the Senator, Governor.” Roosevelt later 


10 Jbid., June 19, 1900. 
11 Jbid., June 20. 1900. 


12 Croly, op. cit., pp. 312 ft. quoting from Roosevelt’s own words. 
13 Platt, op. cit., pp. 387 ff. 
14 Croly, op. cit., p. 313. 


THE LIBRARY 
OF THE 
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS 





Depew Roosevelt LD) Ward Odell Platt 


THE REPUBLICAN NATIONAL CONVENTON OF 1900 
(New York Tribune, June 21, 1900) 





ROOSEVELT CAMPAIGNING IN 1898 
(Photograph by Van der Weyde) 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 121 


admitted that Frank Platt did summon him to a second in- 
terview with the Senator: “I went up-stairs and Mr. Platt 
said he had been in great pain and that I must not mind 
what he had said; that in view of my opposition he would 
withdraw any idea of nominating me for vice-president and 
that [ would be nominated for governor, and that the delega- 
tion downstairs would declare for Lieutenant-Governor 
Woodruff for vice-president, which it did.”1® At the time 
Roosevelt told others that he absolutely upset Platt and 
“stood the New York machine on its head.” The next day 
Roosevelt made no definite statement. Platt had given in 
at the right moment, and Roosevelt’s slouch hat did the 
rest. MckKinley’s friends observed the strength of the 
sentiment among the delegates for Roosevelt, and McKinley 
himself urged Roosevelt to accept the nomination on the 
night of June 21, 1900, through the agency of George W. 
Perkins.!7 Roosevelt was “very much pleased” at McKin- 
ley’s surrender and capitulated himself. 

The task of bringing Hanna into line was more directly 
under the generalship of Mathew S. Quay and Benjamin 
Odell. On the second day of the convention, Quay intro- 
duced a resolution relating to a rearrangement of the basis 


15 Barnes v. Roosevelt, Roosevelt testifying at p. 753. 

16 “Rising and advancing to the front row of delegates, where 
Mr. Roosevelt was seated, Mr. Lauterbach, emphasizing his re- 
marks by gestures almost in Mr. Roosevelt’s face, said to him, 
‘Your very presence at this convention as a delegate-at-large is an 
allurement to the convention to nominate you. You come here, 
and moving among the delegates, associating with your old friends 
from the West, and for that matter in all parts of the country, 
with the glamor of the Spanish War resting on you, you tempt 
the delegates to support you and make you the candidate, regard- 
less of what you may say as to your wishes in the matter.’ ”’”—Platt, 
op. cit., pp. 390-91. See also C. S. Olcott, op. ctt., II, 269 ff; H. C. 
Hansbrough, The Wreck (New York, 1913), p. 23; New York 
Sun, June 17, 1900; and American Review of Reviews, XXII, 19. 

17 Olcott, op. cit., II, 281-82. 


122 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


of representation in future national conventions so that 
‘delegates would be apportioned more nearly in accordance 
with the number of Republican voters.8 This resolution 
created a sensation among the delegates, especially those 
from the South, who were for the most part federal office- 
holders and represented a neglible number of Republican 
voters.!® This was Quay’s method of warming up the negro 
delegates on the subject of Roosevelt’s candidacy; the other 
delegates were already so hot that it was doubtful whether 
they could be stopped.*® Odell then presented to Hanna an 
account of the difficulties in New York. That night Hanna 
held a conference with the leaders of the party and the next 
day his statement “advising” the nomination of Roosevelt 
by acclamation appeared in the newspapers.” The New 
York Tribune interpreted the situation as follows: “The 
Ohio Senator surrendered, yes, with the best grace he could 
master, but his prestige as a political manager was rudely 
shattered in the eye of the convention by his acknowledg- 
ment that he had been surprised and outmanoeuvered by 
Mr. Platt and Mr. Quay.” 8 

It may be said that in truth Hanna bowed to public opin- 
ion and not to the “bosses” * but this does not alter the fact 
that Platt’s prestige was greatly enhanced among certain of 
his New York constituents by the results of the Philadel- 
hia Convention. Of course, Roosevelt was not “shelved ;” 
he was simply “kicked up-stairs into the vice-presidency.” 5 
Platt chuckled, the “Sunday school” was hilarious, and the 


18 Oficial Proceedings, pp. 95-102. 

19 New York Tribune, June 21, 1900. 

20 Croly, op. cit., pp. 316-17. 

1 New York World, June 22, 1900. 

2 New York Tribune, June 21, 1900. 

3 Tbid., June 22, 1900. 

4Croly, op. cit., p. 315. 

5 Nation, June 28, 1900; Platt, op. cit., p. 397, 


NOMINATING ROOSEVELT FOR PUBLIC OFFICE 123 


party organs expanded profusely upon the virtues of the 
Rough Rider. Platt must have mused something like this : 
no more trouble about campaign contributions in 1900, no 
more criticism from “past” contributors, no more worries— 
about “reform” appointments and legislation, no more 
breakfast hours with Roosevelt in which he “had to endure 
that bull-dog grin.” How unfortunate that Platt’s peace of 
mind was to be short-lived! Who could have foreseen the 
events of 1901? 

In the latter part of the year 1900, Platt little dreamed 
that another year would find his perfectly working party 
- mechanism out of gear in part because of the great con- 
vention victory of 1900. The committee hierarchy which 
he had been instrumental in building up seemed to have the 
local associations of Republican voters under perfect con- 
trol. It followed as a matter of course that the delegates 
selected at the various party primaries were subservient to 
the few. Nominations for elective offices, whether local, 
state, or national, came under the general supervision of the 
man who “advised” the state committee. In like fashion 
the determination of the party’s policies, local, state, and _ 
national, came under Platt’s direction. There was not a 
party convention of state or national importance which 
could escape entirely the influence of the New York Repub- 
lican State Committee and its chief advisory member, 


CHAPTER VI 


ELECTING ROOSEVELT GOVERNOR OF 
NEW YORK 


“ROOSEVELT ELECTED GOVERNOR—Rural New 
York Met Van Wyck’s 80,000 at the City Line and Buried 
it Almost Completely” read the headline in the election is- 
sue of the New York Herald for November %th, 1898. 
This headline clearly indicates the problem which con- 
fronted Thomas C. Platt in marshalling the Republican 
voters of the state. Judge Van Wyck, the Democratic can- 
didate for governor, secured a plurality of 80,000 votes over 
Roosevelt in New York City, but Roosevelt’s plurality in 
the up-state was sufficient to give him a majority of 17,000 
in the state as a whole. An analysis of this vote by the 
sixty-one counties of the state shows that on the average 
sixty per cent of the voters in forty of the rural counties 
cast their ballots for the Republican ticket. The percent- 
age of native stock in the same forty counties ranged from 
fifty-three in Franklin County to eighty-six in Tioga 
County, the home county of Senator Platt. From this it 
may be generalized that the main strength of the Republican 
party in New York in the nineties lay in the rural districts 
where the voters were largely native Americans of native 
parentage. The were two or three rural counties which 
were exceptions to this rule, and it should also be pointed 
out that the Republican party polled a considerable vote in 
the up-state cities like Buffalo, Rochester, Syracuse, and 


1 New York State Legislative Manual, 1899, 
124 


ELECTING ROOSEVELT GOVERNOR 125 


Albany where its strength was about even with that of the 
Democratic party. | 

The election of 1898 was not the first election that the 
Republicans had won on the basis of the rural vote. The 
alignment of the up-state against New York City in politi- 
cal affairs dated back farther than any one like Platt could 
remember. There were many counties in the up-state that 
had gone Republican every year since 1856. There were 
many Republicans, who like Piatt, could boast in 1898 that 
they had voted for Abraham Lincoln thirty-eight years be- 
fore. Just as the farmers and the native American city 
dwellers acquired their Protestant religious faith either 
through an emotional crisis or a long period of home train- 
ing, so they acquired their political faith either in the moral 
fervor of the Civil War or through an extended period of 
primary group contacts in their home environment. The 
traditional element in the Republican party of the state of 
New York was very strong. The sons of the up-state 
farmers voted as their fathers did, and Platt could count 
upon a solid array of rural counties no matter how great 
the urban upheavals might be. A rationalization of the 
loyalty of the Republicans to their party has been given by -- 
Senator Hoar: 


The Republican party, whatever its faults, since it came 
into power in 1860 has been composed in general of what is 
best in our national life. States like Massachusetts and 
Vermont, the men of the rural districts in New York, the 
survivors and children of the men who put down the Rebel- 
lion and abolished slavery, saved the Union, and paid the 
debt and kept the faith, and achieved the manufacturing 
independence of the country and passed the homestead laws, 
are on that side, and in general they give and will here- 
after give direction to its counsels. On the other hand 
their antagonist has been, is, and for an indefinite time to 
come will be controlled by the foreign population and the 


126 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


criminal classes of our great cities, by Tammany Hall, and 
by the leaders of the solid South.? 

At the head of his rural army, Platt’s great political task 
was to combat the forces of Democrats recruited from the 
“foreign” and the “criminal” classes of the great cities. 
For fifty years Platt had seen the Irish immigrants rally to 
the support of Tammany Hall. The Irish, being generally 
Roman Catholic, joined the Democratic party in the forties 
and fifties because of the strong Protestant character of 
the Whig party, especially in New York City.? Later the 
Democratic faith of the Irish was strengthened by the 
Protestant and pro-negro bias of the Republican party. 
Similarly among the German immigrants, the Catholics, the 
workingmen, and those who objected to any regulation of 
the liquor traffic were apt to be Democratic. The new im- 
migration from southeastern Europe gave to the Demo- 
cratic party and Tammany Hall many Italian recruits.* 
While in the rural areas the Republican orators made the 
most of_the anti-urban anti-foreign sentiment, in the great 
cities the Republican managers did their best to enlist the - 
support of all racial elements. Among the German Lu- 
therans, especially those of the middle class, they were fair- 
ly successful.° They also had a measure of success among 
the Poles and the wealthy Jews. In the southwestern part 
of the state several Democratic strongholds were changed 
into Republican communities by the infiltration of foreign- 


2G. F. Hoar, Autobiography of Seventy Years (New York, 
1903), I, 200. See also C. H. Betts, The Naked Truth (Lyons, 
1913), p. 75, “The Republican Party,” for a variation of this theme 
by an editor of a New York country weekly. 

3M. Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organization of Political 
Parties (New York, 1902), II, 94. 

4A. Lipsky, “Political Mind of the Foreign Born,” Pop. Science, 
CXXXV, 397-403. (New York City elections of 1912 and 1913). 

5 Ibid. See also J. Bryce, The American Commonwealth (New 
York, 1891), II, 34. 


ELECTING ROOSEVELT GOVERNOR 127 


ers trained in the school of Pennsylvania Republicanism... 
While in general the Republican party was made up of na- 
tive Americans, no political manager could fail to see that 
this group was a declining element in the state’s population. 
To gain the narrow margin necessary for victory, Platt was 
therefore ready to welcome recruits of all nationalities. 

In getting out the full Republican vote, Platt also had to 
keep in mind the men whom Senator Hoar said had* 
“achieved the manufacturing independence of the country.’’. 
A Tammany delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 
1894 described this element of the Republican party in the 
following manner : 


To be a Republican in New York City is a fashionable 
fad, an affectation of the clubs. Your party includes the 
dude statesmen, the butterflies of politics. In the last ap-. 
portionment they were put together in the so-called million- 
aire district, the Twenty-first, otherwise known as the Ter- 
rapin or the Brown Stone district.® 


One of the clubs which the delegate had in mind was the 
Union League Club of New York, membership in which 
was conditioned on “absolute and unqualified loyalty to the 
government of the United States, and unwavering support 
of its effort for the suppression of the Rebellion.” After 
the Rebellion was crushed its members became interested in 
other things. John D. Rockefeller found the oil business 
fascinating, Andrew Carnegie was attracted to the steel 
industry, the Vanderbilts developed the possibilities of the 
New York Central Railroad, the Goulds found real estate 
profitable, James Stillman was building up the National 
City Bank, and J. P. Morgan extended his interests in many 
directions. This club not only contained many of the cap- 
tains of finance and business, but it also had among its sup- 
porters some of the leaders of the professional world, edu- 


6 Record (unrevised), IV, 1892, 


128 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


cators like President Seth Low of Columbia University and 
. President Jacob Schurman of Cornell University, and 
lawyers like Elihu Root, Joseph Choate, and Charles E. 
Hughes, all friends or acquaintances of Theodore Roose- 
velt. While the Republicans who belonged to this and the 
other exclusive clubs were not very numerous, nevertheless 
they were very influential upon election day. Their views 
carried weight with the great middle class. It was their 
presence in the party which led the New York Republicans 
to call themselves, the “business man’s party.” 

When it is considered that in the state of New York there 
were Republican farmers and Republican railway magnates, 
Republican factory workers and Republican factory own- 
ers, Republican brewers and Republican temperance men, 
and Republicans of different racial, religious and social af- 
filiations, it is needless to say that Platt’s task upon election 
day was a difficult one. In a rousing speech in the cam- 
paign of 1898, Chauncey M. Depew said: “At the polls the 
day laborer stands with equal majesty as a citizen and a 
man with the millionaire or the representative of the cor- 
poration.” ” If he had cared to elaborate upon this theme 
he might have added that at the polls the farmer who 
wanted low freight rates and a low tax upon real estate 
stood with equal majesty as a citizen with the railroad di- 
rector who wanted high freight rates and a low tax upon 
intangible values and that the city laborer who supposedly 
wanted low street car fares and better working conditions 
stood with equal majesty as a citizen with the utility mag- 
nate and the real estate millionaire who wanted high street 
car fares and a minimum of tenement and factory legisla- 
tion. Platt’s problem as a campaign manager was the re- 
conciliation of the differences among the Republican voters 


7 New York Tribune, Oct. 26, 1898, 


ELECTING ROOSEVELT GOVERNOR 129 


and the fostering of that feeling of solidarity of interest 
among them which may or may not have had a real basis. 
Since the voting strength of the Democratic and the Re- 
publican parties in the state was about even, the slightest 
mistake on the part of either side was likely to be fatal. 
Platt therefore searched cautiously for a personality or a 
formula which would offend the least number of Republi- 
cans and aitract the greatest number of independents. 

In his task of uniting the conflicting emotions of the dif- 
ferent groups within the Republican party, Platt found the 
organization press most useful. Not only did the party 
newspaper furnish one of the most effective means of cam- 
paigning but at all times when party matters became news, 
the Republican editors played an important part in deter- 
mining party preferences. It has already been indicated- 
that many of the members of Platt’s “Sunday school” owed 
their influence to their connections with some of the im- 
portant Republican newspapers. The circulation of the 
Republican organs in the state was in a measure an index of 
the strength of the Republican organization. Loyal Repub- 
lican voters usually relied upon a party organ for the 
political news. They found it hard to understand political 
news which was not presented from their point of view. 
The weakness of the Republican party in New York City 
was reflected in the press of that city. Republican editors 
in the metropolis as well as other Republican workers 
labored under difficulties. In the early nineties, the most 
widely read metropolitan daily was the Democratic New 
York World which lost no opportunity to expose and ridi- 
cule the weaknesses of the Republican organization. It 
was also hostile to Roosevelt. By 1900 the New York 


8It had a circulation of 185,000. Statistical material here given 
is taken from N. W. Ayer & Son, American Newspaper Annual. 
See Heaton, op. cit., chaps. VIII and XII. 
9 


130 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


Journal, an exponent of William Randolph Hearsts’ radical- 
ism, had surpassed even the World in circulation and in the 
vigor of its attacks upon Republicanism and “Plattism.” 
During this same period the Republican metropolitan dailies 
lost steadily in relative importance.® In the up-state, how-. 
-ever, the Republican editors did not encounter such opposi- 
tion. In 1890 there were about forty Republican dailies 
north of the Bronx as compared with tlhe couple dozen 
maintained by the Democrats. It is true that some of the 
up-state Republican dailies had a rather limited circulation, 
but by 1900 they were clearly predominant over their 
Democratic rivals both in numbers and in circulation.’ 
Even more striking was the predominance of the rural Re- 
publican press. Platt once told the editor of an up-state 
weekly that he did not “care a rap” about the metropolitan 
dailies as long as he had the country press with him. In 
1890 there were some 200 Republican country weeklies 
while in 1900 there were 266. During the same period of 
time the Democrats had merely added twenty country week- 
lies to its 1890 list of 135, and the number of rural periodi- 
cals that classed themselves as “independent” remained con- 
stant at about the 200 mark. It is a safe estimate that the 
combined circulation of the Republican dailies and weeklies 
in 1900 was at least 660,000 a number equal to the total of 
the Republican voters who came out for gubernatorial elec- 
tions in “off”? years.!? In a close campaign Platt was sure 


9E. Davis, History of the New York Times (New York, 1921), 
p. 197. 

10Jn 1900 the state had 67 Republican dailies, 46 Democratic 
dailies, and 33 Independent dailies of the general news sort. 

11 Interview with the Hon. C. H. Betts, editor of the Lyons Re- 
publican on September 27, 1921. 

12 On the average each_country weekly had a circulation of about 


1,000. The circulation of the Republican dailies was as follows: 
2 had around 100,000; 3 had between 20,000 and 50,000; 11 had 


ELECTING ROOSEVELT GOVERNOR 131 


that nearly every Republican voter could be reached by 
some sort of party organ. 

Platt’s functions as a campaign manager can be further 
elucidated by showing his relations with certain typical Re- 
publican newspapers. In the early nineties one of the 
greatest expounders of orthodox Republicanism was the 
New York Tribune, a survival of the old style political 
newspaper. From the standpoint of the Republican state 
organization the 80,000 circulation of the daily Tribune was 
probably not as important as the 150,000 circulation of the 
Tribune’s weekly edition. Horace Greeley had exerted a 
tremendous influence over the country weekly, and the farm- 
ers kept on subscribing to the Tribune under Whitelaw 
Reid’s management more or less as a matter of habit.¥ 
During President Harrison’s administration, Reid did not 
maintain too critical an attitude toward Platt. In fact, 
Reid left the French legation in order to bring about “har- 
mony” in New York for the presidential election of 1892. 
A break came between Reid and Platt in 1894 when the 
two quarreled over the reorganization of the New York 
County Committee. After the state committee turned down 
the Milholland faction in favor of the Committee of 
Thirty, Reid turned the columns of the Tribune against 
the Platt faction.* In a letter to President McKinley writ- 
ten on August 14, 1898, advising against the appointment of 
Reid as Ambassador to England, Platt paid great tribute to 
the political power of the proprietor of an important Re- 
publican paper. While there may have been some personal 
animus in this letter, the following portion of it is signifi- 
cant: 


between 10,000 and 20,000; 7 had between 5,000 and 10,000; 16 
had between 2,500 and 5,000; and 28 had around 1,000 subscribers. 
13]. M. Lee, History of American Journalism (Boston, 1917), 
p. 404. 
14 Platt, op. cit., pp. 257-58; New York Tribune, Dec. 21, 1894. 


e 


132:-) ‘BOSS:PLATT AND: HIS (NEW YORK MAGHING 


It is almost literally true, Mr. President, to say that the 
Republican failures in New York during the last twenty 
years are to be laid at his door. The Tribune has always 
had a large circulation in New York, and until within the 
last five years it has exercised very great influence upon 
public opinion. The utterly selfish and unpatriotic motives 
that have controlled its policy have at last been discovered 
to Republicans generally, and its influence now is at the 
very lowest ebb to which it has ever fallen. If you take the 
action contemplated your act will operate to revive its de- 
structive power. It is and has been the head and front of 
opposition to the Republican organization. No organized 
movement against the party could at any time have been 
successful except for its dishonest tirades against party 
leaders throughout the state. It has furnished the Demo- 
cratic party, every argument that has been efficiently used 
to the injury of Republican candidates and Republican poli- 
cies. We have no substantial party majority in the state 
of New York. When we win, our victory is primarily the 
result of close, election-district organization. Everything 
that tends to impair the strength of the organization, to 
create prejudice against its leaders in the various counties, 
to create distrust of their motives, to misconstrue their acts, 
is bound in its tendency to take away from us that very 
small percentage of Republican votes on which success de- 
pends. The prejudicial and disintegrating course of the 
Tribune ;~its half-hearted support, when it supports at all; 
its false and ugly criticisms during every session of the 
legislature; its vicious abuse of individuals prominent in 
the party; its denunciation of measures judged to be neces- 
sary for the party welfare; its magnifying of party mis- 
takes ; its diabolical blackguardism of the organization as an 
organization, have finally rendered the name of Whitelaw 
Reid so odious to Republicans generally, that his advance- 
ment now would be regarded as a personal insult to every 
loyal member of the party. His course in respect to Gov- 
ernor Black is an interesting and thoroughly significant 
illustration of his character and conduct. In the first year 
of the Governor’s administration, while he was thought to 
be entirely dominated by organization influences, Reid 
abused him like.a pickpocket. He couldn’t stand up or he 


ELECTING ROOSEVELT GOVERNOR 133 


couldn’t sit down without calling forth the wrath of the 
Tribune. Then, when he did some things which the organt- 
zation opposed, and refrained from doing some other things 
which the organization desired, the Tribune hugged him to 
its hysterical bosom; and now, when it fears that the Gov- 
ernor is not “out with” the organization, and fears his re= 
nomination may be contemplated, it becomes distant and 
critical of its late idol and sniffs its doubtful nose. This is 
the characteristic Reid policy when he is waiting to be “‘con- 
ciliated.”’ It is intended for no other purpose than to inform 
us that the course of the Tribune in the pending campaign 
depends on whether or not Reid is to get an office.¥ 


This letter kept McKinley from appointing Reid to the 
Court of St. James. Such were Platt’s methods of “disci+ 
plining’” refractory Republican editors.!® In spite of Platt’s 
prediction, the Tribune gave Roosevelt’s candidacy active 
support during the campaign of 1898. Reid could not af- 
ford to offend too many of his Republican readers and be- 
sides he was one of Roosevelt’s personal friends. Perhaps 
Platt counted upon this when he assumed the risk of the 
Tribune’s continued “attacks.” 

Fortunately for Platt another metropolitan daily came to 
his aid about the time that he broke with Reid. ‘As late as 


1890, the New York Sun, edited by Charles A. Dana, had 


been a bitter critic of Platt and rather friendly to Tammany 
and Hill, but when Croker and Hill went down to defeat, the 
Sun found it convenient to view Platt and his machinations 
in a more favorable light. Moreover, the break-up of the 
Associated Press in the early nineties gave Dana a grudge 
against Reid. At any rate, the political “stories” in the 
Sun, largely the work of Edward G. Riggs who was inti- 


15 Platt, op. cit., pp. 261-62. 


16 An editor of a Republican up-state weekly informed the writer 
that he regarded this letter a masterpiece of invective. 


134 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


mate with Platt and trusted by Dana,!” contained many 
references to the “skillful management of the Republican 
organization.” 18 In 1896 it was through Riggs that Platt 
requested Dana to frame a financial plank for the Repub- 
lican State Convention. At the beginning of the following 
year Dana told General Russel A. Alger that he was very 
fond of-Senator Platt.® As long as Riggs stayed with the 
Sun, which was long after Dana’s death in 1897, Platt could 
count upon his policies and candidates being supported by 
this powerful paper which was supposed to be “close to 
Wall Street.” Early in 1898 the Sun discovered Roose- 
velt’s availability for the gubernatorial nomination. 
Another New York paper that Platt relied upon to do 
some of his city campaigning was the New York Press. 
Unlike the Sun, the Press had always been a Republican 
organ. Platt’s main problem, then, was to keep it “in line.” 
In 1890 its editor, Robert P. Porter, was appointed head 
of the United States Census Bureau. From evidence ap- 
pearing in Platt’s Autobiography it is fairly safe to con- 
clude that Platt maintained friendly relations with James 
Phillips, Jr., the editor and proprietor of the Press from 
1891 to 1894.29 When Lemuel E. Quigg became the editor 
of this paper in 1895, Platt’s only fear was that some rash 
act would come out of the ultra partisan loyalty of this 
impetuous lieutenant. Quigg’s conduct of this paper some- 
times furnished a target for the shafts of the Tribune, but 
Platt at least had the satisfaction of returning part of the 


WF, M. O’Brien, The Story of “The Sun” (New York, 1918), 
pp. 375, 344. 

18 For a typical example see the New Vork Sun, Sept. 17, 1804 
and January 11, 1897. 

19W. D. Orcutt, Burrows of Michigan and the Republican Party 
(New York, 1917), II, 99-102. Alger’s letter to Burrows. 

20 Pp. 266 ff. Phillips was one of Platt’s agents who negotiated 
the so-called “bargain with Strong” in 1894, 


ELECTING ROOSEVELT GOVERNOR 135 


fire, for Quigg had been trained as an editorial writer and 
a party platform composer by Whitelaw Reid. After Quigg 
resigned the editorship of this paper in the latter part of 
1896, he still continued to contribute articles presenting the 
views of the “organization.” | 

There were several other dailies in New York City whose 
editors belonged to the Republican Editorial Association 
of the state of New York.! The Brooklyn Times and the 
New York Mail & Express had smaller circulations than 
either the New York Tribune or the New York Press but 
they could not on that account be neglected by the Republi- 
can state committee. Nor did Platt and his city “Brethren” 
overlook the foreign language newspapers, among which 
the Brooklyn Freie Presse stood out as an influential Re- 
publican representative. In one campaign the state com- 
mittee started a Yiddish paper of its own. While leading 
an up-hill fight in the great metropolis, the Republican 
editors did not give up the game. 

The problem of keeping the Republican dailies in the up- 
state loyal to the organization did not present so many difs 
ficulties to Platt inasmuch as the more important ones 
were well “taken care of” by the ablest “scholars” of the 
“Sunday school.” With State Committeeman Warren di- 
recting the policies of the Buffalo Commercial, with Com- 
mitteeman Barnes editing the Albany Evening Journal, and 
with Committeeman Dunn managing the Binghamton Re- 
publican, there were at least three sections of the state that 
caused him no considerable worry. His other field mar- 
shals may not have been so closely tied up with the local 
party organs, but they were not upon that account without 
“influence” with the local aditors. When Fassett sold the 
Elnura Advertiser in 1896, he kept a “string” upon its po- 


1 New York Tribune, Jan. 25, 1895 and Jan. 25, 1900, 
® Interviews. 


136 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


litical policy.2 The Syracuse Journal was looked upon as 
. the personal organ of Committeeman Hendricks * and early 
in 1898 it came out for Roosevelt for governor. The 
Rochester Democrat & Chronicle, the most widely circu- 
lated paper in central New York, was always amiably dis- 
posed toward Committeeman Aldridge. Platt’s supervision 
over the policies of the up-state Republican dailies did not 
need to be of a very rigorous sort. The “faithful” editors 
saw that they would be rewarded. Now and then a Repub- 
lican editor was appointed to an important public office.’ 
Later, as president, Roosevelt appointed some Republican 
editors to diplomatic posts. As in the case of the Albany 
Evening Journal,’ it went without saying that the party 
organ would receive the city, county and state advertising. 
It was also likely that the lucrative government printing 
contracts would be awarded to the “organization” men. 

The country weeklies, Platt found, could stand a little 
nore active cultivation than their urban contemporaries. 
The New York Tribune soon discovered after its break 
with Platt that the state committee was sending copies of 
the Sun to its regular subscribers in the interior.? The 
distribution of boiler-plate “editorials” to the rural press 
was another expedient employed by the “organization.” ® 
The following letter, printed in the Tribune as authentic, 
seems to indicate that Platt sometimes made a direct appeal 
to the country newspapers for aid promising favors in re- 
turn: 


8 Interview with T. J. Leyden, formerly on the staff of the El- 
mira Advertiser. 

4 Syracuse News, Sept. 15, 1896. 

5 Nation, April 18, 1889, XLVIITI, 315. 

6 See below, p. 228. 

7 New York Tribune, December 12, 1894 and May 9, 1896, 

8 [bid., January 27, 1898. 


& 


ELECTING ROOSEVELT GOVERNOR 137 


UnItTED STATES Express CoMPANY, 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
No. 49: Broapway, NEW YorK, 
Nov. 26, 1894. 


(Confidenital) 

My Dear Sir: Herewith I send you a statement of fact, 
which, as a personal favor to me, | request that you read 
carefully. If it meets with your approval, I beg that you 
will make such use of it in your newspaper as seems to you 
suitable. I do not suggest that you print it in its entirety, 
for in order to cover the ground fully it has been made 
rather long, and perhaps too long for your use at one time. 
My suggestion is that you possess yourself of the salient 
points in this statement, and use them in editorials of your 
own writing during the next few weeks. If this request 
commends itself to your favor, you may be sure that I shall 
appreciate all you will do in response to it. 

Very truly ; urs, 
ANS ORG SET sett 
(Inclosure) 


The inclosure was written in the third person and one of 
its “statements of fact” ran as follows: “His (Platt’s) poli= 
cies are entirely in line with the interests of the Republican 
party, and to make war on him just at this time, when every 
force in the party should be at work to secure a wise and 
harmonious result to the advantage of the state and the 
party, is to do-what is unfair and generally injurious.” 
The sort of “appreciation” that he would show was not indi- 


cated, but other sources have hinted at the way such matters’ 


were handled. The printing of the session laws of the state, 
the insertion of announcements of sales by the sheriff, the 
publishing of the calendar of the county court, and the 
printing of election notices were all profitable jobs that a 


9 Dec. 12, 1894. See also Alexander, Four Famous New Yorkers, 
pp. 231-33. 


10 The article insinuated that the Tribune was hostile to Platt be- 
cause it had lost some political advertising to the Press. 


138 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


“Joyal” country publisher could count upon." An editor of 
a Republican weekly might also expect to receive the local 
postmastership or some other public office. During a cam- 
_ paign entire issues of local weeklies would be bought up by 
the state committee and circulated free among the voters.” 
The rural editors, taken as a body, were less independent 
than the city editors, and therefore more subject to political 
conircl. 

In the campaign of 1898 all these various devices were 
used to keep the Republican newspapers in line. Some of 
them were not needed. The reading public of the up-state 
regions was largely Republican and would not have toler- 
ated any sheet which did not comment upon the “construc- 
tive achievements” of the Republican administration, which 
did not print full reports of the speeches of the leading Re- 
publican orators, which did not describe the “‘enthusiasm”’ 
shown at the Republican rallies, and which did not print 
“unanswerable” editorials upon the issues of “imperialism,” 
“high tariff,’ “Tammany corruption,” “Democratic election 
frauds,” and “Crokerism.” The Troy Times, Governor 
Black’s tried supporter, was bitterly opposed to the nomina- 
tion of Roosevelt before the State Convention of 1898 
reached its decision, but when Roosevelt secured the nom- 
ination in regular fashion, it about faced with astounding 
celerity and became one of the Colonel’s most ardent sup- 
porters.® The campaign arguments printed in Republican 
newspapers probably did not convince many Democrats or 
Independents of the error of their ways, but in a close cam- 
paign like that of 1898 they undoubtedly did arouse the 
fighting spirit of the “dyed-in-the-wool” Republicans. 

11 Lee, op. cit., p. 406; Nation, August 11, 1898, LX VII, 106; Al- 
bany Argus, March 30, 1899; G. Myers, “ ‘Boss’ Platt,’ National 
Review, XXXVIII (1901), 219. 


12 Interview with Hon. C. H. Betts. 
13 See the issues of Sept. 27 and 28, 1898. 


ELECTING ROOSEVELT GOVERNOR 139 


Platt’s chief of staff in the campaign of 1898 was “Ben” 
Odell, chairman of the state committee. The state com- 
mittee was theoretically the body which determined whether 
the campaign would be a “speaking,” a “silent,” a “litera> 
ture,’ an “aggressive” or a “defensive” campaign, but in 
actual practice this decision and the active direction of the 
campaign devolved upon the chairman. To assist him in 
his work, Odell could count upon the services of William 
Barnes, the chairman of the executive committee, who spent 
most of his time “looking after the expenses and looking 
after the people who came in from the newspapers and after 
the advertisements; }® the invaluable aid of a treasuref 
who looked after the collection of funds; and the indis- 
pensable help of three paid secretaries, the first remaining 
always at hand to carry out any command, the second hav- 
ing charge of the literary bureau, and the third looking after 
the speaking department. In addition he had a sufficient 
number of clerks, messengers, stenographers, and other 
office helpers to attend to the routine and clerical work of 
the campaign. It was the chairman who directed the work 


of the “organization,” the fighting army « of ccommitteemen, 
candidates, officeholders, ‘precinct Sn bes and _Party 
workers. — 

“frimediately after opening headquarters in the Fifth 
Avenue Hotel, correspondence was begun with the various 
county committees in order to make sure that the local party 
workers secured a full registration of all the Republican 
voters. At this time, Platt’s field-marshals in the up-state 
cities also tended to the naturalization of the foreigners who 
could be counted upon by the Republicans. Odell watched 


14The main facts here given regarding the campaign work of 
the state committee are taken from an article in the Supplement 
of the New York Tribune, Nov. 13, 1898, “Running a Campaign.” 


15 Barnes v. Roosevelt, pp. 915 ff. 


140 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


each “advance” during the campaign closely. When a 
. weakness was discovered in any locality, he sent a man 
there under orders for the purpose of finding out the diffi- 
culty and bringing about a condition of “harmony.” 
Toward the end of the campaign all the chairmen of the 
Republican county committees were summoned to New 
York for a final council of war, after which Odell could 
say: 

I talked with them one at a time, giving the best informa- 
tion and suggestions J could, and receiving from them any 
suggestions of value and information which shows that the 
Republicans up the state are doing effective work in the 
campaign. We went into many details of the work, such as 
registration, methods of getting out the Republican vote 
and the steps necessary to prevent fraud and the corrupt 
use of money by the Democrats in the election. J am will- 
ing to say now without any hesitation, for the first time 
since the campaign opened, that we are going to carry the 
state and elect the Republican ticket by a safe majority.’ 


Somewhat less effective than the personal house-to-house 
canvass by the local party workers but still widely used in 
the state was the campaign circular. It had been the cus- 
tom to send “literature” in large quantities to “influential”’ 
men in every county, but Odell opened the campaign of 
1898 by sending matter to voters regardless of their stand- 
ing in the community and the change was praised by those 
who watched the results.17 In distributing this material, 
the secretary in charge was greatly aided by the official list 
of party voters furnished by the enrollment made in accord- 
ance with the Primary Law of 1898. In previous cam- 
paigns the committee had been compelled to rely upon lists 


16 New York Tribune, Oct. 29, 1898. 
1% New York Tribune, November 13, 1898. 


» 
t 
+4 


A, 


ELECTING ROOSEVELT GOVERNOR 141 


obtained from less convenient sources such as registration 
books, unofficial directories, and the census returns.'® 
Another important feature of the committee’s work was 
that taken care of by the secretary for the speaking depart- 
ment. He had a list of speakers classified according to 
temperament and nationality; he could furnish “humorous” 


or “serious” or “allround” ones or those who spoke Ger-,... 


man or Italian or Polish or “real Irish,” as the occasion de- 
manded. All kinds had been lined up and had signified 
their readiness to work for the cause—for a consideration. 
In addition there were hundreds who volunteered to serve 
without pay. In all, the committee had nearly five hun- 
dred speakers upon its list #9 and during the last three weeks_ 
of the campaign it arranged for more than fifteen hundred 
meetings. 

In spite of the emphasis that was placed upon the speak- 
ing department, Odell and Platt were unwilling for a long 
time to indorse Roosevelt’s pian of stumping the state. 
They remembered too well Fassett’s failure to speak his 
way into the governorship and they seemed to fear that the 
impetuous Roosevelt would say something “indiscreet.” 
Platt finally gave in to the plan and convinced Odell to do 
likewise. Strange to say, a Rochester paper of Democratic 
leanings seemed to share Platt’s misgivings, for, when the 
decision was finally reached, it said, “Roosevelt is soon to 
be turned loose to stump the state Fassett fashion, with the 
added accompaniments of a band of Rough Riders, a palatial 
car donated by the New York Central, and, as other theatri- 
cal companies express it, ‘an abundance of machinery.’ ” 
Upon his trip Roosevelt was accompanied by several other 


18 For Congressman Raines’ letter to a census enumerator see 
below, p. 255. 

19 New York Tribune, October 29, 1898, 

20 Rochester Herald, October 5, 1898. 


142 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


candidates for office among whom was “Tim” Woodruff 
and Chauncey Depew, the latter showing the same mod- 
esty and backwardness toward the United States senator- 
ship that Platt had displayed two years before. At the out- 
set, Roosevelt and his companions stressed national issues. 
.The Democrats may have looked with envy upon the “pala- 
tial car’ which made at least a dozen stops in a day,’ but 
they did not feel obliged to overlook state issues. 

With Roosevelt determined to make the campaign one of 
the “hoopla” and “hurrah” type, the party workers felt con- 
strained to employ all the many devices known to them 
which appealed to the voters’ emotions. The local com- 
mittees arranged for “cart-tail’ harangues, torch light 
parades, picnics, barbecues, and jollifications. These de- 
monstrations were usually held under the auspices of cam- 
paign clubs which had been organized for the purpose of 
giving recognition to certain racial and economic groups 
within the party. Thus, there were business men’s, travel- 
ling men’s, working men’s, Colored, Italian, German, Irish 
and Polish campaign clubs. These clubs were supplied 
with banners, torches, buttons, lithographs, band instru- 
ments and other paraphernalia. 

In spite of the vigorous onslaughts made in many direc- 
tions, it seemed as though “General Apathy” was running 
the campaign of 1898 until about three weeks before elec- 
tion. Before the “tide changed” the party workers appar- 
ently had been unable to stir up any enthusiasm over the 
“War,” “Sound Money,” the “Merchant Marine,” the 
“Tariff,” and the state “Excise Law.” The farmers had 
been told about the Raines law and its tax saving features, - 
the working men had heard about the many “labor” laws 
passed by the last Republican legislature, and the temperance 


1 New York Tribune, October 23, and November 4, 1898, 
2 Ibid., October 23, 24, 26, and 29, 1898, 


ELECTING ROOSEVELT GOVERNOR 143 


men had been lectured upon the dangers of Democratic ex- 
cise administration. None of these appeals aroused any 
pronounced response nor did Roosevelt’s side-stepping of 
the canal issue leave a very favorable impression.2 The 
turning point came shortly after October 2—on which date 
Richard Croker committed a grave blunder. The Tammany 
“boss” let it be known that Justice Daly had been refused a 
renomination to the Supreme Court because he had failed 
to make an appointment in his court recommended by the 
“organization.” Here was a “local” issue of incalculable 
value, and Roosevelt, the “spell-binders,” the clubs, and the 
party papers took up the cry, “An Untrammeled Judiciary.” 
It was undoubtedly this part of the campaign that Platt had 
in mind when he wrote: 


Roosevelt made a dramatic campaign. He fairly pranced 
about the state. He called a spade a “spade,” a crook a 
“crook.” During the final week of the canvass he made the 
issue Richard Croker, the Tammany boss, who had been so 
exccriated by the Lexow and Mazet committees. The 
Rough Rider romped home on election day with over 
17,000 plurality. 

I have always maintained that no man besides Roosevelt 
could have accomplished that feat in 1898.4 


While inaccurate in its details,> this account gives an 
idea of the new energy this issue and Roosevelt’s use of it 
gave to the lethargic party members. The Troy Times 
could say, “There is no denying the fact that Theodore 
Roosevelt has grown mightily in the public estimation since 
he appeared in person in the campaign.”® To be sure the 
rural voters had been told about the evils of Tammany rule 


8 Alexander, Four Famous New Yorkers, p. 318. 

40Op. cit., p. 373. 

5 The “Mazet” inquiry did not come until 1899. 

6 November 5, 1898. For proof of a “change in the tide” see the 
Albany Evening Journal, October 24, 1898; Nation, October 27, 
1898. 


144 . BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


before, but never in so concrete and forceful a fashion.’ 
After a careful canvass toward the end of the campaign, 
Chairman Odell was so confident of the result that he was 
willing to ‘place’ $20,000 of bis own money upon the re- 
sult. This, indeed, was an inspiring feat for the edification 
of the lesser workers. At the same time, a final ringing 
appeal was sent out to all voters couched in proper martial 
and sportsmanlike terms.® 

The activities described above cost a considerable sum of 
money. How much, Platt, himself, said he would not at- 
tempt to estimate. Large sums were spent for the support 
of headquarters, mass meetings, speakers’ expenses, adver- 
tising, and the distribution of literature. No accounts of 
such matters were kept by party committees prior to 1906.}° 
In 1901, however, a journalist estimated that expenditures 
for these legitimate purposes made by the anti-Tammany 
fusionists in Greater New York alone amounted to over 
$250,000.41. The method by which Platt obtained the 
great bulk of the funds for state campaigns from “those 
abundantly able to give” will be described in a later chapter. 
The local committees, besides looking to Platt for help, 
raised what they could by assessments upon candidates and 
office-holders. Candidates for the higher offices sometimes 
contributed twice as much as the annual salary of the office 
for which they were running.!® Office-holders, on the other 
hand, were only expected to “donate” a given percentage of 


7R. Croker, “Tammany Hall and the Democracy,” Nor. Am. 
Rev., CLIV, 229, ridicules this tendency among Republican speakers. 
For Roosevelt’s speeches see New York Tribune Index, 1898. 

8 New York Tribune, November 4, 1898. 

2 Op. ‘cit, ‘p. 535: 

10 Fuller, op. cit., p. 153. 

11 Nation, Nov. 14, 1901, LX XIII, 370. 

12The salary of the lieutenant-governor was $5,000 a year and 
in 1896 Woodruff contributed $10,250. See New York Tribune, 
Nov. 14, 1896. 


ELECTING ROOSEVELT GOVERNOR 145 


their annual salaries.® Although this latter method appears 
to be somewhat systematic, it can hardly be said that any 
Republican committee in Platt’s day used a “budget sys- 
tem.” Unexpected “emergencies” prevented such “scien- 
tific’ procedure. In the dying days of the campaign of 
1898, it was felt “necessary” to raise a huge fund to offset 
Democratic “corruption.” }* Thomas C. Platt, so the editor 
of his Autobiography claimed in true newspaper fashion, 
was the only man equal to such an emergency and he went 
downtown with a list of names headed by J. Pierpont Mor- 
gan.? Such a “last minute-fund” was distributed among 
the “boys” upon “dough day” for the purpose of “getting 
out the vote” and “delivering it” upon election day.}® 
“Getting out the vote” in rural New York usually meant 
the hiring of teams to “convey electors to the polls,” a prac- 
tice which was permissible under the law. Farmers, so 
“hired” usually found their horses exceedingly valuable 
upon election day and in some cases were paid for leaving 
them in their barns.” In the urban districts “workers”’ 
were engaged to “get out the vote,” whose chief occupation 
seemed to be to stand, or lean near the polling-place a con- 
siderable portion of the day and receive $5 a piece for 


13 Fuller, op. cit., p. 148. For an early example of this practice 
see Ninth Report of the U. S. Civil Service Commission (1892), 
pea. 

14For a rumor concerning this fund see Albany Argus, Nov. 9, 
1898. 

15 Pp. 536-39. The story here given in highly colored terms of 
“how Platt saved Roosevelt” runs to the effect that a fund of 
$60,000 was needed to offset the Democratic canvass, that Roose- 
velt was helpless when asked where it could be raised, and that 
Odell went to Platt who quickly raised it in Wall Street. 

16 “Tough day” was the Monday before Tuesday of election. 

17 Fuller, op. cit., p. 153-54; J. G. Speed, “Purchase of Votes,” 
‘Harper’s Weekly, XLIX, 422-24, 

10 


146 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


“wearing the badge.” 18 Although there were many teams 
and workers that did perform their functions and without 
whose help the total vote in state elections would have been 
much less, still, as Governor Hill, a practical politician, 
wrote to the legislature, much of the money spent for the 
avowed purpose of “getting out the vote” was disbursed 
under a “thinly-disguised claim,” a “transparent excuse for 
bribery and corruption” inasmuch as its “real design or 
effect is to influence the man whose teams or services are 
nominally employed.” 

In a eulogy upon Platt, Quigg maintained that “money 
had become ineffective at elections long before his power 
was established.” ®® The secret ballot law and the other 
election acts which supposedly accomplished this admirable 
result were not, however, without their partisan uses. For 
each of the some 4,600 election districts in the state there 
were four election inspectors, two poll-clerks, and two bal- 
lot-clerks, one half of whom were nominated by the local 
Republican committees. This meant that some 18,400 trust- 
worthy Republicans were paid at least $5 each upon election 
day to perform functions formerly assumed by the party.? 
In the city of New York, the Metropolitan Election Law, 
or “Force Bill’ as it was called by the Democrats, provided 
for an additional force of 600 election officials, called 
“deputies,” one half.of whom had to be appointed from lists 
furnished by the Republican committees. These “deputies,” 
paid in the same manner as other election officials, did not 
conduct the work of election, but “supervised and investi- 
gated” with a view to preventing and detecting fraud. To 
do this important work, these “reliable” party workers were 


18 Nation, November 14, 1901. 

19 Messages from the Governors, VIII, 674. 

20 Loc. cit. 

1 They received the same upon registration day. 


ELECTING ROOSEVELT GOVERNOR 147 


given full “police powers” and access to the sacred area 
within the guard rail. Although “partisan advantage” wa’ 
the purpose branded by many upon this law,? it did lessen 
certain kinds of election trickery.2 On the other hand, this 
and other corrupt practices acts did not wipe out the talk of 
bribery and corruption. In 1905 one investigator estimated 
that there were in excess of 170,000 venal voters in the 
great metropolis, while the corruption of the elaborate in 
the country districts was “even greater.” * This same year 
conditions grew so intolerable in Chemung County that 
chairmen of the two party committees drew up and signed 
a formal agreement to limit their election expenses and to 
refrain from purchasing votes.’ Voters were “purchased 
outright” or “paid for their time” or bought by a promise 
of some future reward. According to one in a position to 
know, “it was in the year 1890 that the thistle-blow of cor- 
ruption was first sown.” ® In the case of illiterates, at least, 
it was possible to know whether the vote had been “deliv- 
ered.”” Quigg was, perhaps, a bit pessimistic about the 
power of money upon election day during the period of 
Platt’s domination. 


In fairness to Platt it should be said that he did not bring _ 


about these conditions. He and the state committee were 
waging a continuous battle against “strikers’’ and “saw dust- 


2E. D. Durand, “Political and Municipal Legislation,” Ann. Amer. 
Acad., XIII, 217; Nation, July 21, 1898. | 

3 Fuller, op. cit., passim, gives a full account of the New York 
election law. The Metropolitan act, he asserted, lessened coloniza- 
tion. 

4Speed, op. cit., pp. 386, 424. 

5 Fuller, op. cit., pp. 141, 178. 

6 New York Tribune, Mar. 8, 1898. Judge S. E. North, of Gene- 
see County, speech before County Convention at Batavia in August 
1896. 

7 Party workers were permitted to enter the booths and instruct 
illiterates, 


148 BOSS PLATT AND HIS N¥W YORK MACHINE 


ers” who claimed that they could influence so many votes if 
they were given a little support.8 Besides, Platt insisted that 
his function as a campaign financier was completed when he 
had handed over the funds to the local committees.? In a 
vast organization, such as the one he headed, it was inevi- 
table that certain mistakes would be made; one man could 
not keep track of all the details. 

What was the net result of the hard and systematic work 
that Platt and his “close election district organization” put 
in each year before election day? As in 1897 it might all 
be spoiled by a rainy day. The bad roads and the primitive 
methods of transportation in rural New York during the 
nineties kept many a confirmed Republican farmer from 
voting upon a rainy day. In 1896 and 1900 the trend of 
public sentiment in New York was so overwhelmingly Re- 
publican that when the returns came in Platt might have 
said, “Why did I work so hard?’ On the other hand, the 
importance of the state party election machinery should not 
be slighted. By the aid of the Republican newspapers and 
the Republican election district organization Platt was able 
to retain a hold upon the state legislature from 1894 
throughout the rest of his political career. It is true that the 
clauses in the constitution of 1894 which limited the repre- 
sentation of New York City in the state legislature gave 
him a great advantage over his opponents but in off years 
he had to fight for a working majority. In a year like 
1898 not only the legislature but the governorship hung in 
the balance. Roosevelt’s plurality of some 17,000 votes over 
his Democratic opponent was a narrow margin of victory, 
considering that the total vote cast in the gubernatorial elec- 
‘tion was over 1,300,000. Platt had grounds for boasting 


*s that he had “saved Roosevelt.” In a state where the 


8 New York Tribune, November 13, 1898. 
9 Op. cit., p. 535. 


ELECTING ROOSEVELT GOVERNOR 149 


strength of the two major parties was so even, Republican 
candidates for elective offices, whether national, state, or lo-’ 
cal, could not afford to neglect the aid of the man who had 
something to do with the organs of party propaganda, and 
the mechanics of the election process.’ 


10 The vote upon candidates for the principal offices from 1888 to 
1900 was as follows: 





| Repelitiogn | Democratic 

















Year Office Candidates | Vote Plurality | | Plurality 
|President | Harrison | R *650,338| 14,373 
1888 | Cleveland D = 635,965 
‘Governor | Miller R_  »631,293 
| Hill iD 650,464 19,171 
1889 | Secretary | Gilbert R 505,894 
of State | Rice D 485,367 20,528 
1891 Governor | Fassett i|R  *534,956 
) Flower 'D 582,893 47 937 
1892 | President | Harrison |R 609,350 
Cleveland {|D 654,868 45,518 
1893 | Secretary | Palmer IR 545,098 24,484 
| of State | Meyer |D 520,614 
1894 |Governor | Morton es 673,818 | 156,108 
Hill 1 517.710 
1895 | Secretary | Palmer R 601,205 90,145 
of State | King D 511,060 
1896 | President | McKinley | R= .819,838| 268464 
Bryan | Die ol 309 
Governor | Black R_ «= 787,516} 212,992 
-| Porter D* > 5/4524 
1897 | Chief Wallace R 493,791 
Judge Parker D 554,680 60,889 
1898 |Governor | Roosevelt R .~ 661,715 17,794 
oi an Wyc ID 643,921 
1900 | President McKinley, R 821,992] 143,606 
Bryan," y } D2 678,386 
Governor | Odell De 304,859} 111,126 
Stanchfield | RY 693,733 

























CHAPTER VII 
CONTROL OVER LAW MAKING 


The control that Thomas C. Platt and his field marshals 
exercised over the law-making machinery of the state was 
closely articulated with the control that they exercised over 
the party nominating and election machinery. No one 
realized better than Platt how to thwart the plans of a re- 
form governor by means of a “machine” controlled legis- 
lature. In his memoirs, Platt said: “I also was influen- 
tial in securing to the people Republican legislatures con- 
tinuously, with two exceptions, from 1883 to the present 
day.” + This boast could be readily translated into the con- 
fession that he could not keep his hands off the Republican 
primaries whenever nominating conventions were about to 
meet to nominate candidates for state senatots and assem- 
blymen.? When it is considered that in thirty-six counties 
the assembly district was coterminous with the county ® and 
that the other sixty-four assemblymen were chosen from 
districts marked out by the boards of supervisors of the re- 
maining twenty-three counties, it is clear why Platt and the 
state committee took such care in “recognizing” the proper 
county chairmen. In other words, the county “boss” who 
controlled the politics of his county had charge of the selec- 


10Op. cit., Introduction, p. xx. 

2 New York Tribune, Dec. 4, 1897. Examples of his interference 
are given, 

3 Fulton and Hamilton Counties were grouped together. They 
constituted the only exception to the statement made above, which 
is based on constitution of 1894. 

150 


CONTROL OVER LAW MAKING 151 


tion of one or more assemblymen according to the size of 
his domain. The nomination of candidates for the state 
Senate presented a more difficult situation to handle, inas- 
much as the senatorial district was not the basis for other 
Republican activities. However, the state committee could 
“suggest”? a compromise whenever one of the up-state sena- 
torial conventions was deadlocked by the rivalry of county 
leaders, and, in the ten most populous counties which con- 
tained within their boundaries one or more senatorial dis- 
tricts, the delicate task of selecting a man to defeat the Dem- 
ocratic organization candidate was in the hands of men like 
“Lem” Quigg, “Tim” Woodruff, John Hazel, George Al- 
dridge, Francis Hendricks, William Barnes, and Charles 
Hackett. The bulk of the Republican legislators came from 
the rural up-state counties where Republican majorities were 
large and certain and the Republican “organization” was su- 
preme; the balance came from the “doubtful” counties 
where an efficient “machine” was necessary to win victories. 
In either case, the “bosses” were determining factors. As 
Governor Hughes said of them (the “bosses’”), “They con- 
trol the nomination of the members of the legislature and 
dictate their votes upon legislative measures. If the latter 
disobey, they are left at home.” ® 

What sort of lawmakers were selected under these condi- 
tions? Were they “representative” of their respective com1- 
munities? How often did a renomination allow them to 
continue their legislative duties? The legislature of 1899 
will be taken to furnish some light upon these questions, in- 
asmuch as this session is representative of the conditions 


4Thirty of the fifty senatorial districts were in these ten coun- 
ties. However, in 1899, only nine of the senators from these thirty 
districts were Republicans. In other words, New York, Kings, and 
Erie counties were great Democratic strongholds. 

5 C. E. Hughes, Conditions of Progress in Democratic Government 
(New Haven, 1916), p. 103. 


152 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


in the state in the heyday of Platt’s power and influence. 

As a whole, the Republican legislators who assembled at 
the state capitol in 1899 had had considerable political ex- 
perience. Of the twenty-seven Republican senators, seven- 
teen were old members, some having served three, four and 
five terms, and five had been advanced from the Assembly ; 
thus, only eighteen per cent had not had previous legislative 
training.6 Since the assemblymen were elected every year 
instead of every two years as in the case of the senators, it 
could not be expected that the assemblymen would show the 
same level of legislative experience. Forty-nine of the 
eighty-seven Republican assemblymen had seen previous 
service in the Assembly; only one-third of these veterans 
were in the legislature before 1898.7 However, all of the 
Republican assemblymen but fifteen had held some public 
‘office; ex-members of county boards of supervisors were 
most numerous, while there was a sprinkling of ex-village 
trustees and ex-aldermen.’ There was scarcely any one in 
either branch of the legislature who had not been linked up 
with the organization in some manner, either as a public offi- 
cer, or as a committeeman,® a delegate to one of the party 
conventions, or a campaign orator. 

The age, schooling and pursuit in life of these Republican 
legislators have been taken as criteria of thir social status 
in their respective communities. The senate group was de- 
cidedly more of a body of “elder statesmen” than the as- 
sembly group; sixty per cent of the senators were over fifty 
-years of age and none were below forty, while one third of 
the assemblymen were in their thirties and only twenty-two 


6 The New York Red Book, 1899, p. 702. 
7 Tbid., p. 724. 
8 Over half of the assemblymen had been supervisors. 


® Fourteen in the Assembly and four in the Senate had been 
county committeemen, 


CONTROL OVER LAW MAKING 153 


had passed the half-century mark. [Tor the most part, these 
men were in the prime of life. One-third of the senators 
had received a college training, a second third had not been 
farther than the common schools, and the last third had 
been trained in academies. One-fifth of the assemblymen 
were college graduates, one-third had gone no farther than 
the public schools, and the remainder had received their 
training in academies and professional schools. These 
ratios were better than the general average, but it could not 
be said that one of these men was a profound student of» 
modern conditions. Over one-half of the senators were 
lawyers, one-third were engaged in various mercantile pur= 
suits, two were farmers, and one was a physician. Not 
quite one-third of the assemblymen were lawyers; almost 
one-half were engaged in businss pursuits, including trad- 
ing, retailing, banking, manufacturing, insurance and mill- 
ing; seven were farmers, three were “newspaper men,” two 
were doctors, and one was a labor union official.4® Consid- 
ering the support that the rural districts gave the Republi- 
can party in the state, it is surprising that there were so few 
farmers among the Republican legislators. However, many 
of the “lawyers” and “business men” had been “brought 
up on the farm” and still kept in close touch with the rural 
situation. The absence of engineers, mechanics, and edu- 
cators was noteworthy. On the whole, these. men were 
fairly “representative” of the middle class found in the up- 
state towns and cities, most of them were members of some 
Protestant church and all but three were native born Ameri- 
cans. It is difficult to ascertain how many of these men 
were professional politicians inasmuch as all but two 
claimed to be engaged in some gainful occupation other than 
the holding of public office. Some of the lawyers were men 


1 fbid., passim. 


154 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


without large practice and others were young men from the 
cities starting out to make their reputations. 

The nomination and election of Republican legislators 
was only the beginning of Platt’s work in organizing the 
legislature. He was sure of a majority because of the con- 
stitutional “gerrymander” but what good was a Republican 
majority if its action could not be controlled upon important 
measures? Through his “advice” and that of the state com- 
mittee with reference to the selection of presiding officers, 
important committees and floor leaders, in both houses, 
Platt was able to conserve the victories that he achieved 
upon primary and election days. Inasmuch as it required 
an absolute majority of the fifty senators and the one hun- 
dred and fifty assemblymen to pass a bill," his task was a 
delicate one whenever there were enough “independent” leg- 
islators to make trouble and an “independent” governor to 
lead them. 

One of the key positions to power in the legislature was 
the speakership of the lower house. It has already been 
pointed out that as far back as 1885 Platt was influential in 
choosing this important legislative officer. Nine years later 
the selection of a speaker became one of his regular annual 
tasks. In 1895 Payn was active as Platt’s agent in securing 
the nomination of Hamilton Fish for speaker.!* In 1897 
George Aldridge was influential in securing the selection of 
James M. E. O’Grady as presiding officer of the Assem- 
bly..2 The Republican candidate for speaker was formally 
chosen by a party caucus at the beginning of a session, but 
in 1899 Platt asked Roosevelt if he had any committee ap- 
pointments to suggest before this caucus met. Roosevelt 
answered, “No,” and expressed surprise because he had not 


11 Constitution, 1894, Art. III, Sec. 15. 
12 Nation, Jan. 10, 1895; Harper’s Weekly, Jan. 12, 1895. 
138 New York Tribune, January, 1897. 


CONTROL OVER LAW MAKING 155 


understood that the speaker who made the committee ap- 
pointments had been agreed upon by the members-elects 
“Oh!” responded Platt, with a tolerant smile, “He has not 
been chosen yet, but of course whoever we choose as speak- 
er will agree beforehand to make the appointments we 
wish.” 1 The man whom Platt had in mind for the speak- 
ership that year was S. Fred Nixon, the man who had seen 
longer service in the Assembly than any other Republican » 
and concerning whom a Tribune reporter prophesied, “As a 
presiding officer he will be a firm and will transact business 
with rapidity.” ?® Speaker Nixon was a cool headed man 
who thoroughly understood his position; he was a man of 
large frame, with a big voice and the Tammany Hall legis- 
lators looked upon him with respect. So sure was Speaker 
Nixon of his re-election in 1900 that a month before the 
caucus met which was to nominate him he “appointed” 
some of the committees by and with the consent of Senator 
Platt.t¢ 

The presiding officer of the Senate was the lieutenant- 
governor who was nominated by the state convention in a 
manner already described. In 1898 Roosevelt was known 
as a “reform” candidate for governor, but it could hardly be 
said that “Tim” Woodruff posed as a “reformer.” 2” The 
leadership of the Senate was divided between the lieutenant- 
governor and the president pro tem, the latter being selected 
by a majority party caucus of the senators at the beginning 
of a session. The temporary presidency of the Senate was 
held by Timothy E. Ellsworth from 1896 to 1902 inclusive. 
It is needless to say that the two “Tims” had little difficulty 


in co-operating with each other. i 
14 Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 284. 
15 New York Tribune, Jan. 5, 1899. 
16 [bid., Dec. 2, 1899, editorial on “the Evolution of a Trust.” 
17C,. W. Thompson, Party Leaders of the Time (New York, 
1906), pp. 412 ff. 


4 


156 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


After the selection of the presiding officers of the two 
liouses, the appointment of the committees was the next 
important step in the organization of the legislature. This 
was invariably an occasion for a meeting of the “Sunday 
school” at the Fifth Avenue Hotel.4® Here the leaders of 
beth houses consulted with Senator Platt and prominent 
members of the state committee as to the selection of the 
chairmen of the important committees. In the Assembly 
the important committees were those on ways and means, 
judiciary, cities, railroads, excise, insurance, taxation and 
commerce, and at the head of each was placed a strong or- 
ganization man. There was a tendency for Platt, Odell, 
and Barnes to slight the reform sentiment of New York 
even on the Cities Committee /% and to place their own lieu- 
tenants in charge of the committees which had relations with 
.. the corporations. In the Senate the crucial committees 

bore the same names as those mentioned for the Assembly, 
except that the committee which corresponded to the As- 

sembly Ways and Means Committee was called the Finance 
Committee. The appointment of these committees was a 
matter of agreement between the leutenant-governor and 
the president pro tem, subject, of course, to the approval of 
a conference with Platt and his marshals. Inasmuch as 
both houses depended to a great extent upon their commit- 
tees to decide what bills should be considered and passed, 
_the determination of the membership of these committees 
amounted almost to a charting of the work of the session. 

There was another centralizing agency in both houses 


18 New York Tribune, Jan. 7, 1899; Jan. 11, 1900. 

19 Nation, Jan. 17, 1895; New York-Tribune, Jan. 9, 1896. 

9 New York Tribune, Jan. 11, 1900. 

1D, L. Colvin, The Bicameral Principle in the New York Legisla- 
ture (New York, 1913), p. 88. This monograph is an intensive siudy 
of the session of 1910 but many of the customs described originated 
in the nineties. 


CONTROL OVER LAW MAKING 157 


called a Committee on Rules which in certain important par- 
ticulars superseded all the other committees. In the lower 
house, especially, the Rules Committee was an exceedingly 
powerful body. It was made up of the speaker, the chair- 
man of the Committee on Ways and Means, two other im- 
portant comimittee chairmen selected by the speaker, and 
two minority members, one of whom was the minority lead- 
er. The chairman of the Committee on Ways and Means 
was also looked upon as the floor leader, the party whip, 
who got the members out and then directed them how to 
vote. By a rule adopted by the Assembly in 1896 and con- 
~ tinued during the period under discussion, this committee of 
six assumed almost absolute control of the business of the 
house during the last weeks of a session.2. The other stand- 
ing committees were then discharged and the decision of the 
Rules Committee as to what bills would be considered and 
what bills would not was the decision of the house, unless. 
otherwise ordered by a two-thirds vote of the members 
present. This practically meant that in 1899 and for sev- 
eral years afterward, two’men, Speaker Nixon and Floor 
Leader Jotham P. Allds,3 decided for the most part the 
fate of legislation toward the close of a session when most 
of the bills were rushed through the Assembly. The Rules 
Committee of the upper house was composed of the presi- 
dent pro tempore, his most trusted lieutenant, and the min- 
ority leader. Although Temporary President Ellsworth did 
not possess the same arbitrary powers as the speaker of the 
Assembly, yet, as floor leader and with the help of “Uncle” 
John Raines on the Rules Committee,* he could direct the 
work of the Republican senators. Toward the close of a 


2F. B. Gilbert, “The Legislature” in Official New York, III, 26. 


3 Allds was floor leader from 1899 to 1903 when he was advanced 
to the Senate. 


# Raines was made president pro tem. in 1903, 


158 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


session if a bill was not advanced on the calendar by the 
‘order of the Senate Rules Committee, it practically had no 
chance of passage. 

What chance had the individual member against a sys- 
tem like this? He could drop his bills in the bill box, but 
he had no guarantee that they would get any farther than 
the committee stage. The chairmen of the various com- 
mittees were governed by no rules; they decided arbitrarily 
when the meetings would be held, what matters would be 
considered and what postponements would be made.® If by 
chance or by some clever log rolling the member’s bill is 
reported out of the committee to which it was referred and 
put on the calendar, the presiding officer and the floor leader 
are the next persons to be propitiated. There was a tradi- 
tion about two drawers in the speaker’s desk; one was 
called “grave yard No. 1” out of which a few bills came 
back to life, the other was called “grave yard No. 2” in 
which a bill once buried had no chance of resurrection. On 
the other hand, when the leaders made up their minds, a 
large number of bills were passed and the avalanche was so 
great that the individual member was likely to find himself 
overwhelmed. According to the constitution,® each mem- 
ber had the right to show his independence upon the final — 
passage of a bill, but the custom of calling a “short roll’ 
whereby his vote was counted in the affirmative unless he © 
conspicuously arose to protest made him hesitate to exer- 
cise this right for fear that his own bills would be jeopar- 
dized. 

There is not much evidence showing the way in which 
Platt and his sub-leaders used this power of the party within 
the legislature. However, the investigation demanded by 


5 For an example of the way in which this power was used, see 
New York Tribune, April 14, 1899, 
6 Art. III, Sec. 15. 


CONTROL OVER LAW MAKING 159 


Senator Allds in 1910 to clear himself of certain bribery 
charges revealed an interesting letter written at the time 
that Alids was floor leader of the Assembly: 


49 Broapway, NEw York, 
Aprit 15, 1901. 
Hon. J.P. Allds, 
Assembly, 
Albany, N.Y. 
My pEAR ALLDs: 

I wish to call your attention to the attached fete from 
Mr. William A. Smyth, the chairman of the Republican 
county committee of Tioga County, concerning two bills 
now before the Assembly committee on rules proposing to 
amend the Highway Law relative to extraordinary repairs 
of highways and bridges. This legislation will affect very 
unfavorably the Owego Bridge Co., which is an important 
interest in Owego, and I suspect that the necessity for this 
letter of Smyth’s arises out of conditions which are exceed- 
ingly important. I know that there is a proposition to 
enlarge the Owego Bridge Co. under this new combination © 
with the American Bridge Co., and I would like very much 
to aid them in any way that I consistently could. Will you 
not hold this bill in the committee on rules? Please let me 
hear from yous 

Very truly yours, 
ee eo Prams 


The important thing to note about this letter is that it 
was written toward the end of the session after the rules 
committee had taken charge of all the business of the 
house.® Platt realized that it was only necessary to get the 
co-operation of two men upon this committee in order to 
smother any bills which he regarded as objectionable. The 
reasons for his objections to the particular bill mentioned 


7 State of New York, Senate Documents, 1910, No. 28, pp. 1244-45. 
(Proceedings of the Senate in the matter of the Investigation De- 
manded by Senator Jotham P. Allds). 


8 [bid., p. 1253, 


160 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


in the letter will be discussed more at length in another con- 
‘nection. Sufficient details are given to illustrate his method 
of influencing legislation. In addition to the letter to the 
floor leader given above, Platt also wrote the following to 
Speaker Nixon: 


AprIL 17, 1901. 
Hon. S. Fred Nixon, 
Assembly, 
Albany, N.Y. 
My peAR NIXon: 

I have written Allds, asking him to endeavor to hold in 
the committee on rules Senate bill No. 292, introductory 
No. 273, and Assembly bill, No. 491, introductory No. 458, 
both of similar purport, namely, amending the Highway 
Law relative to extraordinary repairs of highways and 
bridges. I have explained to him the reasons for making 
this request. I very much want your co-operation in hold- 
ing these bills in committee. Will you co-operate? Allds 
can explain the details. 

Yours sincerely, 
Te, GP eae 


Whether these letters were the chief factors in preventing 
the passage of the bills referred to will probably never be 
definitely determined. However, the fact remains that the 
bills were “put to sleep” in the Committee on Rules.?® At the 
investigation demanded by Senator Allds, corroboration evi- 
dence was introduced to the effect that Allds and Nixon re- 
ceived bribes on April 23 from the manager of the bridge 
companies for suppressing the very bills that Platt ordered 
to be killed,!! and four-fifths of the senators agreed that 
these bribery charges against Allds were sustained. On 
.the other hand, Allds maintained his innocence to the end, 
and his attorneys set up the theory that he held the bills in 

9 Tbid., p. 1251. 


10 /bid., p. 1253. Allds testifying. 
11 Jbid., pp. 98, 335. 


a 


CONTROL OVER LAW MAKING 161 


the committee because he had been asked to do so by his 
party leader. That Platt’s correspondence alone would have. 
been insufficient to explain the action taken on the bills 
seems to be indicated by other testimony that was intro- 
duced at the investigation to the effect that for four years 
after 1901 the bridge companies were able to prevent hostile 
legislation by making contributions to the Republican cam- 
paign funds through the state chairman.” After 1901 no 
money payments were made by the bridge companies to the 
individual members of the Assembly and yet no measures 
hostile to the bridge companies were passed. What Chair- 
man Dunn could do certainly was not beyond Senator Platt. 

The party leaders outside the legislature were able to con- 
vince the legislators to pass certain measures as well as to 
leave other measures out. An interesting case showing the 
relations between State Committeeman Aldridge and the 
legislators from the city of Rochester was brought to light 
in a fire insurance investigation conducted by the State Su- 
perintendent of Insurance in 1910. A bill was introduced 
in the legislature of 1901 by a Rochester assemblyman 
which was designed to remove a tax from certain insurance 
companies. A certain Mr. E. R. Kennedy, an insurance 
broker of New York City, produced in the investigation a 
telegram from Committeeman Aldridge, dated February 21, 
1901, to the following effect: “I talked with friend over 
telephone. Friend will take care of the bill when it comes 
before committee.” 18 Another telegram, dated March 20, 
1901, said: “Our friends will not permit accident. The 
bill will pass tomorrow.” The bill was passed and Mr. 
Kennedy’ regarded Committeeman Aldridge’s services of 
sufficient value to write him a check for one thousand dol- 


12 Tbid., pp. 705 ff. 


13 New York papers, March 20, 1910, 
11 


162 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


lars,!# which sum Aldridge said he used for the benefit of 
‘the party in Monroe County.¥ 

The fate of the amendments to the Highway Law and the 
passage of the insurance bill mentioned above in 1901 did 
not attract any public attention at the time. Did not many 
other bills fail of passage in that session and what was one 
little insurance bill in the great mass of bills that did pass? 
There was no reason why the party leaders should parade 
such petty achievements which would only be misunderstood 
by the ignorant public. In 1915 Committeeman Barnes ad- 
mitted that he had received many requests in regard to leg- 
islation.4® Persons who wanted their affairs taken care of 
with reference to the legislature at Albany soon learned that 
the party leaders outside the legislature could handle these 
matters in a quiet and efficient fashion.” 

When considerable public pressure was brought to bear 
upon the legislature regarding bills which were featured in 
the newspapers, the party leaders found that the simple ex- 
pedient of a letter, a telegram, or a long distance telephone 
call was not sufficient to insure to them control over the sit- 
uation. It therefore became necessary for Platt to hold a 
plenary session of the “Sunday school” to decide what pro- 
cedure should be followed with reference to measures which 
had attracted or were likely to attract widespread public 
interest and comment.!® 

The devices that were employed to secure the passage of 
the so-called Raines Liquor Tax bill in 1896 illustrate the 
methods employed by the party leaders to over-come oppo- 
sition of various sorts to measures openly favored by the 


14 The check was reproduced in the Rochester Post Express, April 
8, 1910. 

15 Rochester Democrat & Chronicle, March 20, 1910. 

16 Barnes v. Roosevelt, p. 1998, Barnes testifying on May 14, 1915. 

17 Colvin, op. cit., p. 178. 

18 Supra. 


CONTROL OVER LAW MAKING 163 


“old man.” This bill, as introduced by Senator John 
Raines, provided for higher liquor license fees, abolished 
the local excise boards and created a state excise commis- 
sion which was to collect all the liquor taxes and divide the 
proceeds equally between the local divisions and the state. 
The brewers’ associations, the liquor dealers’ associations, 
the German-American leagues, the chambers of commerce, 
and other societies in cities like New York, Brooklyn} 
Buffalo, and Rochester protested violently against the bill. 
Some of the more independent newspapers looked upon it 
as one of Platt’s patronage schemes,’® the financing of 
which would fall most heavily upon the urban communities 
of the state. It was obvious that considerable pressure 
would be needed to bring some of the Republican legislators 
from the large cities into line. 

It was decided to push the bill through the Senate first, as 
this would lessen the responsibility of some of the assembly= 
men who were voicing the loudest objections. In order to 
start matters properly, Platt telephoned to Temporary 
President Ellsworth explaining to him the urgency of the 
situation." Two days later Platt sent his son, Frank H. 
Platt, to Albany in order to make sure that the senators 
went-into party caucus regarding the matter.1 The caucus 
was held and it labelled the bill a “party measure,” after it 
had made certain amendments by way of concession to those 
most directly affected. All those who participated in the 
catuicus were expected to support the bill as amended. Sen- 
ator Raines next dashed off to New York to see if Thomas 
C. Platt approved of the changes. The Tioga chieftain evi- 
dently was pleased, for upon the return of Senator Raines, 
Senator Higgins, chairman of the Committee on Taxation, 


19 Harper's Weekly, March 7, 1896. 
20 New York Tribune, February 27, 1896. 
, lIbid., February 29, 1896, 


A 


164 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


intimated that immediate action would be taken.? To super- 
‘vise the final process Platt sent State Chairman Hackett, 
State Committeeman Parkhurst, and Chairman Lauterbach 
of the New York County Committee to Albany. These 
agents saw the bill pass the Senate under a cloture rule and 
were also rewarded for their efforts by witnessing the adop- 
tion of the bill as passed by the Senate by a caucus of the 
Republican assemblymen.? Two days later after a stormy 
session in which the doors were locked for seven hours, the 
Assembly stamped its approval upon the bill. A bill passed 
in this manner was said to be “jammed through” under the 
“gag rule.” 

There were rumors at the time that a large corruption 
fund was being raised by certain brewers to defeat the 
Raines bill. A correspondent upon the New York Press 
told a story about a fund “big enough to buy all the men in 
the Senate who are purchasable.”® According to an ac- 
‘count cited in Platt’s Autobiography, the brewers’ plan 
failed for the following reasons: 


But they had reckoned without the “Easy Boss,” who 
was then in the heyday of his power. He had set his mind 
upon passing the bill—for the good of the party. Learning 
that it was in this jeopardy, he had read the riot act in cer- 
tain quarters, as coming direct from him, threatening, if the 
bill was defeated, a whole lot of criminal prosecutions for 
bribery would follow. It was enough. The only thing 
which could save the bill had happened. There was a scat- 
tering. The money was sent back to Buffalo, and all those 
graft promises were off.” 


2 March 3, 1896. 

3 New York Tribune, March 11, 1896. 

4 [bid., March 13, 1896. 

5 Ibid., February 29, 1896. 

6 Cited in New York Tribune, February 29, 1896. 

TP. 472, quoting from account of George L. Carlisle in New York 
Times. 


CONTROL OVER LAW MAKING 165 


It is singular that a party leader in the final summing up 
of his life would give credence to such a story regarding his 
fellow fartisans, the legislators whom he helped nominate 
and elect. 

Another one of Platt’s favorite measures in 1896 was 
the Greater New York bill which was passed about the 
same time and same manner that the Raines bill was pushed 
through. In the following year impressive opposition de- 
veloped against the proposed charter for Greater New 
York,® but the bill was hurried through without discussion - 
because the “despot” had said it must pass. One of the 
members who voted for it said privately, “If it were not for 
the fact that the ‘old man’ wants it, I doubt if the charter 
would get a dozen votes in the legislature outside the Brook- 
lyn and Long Island members.’® Conditions continued 
much the same throughout the late nineties and in the early 
years of the twentieth century. Roosevelt in looking back 
upon his governorship could write, “It must be remembered 
that Mr. Platt was to all intents and purposes a large part~ 
of, and sometimes a majority of, the legislature.” }® When 


ques‘ioned in the Barnes-Roosevelt libel suit, Roosevelt ad- 


mitted that the Civil Service Reform bill of 1899 would not 
have rotten through without Platt’s “influence.” In 1899 
and 1999 Platt’s chief agent at Albany when the legislature - 
was in session as well as Roosevelt’s constant legislative ad- 
visor was State Chairman Odell, whose activities at the 


8 The New York Chamber of Commerce, the Board of Trade, the 
Clearing House Association, the City Club, the Union League, the 
Reform Club, and the Real Estate Exchange came out against it. 


9E. L. Godkin, Unforeseen Tendencies of Democracy (Boston 
1898), p. 167, citing a history of the bill by J. B. Bishop. 

10 Op. cit., pp. 286-87. 

11 Barnes v. Roosevelt, pp. 401, 549. 


166 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


state capitol were described by the chief Democratic organ 
at Albany in the following language: 

Mr. Odell is here in a capacity which includes, or super- 
sedes, all three departments recognized by the constitution. 
He is here as the Personal Representative of the Boss. 

Mr. Odell makes the calendars of business 1n each house. 
Mr. Odell makes the reports of committees, decides the fate 
of measures, is judge, jury, and executioner at one and the 
same time. Has a member, by remiss, neglected to call and 
pay his respects to Mr. Odell? Back goes his bill to the 
committee, or in the committee stays his bill—as a gentle 
reminder which the average legislator is quick enough to 
comprehend.! 

But, it may be urged, these are only isolated cases. 
What was the influence of the party leaders upon the work 
of a whole session of the legislature? One well known 
scholar has made a careful study of this question, taking as 
his samples the New York legislatures of 1894 and 1899.38 
Defining of a party vote of any party as one in which more 
than nine-tenths of those of its members who voted were on 
the same side of the question, he found that the proportion 
‘of cases where both of the principal parties cast party votes - 
on opposite sides was about 25 or 30 per cent in the Senate 
and 45 or 50 per cent in the Assembly. These figures were so > 
much larger than those found in examining other state legis- 
latures that he thought New York should be placed “in a 
class by itself.”14 On the other hand he discovered that 
only about 3 per cent of the bills actually enacted received a 
party vote at some stage. Thus, in the session of 1899 only 
ten of the 328 public bills enacted and fourteen out of the 
268 local bills enacted had party votes in the Assembly at 

12 Albany Argus, March 23, 1900. 

13 A, L. Lowell, “The Influence of Party upon Legislation in 
England and America,” Annual Report of the American Historical 


Association for roo1, I, 319-542. 
14 [bid., p. 338. 


CONTROL OVER LAW MAKING 167 


some stage.’ The second part of this investigation appears 
to be rather damaging to Platt’s reputation, and the conclu 
sion is drawn that the actual influence of party on legisla- 
tion is small. 

An explanation of the untoward conclusion of this statis- 
tical analysis may be found along several lines.4® An ex- 
amination of the bills enacted shows that the great majority 
of them were of small importance and the probable result of 
the long-rolling tendencies of the legislators. Where their 
own local interests were not affected, there was no reasori 
why the Republican legislators should hold up the local bills 
of their Democratic colleagues. Furthermore, both parties 
were not averse to claiming credit for having supported pub- 
lic measures for which there was a genuine public demand 
and which did not affect party machinery adversely. A 
“bipartisan” vote upon an important bill might also be in- 
terpreted as the result of a “deal” between the Republican” 
and the Democratic “machines.” Platt and his marshals 
always had to contend with a few “independent” Republi- 
cans who were very refractory upon certain matters. A 
little patronage thrown in the way of certain Democratic 
legislators would be sufficient to offset the negative votes of 
the “independents.” }7 On a proposal like that embodied in 
the Greater New York bill, where it was said that Platt and 
Croker had a “community of interest,’ ?® why should the 
two “bosses” oppose each other? Platt and Croker also were 
reputed to have “combined” upon the passage of the New 
York police commission bill, which Roosevelt found ex- 
tremely objectionable.?® On the other hand, the measures 


15 Jbid., p. 342. 

16 Colvin, op. cit., pp. 161-62. 

17 New York Tribune, January 9, 1896. 

18 Tbid., March 27, 1896; Nation, April 2, 1896, 
19 Harper’s Weekly, March 30, 1895. 

20 Op. cit., pp. 170-71. 


168 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


that were passed by a party vote, such as the liquor bills, the 
election bills, and the civil service bills, were the few meas- 
ures that Platt regarded of importance in his work of manu- 
facturing state issues. 

An analysis of party votes alone also neglects one of the 
most persistent and pre-eminent influences of the party upon 
legislation, and that is the power of the party to smother 
proposed legislation. In order to make a complete estimate 
of the law making functions of the Republican organization 
under Thomas C. Platt it would be necessary to find a 
record of the “burials” in the speaker’s “grave yard No. 
2,” a chart of the “pigeon-holes” in the various committee 


rooms, and a copy of the floor leaders’ “memo.” It is need- 4 
’ y 


less to say that these records will never be found. 

One reason for the large number of party votes in com- 
parison with actual number of bills passed by party vote in 
1899 was the struggle over the creation of a special com- 
mittee of the Assembly to investigate the public offices and 
departments of the city of New York. This so-called ‘“Ma- 
zet Committee,’ like its predecessors, the “Fassett” and 
“Lexow’’ committees, was the result of a sharp contest be- 
tween the two “machines” and was therefore the subject 
of a large number of motions. 

Platt was willing to admit that he had been the sponsor 
.for more legislative inquiry committees than any one man 
in the state. These legislative investigations were called 
“political smelling schemes”? or “strikes for terms” be- 
cause it was thought that one of Platt’s purposes in urging 
them was to compel Croker to give “specific performance” 
on some “deal” * and incidentally to learn something about 

1A.L. Lowell, op. cit., table on p. 491. 

2 Plattop. cia p, 225. 

8 Ibid., p. 228. 


4 Senator Cantor’s remarks were to the effect that the resolution 
was a “political strike,” New York Tribune, Jan. 22, 1890, 


Sy -- 


CONTROL OVER LAW MAKING 169 


his enemy’s political methods. It is said that the investiga- 
tion of 1890 under Senator Fassett was ordered because 
Hugh J. Grant, the Tammany Mayor, refused to make cer- 
tain appointments in New York City that had been 
“promised” to Platt in return his support with reference to 
certain legislation desired by the Tammany organization.® 
Platt was a “power” in 1894 because Tammany was willing 
to “pay almost any price” if the “LLexow Committee” could: 
be prevented from making a thoroughgoing investigation.® 
As it has already been pointed out, the initiative for this 
investigation did not come from Platt and the effectiveness 
of its work depended upon the counsel hired by the Cham- 
ber of Commerce. In 1899 Platt personally supervised the 
creation of the “Mazet Committee” which was “sprung” 
unexpectedly upon Tammany as a result of a meeting of 
the “Sunday school” in Albany.’ In the debate over the 
resolution one of the Tammany legislators asserted that 
the real purpose of the appointment of this investigating 
committee was to establish Lemuel Ely Quigg more firmly 
as the Republican leader of New York County. Whatever 
Platt’s motives may have been in supporting these investiga- 
tions, it should be kept in mind that these committees with 
their wide powers of investigation, their authority to sub- 
poena witnesses and to recommend punishment for con- 
tempt, were important agencies in the governing process. + 

While the influence of the Republican party over the 
legislative inquiry committees, like its influence over the 
enactment of laws, was not always of a positive and con- 
structive nature, the party did determine what matters 
would or would not be investigated. The significance of 


5 New York Herald, March 7, 1910, 
6 Nation, Nov. 15, 1894, LIX, 351. 

7 New York Herald, March 30, 1899. 
8 New York Tribune, March 30, 1899, 


170 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


this power was pointed out in the minority report of the 
“Tammany members of the ‘““Mazet Committee,’ which con- 
tained the following, somewhat exaggerated, account of this 
part of the committee’s conduct: 


But even in this the majority of the committee lack both 
the courage and candor to point at the typical, though “easy, 
boss.” They may try to mask and conceal him in quite the 
same subservient manner that they protected him from 
the subpoena of the committee, and refused our insistent de- 
mand that he should be called to the stand as a most unique, 
necessary and desirable exhibit. The people, however, 
again and again demanded, in a spirit of fair play, that the 
boss of our state politics should be questioned as to the 
source and sanctity of the authority which he admittedly 
exercises 1n governmental affairs, as to the character and 
strength of the recommendations for appointments and 
nominations which he has dictated, and which he now con- 
trols, as to the corporate and other influences operating un- 
der guarantee, and the reason therefore (whether political, 
social or financial), as to his connection with the legislative 
brokerage concern which undertakes, for a consideration of 
one kind or another, to insure to the citizen or corporation 
knowing the ropes the success or defeat of any proposed 
legislation affecting him or them, or his or their interests 
just as and when desired, as to his identification with the 
“family law firm” and his profits therefrom, as to his ac- 
cumulations by reason of his political connections and politi- 
cal domination, as to whether the signing of the Ramapo 
Water Bill increased his income, and as to whether the fail- 
ure of the Astoria Gas Grab had disappointed his financial 
expectations.” ® 


The real test of the subservience of the legislators, how- 
ever, came in the election of Thomas C. Platt as United 
States senator in 1897. The issue was unmistakable; the 
legislators were asked by the party leaders to vote for the 


9New York State, Assembly Documents 1900, No. 27, pp. 3-4. 
(Final Report of the Special Committee of the Assembly appointed 
to investigate the public offices and departments of the city of New 
York.) ‘ 


CONTROL OVER LAW MAKING 171 


man who had shown an interest in their nomination and 
election, the man who was the personification of the “sys- 
tem,” the man who must be reckoned with both within and 
without the legislature. One of the assemblymen expressed 
his dilemma as follows: 


I am uncertain what to do. I have various important 
measures which I desire to introduce in the Assembly, and 
if I do not vote for Platt, none of them will be allowed to 
go through. You have no idea of the pressure which has 
been brought to bear upon me to vote for Platt, and I am, 
not sure that it is the part of wisdom for me to refuse to 
support him.!° 


Platt very modestly insisted that he was not a candidate, 
he never had “any affectation about office-seeking and office= 
holding,” he wanted it generally known that the banquet for 
which the “Boys” were making elaborate preparations was 
not a “Platt” banquet but a banquet for the winner of the 
senatorial contest. No one consulted him regarding this 
matter, but “spontaneously” from all parts of the state 
voices went up insisting that, unless he should decline posi- 
tively to be the candidate, nothing could stop his nomina- © 
tion. In the caucus which met to confirm the verdict of 
all “practical” Republicans, there were no nominating 
speeches for Platt. Why comment upon the obvious? Why 
should not this function of the legislature be performed in 
as quiet and decorous a manner as some of its other 
“duties ?”’ When it came to the matter of voting, however, 
Joseph Hodges Choate, the eminent lawyer and orator, re- 
ceived just seven votes, while Platt “had to be content with 
142.” When the news reached Platt in New York City, he 
received it calmly and with that subtle touch for the drama- 
tic which he sometimes displayed he asked for the names of 

10 Rochester Herald, January 16, 1897; also cited in G. H. Haynes, 


The Election of Senators (New York, 1906), p. 190. 
11 New York Sun, January 13, 1897, 


172 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


the seven men who had voted for Choate and thrust the list 
into his pocket. 

Imagine Platt’s feelings upon that occasion. Day and 
night, through one disaster after another, for sixteen long 
years he had worked for this “vindication.” Who would 
‘call him “Me-too” Platt on that night? Even the Mug- 
wumps were saying that he had no rival except Senator 
Quay, of Pennsylvania.* To be sure his old enemy, John 
Sherman, mindful of the customs controversy of 1877 and 
the “corrupt bargain” of 1888, was to be secretary of state, 
but he was to be in the United States Senate where he could 
safeguard the interests of his organization. With the state 
legislature so completely under his control was it strange 
that Platt felt confident in 1898 that he could keep the im- 
petuous Roosevelt from wrecking the organization? 


PLATTS RELATION TO CONGRESS 


Although Platt did not return to the United States Sen- 
ate until March 4, 1897, it cannot be said that he was with- 
out influence in Congress during the first two-thirds of the 
nineties. He was “influential” in Congress for the same 
reasons that he was a “power” in the state legislature, 
namely, because he and the state committeemen were inter- 
ested in the congressional nominating conventions and elec- 
tions. The state committeemen took special pains with the 
conventions which nominated candidates for the House of 
Representatives because the congressional districts were 
their peculiar domains and they were responsible for all 
matters affecting the party therein. 

As far as its voice in the House of Representatives was 
concerned, New York’s population was a political asset, for 
in the nineties the state was allotted thirty-four of the 357 


12 New Vork Tribune, January 15, 1897. 
13 Harper's Weekly, January 30, 1897. ff? 


CONTROL OVER LAW MAKING 173 


representatives. By and large, the proportion of Republi- 
cans in the New York delegation varied with the proportion 
of the Republicans in the House as a whole; thus, in the 
elections of 1890 the number of Republican representatives 
reached the low water mark of the nineties in the state as 
well as in the nation.14 However, for the four consecutive 
years beginning with 1895 the Republicans of the state 
wielded an unusual strength in the lower branch of Con 
gress. In the Fifty-fifth Congress there were 202 Republi- 
cans and twenty-eight or about one-eighth of them were 
from New York. This meant that in the beginning days of 
McKinley’s first administration, the New York delegation 
controlled one-fourth of a majority of the Republican cau- 
cus in the House of Representatives. 

Taken as a body, the members of the New York delega- 
tion to the Fifty-fifth Congress were older, more experi= 
enced, better educated and more highly versed in the ways 
of politics than their Republican brethren in the state legis- 
lature. More than one-half of this delegation were fifty 
years of age, seven of them were Civil War veterans, about 
one-half had received a college education, only five had not 
gone farther than the common schools, and only five had not 
been members of at least one previous Congress.¥ Of these 
twenty-eight legislators, two-fifths were lawyers, over a_ 
fourth were business men engaged in such varied lines as 
the shipping, the contracting, the banking, the glove making, 
and the electric lighting industries, while the rest were 
farmers. journalists, or politicians. Among the older mem- 
bers, Sereno E. Payne, a lawyer from the small city of 
Auburn in middle western New York; James S. Sherman, a 
lawyer from Utica; James W. Wadsworth, a stock farmer 


14Ten out of the eighty-eight Republican representatives were 
from New York, in the following Congress fourteen out of 128. 
15 C ongxessional Directory, Fifty-fifth Congress. 
* 


174 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


from the Genesee Valley; and George W. Ray, from Platt’s 
old congressional district were noteworthy. All of these 
men had been. in Congress throughout the nineties, and 
Payne had been a member of Congress continuously since 
1883. Among the newer members who were later on to be 
of importance in state politics were: Benjamin B. Odell, 
Lemuel E. Quigg, William L. Ward, a manufacturer from 
Westchester County, and De Alva S. Alexander, the noted 
lawyer and historian from Buffalo. 

The most outstanding representative from the state of 
New York during Platt’s period of political management 
was Sereno E. Payne, who owed his position of prominence 
to his place upon the Committee on Ways and Means. Asa 
member of this committee, Payne was part of the House 
“aristocracy,” he had helped frame the McKinley Tariff 
bill of 1890, and he was the most influential member of the 
House in the framing of the Dingley bill of 1897 next to 
the chairman of the committee himself! Payne admitted 
that the Dingley bill was prepared by the Republican mem- 
bers of the committee before the Fifty-fifth Congress met,?” 
and when the House refused to concur in the Senate amend- 
ments, Payne was appointed as one of the members of the 
conference committee which drafted the compromise that 
was finally accepted. Upon the death of Representative 
Dingley in 1899, Payne was made chairman of the Com- 
mittee on Ways and Means, a position which carried with 
it the majority leadership on the floor of the House. From 
that time on until his retirement in 1913, Payne was a mem- 
ber of the House “machine,” a close corporation made up 
of the speaker, the two majority members of the Committee 
on Rules, and the floor leader, a group of four which was 
able to rule the House in despotic fashion by reason of its 


16 New York Tribune, January 21, 1899, 
1% [bid., June 8, 1900. 


CONTROL OVER LAW MAKING 175 


power to hold up the local bills of any recalcitrant member.” 
It has already been pointed out that Payne recognized the 
value of “machine’’ methods in the way in which he ran the 
state convention which nominated Roosevelt. In the House 
he was not an eloquent talker, but he was “strong on tariff 
matters” and he had a “sledge-hammer fashion” of dealing’ 
with Democratic interrupters. It goes without saying that 
Payne’s power to negative bills was very great; even Presi- 
dent Roosevelt could not convince him and his fellow auto- 
crats to take up the question of tariff reform. 

There were other members of the New York delegation 
to the Fifty-fifth Congress who by reason of the committee 
positions that they held were not to be ignored by those in- 
terested in the work of Congress. No fewer than ten of the 
fifty-six committee chairmanships fell to the Empire State. 
James W. Wadsworth was chairman of the Committee on 
Agriculture, which had control of annual appropriations 
amounting to three and one-half million dollars and which 
considered such important questions as the prohibition of 
interstate trade in oleomargarine; James S. Sherman was 
chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs which had 
charge of annual appropriations running up to nearly eight 
million dollars arid all bills proposing to open Indian lands 
with their valuable mining rights; and W. B. Hooker was 
chairman of the Committee on Rivers and Harbors, which 
stood guard over one of the richest of all the “pork barrels.” 
In fact, all of the members of the New York delegation 
were appointed to one or more of the leading and important 
committees which had the power of life or death over the 
crucial bills brought before Congress.® Surely, during 


18 Thompson, op. cit., pp. 157 ff. 

19 Alexander: Judiciary, Reform of Civil Service; Belden: Appro- 
priations; Brewster: Invalid Pensions, Alcoholic Liquor Traffic, 
chairman; Chickering: Railways and Canals, chairman, Printing; 


176 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


the first two years of the Mclxinley régime when so many 
significant measures were being considered, it could hardly 
be said that the great state of New York was not well “rep- 
resented” in the House of Representatives. 

It should not be implied that these Republican legislators 
were absolutely under the control of the party organization 
within and without Congress. Some of them, like Wads- 
worth and Ward, were their own political managers to a 
certain extent, and others, like Payne, Odell, and Quigg were 
in a position to influence the work of the organization it- 
self. On the other hand, when it came to a matter like a 
vote on the Dingley Tariff, there was not one who was pres- 
ent who dared to go against the party decision.” In the 
reconciliation of conflicting views, in the distribution of 
patronage and campaign funds, Platt and the organization 
were centralizing agencies. Platt, however, could not save 
ten of the Republican congressmen from defeat in the elec- 
tion of 1898. 

There has been a tendency to disparage Platt’s influence 
as a legislator in the United States Senate; one Washington 
correspondent, for instance, wrote that “Platt of New York 
has no more influence on legislation in Washington than the 
coruscations of a lightning bug have on the solar system.” } 
This was a journalist’s way of saying that when Platt came 
into the United States Senate in 1897, he found that body 
highly organized with no vacancies in the oligarchy for a 


Mahany: Military Affairs, Immigration; Odell: District of Colum- 
‘bia, Accounts, chairman; Quigg: Foreign Affairs, Expenditures of 
the Executive Departments, chairman; Ray: Judiciary, Invalid Pen- 
sions, chairman; Belford: Elections; Hurley: Naval Affairs; Ben- 
nett: Interstate and Foreign Commerce; Gillett: Public Buildings 
and Grounds, were among the most important. 

20 Congressional Record, Fifty-fifth Congress, First Sess., p. 2750. 

1 Thompson, op. cit., p. 34. 


CONTROL OVER LAW MAKING 177 


new comer who was declining in health. This same cor- 
respondent gave a more tempered view of Platt’s legislative 
activities in a later passage, part of which is reproduced be- 
low: 


He is simply one of the rank and file. The great leaders 
of the Senate make up their programmes without him, and 
he learns of the thing projected when his vote is needed. 
When a bill comes up he votes with the rest of the rank 
and file; he offers no amendments and he never speaks» 
Reporters, sceking to know what is contemplated by the 
Republican leaders, often go to other senators who are not. 
leaders, thinking that these men may have gleaned some- 
thing of the leaders’ plans. But they never go to Platt.’ 

Another writer said, “Mr. Platt is unique and remarkable 
for having never, by spoken or written word, declared the» 
shadow of an opinion concerning any of the vital issues of 
the time.” 8 

While true in the main, these estimates err in certain par- 
ticulars. Platt did make one “leave-to-print-speech” in 
favor of the retention of the Philippine Islands which ap- 
pears in the Congressional Record as of January 27, 1899. 
This, however, was the only official expression that he gave 
of his views while in the United States Senate. Before he 
took his seat, he outlined his opinions upon national ques- 
tions at the Albany “senatorial” banquet in his honor. Here 
he made it known that he did not regard it necessary to en- 
act at once a law for the maintenance of the gold standard, 
that he thought the enactment of “an intelligent and consist- 
ent tariff, based in every schedule upon the principle of pre- 
venting the foreign producer of goods that compete with 
American goods from wholesaling his wares in the Ameri- 
can market at prices which compel the American maker of 
such wares either to go out of business or to reduce the 


2 Tbid., p. 100. 
3 Puck, January, 1897, 
12 


178 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


wages he pays to his labor;” that he favored the principle 
of arbitration with Great Britain, and that he was opposed 
to intervention in Cuba.* The striking thing about these 
views was their remarkable similarity to the expressed poli- 
cies of the President-elect; it looked as though Platt was 
trying to show that he was “safe and sane.” Many who 
opposed Platt’s methods did not object to the attitude he 
here expressed. While in the Senate, Platt was occasionally 
“interviewed” by reporters upon national questions. On 
one particular occasion he declared that he was in favor of 
expansion for the good of American commerce, that he 
favored the Nicarauguan Canal proposition, and that the 
Hague conference idea was, “Beautiful! Impracticable! It 
never can be.” ® 

Platt’s vote in the United States Senate was a matter of 
importance in 1897, for in that year only forty-four of the 
ninety senators were Republicans. Thus, the refined sugar 
amendment, which he had taken a prominent part in advo- 
cating in private conferences, passed the Senate by the 
meagre majority of two.6 In 1899 Platt was instrumental 
in securing as a partner in his senatorial labors, his old 
“Amen Corner Brother,’ Chauncey M. Depew, and then 
there were two votes from the Empire State, which could be 
counted upon by the leaders as “regular.” Governor Roose- 
velt did not oppose this arrangement. With Nelson Aldrich, 
nominally from Rhode Island but more of a “New Yorker” 
than Platt, at the helm of Senate, Platt and Depew did not 
have to worry about working out the deep questions of our 
national politics. 

Like the other senators, Platt was made the chairman of 


*New York Tribune, January 27, 1897, also found in Platt, op. 
cit., pp. 349-54. 

5 New York Tribune, May 25, 1899, 

6 Tbid., June 12, 1897, 


CONTROL OVER LAW MAKING 179 


a committee so that he might have an office and the other 
“perquisites” necessary for the transaction of his senatorial 
duties other than those performed in the senate chamber. 
In the Fifty-fifth Congress, he was chairman of the Com- 
mittee on Transportation Routes to the Seaboard, a useless 
survival of another age, while during the rest of his sena- 
torial career, he was chairman of the Committee on Print- 
ing, an innocuous body, which at intervals submitted a reso= 
lution providing for the printing so many copies of a docu- 
ment on boll weevils or something of the sort. On the other 
hand, Platt was regarded as “safe’’ enough to be made a 
member of some important committees. "He served contin- 
uously on the committees on census, naval affairs, and 
inter-oceanie ¢anals, and in 1899 he was made a member of 
the Committee on Finance, the most important committee 
in the Senate, as chairman of which Senator Aldrich exe- 
cuted his plans for national legislation.? Depew did not 
fare quite so well as Platt in his committee positions ; he was 
at first chairman of the transient Committee on Industrial 
Expositions and later he was the head of the harmless 
Committee on Revision of the Laws of the United States, 
and he was a member of the following committees; Forest 
Reservations and Protection of Game, Public Health and 
National Quarantine, Commerce, Judiciary, and Pacific 
Islands and Porto Rico. 

Platt’s name is not attached to any great public bill but 
as to New York matters, he introduced many bills and reso- 
lutions which contained in their titles such phrases as “for 
relief,” “to pension,” “for improvements of,” “to pay war 
claim,” etc. He was more active than Depew in seeing that 
New York had her fair share of the appropriations. 


7D. G. Phillips, “The Treason of the Senate,” Cosmop. Mag., 
1906, XL, 636. ie 
8 Cong. Record Index, Fiity-fifth Cong., First Sess. 1897, p. 200. 


180 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


The main ‘interest and attention of the Tioga statesman in 
Washington were concentrated upon the distribution of the 
federal JEM: in N ew York. Here the time honored 
rule of “senatorial courtesy” helped him out although no 
one realized better than he that this rule had limitations. 
At the beginning of McKinley’s administration, he, the Re- 
publican congressman from New York, and some members 
of the “Sunday school” constituted themselves as a sort of 
a “governing board” or “patronage trust” in order to se- 
cure an “equitable” distribution of the federal appointments. 
{t was said that Senator Platt received and answered hun- 
dreds of letters daily relative to political jobs, and it 
was known that he made weekly pilgrimages to New York 
City in order to hold his solemn councils regarding this 
subject.2 Among other things the “little band” would 
call at the White House in order to inform the President 
who was who in New York and as a result of such a con- 
ference Platt would usually announce that such and such 
appointments “would all be made in due season.” ” Some 
newspapers were prone to criticize the state leader’s silence 
at Washington; an editorial writer upon the New York Tri- 
bune ironically replied: 








Neglecting duty? Not much. He was up to his ears in 
work. Working the Committee on Appropriations, working 
the Executive Mansion, working the departments, working 
Quigg, working the legislature at Albany, working Van 
Wyck, working the long-distance telephone, working the 
New York Sun.) 


The principles, customs, and traditions which governed 
the organization of the Republican members of Congress 
were in general the same as those which controlled the or- 


9New York Tribune, April 20, 1897. 


10 Tbid., September 16, 1897. 
11 New York Tribune, Jan. 28, 1898. 


CONTROL OVER LAW MAKING 181] 


ganization of the members of the state legislature. The 
Republican legislator, whether he belonged to the state As- 
RET TiE ctate, Senate, the United States House of Repre- 
sentatives, or the United States Senate, was _primarily a 


CeO ea 


localist, interested in showing his more active constituents. 


that he was taking care of their concerns. In order to make 
a local record, the individual legislator found it necessary 
for him to align himself with the dominant clique in his 
particular law making body. The dominant clique was 
usually chosen by the rule of seniority, a practice which or- 
dinarily insured the selection of the best localists. Platt 


was the connecting link between the national and the state 


law makers and in a sense the best localist of them all. 
Roosevelt and others found Platt useful when action or non- 
action on the part of both or either of the two law-making 
bodies with which he was connected was desired. 


ae 


CHAPTER VIII. 
GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 


There was no part of the state governmental machinery 
that caused Thomas C. Platt so much worry and trouble as 
the governorship. He might control the “hand picked”’ dele- 
gates who assembled every two years at Saratoga to nom- 
inate a Republican candidate for this important post, but 
what good did that control do him when his choice was so 
limited by the exigencies of election day? The voters were 
attracted to a gubernatorial candidate who possessed good 
business ability, firmness, tact, common sense, and above 
all a strong will. Unfortunately, this sort of a man was not 
the kind to be easily influenced on certain matters after 
election day. Furthermore, even when “circumstances per- 
mitted” the selection of a person who seemed to be flexible, 
there was no telling what a seemingly “flexible” person 
would do once he was elected governor of the greatest state 
in the union. There were traditions surrounding the New 
York governorship, which a governor could ill afford to 
violate. The office had high rank even in the national party 
system. Had not two governors, Van Buren and Cleveland, 
been elected to the high office of president of the United 
States; were not four others, George Clinton, DeWitt Clin- 
ton, Seymour and Tilden, unsuccessful candidates for the 
same office; had not four, George Clinton, Tompkins, Van 
Buren and Morton, occupied the position of Vice-president ; 
and finally had not ten governors—DeWitt Clinton, Van 
Buren, Marcy, Wright, Dix, Seward, Fish, Morgan, Fenton, 
and Huill—been members of the United States Senate? The 

182 


GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 183 


Republicans gained control of the New York governorship 
in the middle of the nineties, ten years after Cleveland had. 
been elevated to the presidency largely because he had re- 
garded the governorship as a “public trust.’’ The people 
at large might forget about the one hundred and fifty in- 
conspicuous legislators at Albany, but the governor was ever 
before them and they watched with interest, at least many 
did, the newspaper accounts of his activities, and they held» 
him accountable for the accomplishments and failures of his 
administration. 

Especially with reference t» legislation, there was a 
growing tendency during the period under discussion to 
place responsibility upon the governor for what was done 
and what was not done. The constitutional powers of the 
governor over legislation remained the same: in his annual 
message, he was required to recommend to the legislature 
such matters as he thought expedient; in a special er emer- 
gency message, he might expedite the process of legislation 
on certain matters; and by the exercise of his veto power 
he could practically prevent the enactment of any law that 
he regarded as undesirable.! The actual legislative powers 
of the governor, however, were expanding, and Platt had 
to accommodate himself to this development, a task which 
he did not always find congenial, especially when he had a 
“safe” margin in the legislature. 

In order to understand the relations between Governor 
Roosevelt and “Boss” Platt in their proper perspective it is 
necessary to review briefly the attitudes and accomplish- 
ments of the two “Platt” governors who preceded Roose- 
velt. 

According to Platt, Levi P. Morton was “the safest gov- 
ernor New York ever had.’ Business experience had 


1C. Z. Lincoln, “The Governors of New York,” New York State 
Hist. Asso. (1910), IX, 75. 


184 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


taught him conservatism. He never was influenced by 
crazy theorists, but conducted his administration as he did 
his great private financial institutions? When Morton 
‘assumed the governorship in 1895, he was over seventy years 
of age and he was reported as saying that the arduous duties 
‘at the .beginning of his administration were very tiring$ | 
The “man from Wall Street’? was amiable, diplomatic, easy 
going, and he did his work “without beating of tom-toms or 
crash of cymbals.” In those days the Governor was wary 
of too much newspaper publicity, he kept the reporters at 
as much of a distance as possible,* and there was little dan- 
ger of his appealing over the heads of the organization to 
the people. In his first annual message, Governor Morton 
summed up his views upon matters which were of import- 
ance to Platt as follows: 


But it is my conviction that the governor should never in- 
terfere with the work of the legislature beyond the precise 
line which his constitutional duty and obligation warrants. 
The veto power, as it is commonly called, is one that should 
be exercised with great care and only when the interests of 
the state are in question. The chief executive should never 
use it as an instrument to aid in impressing or imposing his 
will upon the legislature, nor should it be invoked to serve 
personal or partisan ends.° 


Platt’s testimonial as to the party loyalty of Governor 
Black, the successor to Governor Morton inaugurated in 
1897, has already been given in another connection. On 
the other hand, Frank S. Black was inclined to put his own 
interpretation upon the question as to what were the needs 


2 Platt, op. cit., p. 332. 

3 New York Tribune, Nov. 24, 1894. 

#C. D. Morris, Albany Correspondent of the New York Evening 
Telegram, “Governors I Have Known,” The Lyons Republican, 
August 3, 1921 (Centennial issue), p. 34. 

5 State of New York, Messages from the Governors, edited by 
iene LAncoiny dK, t037706. 





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GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT 


(Negative owned by Roosevelt Memorial Association) 


GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 185 


of the organization at any particular time; he was a young 
man, only forty-three when he started his administration; 
he was noted for his vigorous and aggressive prosecution of 
election thugs; and he was a bright, shrewd lawyer capable 
of comprehending the significance of intricate pieces 
of legislation.2 While Governor Black was cold to and 
fearful of newspaper men and seemed to neglect the value 
of newspaper publicity,’ he was an effective speaker of the 
campaign orator type and he could present his views in 
forceful language when the occasion demanded. His ideas’ 
regarding the proper relation between the executive and 
legislative branches of the government were not so reassur-> 
ing to Platt as those of Governor Morton had been: 


There should be opportunity for conference and discussion 
between the executive and members of the legislature: 
This will afford both a better understanding of measures 
proposed. 

_I advise that only such acts be passed as have general 
application. Cases are rare where the need for local or 
special legislation exists. A large part of our laws serve no 
desirable end whatever. They increase the expense, confuse 
existing law, and are often trivial and uncertain in their 
character.® 


So much has been written regarding Theodore Roosevelt 
in the light of his presidency that it is difficult to get an ac- 
curate estimate of Roosevelt as governor in 1899, a man 
who had had a varied and useful career but who was only 
forty years of age and whose reputation was yet in the 
making. An incident which took place at the trial of one 


6 The Nation, September 3, 1896, commented upon Black’s nomi- 
nation as follows: “He is a man of undoubted personal integrity, 
of much force of character, and instead of being a ‘dealer’ and 
‘dickerer’ with political rascals in his own and other parties, has 
been a persistent fighter of them.” 

7G. D. Morris, loc. cit. 

8 Messages, IX, 848. 


186 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


of Roosevelt’s fellow police commissioners in 1896 illus- 
trates the attitude that some of the important members of 
the Republican organization had toward this young “re- 
former” in the nineties. “I say that all these cases were 
properly attended to,’ emphasized General Tracy, the coun- 
sel for the commissioner on trial. Mr. Roosevelt shook his 
head vigorously as dissenting from this statement. General 
Tracy coolly surveyed him for a moment and then remarked, 
“T see my friend shakes his head, but there is nothing in 
it.” ® When Roosevelt’s name was suggested for governor- 
ship, Governor Black who desired a renomination, protested 
on the ground that Roosevelt was not fit to be nominated 
because he was impulsive and erratic; that his military 
record, however it might have attested his personal bravery, 
displayed his characteristic rashness and impetuousity and 
foolhardiness, and that as governor he would play the devil 
with the organization and get the party into all sorts of 
tangles and ridiculous positions.4° While these two illus- 
trations do not give impartial estimates of Roosevelt’s per- 
sonalty, they at least give some characteristic views of 
Roosevelt common among the organization workers at the 
time. 

An editorial writer upon the New York Tribune gave a 
more friendly description of Roosevelt’s qualities when he 
took up the duties of the governorship, part of which is 
given below: 


He had youth, abounding health, various talents, experi- 
ence of public life, a large acquaintance with men and af- 


9 New York Herald, June 30, 1896. See Alexander, Four Famous 
New Yorkers, p. 242. 

10 Barnes v. Roosevelt, pp. 2354ff. Quigg’s letter to Roosevelt of 
September 10, 1898 in which an account of Quige’s conversation 
with Governor Black is given. 

11 The same arguments against the nomination of Roosevelt were 
given by Platt to the Rev. Iglehart. See Iglehart, op. cit., p. 131. 


GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 187 


fairs, the admiration of the people, the confidence of many 
who are not his political adherents and a competency which 
relieves his mind of financial worry.” 


Governor Roosevelt was not only an able and forceful 
‘speaker upon the public platform but he also understood 
the art of blazonry and knew how to make every newspaper 
man his publicity agent. One of the first things that he 
started to do at Albany was to win the friendship of the 
reporters of the various journals and one of the methods 
that he used was to furnish them with “lots of copy.” #8 
Definite hours were set aside by the governor for confer- 
ences with the newspaper correspondents, a practice which 
proved highly useful to all concerned.4* In looking back 
over his career in 1913, Roosevelt stated that more than 
half of his work as governor “was in the direction of getting 
needed and important legislation” which he accomplished 
“only by arousing the people, and riveting their attention 
on what was done.” > Regarding Roosevelt’s energy, his 
powers of concentration, his superior intelligence, and his 
loyalty to his friends and his own ideals, there is little dis- 
pute. It must have been with some misgivings that Senator 
Platt looked forward to Roosevelt’s term as governor after 
the election of 1898; he could look for little “peace” from 
the man who shortly after his inauguration proclaimed the 
following creed: 


I wish to preach, not the doctrine of ignoble ease, but the 
doctrine of the strenuous life; the life of toil and effort; 
of labor and strife; to preach that highest form of success 
which comes, not to the man who desires more easy peace, 


12 January 1, 1899. 

13G. D. Morris, loc. cit. 

14W. J. Youngs, Sec. to Gov. Roosevelt, “The Administration of 
Theodore Roosevelt,” Official New York from Cleveland to Hughes, 
I, 169. 

15 Op. cit., p. 282. 


188 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


but to the man who does not shrink from danger, from 
hardship or from bitter toil, and who out of these wins the 
splendid ultimate triumph.’® 


It is difficult to establish just what Platt’s influence was 
with these three executives but there is no question that 
Platt was consulted by them with reference to important 
affairs of the state government. As it has been pointed out, 
Platt was very particular peice ee 
a “consultation” gave him the semblance of power even if 
it denied its substance. He was a frequent visitor at the 
office of Governor-elect Morton in the latter days of the 
year 1894, and when Mr. Morton was asked about the nature 
of these visits, he replied that he and Mr. Platt “had been 
warm friends for years” and that “there was no misunder- 
standing” between them.” After Morton was inaugurated, 
Platt used to make trips to Albany to see him, and upon one 
occasion, when the governor had been in New York, both 
of them made the trip together upon a slow train “so as to 
have time for a nice, long chat.’ 18 The Governor also used 
to have “harmony” banquets at the executive mansion to 
which Mr. and Mrs. Platt were invariably invited. 

When Frank S. Black became governor of the state, 
“Lou” Payn, who had been so very skilful at the state nom- 
inating convention, acted as the intermediary between the 
chief executive of the state and the manager-in-chief of the 
Republican organization.® Although the connection be- 
tween the two men was not very close, Governor Black said 
at the “senatorial” banquet in Platt’s honor that he was 
“proud” to number Mr. Platt among his friends. Because 


16New York State, Public Papers of Governor Roosevelt, 1899, 
p. 293. Speech before the Hamilton Club, Chicago, IIL, April 10, 
1899, ; 

17 New York Tribune, Nov. 24, 1894. 

18 Tbid., Jan. 16, 1895. 

19 Nation, April 22, 1897. 


GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 186 


of the many journeys that his duties in Washington required 
of him, the aged chief practically discontinued his trips to 
Albany. The governor showed his independence by failing 
to visit Platt at the Fifth Avenue Hotel and during 1897 
the relations between the two men were often strained. 
However, the metropolitan. newspapers announced one 
Monday morning in 1898 that Governor Black, Senator. 
Platt, and Chairman Hackett had met in council the previous 
evening and “had a long talk after dinner about legislative 
matters at Albany” and that “all three were agreed that the 
legislature should be out of Albany by the last week of 
March or the first week in April.” *? 

Just as accounts of Theodore Roosevelt’s other activities 
were spread abroad in the newspapers, so his “conferences 
with the chief,” his “breakfasts” with Platt were the sub- 
ject of comment and discussion on all sides. One reason 
for comments upon these conferences was their great fre- 
quency. While Roosevelt was still governor-elect, the news- 
papers were heralding the fact that Senator Platt and Chair- 
man Odell had taken breakfast with the Colonel at the home 
of his sister, Mrs. Robinson.! Roosevelt claimed on his 
part that “a series of breakfasts was always a prelude to 
some active warfare,’® and Senator Platt said of them: 
“Roosevelt had from the first agreed that he would consult 
me on all questions of appointments, legislature, or party. 
policy. He religiously fulfilled this pledge, although he fre- 
quently did just what he pleased.” Mrs. Robinson states 
that she also was present at these after “breakfast” confer- 
ences, much to the discomfiture of the Senator.* Platt, 


20 January 31, 1898. 

1 New York Tribune, December 11, 1898, 

2 Op. cit., p. 288. 

3 Op. cit., p. 374. 

#(Mrs.) C. R. Robinson, My Brother Roosevelt? (New York, 
1921), p. 81. 


1909 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


however, could do nothing about it as he found it incon- 
‘venient to go to Albany except on such rare occasions as 
Governor Roosevelt’s “harmony” banquet.® The nature of 
the Platt-Roosevelt conferences is revealed in part by the 
following letter: 


Unitep STATES SENATE 
WASHINGTON, D. C, 
Fes. 3, 1900. 
Hon. Theo. Roosevelt, 
Executive Chamber, 
Albany, N.Y. 
My DEAR GOVERNOR: 

Your letter of the 31st ultimo came duly to hand and its 
contents have been carefully considered. It will be agree- 
able to me to change the date of our breaking bread to- 
gether, from Saturday the 10th, at luncheon, to breakfast on 
Monday the 12th. 


The question of adopting the policy of the Canal Com- 
mission is a very serious one, and I am very much at a loss 
to decide what is wise and politic. There is no doubt as to 
what is good business and for the material welfare of the 
great state of New York, but present expediency must 
sometimes govern such cases. The farmers in the rural 
counties are so sensitive on the subject of taxation that we 
are in grave danger of wasting away our narrow margin 
Of anAjOUtY ay wes 

4 Yours sincerely, 
Tl. Caen 


The first legislative act of a governor that interested 
Platt in his capacity as general manager of the Republican 
organization was the annual message to the legislature, con- 
taining such recommendations as he deemed worthy of the 
consideration of that body. While the governor might in 
this. message dodge his responsibility and submit a general 


5 New York Herald, March 29, 1898, 
6 Barnes vy. Roosevelt, pp. 2472-74. 


GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 191 


lecture on political principles or public morals, a careful stu- 
dent of the constitutional history of New York thinks that 
it may fairly be said that “much the larger proportion of 
executive recommendations as to particular legislation have 
been adopted and may be found in the statutes of the 
period.” 7 

In Platt’s Autobiography a long letter, written to Gover- 
nor Morton on January 3, 1896, is given,® which illustrates 
very clearly some of the precautions that a political man- 
ager takes regarding the governor’s annual message. The 
significant portions of this letter, so far as the points at is- 
sue are concerned, are given below: 


IT put it mildly when I say to you that I was disgusted 
and disheartened when General Tracy handed me yesterday= 
your letter to him of. December 3lst, relative to Greater 
New York. When we sought and had the conference with 
you at General Tracy’s house on this question, it was for 
the purpose of having definitely settled what your position 
would be on this question. There could have been no mis- 
understanding on your part as to what was our intention 
and purpose in that interview with you, because our entire 
programme was definitely stated and thoroughly explained; 
and we went away from that conference understanding that 
you were in full accord and would stand by us to the end: 
Now, at the very opening of the legislature, as I have ex- 
pressed it to you before, you “take to the woods” and are 
leaving us in the lurch. . . . Your message on the sub- 
ject of Greater New York was, to put it mildly, as weak as 
dishwater; last year you were quite outspoken. Evidently 
the raid on you by Mr. Low and Company had its eifect. 
You understand at the interview above referred to that this 
was what was likely to happen; that the enemies of the 
measure would do everything in their power to prevent the 
passage of this bill and would resort to just the arguments 
that they are using; and would do everything in their power 


7 Lincoln, op. cit., p. 69. 
8 Pp. 307-310. 


192 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


to intimidate you. This was our reason for calling upon you, 
so that we might know that you would stand firmly by the 
programme. 
In his annual message for 1895, Governor Morton had 
said on the subject of Greater New York that “it now be- 
comes the duty of the legislature to take such further steps 
as are necessary to put the wishes “of the people of the 
cities involved into effect’? and that he suggested “that a 
commission be at once created, to be composed of the most 
capable citizens of the various localities interested, and to be 
charged with the power and the duty of framing a charter 
and reporting the same to the present legislature, if such a 
plan can be drafted and submitted before the session 
closes.” ® In the “dishwater” message of 1896, which was 
submitted to the legislature on January 1, two days before 
Platt’s letter was written, Governor Morton had merely 
said: “I recommend that earnest and careful consideration 
be given to the subject (Greater New York) and that some 
conclusive action be taken regarding it at your present ses- 
sion.” 2° The subsequent history of these recommenda- 
tions will be discussed in later parts of this chapter; the 
above quotation is sufficient to show Platt’s relations with 
Morton with reference to the initial stages of legislation. 
In Platt’s memoirs no letters to Governor Black are given 
and it is therefore difficult to say how much “instruction,” 
if any, was given to this chief executive in the matter of an- 
nual messages to the legislature. The most striking part of 
_ Governor Black’s first annual message was the part on civil 
service in which he said that “‘civil service will work better 
with less starch,” that the system should be ridden of ‘ideas 
so delicate as to be worthless in practice,” and that greater 


9 Messages, 1X, 552-53, 
10 Jbid., p. 674. 


GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 193 


“discretion” should be given to the appointing officers." By 
“civil service” he must have meant the system of choosing 
civil service employees by competitive examinations, the 
“reform” which Thomas C. Platt had scored so bitterly 
twenty years before in a speech before a state convention. 
Platt had no difficulty in seeing the connection between 
“starchless” civil service and a “simon pure party régime,” 
so it is probable that he thought he could neglect Governor, 
Black’s education somewhat when it came to the matter of 
recommendations to the legislature.” | 

The way that Governor Roosevelt made up his annual 
messages cannot be demonstrated in any more striking way 
than by quoting from a letter of his to Senator Platt: 


STATE OF NEw York, 
EXECUTIVE CHAMBER, 
ALBANY, Dec, 19TH, 1899. 
Senator T. C. Platt, 
Senate Chamber, Washington, D. C. 
My DEAR SENATOR: 

Herewith I send you proof of my message. All the im- 
portant parts I have had gone over by various experts. 
Thus the entire canal matter has been laid before General 
Greene, Supt. Partridge, State Engineer Bond, and Fox and 
MacFarlane. The part on taxation, franchise tax, public 
utilities, industrial conditions and trusts has been laid be- 
fore Stranahan, Elihu Root, President Hadley of Yale and 
Prof. Jenks of Cornell, as well as in part before Prof. Selig- 
man of Columbia and Judge Cohen, and that lawyer, James 
A. Dill, of New Jersey. . . . The part about labor I 
have put before Secretary of State McDonough, Prof. 
Jenks, and Attorney General Griggs. The agricultural part 
has been before Assemblyman Witter of Tioga County. 


11 Messages, IX, 749. 
12 The New York Herald, Jan. 7, 1897 complained that New York 
city had been slighted in the message. 
13 


194 BOSS PLATT‘AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


I need not say that I want you to make suggestions and 
criticisms with utmost freedom. ; 
Faithfully yours, 
THEODORE ROOSEVELT. }8 


Two of the men mentioned in this letter, the State En- 
gineer and the Secretary of State, it will be remembered 
were nominated at the same convention which named 
Roosevelt as a result of that “higgling in the market” 
process by which minor state officers were selected. As- 
semblyman Witter, of course, from Platt’s home county, 
was one of the Senator’s close friends and lieutenants. It 
is likely that Governor Roosevelt submitted his message to 
these men and to Platt also as a matter of courtesy and that 
after receiving their advice he did as he pleased, but the let- 
ter at least shows that Roosevelt regarded Platt as a man 
well worth flattering. 

The annual message of the governor was a constitutional 
requirement and even a “constitutional executive” could not 
avoid saying some things of importance in performing this 
task which were more or less displeasing to the leaders of 
the legislature. This was a condition which the organiza- 
tion workers had to accept with as much equanimity as pos- 
sible. Thus, Governor Morton’s remarks upon the subject 
of civil service 1* and Governor Black’s comments on the ad- 
vantages of biennial sessions #® were not welcome to all the 
law makers. On the other hand, when it came to the trans- 
mission of special messages, the governor might upon his 
own volition place the legislature in a most embarrassing 
position. The necessity of the immediate passage of some 
“obnoxious” measure which had been “put to sleep” in the 


13 Barnes v. Roosevelt, p. 2463. 

14 Messages, IX, 560. Morton was friendly to the question of 
civil service reform. 

15 Messages, IX, 753-54. This recommendation has repeatedly 
been made but the legislature refused to act. 


GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 195 


committee might be certified or a special session might be 
called to consider some “dangerous” subject. Attention 
would then be focused upon the legislators, a condition of 
affairs which they did not always find comfortable. It 
therefore seems to the writer that Platt’s influence and that 
of the organization over the governor's ‘power to send® 
special messages to the legislature must be judsed-as much 
from the point “of view of what was not done’as well as from 
the standpoint of what was done. 

Governor Morton sent special messages to the legislature 
on such subjects as the dedication of Chickamauga Military, 
Park, the advisability of celebrating the capital city centen- 
nial, the reorganization of the New York criminal courts 
and police, and the need for economy in appropriations.’ 
The last two matters were of great importance, but the pro- 
posals were not “revolutionary.” Governor Morton also 
certified for immediate passage such bills as the Regulation 
of the Civil Service bill, the Election Law, and the Supple- 
mental Supply bill. Although there was some opposition in 
the legislature to the first of these bills, it can hardly be said 
that Platt regarded any of them as “unsafe.” While Gov- 
ernor Morton filed a memorandum with his approval of the 
bill regulating horse racing, there was no ringing message on 
the subject like the one with which Governor Hughes 
startled the lawmakers some thirteen years later. 

Governor Black likewise did not make any rousing ap- 
peals to the voters over the heads of their representatives at 
Albany. It is true that he asked for power to appoint a 
commission to investigate the canal improvement but this 
was largely to please his own appointees.’” It also is true 
that he certified for immediate passage the Metropolitan 


16 State of New York, Public Papers of Governor Morton, 1895- 
96, passim. 
17 Messages, IX, 849-51. 


196 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


Elections bill, the bill to regulate primary elections, and the 
military appropriation bill, but these measures were accept- 
able to the organization in their final form.1® In justice to 
Governor Black, however, it should be noted that some con- 
temporaries regarded the primary reform law which he 
sponsored as “bitterly distasteful to the Platt machine.” ™ 

It remained for Governor Roosevelt to shock the “organi- 
zation” by his use of the special message to secure the 
passage of the Franchise Tax bill. In his annual message 
for 1899, his remarks upon the subject of taxation had been 
general enough to cause the organization leaders no alarm. 
Toward the end of January Senator Ford introduced a bill 
authorizing the taxation of franchises of street railway, gas, 
electric light, and telephone companies as real property.?® 
This bill was not revolutionary because the utility companies 
had been subject to such taxation prior to a judicial decision 
in 1892. Hearings were held upon the bill and toward the 
end of March the Governor showed his interest in the sub- 
ject by telling the newspaper correspondents that he thought 
franchises should be taxed.t On March 27, he sent a 
special message to the legislature in which he said that the 
farmers, the market gardeners, and the mechanics and 
tradesmen having small holdings, were paying an improper 
and excessive portion of the general taxes and that one 
thing was certain, that the franchises should in some form 
yield a money return to the government, especially fran- 
chises bestowed upon gas companies, street railroads and 
the like.2 This message did not have an immediate effect 


18 See New York Tribune, Feb. 2, 1898, for Platt-Black confer- 
ence on the primary reform bill. 

19 Nation, April 7, 1898. 

20 New York Tribune, Jan 26, 1899, for discussion of bill by 
Sen. Ford. 

1 Tbid., March 22, 1899, 

2 Messages, X, 35-36. 


GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 197 


upon the Ford bill because it contained an indirect sug- 
gestion that such a measure should be referred to an inves* 
tigating committee, a sort of committee which might take 
a year or so for its work 

Governor Roosevelt, however, did not let the matter drop 
at this point. His announcement to the newspaper corres- 
pondents that he thought the Ford bill should be passed 
at once was sufficient to persuade the Senate to take action 
upon it.* In the Assembly the bill ran into all sorts of ob- 
stacles. The Committee on Taxation and Retrenchment to 
which it had been referred refused even to hold hearings 
upon the matter.’ These dilatory tactics continued so long 
that the time came when the Rules Committee assumed its 
absolute sway over all bills and then it was thought that the 
_ measure was “safely put to sleep.’ In spite of the protests 
of the organization leaders, Roosevelt would not let it “rest 
in peace,” and he kept talking to the newspaper men about 
its desirability. Finally on the eve of the day set for ad- 
journment he sent a special emergency message to the As- 
sembly which should have had the effect of taking the bill 
out of the Committee on Rules. Roosevelt’s account of 
what happened after this runs as follows: 


The machine leaders were bitterly angry, and the Speak- 


er actually tore up the message without reading it to the’ 


Assembly. That night they were busy trying to arrange 
some device for the defeat of the bill—which was not diffi- 
cult, as the session was about to close. At seven the next 
morning I was informed of what had occurred. At eight 
I was in the capitol at the executive chamber, and sent in 
another special message, which opened as follows: “I learn 
that the emergency message which I sent last evening to the 


3 New York Tribune, March 29, 1898, 
4Jbid., April 12, 1899, 
5 Tbid., April 14, 1899, 
6 Jbid., April 15, 1899, 


: 


198 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


Assembly on behalf of the Franchise Tax Bill has not been 
read. I therefore send hereby another message on the 
subject. I need not impress upon the Assembly the need of 
passing this bill at once.” I sent this message to the Assem- 
bly by my secretary, . . . with the intimation that if this 
were not promptly read I should come up in person and read 
ters 

When this second emergency message was read there was 
a great flutter in the Assembly. The assemblymen who had 
read the morning papers commenting upon the “shameful 
conduct of the Assembly leaders” of the night before, prob- 
ably thought of their rural constituents and their attitude 
upon this question. Floor Leader Allds reported the bill 
from the Rules Committee and an irresistible tide of public 
opinion carried it through.§ 

The organization leaders were stunned but not beaten. 
They thought they saw visions of disappearing campaign 
funds, but these visions were not yet reality. On May 6 
Platt wrote a long letter to the Governor which ran in part 
as follows: 


Please take the time to read this letter through care- 
fully. . . . But the Ford bill shot into the heart of the 
business community out of a clear sky, worked by Tammany 
Hall for political and individual plunder is a bad thing and 
I sincerely believe that you will make the mistake of your 
life if you allow the bill to become a law. With a political 
experience that runs back nearly half a century I do not 
hesitate to predict that the signing of this bill, with the tre- 
_mendous power it conveys to the Tammany assessors, will 
_ give New York to the Democratic party in 1900. 

. | hope that you will not consider that I am making any- 
thing in the nature of a personal request. The subject is 
too serious for anything of that kind. I am asking and ad- 


TOp. cit., p. 302. 
8 New York Tribune, April 29, 1899, 


GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 199 


vising in the public interest and for reasons that I have here 
set forth.® 

Governor Roosevelt thanked the Senator for the “frank- 
ness, courtesy and delicacy” with which he wrote, but his 
keen sense of this made “it more unpleasant to have to dis- 
agree” with him.’ After the corporation lawyers had been 
given a hearing, the Governor admitted that the assessment 
feature was “wrong,” but he insisted upon the bill with this» 
feature rather than no bill at all. A compromise was 
reached when the Governor agreed to reconvene the legisla- 
ture for the purpose of considering certain amendments to 
the bill which would remedy this defect. A few changes 
were made and the fight against the bill, based principally 
upon these very changes, was then carried into the courts.¥ 
But the “damage” had been done by the emergency message, 
as Platt admitted in the following words, written before the: 
extra session was called: “But at the last moment, and to 
my very great surprise, you did a thing which has caused 
the business community of New York to wonder how far 
the notions of Populism, as laid down in Kansas and Ne- 
braska, have taken hold upon the Republican party of the 
state of New York.” ® 

Governor Roosevelt sent many other special messages to 
the legislature, but none of them were so striking as the one 
which has been discussed and even Platt was willing to 
admit that his other messages had “created a good opinion 
throughout the state.” These other messages touched on 

9 Barnes v. Roosevelt, pp. 2368 ff. 

10 Barnes v. Roosevelt, p. 2375, Roosevelt to Platt, May 8, 1899. 

11“Tt is easy to say that the Governor has called the extra ses- 
sion to get himself out of a scrape, and the people who want him 
to be in a scrape are quick to say it. As a matter of fact the ex- 
tra session was called at the suggestion of the franchise-holders,”— 
New York Tribune, May 23, 1899. 


12 Messages, X, 71. 
13 Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 300. 


200 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


such subjects as civil service reform, rapid transit for New 
York City, ;he regulation of tenement houses, and the Pub- 
lic Health Law. On the last three of these matters, Platt 
gave his “grudging and _querulous assent.” 

The third great constitutional power that the governor 
possessed over legislation was the veto power. After a bill 
was passed it had to be submitted to the governor for his 
approval before it could become a law, except that if he 
held a bill ten days before the legislature adjourned without 
any action, it might become a law without his signature. 
If a bill failed to meet his approval he could of course veto 
it within the ten-day period or use the veto as a threat to se- 
cure certain amendments. A direct veto was overridden by 
a two-thirds vote of the legislature only on rare occasions. 
The situation was different, however, during the thirty-day 
period allowed to the governor for the consideration of bills 
after the adjournment of the legislature, for at this time the 
governor’s veto was absolute whether it was of the explicit 
or the “omnibus” variety, bills not signed during this period 
being deemed in the latter category. Since the governor 
could veto specific items in an appropriation bill, his “om- 
nibus” veto was a very powerful weapon. ~It-could be used 
to embarrass legislators who were overzealous in caring for 
the local interests of their constituents. 

Governor Morton did sign some “organization measures,” 
and this fact was interpreted by some as “proof that he 
was in close alliance with Platt.’?* Among such measures 
might be classified the bill for a “bi-partisan police board” 
for West Troy which was designed to secure to the two 
“machines” a “voice” in the distribution of the local police 


14 Constitution, Arte eCAaw, 
15 Nation, April 30, 1896, LXII, 336, 


GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 201 


patronage,!® a bill for the relief of Tioga County which 
aimed to recompense Platt’s county for certai* expenses in 
connection with a railroad strike,!” a bill relative to guaran- 
tors and sureties which permitted such foreign corporations 
as the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, in which 
one of Platt’s sons was interested, to do business in the’ 
state,!® a bill to regulate race track gambling which left out 
the penalties, a bill to amend the Insurance Law which 
sanctioned discriminations against foreign insurance com- 
panies, the Raines Liquor Tax bill, and the bill relative to 
the creation of Greater New York. Perhaps the fact that 
these bills were signed was one of the things that led Platt” 
to call Governor Morton, the “safest governor that New 
York ever had.” It should not be supposed that all of these 
bills were signed without a struggle; for instance, Governor 
Morton could not help but pay some attention to the deter- 
mined opposition to the Greater New York bill which de- 
veloped alarming proportions. Additional portions of 
Platt’s letter to Governor Morton, dated January 3, 1896, 
will show what tactics the wily chief employed to meet this 
contingency : 


I say to you that this whole business utterly discourages 
and demoralizes me; and it makes me wonder what would 
be the result if you succeeded in becoming president of the 
United States and had to meet such issues as are involved 
in the questions of the present hour, for instance, the Vene= 
zuelan question and the Bond question. . . . Andif you 
are to persist in the policy which you have outlined in your 
letter, we might as well quit right where we are and not in 
troduce any resolution or bill for Greater New York; but I 


167). Wilcox, “Party Government in Cities of New York,” Polit- 
ical Science Quarterly, XIV, 687. 

17 Messages, 1X, 593ff. 

18 See below p. 247. 

19 See below p. 278. 


202 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


assure you that you will be the greater sufferer from such 
a cowardly policy. Jn such case I will not feel like taking 
off my coat and doing the work I contemplated in the presi- 
dential matter. I might as well be frank with you now. If 
matters of legislation are to be run on the issue of the presi- 
dential candidacy, it will be impossible for us to accomplish 
anything upon any questions which involve sharp differ- 
ences of opinion, however strongly the balance may be in 
favor of the course which the organization is recommend- 
ings? 

The editor of Platt’s Autobiography called this letter 
the “clincher” to Morton which, it was believed, “induced” 
the Governor to attach his signature to the bill. If this was 
so, it had a long time to work, because the bill was not final- 
ly signed until May 11, 1899. Governor Morton was not 
tractable upon all matters. Platt had a favorite bill which 
aimed to give the governor direct power over the New York 
City police, but this bill was so offensive to Morton that he 
said he would not sign it until it was so amended as to give 
Mayor Strong the power to appoint the commission to re- 
organize the force. Platt saw that he had to retreat and the 
changes were made in the bill.1. Governor Morton likewise 
showed a stubborn independence in his treatment of thirty- 
day bills, an “interference and opposition” which Platt called 
“executive back-fire on our friends in the legislature.” ? 
Among these “humiliations and sad experiences” were the 
governor’s vetoes of some of Senator Lexow’s bills referring 
to New York City and numerous other measures of a local 
or “pork barrel” nature.® 

That Senator Platt had “influence” with the next gov- 
ernor was surmised from the fact that Governor Black 


20 Op. cit., pp. 308-9. 

1 Nation, February 7, 1895, LX, 101. 

2 Platt, op. cit., pp. 307, 309. 

3 Ibid., and Public Papers of Governor Morton, 1895, passim. 


GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 203 


signed the Greater New York charter bill, the work of the 
commission created by the law passed during Governor 
Morton’s administration. At any rate, in recognition of the 
interest which the Senator had shown in the passage of the 
bill, the Governor sent him the pen with which he had signed 
it.* With reference to the civil service bill, the primary 
elections measure and the metropolitan elections bill, there 
was no need for such courtesy because the governor him- 
self had been one of the initiating forces. 

Governor Black’s “executive back-fire’ was probably 
more constant and “saddening” than Governor Morton’s had 
been. At the beginning of the session for 1898 he openly 
declared that he would not give his approval to any meas- 
ures amending the Greater New York charter except such 
as might be found essential to its actual working and that 
he would not sanction “deals” of any kind.’ He told the 
Senator personally that he would veto any anti-caricaturist 
bill, and his threat was sufficient to prevent the passage of 
any such measure just as it had thrown out the metropoli- 
tan police bill the year before.” The anti-cartoonist, or 
“press gag” bill, was the only “personal favor” that Platt 
was supposed to have asked of the legislature and the police 
bill was strenuously sponsored by Messrs. Quigg, Gibbs, and 
Lauterbach, but the Governor “riddled” both. During his 
régime the “organization” also fared badly in the matter of 
thirty-day bills: he refused to sign bills invading the rights 
of various up-state cities;® he vetoed the New York City 
school salary bill by which the municipal authorities sought 
to evade their responsibility ; he kept from the statute books 


2 Nation, May 13, 1897. See Alexander, Four Famous New 
Yorkers, p. 292. 

5 Nation, April 7, 1898, LX VI, 256. 

6 New York Tribune, February 1, 1898. 

7 Ibid., May 18, 1897. 

8 [hid., Jan. 8, 1898. 


204 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


the Burns Insurance bill which sought to increase the in- 
‘equitable burden of policy holders; and he failed to approve 
-some dangerous amendments to the Railroad Law.® It was 
because of his vetoes, he claimed, that certain of Platt’s lieu- 
tenants opposed his renomination for governor in 1898.!¢ 

The organization leaders did not need to be told that 
Governor Roosevelt would not be subservient when his ap- 
proval for certain bills was desired. In 1898 the margin of 
the Republican organization in the legislature was so narrow 
that it could not ruthlessly control the law-making process. 
Because of Governor Roosevelt’s decided stand upon the 
franchise tax question, the leaders of the organization were 
constrained from pushing any of their “favorite” meas- 
ures.1! When the Governor disapproved of certain provi- 
sions in a measure, he would request that it be recalled from 
him and amendments made. Although no “conspicuously 
bad” laws were passed during this session, the omnibus veto 
kept 105 bills from the statute books, most of which were 
of a local or special character.” During the next session of 
the legislature, the Governor was more politic, and instead 
of trying to force the party leaders to accept his views by 
peremptory methods, he arranged the program with them 
in a spirit of concession. A friendly interpreter said that 
“this course was doubtless by him considered wise, in view 
of the approaching election of a president and a gover- 
nor.” 18 Jn spite of the “harmonious” character of the ses- 
sion and its negative achievements, the omnibus veto fell © 
upon 169 measures.’* The legislators were tending more 
and more to shift the responsibility for legislation to the 


9 Ibid., May 5, 1898. 

10 Barnes v. Roosevelt, pp. 2354 ff, Quigg to Roosevelt. 
11 New York Tribune, April 29, 1899, 

12 Messages, X, 48-64. 

13 New York Tribune, April 7, 1900. 

14 Messages, X, 150-79. 


GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 205 


governor and to say among themselves, “Let us put it up 
to the governor.”’ On the other hand it cannot be said that 
Governor Roosevelt’s use of the veto power was any more 
spectacular than that of his predecessors. 


APPOINTMENTS 


Another feature of the governor’s work that attracted 
widespread attention was his use of the appointing power. 
While many administrative officers were made elective by 
the constitution and others were given statutory terms long- 
er than that of the governor, still many appointments were 
made by the governor, and this task often involved the deli- 
cate responsibility of selecting high judicial, military and 
administrative officers, and also important local officers, 
especially to fill vacancies. 

Platt was said to have “influence” with that governor who 
appointed prominent members of the “organization” to 
some of the high positions in his gift. When Mr. Morton 
became governor, he found that the “Republican organiza- 
tion” had pledged the office of superintendent of public 
works to State Committeeman Aldridge. This office, which 
had extensive control over the canal patronage and other 
public works, was the most important at the governor’s dis-- 
posal, at least from Platt’s point of view. Aldridge’s name 
was pressed by many active politicians who lived in Roches- 
ter and by some who lived in New York. Among the latter 
was Chauncey M. Depew.” Attention has already been 
called to the fact that as mayor of Rochester, Aldridge ac- 
quired the reputation of being a “spoilsman of the Platt 
type.” ?® It was thought that he would use the canal patron- 
age to build up a “machine” to control caucuses,” and so 


15 New York Tribune, January 3, 1895. 


16 See above p. 62. 
17 New York Tribune, November 24, 1894, 


206 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


when Governor Morton, among the first acts of his adminis- 
tration, sent in the name of this “unfit candidate,” the re- 
formers shook their heads and the “Boys” shouted for joy. 
The senators, of course, Republicans and Democrats alike, 
did not hesitate to confirm such an appointment. 

Among the other appointments which Governor Morton 
made, several called forth adverse comment. One of these 
was his choice of a “practical” politician for the office of 
civil service commissioner, to replace an incumbent who was 
satisfying the reform element. Another was his appoint- 
ment to the state inspectorship of gas meters of a person 
whose recommendations were afterward shown to be false 
and misleading.4® Still another was his appointment of Ly- 
man as state excise commissioner, a new state officer of 
great “political” importance whose powers grew out of the 
Raines Liquor Tax Law.’® The crowning use of his power 
for “the good of the organization” was his elevation of 
“Jake” Worth, the “boss” of Brooklyn, to the Kings County 
clerkship, a position which entailed large fees.”° 

In the matter of appointments, Governor Black soon dis- 
pelled all doubts as to his loyalty to the “organization.” 
Superintendent Aldridge, who had gained great “popular- 
ity” along the line of the canal,’ was reappointed to his old 
position, and thus a graceful courtesy was accorded to one 
of the leading candidates at the Saratoga Convention who 
had come so near to success. ‘‘Boss” Worth was reap- 
pointed to his “$40,000 County Clerkship,” * and State Com- 
mitteeman Dunn, from Platt’s congressional district, was 
selected as one of the railroad commissioners. The “brav- 


18 New York Tribune, January 12, 1896. 
19 Nation, April 30, 1896. 
20 Ibid. Nov. 5, 1896. 


1 Utica Press, January 8, 1897. 
2 New York Tribune, April 12, 1897, 


GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 207 


est” act of the Governor, however, was his appointment of 
“Lou” Payn as superintendent of insurance, “Lou” Payn, 
the life-long friend of Platt, the self-confessed lobbyist, 
whom Elihu Root had called but two years before “‘a stench 
in the nostrils of the people of the state of New York,” 
was to deal with some of the largest and most powerful cor- 
porations in the state. The Democratic and “Mugwump” 
press went into spasms.2 Even some of the senators who 
usually voted “regular” were constrained to “bolt” this 
appointment. It was thought for a while that Governor 
Black was trying to set up an organization of his own and 
to become “boss” in Platt’s place.4 

After Roosevelt’s election in 1898, every one knew that 
“things would be different.” Platt said that “Governor 
Roosevelt started in whirlwind fashion to clean house at Al- 
bany.”® Only now and then was the Senatorabletoimpede 
the_process. The Daly-Cohen controversy affords an inter- 
esting example of one of the methods that he employed. A 
Democratic justice of the Supreme Court, Judge Morgan 
J. O’Brien, talked of resigning his office in order to become 
the head of the firm of Tracy, Boardman and Platt (the 
so-called Platt family law firm). Roosevelt wanted to ap- 
point Judge Daly, a Democrat whose independence of 
Croker had furnished the Republicans with an “issue” in the 
previous campaign, but Platt favored the appointment of 
Cohen, a Republican. When Roosevelt indicated that he 
would not be moved, Justice O’Brien changed his mind 
about resigning. The inference was that Platt had in- 
formed Croker of the Governor-elect’s decision and the 
Tammany chief had used his influence to keep Judge 


3 Binghamton Republican, February 4, 1897. 

4New York Tribune, April 12, 1897, “Black, Not Platt, the Boss.” 
5 Op. cit., p. 374. 

6 New York Tribune, December 11, 1898, 


208 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


O’Brien upon the bench.’ Discipline was a matter of im- 
‘portance to both organizations and this was what the poli- 
ticians called a “move.” When asked whether he had in- 
spired it, Platt winked wickedly and smiled. Governor 
Roosevelt used one of his favorite similes to the effect that 
he was playing the game on the table and not under it. 
The first real clash between Platt and the Governor-elect 
came over the appointment of a superintendent of public 
works whose office Roosevelt regarded as by far the most 
important under his care. During the last weeks of Gover- 
nor Black’s administration, Superintendent Aldridge had 
asked that he be suspended while certain charges against 
him were being investigated. The canal scandals furnished 
one of the reasons why Platt consented to have Roosevelt 
run for governor, and the appointment of Aldridge’s suc- 
cessor was therefore watched with great interest. Rumors 
were current around the Fifth Avenue Hotel that Francis 
J. Hendricks, of Syracuse, an organization man with a 
highly respectable reputation, had been “slated” for the 
position. At a Platt-Roosevelt-Woodruff conference, the 
Senator informed the Governor-elect that he had a most 
admirable man for the place as he had just received a tele- 
gram from Hendricks saying that he would accept the posi- 
tion. Roosevelt saw that this was a test case and replied 
that he was sorry but he could not appoint Hendricks whom 
he liked or any other man who was chosen for him, and 
that he must choose for himself. He then presented the 
names of four men for the place. Platt soon saw that Roose- 
velt was determined, so he consented to the selection of one 


7J. L. Steffens, “Governor Roosevelt.” McClure’s Mag., XIII, 


63. 
8 New York Tribune, December 29, 1898. 


a) ay 


’ 


ae, S43) 
aye (2s 








LHE GLAD HAND 


Wait Till the Light is Turned Out and the Air Will Be Full of 
Eye-Glasses and Pointed Whiskers. 


(From The Verdict, April 16, 1900. Original owned by Roosevelt Memorial 
Association) 


GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 209 


of these four, Colonel Partridge, of Brooklyn, a relative of 
“Tim” Woodruff. 

After the appointment of Partridge as superintendent of 
public works, Roosevelt thought that he had established his 
relations with Platt on pretty nearly the right basis. The 
Senator, however, did not show his full hand as manager 
of the organization until over a year later when the spec- 
tacular struggle over the appointment of a successor to 
“Lou” Payn, superintendent of insurance, was staged. 
There was a story that Roosevelt had made a pre-election 
pledge to Quigg, to deliver “Lou” Payn’s political head on 
a charger.’® This certainly was not part of Platt’s program, 
for Platt sent an ultimatum to the Governor that Payn must 
be reappointed when his term expired in February, 1900, 
or else there would be a fight. The announcement from 
the executive chamber that Payn would have to go was 
answered by a flood of petitions from the insurance com- 
panies asking for his retention. Roosevelt still persisted in 
his determination. Platt then began to show his real 
weapon; Payn could not be ousted because the assent_of 
the Senate was necessary to appoint any successor and the 
incumbent continued in office until his successor was ap- 
pointed. As to Platt’s control of the Senate on this matter, 
Roosevelt testified later as follows: 


“After full investigation I became convinced in my own 
mind that the organization controlled the majority of the 


9 Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 285. W. J. Youngs, Administration of 
Theodore Roosevelt as Governor (Manuscript in Roosevelt Me- 
morial Association Library). 

10 Albany Argus, January 15, 1900. In his Autobiography Platt 
said, “He threw Superintendent of Insurance Louis F. Payn out 
of his job so quickly as to send that official to me with a cry: ‘T. 
warned you that fellow would soon have you dangling at his chariot 
wheel.’” Platt was evidently under the false impression that this 
occurred at the start of Roosevelt’s administration, 

11 Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 291, 

14 


210 BOSS PLATT AND HIS°NEW YORK MACHINE 


Senate, and that if I wished to discuss questions of appoint- 
ment that were apt to come to an issue between me and 
the Senate, it was advisable for me to go to where the real 
power was, to talk with Mr. Platt, and not to talk with men 
who I had become convinced in my own mind would merely 
‘carry out the bidding of Mr. Platt, therefore that I must 
consult with him if I wished to get ‘affirmative action.” 


There can be no doubt that Platt was consulted upon the 
question of the appointment of a superintendent of insur- 
ance.48 The Governor found out that Platt’s arrangement 
with the organization Democrats was “iron-clad” on such 
matters, and that a great majority of the Democratic sena- 
tors would vote with the Republican organization upon this 
question.1* Roosevelt next decided to send in the name of 
Francis J. Hendricks for the position. Platt had desired to 
put Hendricks in one high administrative position, surely 
he could not object to Hendricks being placed in another 
position of about equal importance. Besides Hendricks was 
an ex-senator and very popular with his old friends in the 
state Senate. That body certainly could not refuse to en- 
dorse him. An offer was sent immediately to the gentleman 
from Syracuse. Imagine the Governor’s surprise when that 
gentleman declined the nomination! Here was another ex- 
ample of what the politicians called a “move.” ¥ 

Roosevelt had one weapon left. He remembered that 
Platt had said the retention of Payn was demanded by cer- 
tain big-monied men of both parties, whose contributions to 
the organization in the past had been very heavy and who 
possessed such influence upon newspapers in the business 


12 Barnes v. Roosevelt, p. 690. 

13 Platt, op. cit., p. 375; Roosevelt, Joc. cit. 

14 Barnes v. Roosevelt, answer to complaint and p. 1308; J. B. 
Bishop, op. cit., I, 130, letter of Roosevelt analyzing votes in the 
Senate. 

15J. L. Steffens, “Governor Roosevelt as an Be ee ” Mc- 
Clure’s Magazine, XV (1900), 110. 


GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 211 


world that it was not safe to antagonize them.!® About this 
time, a petition to the state superintendent of banks was 
published alleging that certain directors of the State Trust 
Company had lent enormous sums of money to themselves 
and others on several varieties of unsatisfactory security. 
Among these loans of doubtiul legality, was one to Louis F. 
Payn for $435,000.17 This disclosure gave the Governor 
the whip hand. It appeared that if charges were brought 
against Payn, many others higher up would be involved. 
Platt was now frantic lest he would not be consulted in the 
making of the final choice.'8 Francis Hendricks, who had 
thrice declined the office, sent a telegram to Roosevelt that 
“he would accept the office if the ‘Republican organization’ 
would support the nomination.’ This support was promised 
by the “Republican organization.” #8 For some reason, le= 
gal proceedings were not brought against the directors of 
the State Trust Company, and that institution with all its 
records went out of existence a few months later when a 
law was passed permitting its merger with the Morton Trust 
Company.”° Francis Hendricks was established in the office” 
of state superintendent of insurance until after the insur- 
ance investigation of 1905. Roosevelt later pictured this 
incident as one of his great victories, but at the time it was 
looked upon as an organization victory.! 


16 Barnes v. Roosevelt, answer. 

17 New York Tribune, January 14, 1900. 

18 Tbid., January 19, 1900. 

19 Tbid., January 27, 1900. See also the Nation, February 1, 1900; 
Steffens, loc. cit. 

20 B. J. Hendrick, “Great American Fortunes and Their Making,” 
McClure’s Mag., XXX, 324. Roosevelt told the newspaper men that 
he regarded the company as solvent (New York Tribune, January. 
30, 1900), but the results of his investigation were never published. 

1 The writer was informed by D. S. Alexander that Roosevelt was 
drawing the “long bow” in his account of this affair. Roosevelt, 
op. cit., pp. 293-94, and Alexander, Four Famous New Yorkers, p. 
331. 


212 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


With reference to the other appointments which he made, 
Roosevelt admitted that in almost all cases, although in not 
all, he consulted with Platt even though he was obliged to 
disregard his advice in some cases, especially where can- 
didates for judicial positions were being considered.? The 
‘following letter reveals the way in which Platt handled such 
matters : : 


Marcu 31, 1899, 
Hon. Theo. Roosevelt, 
Executive Chamber, Albany, N. Y. 
My DEAR GOVERNOR: 

I am in receipt of yours of March 30th. Gelshenen is a 
first-class man in every respect and I should think would be 
as acceptable as anybody, as a Democratic appointee. I 
think it would be well moreover, to please Grady. 

I find that I have been mistaken with reference to Leo- 
pold Stirn. He has no connection whatever with Stirn 
Brothers family, and is not a relative. Different family en- 
tirely. He is a downtown jeweler of wealth and reputation. 
He was very generous last fall, and therefore Quigg is 
anxious that he should receive the appointment. So you 
will excuse me if I change off my mind. 

Yours sincerely, 
LCA 


To this letter Roosevelt replied on April Ist as follows: 
“All right I will appoint Stirn and Gelshenen. Grady does 
not know the last named.’’?* When he was questioned with 
reference to this letter, Roosevelt replied that there were 
times when he relied entirely upon the knowledge and sug- 
gestion of Mr. Platt and that the appointment of Gelshenen 
was made partly as a matter of pleasing Grady, the leader 
of the organization Democrats in the legislature. Another 


2 Barnes v. Roosevelt, p. 771. 
3 [bid., exhibit 50 (17). 

4 Ibid. 

5 Tbid., p. 542, 


GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 213 


letter, written a little later that same year, illustrates per- 
haps more clearly the usual manner in which Platt made 
recommendations for appointments : 


Avcust 11, 1899. 


* 


Hon. Theo. Roosevelt, 
Oyster Bay, New York. 
My DEAR GOVERNOR: 

Our friends in Delaware County have settled upon a nom- 
inee for county judge and surrogate, in place of Sewell, 
whom you recently made Supreme Court Judge, in the per- 
son of John P. Grant of Stamford, N. Y., an old time Re- 
publican. As you will see, he is indorsed by the organiza- 
tion and by the whole Bar of the County. It is a good ap- 
pointment, and I think the sooner it is disposed of the 
better. 

Yours truly, 
PG PE arin 


In answer to this letter the Governor’s secretary sent a 
telegram to Platt on August 24 announcing that Grant 
had been appointed. Roosevelt later explained that he did 
not know anything about the man appointed personally but 
that he had relied upon the judgment of Judge Sewell who 
gave him first hand information and then obtained recom- 
mendations from the members of the bar.?. The letter re- 
veals, the narrow range of choice exercised by both Platt 
and Roosevelt.2 It was Roosevelt’s custom to eliminate all 
those except the ones highly recommended and to send this 


6 Barnes v. Roosevelt, p. 2447. 

7 Ibid., p. 771. 

8In regard to the appointment of a new surrogate for New York 
City, Roosevelt wrote to Platt, under date of Feb. 10, 1899, as fol- 
lows: “I have not the slightest purpose beyond getting a thor= 
oughly good man who will do the work well, who is a Republican, 
but who is also a man thoroughly satisfactory to the bar and to the 
people.” J. B. Bishop, op. cit., I, 118. 


214 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


list of the leaders of the organization for them to make the 
final choice.® 

From the evidence adduced above, scanty as it may seem, 
it may safely be concluded that Platt was “consulted” with 
reference to the great majority of appointments that were 
made in the state service. Often the recommendation came 
in the form of an impersonal request from the “organiza- 
tion” and the governor may not have been conscious of 
Platt’s influence, but the system was centralized. 


GENERAL EXECUTIVE DUTIES 


The New York State Constitution of 1894 declared that 
“the exectitive power shall be vested in a governor,” but, 
paradoxical as it may seem, subsequent provisions of the 
document went on to deprive him of a large part of that 
power. As Governor Hughes remarked in his inaugural ad- 
dress in 1909, after two years experience in office: ‘While 
the governor represents the highest executive power in the 
state, there is frequently observed a popular misapprehen- 
sion as to its scope. There is a wide domain over which he 
has no control, or slight control.” ?® He went on to point 
out that there were several elective state officers not ac- 
countable to the governor, who exercised within their pre- 
scribed spheres most important executive powers. In dis- 
cussing the statutory boards and officers he said: “The 
terms of officers are generally longer than the governor’s 
term. And in their creation the legislature, with few excep- 
tions, has reserved the final administrative control to the 
Senate in making the heads of departments, to whose ap- 
pointment the Senate’s consent in necessary, removable 
only by it.” 


9 Youngs, op. cit., p. 4. 
10 State of New York, Public Papers of Governor Hughes (1909), 
p. 8. 


GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 215 


While Thomas C. Platt cannot be given the credit for de- 
vising this intricate and chaotic system of administrative or- 
ganization, it is nevertheless true that he found this system 
operated in a way very much to his advantage. Thus, a 
governor like Roosevelt might cause a good deal of irritation 
in the organization by an independent use of his legislative 
and appointing powers, but there was little danger that he 
would overturn the entire administrative system, built up 
as it had been over the course of a number of years by 
various organization men planted in well nigh impregnable 
positions. The controlling consideration in the legislature 
in prescribing methods of appointment and removal, runs 
one very keen analysis of the governor’s executive functions 
in New York, was not “to make the government responsible 
directly to public opinion or to make anyone responsible for 
leadership, for fidelity, or for efficiency and economy in 
carrying on the business of the state,” but rather the domi- 
nant motives were “to prevent responsible leadership, to dif- 
fuse authority and to set one officer up against another so. 
that no agent could have any power to do harm.” 4 

The powers of removal that the governor did possess 
were carefully hedged about by many restrictions and were 
not sufficient to enable him to really direct the course of his 
administration. For example, he might suspend the treasur- 
er for violation of his duty but he could not remove him; 
he might remove the superintendent of public works but he 
must report the cause of such removal to the legislature; 
he might remove the superintendent of prisons but this could 
only be “for cause’ and after a hearing in which the ac- 


11New York Bureau of Municipal Research, The Constitution 
and Government of the State of New York, An Appraisal (1915), p. 
37. See also New York Executive Chamber, Report of the Recon- 
struction Commission on Retrenchment and Reorganization in the 
State Government, 1919, chap. I. 


216 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


cused had a chance to make his defense; and finally, he 
might remove some of the important statutory officers but 
only with the consent of the Senate. The evidence which 
the writer has been able to find with reference to Platt’s in- 
fluence over the exercise of the governor’s power of removal 
has been entirely of a negative character. During the six 
years of Platt’s most successful management of the Republi- 
can party in New York which have been chosen as a basis 
for illustration in this chapter, there was only one actual 
removal by the governor of a high state administrative 
officer. In addition to the removal of a state lunacy com- 
missioner by Governor Roosevelt, there were several re- 
movals by the governors of local officers, but otherwise the 
records on this subject are a blank.” -It is clear that Platt 
did not need to do very much “consulting” about the use 
of this power. On the other hand, it is probable that when 
it was used even in connection with local officers, his ad- 
vice was asked."% } 
_ In the performance of certain of his executive functions 
the governor did enjoy a fair amount of freedom. Within 
the limits of the law, the governor could lay down such 
regulations regarding the civil service as he deemed fit. 
Governor Morton exercised this power in such a way as to 
“cause deep pain” to Superintendent of Public Works AlI- 
dridge,!* and he thereby won the commendation of the civil 
service reformers.® Governor Black carried out his ideas 
as to the proper nature of civil service examinations by es- 
tablishing a set of “‘starchless rules.” After the Civil Service 
Law of 1899 had been passed, the organization could do 


12 At least as shown by an examination of the public papers of 
Governors Morton, Black, and Roosevelt. > 


13 New York Herald, June 9, 1900. 
14 Nation, February 7, 1895, LX, 101. 
15 Jbid., Dec. 17, 1896. 


GOVERNOR ROOSEVELT AND BOSS PLATT 217 


nothing to prevent Governor Roosevelt from supplanting the 
“starchless rules” by a set more rigid than had yet been es- 
tablished in any state. In the granting of pardons and com- 
mutations, the governor was also comparatively free from 
any interference on the part of the organization. It is inter- 
esting to note, however, that requests for executive clem-, 
ency usually came from the local party organization, the 
trial judge or the district attorney, and in some cases from, 
men like, Chauncey M.. Depew, George W. Dunn, J. Sloat 
Fassett, or Cornelius Van Cott.?® 

Toward the close of the nineteenth century the governor 
came to be looked upon more and more as the official head 
and spokesman for the party in the state. The people came 
to look to him for the carrying out of the party’s legislative 
program as well as for the driving force in administration. 
When the leaders of the organization decided upon a pro- 
gram of action, they expected to get the governor’s co-opera+ 
tion in the work of its fulfillment. Governor Morton al- 
lowed his name to be used in the game that Platt and his 
lieutenants played in the Republican National Convention 
of 1896. Governor Black came to New York City in 1897: 
and made a speech in the interests of a factional fight that 
Platt and the “organization” were waging there!” Governor 
Roosevelt likewise showed an interest in New York City 
politics }* and in the State Convention of 1900 he was called 
upon to make a eulogistic speech in behalf of the new can- 
didate of the organization which had striven so hard to 
“shelve him in the vice-presidency.” 

Platt’s position as head of the “invisible” government of 


16 These names appeared in the public papers of Governors Mor- 
ton and Roosevelt in the explanations of why certain pardons and 
commutations were granted. 

17 New York Tribune, October 21, 1897, 

18 Tbid., June 29, 1900. 

19 Tbid., September 6, 1900, 


218 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


the state depended in large part upon his maintaining satis- 
factory relations with the governor who stood at the head 
of the visible government. When Governor Roosevelt wrote 
special messages upon touchy. topics, when—he-vetoed-the— 
organization measures, when he refused to make appoint- 
ments recommended by the organization, and when he in- 
sisted upon publicity for all phases of public. administration, 
he threatened the place of the political manager who oper- 
ated behind the scenes. Yet Platt held his place through 
this trying governorship. Platt made himself useful to 
Roosevelt. His contacts with the Republican organization 
enabled -him to advise the governors about the probable 
effect of a message to the legislature, about the political con- 
sequences of certain appointments, about the practicability 
of certain administrative schemes. A governor in the state 
of New York in the late nineties who failed to heed or to 
listen to Platt’s advice might be warned as to his fate before 
the next Republican convention, but ordinarily the over-bur- 
dened chief executive of the great industrial state of New 
York welcomed political information of the type which 
Platt was interested in gathering. 


CHAPTER IX 
THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 


To Platt the distribution of the spoils of public office was 
a serious business. At times he seemed to be more con- 
cerned with the “equitable” allotment of the political patron- 
age than he was with his own private affairs. Roosevelt 
viewed the spoils system with an air of amused tolerance, 
especially as it concerned appointments. As civil service 
commissioner, Roosevelt fought the spoilsman hard, but as 
governor of New York and later as president of the United 
States he did not try strenuously to “wreck the organiza- 
tion” by drying up the sources of its power as he might have 
done. Roosevelt concerned himself with large matters 
which attracted public attention, while Platt was concerned 
with the minute details of the system of party rewards and 
punishments. 


LOCAL PATRONAGE 


It is difficult to ascertain just what Platt’s part was in the 
distribution of local rewards to the petty politicians. It is 
even more difficult to determine Roosevelt’s relation to the 
patronage system. The centralization’ of control over the 
party machinery through the hierarchy of party committees 
made it necessary for the local leaders to “consult’’ those 
higher up when they desired favors from the state and 
national governments, but in local matters they were usually 
allowed a free hand. As long as a local leader carried his 
district, the state committee did not pry too closely into his 
affairs. On the other hand, local elections as well as state 

219 


220. BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


and national elections were run by the same organization, 
and it was one of the duties of the state leaders to see that 
each unit of the state organization was in proper working 
order. When the necessities of discipline demanded it, the 
state leaders could and did deprive refractory local leaders. 
of their control over their local organizations.} 

In each one of the sixty-one counties of the state there 
were at least seven elective officers, i. e., a judge, a treasurer, 
a sheriff, a clerk, a district attorney, a superintendent of the 
poor, and one or more coroners. Anyone desiring to hold 
one of these offices outside of New York City was practical- 
ly compelled to seek it at the hands of the local Republican 
party manager. In 1899, for instance, between forty-six 
and fifty of the fifty-seven up-state counties were Republi- 
can.” In other words, one of the functions of the Repub- 
lican party in New York was the nomination and election of 
over three hundred county officers. In addition the party 
had charge of the election of town officers in about eight 
hundred towns.? Since there were at least sixteen elective 
officers in each town, 1. e., a supervisor, a clerk, four justices 
of the peace, three assessors, two school directors, two over- 
seers of the poor, two or more constables, and a superin- 
tendent of highways, there must have been about thirteen 
thousand town officers in the Republican state organization. 
-Then, too, there were about three hundred and seventy Re- 
publican villages, each with an elective president, treasurer, 
collector, police justice, and from two to eight trustees, con- 
taining in the aggregate over three thousand elective posi- 
tions for the local Republican organizations to fill. 


1 Platt, op. cit., pp. 504 ff. 
2 New York Red Book (1899), p. 756. In 46 counties both the 
sheriff and clerk were Republicans. 


3 Legislative Manual, 1900, the election returns for 1899 show that 
about 800 out of the 930 towns were Republican. 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 221 


It is not too much to say that the elective county, town, 
and village officers laid the basis for the Republican state 
organization which Platt directed during the nineties. How; 
ever his fortunes might fluctuate in state wide and national 
politics, he could count on a solid phalanx of rural office 
holders year after year.* The disbursements which these 
local officers controlled were of no mean proportions. In 
1910 the State Comptroller estimated that the counties out- 
side of New York City expended each fiscal year over 
$30,000,000, while the incorporated villages expended 
around $7,000,000 annually.6 These expenditures were di- 
rected for the most part by Republican officials and a large 
part of them went for personal services. The salaries of 
elective county officers ranged from $500 to $10,000 a 
year,® and those paid upon a fee basis sometimes received 
as much as $20,000 a year.” In a populous county like Mon- 
roe County, which contained two hundred thousand people, 
there were over three hundred and fifty county employees 
whose annual payroll amounted to over $300,000 a year.® 
State Committeeman Aldridge had trouble with his city but 
he never lost his county during the period under discussion. 


4 Official New York from Cleveland to Hughes, passim. Lists of 
county officers with their political affiliations are given for the years 
1883-1911. 

5 Report of the Comptroller on Municipal Accounts, 1910, p. 13. 
Only part of these disbursements were controiled by Republican 
officials. 

8 Jbid., 1908, p. 14. The figures are based upon the fragmentary 
reports of local officers submitted for 1907. 

7 Westchester County Research Bureau, “Organization of West- 
chester County” in New York State Constitutional Convention Com- 
mission, County Government in New York, 1915, p. 114. 

8 New York Bureau of Municipal Research, “Government of Mon- 
roe County” in New York State Const. Conv. Com., City and County 
Government (1915), p. 7. These figures are too high for the period 
under discussion but an examination of 1908 report of the Comp- 
troller shows that the error is not enormous. 


222 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


In another county, with a population of fifty thousand, 
there were about one hundred employees whose services. 
cost about $140,000 a year.2 The money spent for_salaries 
-and wages in the towns and villages probably ranged from 
$100 to $20,000 a year.4° Inasmuch as the merit system 
was not applied to the civil service of any town or county 
during the nineties, it is likely that the selection of these 
employees was based largely upon political considerations. 
One of the signs of the disintegration of the old régime was 
the extension of the civil service rules to Erie County in 
1900 and to four other up-state counties in 1905." 

Another sign of a changing era was the passage of a law 
in 1905 providing for the examination of county and village 
finances by the state comptroller. Hitherto the administra- 
tion of county affairs had attracted little attention. Unfor- 
tunately for the Republicans, the enforcement of this law 
came into the hands of a Democratic comptroller due to the 
untoward election of 1906. The first report that he made 
upon municipal accounts must have startled many of the 
country politicians and have caused much grief among the 
“henchmen” of State Committeeman Dunn. A portion of 
this report reads as follows: 


The County of Broome was first selected for examination 
and investigation in that county disclosed an astounding 
condition of affairs. It was found that the moneys of the 
county were being disbursed absolutely contrary to law; that 
county funds were regularly loaned to private individuals 
and county officials and that there was unmistakable evi- 
dence of defalcations aggregating many thousand dollars. 
During the process of investigation the clerk of the board 


9Jbid., “The Government of Nassau County.” This should be 
taken with the same qualifications. 

10 /bid., passim. The disbursements for personal services in sev- 
eral towns and villages are given. 

11R. W. Belcher, “Merit System and County Civil Service,” An- 
nals of the Amer. Acad., XLVII, 101. 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 223 


of supervisors was indicted upon eight counts, charging 
forgery and larceny; charges were preferred against the 
county treasurer, who resigned two days prior to the date 
set for the hearing before the governor; the county treasur- 
er was arrested upon information obtained from one of the 
examiners and has since been twice indicted for misappro- 
priation of public funds; the superintendent of the poor 
placed his resignation in the Comptroller’s hands when his 
accounts became subject of the Comptroller’s investigation, 
and made a written confession of serious irregularities in 
his office.” * 


One of the Broome County officials indicted as a result 
of this investigation was found guilty upon trial and sen- 
tenced to a term in prison. The sum of $30,000 was recov- 
ered by a suit upon the bonds of the former county treas- 
urer.\® The examination of other counties revealed condi- 
tions that were equally amazing and the excuses offered by 
the county officials showed that county financing had been 
in a deplorable state for some time back. In Nassau County 
the disclosure of a shortage of about $45,000 resulted in the 
suicide of one of the persons involved and the subsequent 
punishment of the other. In each of the twelve counties 
examined during the first two years that the law was en- 
forced, irregularities of some sort were discovered. Among 
the most common were: overcharges by county sheriffs for 
the board and transportation of prisoners, illegal retention 
of fees by sheriffs, treasurers and clerks, payment of per- 
sonal and family expenses out of the county funds by 
sheriffs and superintendents of the poor; excessive charges 
for mileage and wages by supervisors; and illegal retention 
of funds by town tax collectors. In one county it was found 
that jurors’ certificates had been issued to dead men and the 


12 Annual Report of the Comptroller, “Municipal Accounts,” 1908, 
p. XXXVii. 

13 Report of the Comptroller on Municipal Accounts, 1909. The 
facts in this paragraph are taken from this report. 


224 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


money due on such certificates drawn from the county 
treasury. In Onondaga County it was brought to light that 
the duties of the county treasurer had been “farmed out” to 
the State Bank of Syracuse. In the village of Watkins it 
was shown that a certain village officer was engaged in a 
private banking business and that he sometimes got his pub- 
lic and private duties confused. The next state comptroller, 
who was a Republican, placed the blame for these and other 
irregularities upon the tendency among local officials to fol- 
low precedents rather than the law. 

An investigation made of the general affairs of the county 
of Albany in 1911 illustrates other possible ways in which 
county offices were used for partisan and factional pur- 
poses.4* It is true that this inquiry came many years after 
the zenith of Platt’s power, but it was found here as in other 
counties that there was a strong disposition among the 
county officers to follow “precedents.” Republicans had 
seen elected to county offices in Albany by and with the con- 
sent of Committeeman Barnes as far back as 1894 so it is 
not too much to imagine from what was reported in 1911 
how things were managed in the late nineties. In 1908 the 
Comptroller found that the affairs of Albany had become a 
tangled mass because of special acts of the legislature, that 
several county officials had illegally retained certain fees, 
and that a unique and costly job of indexing had been main- 
tained in the county clerk’s office since 1893.4% In addition 
to abuses of the sort mentioned, the Democratic legislators 
in charge of the investigation of Albany in 1911 thought 
- they saw in this county a “settled policy to keep the civil ju- 
dicial system under the influence of Republican leaders” by 


14New York State Legislature, Report of the Special Committee 
Appointed to Investigate the City and County of Albany, trans- 
mitted to the Legislature, March 29, 1912, 

15 Tbid., p. 72. 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 225 


selecting the trial jurors according to their political affilia- 
tions and they also claimed to have discovered a “sinister 
use of indictments for political purposes” in the district 
attorney’s office. At the end of the year 1907 when the dis- 
trict attorney’s office changed hands, 465 indictments were 
dismissed in one day and the holder of the office in 1911 
was of the opinion that it was his duty to pigeon-hole in- 
dictments in order to keep the defendant under control.'¢ 
The conclusions of this investigation perhaps explain the 
absence of any crusades against crime in Albany such as 
occurred in New York City in the late nineties. 

So far nothing has been said about the forty-one cities of 
the up-state, varying in size in 1900 from Oneida with a 
population of 6,364 to Buffalo with a population of 352,382. 
The fact that the Republican and Democratic parties were 
fairly evenly divided in most of these cities makes it neces- 
sary to discuss the party spoils system found in them apart 
from the strongly Republican rural municipalities. At a 
time when Platt’s power was most complete, an exact stu- 
dent of municipal affairs pointed out the nature of party 
government in the cities of New York.” After commenting 
upon the great increase in the number of acts creating bi- 
partisan boards for the administration of the police, fire, 
public works, and other departments of the cities in the 
state, he said, “Indeed, the clear purpose of these acts has 
so commonly been a division of spoils between political par- 
ties, that even lawmakers themselves have in a number of 
cases been constrained to adopt frankly the word ‘bi-parti- 
san,’ with whatever stigma of selfishness that word may be 
burdened.” 38 


16 [bid., pp. 81ff. 
17D—D, F. Wilcox, “Party Government in Cities of New York State,” 
Political Science’ Quarterly, XIV (1899), 681ff. 
18 Tbid., p. 692. 
15 


226 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


One of the cities in which the bi-partisan system flourished 
during Platt’s time was the city of Albany, which was lo- 
cated in the bailiwick of William Barnes, Jr. This able 
pupil of Platt converted what had been a Democratic 
stronghold into dependable Republican territory. Some of 
the methods which he used in accomplishing this feat were 
disclosed by the special investigation of 1911, to which 
reference has already been made. 

The majority of the “Bayne” Committee, as the body 
which made the inquiry of 1911 was called, claimed that it 
had discovered the reasons why the mayor whom it fotind 
in office was willing to “take quite largely, pretty largely” 
the advice of Committeeman Barnes and to act strenuously 
upon that advice.!®. This mayor, before his election in 1909, - 
had been for many years chairman of the county committee 
of his party, a position which he held when Roosevelt was 
governor. In addition to this mayor’s political activities, it 
appeared that he had been busy along many other lines. He 
was a director of the gas company which supplied the city 
gas and electricity, he was a director and large stock holder 
in a coal company which sold coal to public institutions, and 
he was a director and stockholder in a banking concern 
which received deposits from the city.2? The Republican 
member of this committee was convinced that the dual posi- 
tion of the mayor evinced a “decided lack of propriety” and 
that the average bank balances carried certainly seemed ex- 
cessive for a city the size of Albany and might indicate that 
the profit of the institutions carrying these balances was 
considered rather than the interest of the tax payer. He 
also thought that the mayor was in a large measure respon- 
sible for the shortcomings of the appointive officers of the 


19 P, 120. 
20 Tbid., p. 29. 
1Jbid., p. 128. 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 227 


city and that his removal should be recommended to the 
governor. 

Viewed from another standpoint the “short comings” of 
the subordinate city officials were reasons for their loyalty 
to the organization which Barnes had built up. In 1908 the 
State Comptroller’s examiner had discovered that scarcely 
any attention was paid by the city officials to the statute re- 
quiring a contract for supplies, the price of which would 
exceed $500, to be let to the lowest bidder.? One of the most 
flagrant violations of the law discovered by the investigating 
committee was the failure to suppress vice, gambling, and 
drunkenness. The minority member said that “the condi- 
tion in the district in which vice is segregated could hardly 
be worse” and that the commissioner of public safety 
“should be summarily removed for neglect of duty.”? The 
majority members claimed that vice in Albany was under 
the “protection” of Republican politicians who levied tribute 
upon the unfortunates in the segregated district by com- 
pelling all those who were engaged in running disorderly 
houses to make purchases from certain favored real estate 
dealers, liquor dealers, furniture dealers, bondsmen, plumb- 
ers, painters and others.* All those who were connected” 
with the traffic of the underworld in Albany whether di- 
rectly or indirectly were expected, it seems, to turn out for 
their share of the work to be performed upon election day. 
There were protests against this system, but the reformers 
soon grew tired and discouraged. How could they get ac- 


% 

Ppt, ps 2/7. 

3 Op. cit., p. 128. 

4Jbid., p. 111. On page 35 the report reads: “There is in the 
lower part of the city of Albany a notorious section known as 
‘The Gut.’ This part of the city, in the Fourth Ward, is devoted 
to prostitution openly carried on, without molestation on the part 
of the police or other officials of the city whose duty it is to sup- 
press such violations of the law.” 


228 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


tion from the district attorney’s office? If they did stir up 
some trouble, how could they then prevent the city officials 
from raising their assessments or harassing them in some 
other way? 

The bi- teen character of the Barnes régime in Albany 
is revealed by a “graft” disclosure in which Barnes himself 
was named. The way in which the Republican leader and 
practical owner of the Albany Evening Journal co-operated 
with the firm which published the leading Democratic paper 
of the city is shown by the following quotation from the 
report of the “Bayne Committee :” 5 


We shall not repeat in detail the uncontradicted facts 
brought out before us to the effect that the contract for 
printing the proceedings of the Common Council of the city 
of Albany was the result of a scheme whereby the successful 
bidder was assured of getting additional work in violation 
of the law, and fixed his bid lower than any outside printer 
could do the work for, that the work was padded to an in- 
credible extent merely to increase the cost of the job and 
the value of the contract thus obtained, that Mr. Barnes’ 
concern, the Journal Company, without having any plant to 
do the work with, nevertheless got, in violation of the law, 
orders for duplicate copies of the work done by the public 
bidder, and farmed these orders to that bidder who paid 
Mr. Barnes’ concern 25% on the job, that on the work 
obtained at public bidding the successful bidder paid Mr. 
Barnes’ concern 15%, that these payments were made to 
Mr. Barnes’ company because, to use the language of a wit- 
ness who knew the facts, “Mr. Barnes dictated where the 
printing goes and the Argus gives up to the Journal in order 
to obtain the printing.” ® 


It should be kept in mind that the investigation cited 
above covered but one up-state city and was the work of 


5 New York Evening Post, September 19, 1910. An article red 
W. T. A. (W. T. Arnt) on conditions in Albany. 
6 Op. cit., p. 119. 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 229 


what. the politicians would call a “political smelling com- 
mittee.” Furthermore, it should be remembered that “poli+ 
tics” probably played a larger part in the life of the Capital 
City than in the other up-state cities. In the middle eighties 
Theodore Roosevelt commented upon the temptations which 
confronted the legislators at Albany.” Moreover, Platt’s 
other field marshals may not have been able to build up 
such thorough going “organizations.” 8 

The outlook for Republican “Stalwarts” in New York 
City was always discouraging, at least in Platt’s time. It> 
seemed as though the more the city departments expanded 
and multiplied and the higher the city budget mounted, the 
more firmly entrenched became the Tammany Democracy 
on the one hand and the more influential became the “inde- 
pendent” reformers on the other. Since Platt was never 
able to “rule” the great metropolis, he was compelled to re- 
sort to “deals” with the Tammany leaders in order to keep 
his own regulars “satisfied.”® His “influence” at Albany 
was his principal stock in “trading with the enemy.” 

As far back as the days of the notorious Tweed, the idea 
of a “bi-partisan” police board had gained a foothold in 
New York City. Since the police “graft” was the most 
lucrative and the most coveted of all forms of “spoils” in 
the great city, the development of this idea in that depart- 
ment can be taken as typical of conditions in general. 
Abram S. Hewitt, mayor of New York in 1887 and 1888, 
described in the following words the police situation as he 
found it: “The police were managed by four men, who di- 
vided up the patronage into four parts. Two of them were 
Democrats, two of them were Republicans, and each one 


7 Century Mag., XII (1885), 820. 
8 This was the opinion of W. T. A., op. cit. 
9 Heaton, op. cit., pp. 108-9. 


230 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


- had his portion.” ?® At the ‘“Lexow” investigation no di- 
rect evidence was given to establish the complicity of the 
police commissioners in the general extortion, but John Mc- 
Clave, the Republican commissioner resigned after a search- 
ing and pointed examination.” 

The year 1894, it will be remembered, was a time of storm 
and stress for the Tammany organization. Out of the 
calamities of the enemy, Platt was able to wring two “places” 
on the police board.!@ As he naively put it, “Early in 1894 
the term of Commissioner Charles F. McLean, . . . (who 
was a Democrat), expired. Mayor Gilroy asked me to 
recommend a Republican to succeed him.” }* The other 
“place” was created by McClave’s resignation. The next 
year Platt sought to conserve these “places” by the enact- 
ment of a law which provided that not more than two of the 
four commissioners should “belong to the same political 
party” or “be of the same political opinion on state and 
national issues.”!4 Unfortunately, Mayor Strong violated 
his “trust” and used the newly enacted power of removal 
law to “lop off the heads” of the Platt place holders to make 
room for Theodore Roosevelt and Fred D. Grant as com- 
missioners.® Nothing could have been more fatal to Platt’s 
intrigues than Roosevelt’s fearless and rigid enforcement of 
the law. Platt’s anger was shown by his attempt to pass a 
law vesting the work of reorganizing the New York police 


10K. P. Wheeler, Sixty Years of American Life (New York, 
1917), p. 336, citing Mr. Hewitt’s speech of November 1900. 


11 See report for May 21, 1894, also New York Tribune, May 22, 
1894, and July 17, 1894. McClave resigned upon the latter date. 


12 Nation, November 15, 1894, LIX, 351. 
13 Op. cit., p. 268. 
14 Wilcox, loc. cit., p. 688. 


15 Platt, op. cit., pp. 272ff. At the time, Mayor Strong denied the 
existence of any “bargain;” New York Tribune, Dec. 1894, 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 231 


department in the governor.4® He had to console himself, 

however, with efforts to neutralize Roosevelt’s influence. 

This was done by bringing “pressure” upon Grant to dead- 

lock the board and by persuading the governor not to re* 

move the Democratic commissioner who was doing his best 

to perpetuate the old system.1? Mayor Van Wyck, whose 

election is described below, might have been expected to do 

better, but his interpretation of the words, “the same politi- 
cal party,’ was more distasteful than Mayor Strong’s had 

been and in despair Platt abandoned bi-partisan police board > 
idea. No wonder that he was pessimistic about New York, 
City politics! 

Contemporary observers seemed to believe that signs of a 
Platt-Croker alliance were most apparent around election 
time. Since the defeat of Tammany was likely only when 
all anti-Tammany elements were united, whenever the Re- 
publicans refused to join with the fusionists and ran a third 
ticket of their own, it was said that “Platt had made a bar- 
gain with Croker.” This was the case in 1886 when Roose- 
velt ran against Hewitt and George for mayor and in 1888 
when the Republicans ran Erhardt for mayor against 
Hewitt, independent Democrat, and Hugh J. Grant, the 
Tammany candidate.18 In 1892 when the fortunes of the 
Republican party were at a low ebb, it later came out that 
Platt had “knifed” the Republican ticket in New York City, 
supposedly to avoid being found outside the “breast- 
works.” 19 In 1894 he actually did co-operate with the other 


16 Governor Morton’s refusal to countenance this has been de- 
scribed above. 

17 J. B. Bishop, op. cit., I, 62-64 and Roosevelt, op. cit., pp. 170-72. 

18M. P. Breen, Thirty Years of New York Politics Up to Date 
(New York, 1899), p. 828. 

19 New York Tribune, October 30, 1897. The affidavit of a dis- 
gruntled Republican, who ran a paper devoted to the liquor inter= 
ests, claims that Platt directed the policy of the paper as follows: 


232 . BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


anti-Tammany elements, but immediately after the election 
he regretted it.2° It remained for his true “colors” to be 
displayed in the famous mayoralty campaign of 1897, the 
first under the newly created Greater New York charter 
with its “magnificent possibilities.” Early in the campaign, 
“Platt issued a statement to the press to the effect that he 
surest way to save the new city from Tammany misrule was 
by a union of all the anti-Tammany elements under the lead- 
ership of the Republican party.1 The Citizens’ Union, a 
permanent municipal-reform party, issued a platform which 
held that “good city government cannot be secured through 
the agency of existing parties organized upon national and 
state issues,” and that “it can be secured through the united 
action of citizens earnestly determined that the city shall be 
governed solely with reference to the welfare of the city and 
its citizens.” ® Seth Low, the well-to-do president of Colum- 
bia University, twice Republican mayor of Brooklyn, con- 
tended to run upon this platform. He was backed by such 
Republicans as Theodore Roosevelt, Elihu Root, Joseph H. 
Choate, and Nicholas Murray Butler, but the Republican 
party refused to endorse him and placed in the field a 
third candidate of its own choosing, Benjamin F. Tracy, the 
law partner of Platt’s son. The result was a sweeping vic- 
tory for the Tammany Hall Democracy, although the com- 
bined vote of Low and Tracy considerably exceeded that of 
the Tammany candidate, Van Wyck.? An up-state Republi- 
can newspaper commented upon the debacle as follows: 


“Now I tell you that I don’t think Einstein (the Republican candi- 
date) is in it. You better support the Tammany ticket.” 

20 New York Tribune, Dec. 15, 1894. 

1Tbid., May 8, 1897. 

2 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 359. 

3 The vote stood: Van Wyck, 233, 997; Tow 151, 540; Tracy, 
101, 540; George, 21, 693. 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 233 


It is due solely to the selfishness of Thomas C. Platt 
that Van Wyck, the representative of Tammany Hall, is té 
occupy the office of mayor in Greater New York during the 
next four years. Thousands of Republicans desired that 
their party should endorse the nomination of Seth Low but 
because Platt could exact no promises or pledges, the ma- 
chine was manipulated to prevent such endorsement being 
made.* 


Edward Lauterbach had made a frank confession that 
he and his Platt associates would rather see a Tammany 
man elected mayor than have a non-partisan succeed in get- 
ting office. Platt, himself, afterward admitted that “for the 
doctrine of non-partisanship in local elections” he had “the> 
sincerest and the profoundest contempt” and that “the suc- 
cess of such attempt would have a demoralizing effect on 
party organization.” It was thought at the time that an- 
other phase of ‘“‘costly” bargain between the two “machines” 
was the desire of both to retain the campaign “contribu- 
tions” of the public utility corporations which were directed 
by men who evidently preferred to pay for “protection’’. 
rather than to take a chance with a man like Low. Ina 
closing address Low had said that he stood for the principle 
that for every franchise or privilege granted to a corpora- 
tion or an individual the city should receive full and fair 
compensation. One of the admirers of Platt maintained 
that Low was ambitious for the presidency and the whole 
“citizens” movement was a “covert scheme to discredit the 
Republican organization.” 7 Such movements should be 
nipped in the bud. As James Bryce pointed out: 


4 Utica Press, November 5, 1897. The Press was an “independent” 
Republican newspaper. 

5 Nation, October 7, 1897, LXV, 269. See also Breen, op. cit., 
pp. 832-36: Breen holds that Platt was hoodwinked by one of his 
deputies who was close to the traction companies, 

6 New York Herald, November 1, 1897. 

7 Albany Evening Journal, November 5, 1897, 


234 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


To win without the help of the Republican machine would 
deal a heavy blow at city machines everywhere, for it would 
enable an example to be set in the greatest city of the Union 
of a municipal government relieved from all obligations to 
find places or contracts for its party friends, free to think 
of nothing but securing the best men for its service and 
making the best bargains for its taxpayers, free to study 
the interests of the people and the people alone.’ 


With every machine leader in the up-state watching him, 
what could Platt do? 

Before his rural constituents Platt liked to pose as the 
only possible “redeemer of the wicked city.”® From the 
brief survey that has been made of his career in New York 
City politics, it can hardly be said that he tried very hard to 
carry out that pose in practice. He tried to block the efforts 
of Roosevelt at reform in the police department. The fact 
that Colonel Waring gave the citizens of New York clean 
streets for the first time in many years meant nothing to 
him except that “no organization leader could get a place 
from him (Waring) during his entire administration.” 1° 
When the Tammany organization failed to “come through” 
with its part in a deal, he “struck for terms”’ by ordering a 
legislative investigation. These feeble efforts, however, 
made little impression either upon the power of feudalistic 
Tammany or upon the growing strength of the reformers. 


STATE PATRONAGE 


One of the most obvious interpretations of Platt’s pop- 


8 “The Mayoralty Election in New York,” Contemp. Rev. LXXII, 
759. 

9 See above p. 84. 

10 Op. cit., p. 293. 

117Tn answer to the criticisms, Platt wrote, “New York City is 
still a part of New York State, and just as much interested in a 
continuance of the wise and successful administration of state 
affairs as any other part of the state.” Autobiography, p. 364. 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 235 


ularity as a state convention manager was the fact that he 
had at his command the distribution of the enormous pat- 
ronage of the Empire State. When this interpretation is 
qualified by the consideration that he only remained in “sub- 
stantial control” of the state executive departments for 
about six years, there are no doubt a good many elements of 
truth in it. In the first year of Governor Morton’s admin- 
istration the total expenditures for the ordinary expenses of 
the government. exclusive of debt fund transactions 
amounted to about $10,500,000 and in the last year of Gov- 
ernor Roosevelt’s term these expenditures came to about 
$15,700,000. The peak of “extravagance” during the Platt’ 
era was reached in 1898 under Governor Black when $16,- 
700,000 was spent by the state government for its ordinary 
expenses.’* Including debt fund transactions, of which 
payments from the canal fund were the most important, the 
total expenditures of the state government reached the un-. 
precedented figure of $30,900,000 in that year.8 Consider- 
ing the $150,000,000 budget of Greater New York City for 
the same year,!* it is clear why Platt felt himself cramped 
as compared with Croker. Besides, Platt had to contend 
with “independent” executives. 

The term “ordinary expenses of the government,” as 
used above, included such items as the salaries and wages 
paid for personal services, office expenses, construction of 
public works and the maintenance of public institutions. 
Thus, the expenses of the governor and the other elective 
administrative officers came to about $400,000 annually dur- 


121—D. C. Sowers, The Financial History of New York State from 
1789 to 1912 (New York, 1914), Appendix, pp. 320-21, “Classified 
Expenditures.” 

13 [bid. 

14 New York City, Annual Report of the Comptroller, 1898, p. 95. 


236 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


ing the six years under discussion: the legislature spent on 
the average $1,200,000 a year to keep itself going and well 
supplied with printing and legal services; it cost over $800,- 
000 annually to keep the state prisons in proper order, and 
about $1,000,000 to maintain the state militia. The most 
considerable item of state expenditure was that for curative 
purposes, for state asylums, hospitals and reformatories, 
which reached a maximum point of $7,000,000 in 1897 al- 
though the services performed in that year were not as ex- 
tensive as those rendered in 1900 for $6,500,000.2® In 1897 
the regulative functions of the state also seemed unduly 
costly, in view of subsequent developments, and the canal 
expenditures became an open “scandal.” The gradual in- 
creases in the expenditures for educational, for agricultural 
and health purposes throughout the period is accounted for 
by the fact that the newer social and economic activities of 
the government were increasing in a correspondingsmeas- 
ure.?? ae 
How much of thesé disbursements was available for dis- 
tribution among the “Boys?” The New York Tribune 
pointed out one very important limitation in the following 
terms: 


Light-weight politicians have talked about the state 
patronage which Mr. Platt will have to pass out to his 
friends, but what is that around here? What does it 
amount to altogether? Just about $4,000,000. This in- 
cludes the governor’s salary, the salaries of the judiciary, 
members and employees of the legislature, heads of depart- 
ments, clerical help, commissioners, superintendents and all 
persons employed by the commonwealth. A large part of 


15 Traveling, office, legal expenses and salaries. The salaries 
ranged from $5,000 to $10,000. 

16 Nation, Aug. 14, 1902 for an interpretation of the “cost of 
state government” and Sowers, op. cit., for the figures, 

17 See above p. 200. 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 237 


it is useless for partisan purposes on account of the Civil 
Service Law. . . . Not only this, but look where thé 
state patronage is distributed. Most of it is at Albany, 150 
miles from New York and Brooklyn and of little practical 
use. ‘he greater part of the canal patronage goes to Re- 
publican counties up the state and will be swallowed up sO 
quickly as to be out of sight in a few weeks.¥® 


It is obvious that this was written from the standpoint 
of a“machine politician” in New York City, but neverthe- 
less the comments are of general significance, after certain 
qualifications have been made. In 1895 there were fifty- 
four hundred persons, not counting laborers, in the employ 
of the state. Of these, one third were in the class chosen by 
competitive examination, six per cent were unclassified or, 
exempt from examination and the remainder were in the 
non-competitive or “pass examination” class.9 The roster 
of state employees in 1900, the last year of Roosevelt’s ad- 
ministration, included eight thousand persons, of whom 
slightly more than one third were in the competitive class, 
sixteen per cent not subject to any examination and the 
remainder in the non-competitive class.2® In other words, 
in the former year 340, and in the latter year 1300, of the 
“choicest” positions in the state service were not subject to 
the merit system at all, while the great bulk of the persons 
seeking state jobs had to pass merely a non-competitive 
examination. 

The fact that one third of the state employees were pro- 
tected by the competitive system did, however, cause Platt 
and his lieutenants considerable trouble. Platt no doubt. 
regretted the indifferent attitude he had taken while the 


18 January 14, 1895. 

19 Thirteenth Report of New York Civil Service Commission 
(1895), passim. 

20 Eighteenth Report of the State Civil Service Commission, ate 
passim. 


238 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1894 were in- 
corporating the principles of the merit system into the fun- 
damental law of the state. At any rate his henchmen, like 
Assemblyman Nixon of Chautauqua and Assemblyman 
Howe of Tioga, were among the most vigorous opponents 
of any bill which carried out the constitutional mandate and 
it is significant that no such bill was passed in 1895.* 
Governor Morton’s appointment of a “practical” politician 
as civil service commissioner has already been commented 
upon. Platt also “stood by” while Governor Black gave his. 
approval to the bill “to place the civil service of the state at 
the mercy of machine politics,’ a bill which Republican 
newspapers regarded as “a perversion of Republican princi- 
ples and a betrayal of reform.” ® It is true that he favored 
the White bill which repealed the “Black Law” and put 
some “starch” back in the service, but this he probably did 
to please Roosevelt and to inconvenience Tammany, rather 
than from a fundamental change of heart.? 

The actual administration of the Civil Service Law can 
best be studied by following the history of the department 
of public works which during these years happened to be 
subjected to several investigations, official and unofficial. 
The New York Civil Service Reform Association found 
that of the 1500 men employed by Superintendent Aldridge 
to carry out the $9,000,000 canal improvement, only 200 
were held subject to classification, that the total number of 
competitive appointments made during two years was only 
thirty-eight, and that persons had been appointed to clerical 
positions under title of mechanical class in order to secure 

1 Good Government, September 15, 1895, XIV, 208. 

2Tbid., June 15, 1897, XVI, 76; “The Press on Governor Black’s 
Memorandum.” 

3 This is the writer’s interpretation. By the time Roosevelt be- 


came governor, most of the political workers had been “placed.” 
Civil service rules might have helped to keep them in, 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 239 


their exemption from examination.* At first Superintend- 
ent Aldridge openly defied the rules promulgated by the 
governor including his department, and he made fifty-one 
appointments without reference to the Civil Service Com- 
mission but he was checked in this move by the highest court 
of the state which held that the merit principle of the con- 
stitution was operative without action on the part of the 
legislature. A typical example of the sort of thing that 
was done with the canal fund is given in the following quo- 
tation from the report of an investigating commission ap- 
pointed by Governor Black in 1898: 


On January 1, 1898 on account of a change in the admin- 
istration of the city government of Rochester, many em- 
ployees lost their places; of these ten or fifteen were ap- 
pointed inspectors on the canal work without civil service 
examination. The evidence shows that it must have been 
known at the time of their appointment that some of these 
temporary appointees were not competent to properly dis- 
charge the duties of inspectors, and it follows that the money 
paid for their services was not properly expended.® 


It was also shown by this same commission that great 
gangs of inspectors were employed in the season of open 
navigation when there was comparatively little use for 
them. There is little wonder that Aldridge was so popular’ 
with the “Boys” at the State Convention of 1896! Yet 
Roosevelt thought the evidence against Aldridge insufficient 
to warrant a prosecution. 

But the canal improvement was not the only branch of 
the state service that furnished “places” for the expectant 
party workers. As a member of the reorganized Capitol 


4 Good Government, September 15, 1896, XV, 103. 

5 People ex rel. McClelland v. Roberts, Comptroller, 13 Misc. Rp. 
448, 91 Hun, 104. 

6 Report of the Commission Appointed by the Governor pursuant 
to Chapter 15 of the Laws of 1598, p. 34. 


240 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


Commission, Aldridge was instrumental in turning out some 
skilled workmen in order to make room for some “good 
Platt men.” 7 Commissioner Lyman, of the Excise Depart- 
ment created by the Raines liquor law of 1896, refused at 
first to appoint some of his special “confidential” agents on 
the basis of competitive examinations, but, like Aldridge, he 
was blocked by the courts in his efforts to reward the “faith- 
ful.”’® There was some hope left, however, for the “Black 
Law” and its accompanying rules provided that the writ- 
ten examinations should only count one-half in the final 
rating and that “experience, character, tact, and even 
muscle” should be considered by the appointing officer. 
Under this new administration of the merit system, Super- 
‘intendent of Insurance Payn and Superintendent of Public 
Works Aldridge were given leeway for their “operations,” ® 
and, as Platt expressed it, there was “ ‘starchless’ civil 
service, which put practically every Democratic office-holder 
out and installed a Republican organization man in his 
job.” #° It was not to be expected that even a reform gover- 
nor like Roosevelt would remove many of these -Republi- 
cans. 

It should not be supposed from the two decisions of the 
New York courts cited above, which involved the interpre- 
tation of the merit principle embodied in the state constitu- 
tion, that the judges were entirely impervious to the sorts of 
pressures that were brought to bear upon other state officers. 
To be sure they were fortified by longer terms ™ and by 


7 Good Government, August 15, 1895, XIV, 197. 

8 People ex rel. Sweet v Lyman, 157 N. Y. 368 (1898). Over half 
of the “confidential” appointees who did finally take the “pass ex- 
amination” failed. See the Nation, May 28, 1896. 

8 Good Government, July 15, 1897, XVI, 82-83. 

10 Alexander, Four Famous New Yorkers, p. 288-89. 

11 County judges were elected for six years, supreme court jus- 
tices and judges on the Court of Appeals for fourteen years, Con- 
stitution, Article VI. 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 241 


traditions of independence, but they were nominated and 
elected by the same party machinery which had charge of 
the selection of the other state officers. Roosevelt discov- 
ered this when, as a legislator, he tried to bring about the 
impeachment of a judge. Although Platt was clever enough 
not to antagonize the sentiment of the legal profession in 
the brazen way that Hill and Croker did, there were many 
“sood Republicans” who found their way to the bench. 
Platt mentions with pride in his Autobiography some of the 
“able jurists” that were “elevated by the organization” of 
which he was “leader.” ® His letter to Governor Roosevelt 
regarding the appointment of an “old time Republican” to a 
vacancy in a county judgeship has already been given. A 
delegate to the Constitutional Convention of 1915, a “plain 
country lawyer,’ said that he had found the judges “hu- 
man,” that he had seen them “jack up their salaries by in- 
tense persistent application to the legislature” and apply 
for private secretaryships which were filled with their “rela- 
tives.” 1* As to the decisions of the judges, the “organiza- 
tion” could expect little. By one decision, Platt, himself 
had been ousted from the office of New York quarantine 
commissioner.% On the other hand, Roosevelt found the 
New York courts impervious to some social reforms. He 
bitterly resented a decision which annulled a favorite tene- 
ment house law of his.*° In 1897 when the Court of Ap- 
peals, the highest court in the state, held that the machinery 
for conducting civil service examinations was entirely de- 


12 The Maynard incident in 1893 and the Daly incident in 1898. 
18 Pp. 511-12. 

14 Record (unrevised), III, 2523. 

15 People v. Platt, 3 New York Supp. 367. 


16 in the Matter of the Application of Peter Jacobs, 98 New 
York, 98. 
16 


242 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


pendent for its existence upon laws passed by the legisla- 
ture,!” other reformers had their complaints: 


In achieving this triumph, the enemies of civil service re- 
form have had to get an apparently partisan construction of 
the constitution unsupported by the weight of judicial au- 
thority. Judges Haight, Bartlett, Martin and Vann, all 
Republicans, have overruled Judges Gray, Andrews and 
O’Brien, and all the Judges of the Appellate Division, as 
well as the trial judge, on a point so simple that a child can 
understand it; when the constitution says that no man shall 
shall be appointed to office except by competition, if compe- 
tition is “practicable,” the courts, and not the legislature, or 
the governor, or the mayors are to decide whether it is prac- 
tical in view of the duties which the office has to perform.'® 


In other words, the reformers thought that this decision 
made the constitutional mandate upon the merit system a 
pious recommendation which could be safely ignored by 
passing such an act as the “Black Law” taking the “starch” 
out of the civil service. The legal theories of this same 
tribunal regarding the determination of party “regularity” 
also fitted in with the exigencies of Platt’s position as a 
political manager, for in a famous case it held that such 
matters were determined finally and conclusively by the 
highest authorities in the party.!® Finally, it is well estab- 
lished that the “organization” profited from the way in 
which the judges regulated the appointment and work of 
certain official referees.” 

_. Offices were not the only “plums” which could be plucked 
from the patronage tree furnished by the state government. 


MW Chittenden v. Wurster, 152 New York, 345 (1897). 

18 The Nation, April 29, 1897. 

197 the matter of Fairchild, 151 New York, 359, cited and ex- 
plained in F. Goodnow, Politics and Administration (New York, 
1900), pp. 210ff. 

20 For the principal abuses, see Sowers, of. cit., pp. 252-54, “Courts 
and Trust Funds,” 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 243 


The report of Governor Black’s commission to investigate 
the canal improvement, which has been cited above, con- 
tained a reference to “the traditions and habits of the canal, 
contractors” as a “power for evil which required continual 
watchfulness to oppose.”? According to the report, where 
some of the resident engineers were “watchful,” they were 
“snubbed and overruled” by the state engineer. Improper 
classification of the material excavated was the chief abuse 
the commission found in the work done by the contractors. 
For instance, on the middle division, a “very large propor- 
tion of the material returned as rock,’ which was paid for 
at the rate of $1.25 per cubic yard, was “earth under the 
specifications” and should have received but 24 cents per 
cubic yard.2, The commission concluded that in this and in 
other ways “not less than $1,000,000 had been “improperly 
expended.” But what was the “political” significance of 
this manipulation of accounts in favor of certain contrac- 
tors? The following extract from the report of the com- 
mittee will help to explain: 


In investigating the subject of mucking we discovered a 
clearly deliberate abuse of the canal work for political pur-». 
poses. On two contracts in and near the city of Rochester 


the contractors were induced to accept and put upon their_ 3 


force men who came to them with “tickets” from office- 
holders in the city of Rochester. . . . The work which 
they did was to a great extent unnecessary.* 


It was the report of this commission that Platt had in 
mind when he said, “Already the canal appropriations were 
giving us trouble.” In his campaign speeches Roosevelt 
said that if any wrong had been done, those responsible for 

10Op. cit., p. 9. 

2 Ibid., p. 83. 

3 [bid., p. 137. The report of this commission is analyzed in the 


Nation, August 11, 1898, LXVII, 106. 
4Op. cit., p. 54. 


244 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


it would be prosecuted, but the counsel he appointed for that 
purpose as governor decided not to institute criminal pro- 
ceedings because the officials involved were within the “wide 
discretionary” powers granted to them by a law passed in 
1896.5 Little wonder that Aldridge gained the reputation 
for being a “shrewd politician.” 

The contracts for state printing were let to publishing 
houses ‘in Albany and New York, which, according to some 
observers, had propensities not unlike those of the canal 
contractors. At any rate the “Bayne Committee” charged 
that Mr. Barnes’ company “had obtained unlawfully from 
the state the sum of $13,504 . . . on the pretext of fur- 
nishing work which his concern had not done.’® That 
there were difficulties in the printing game is indicated by 
the following bitter complaint of Barnes to Platt, dated July 
14, 1899: “For six years men assumed to be. friendly to 
you have systematically prevented me from getting any- 
thing in the printing line in Albany.” ’ That some of these 
difficulties must have been absolved some five months later 
is suggested by a letter Barnes wrote to Roosevelt, which 
is given below: 


THE JOURNAL CoMPANY, PUBLISHERS 
WILLIAM BARNES, JR. PRESIDENT 
Albany, New York, 
December 22, 1899. 
DEAR GOVERNOR: 
It is rumored that you contemplate in your message ad- 
vising the establishing of a state printing house. 
_ I write you this because I presume that your message will 
be a matter discussed between you and our friends tomor- 


5 Report (Counsel appointed by the governor to prosecute cer- 
tain state officers for alleged criminal practices in carrying out the 
canal improvements under chapters 79 of Laws 1895 and 794, 
Laws of 1896). 

6 Op. cit., p. 119. 

7 Barnes v. Roosevelt, p. 1161. 

11 Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 291. 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 245 


row. It is not my desire to intrude my personal matters 
upon you, but I wish merely to state the fact that the estab- 
lishment of a state printing house here would be a serious 
if not fatal blow to me financially. 
Very truly yours, 
WILLIAM Barnes, Jr.® 
It appeared in the “Bayne Committee” report of 1911 and 
in the Barnes-Roosevelt libel suit of 1915 that Barnes had. 
owned for some time a large block of stock in the J. B, 
Lyon Company which had extensive business relations with 
the state. It was probably the operations of this company 
as well as those of his own that he had in mind when he 
wrote about the “fatal blow.’ His letter did not deter 
Roosevelt from advocating a state printing house in his mes- 
sage, but the legislature did not act upon that recommenda- 
tion.® 
Certain of the legislators, whose expenses ran beyond the 
$1,500 annual salary and other usual perquisites of a New 
York law maker, were able to make both ends meet in vari- 
ous and sundry ways. Jotham P. Allds, one of the “faith- 
ful,” the Assembly floor leader while Roosevelt was gover- 
nor, furnishes as good an example as can be had. When 
this solon was handed a thick envelope by the agent of the 
bridge companies in 1901, it is reputed that he said, “Guess 
it’s all right, Conger, it feels good.” }® Allds was a mem- 
ber of the Assembly Committee on Public Lands and Fores- 
try in the year 1896 and he learned so much upon this com- 
mittee that the next year he was hired as an attorney for 
the State Forest Commission at a stipend of about $3,000. 
Thus in the course of several years he received from the 


8 Ibid., p. 335. 

9 Messages, X, 123. 

10 The “Allds” Investigation, p. 335. 
41 [bid., p. 1327, 


246 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


state in attorney’s fees about $16,000 in addition to his reg- 
ular salary as legislator. He also accepted a retainer of 
$6,000 from the Argus Company “for no apparent reason 
unless it was for promoting a bill for the Argus Company 
against the state.” }* Speaker Nixon’s name was also in- 
volved in the Allds investigation. It was said that he ex- 
torted as much from the bridge companies as Allds did in 
1901. This and other evidence seemed to reveal the exist- 
ence of a legislative cabal which made money by blackmail- 
ing the corporations.® 

Legislative business of a decorous nature, was handled 
by the law firm of Tracy, Boardman and Platt, the first 
mentioned name standing for none other than Benjamin F. 
Tracy and the last for Frank H. Platt, one of Platt’s sons 
who showed great interest in politics. The counsel for the 
“Fassett” investigating committee was this “well known” 
law firm. When General Tracy became secretary of the 
navy, he transferred all his legal business to this firm, which 
thus became heir among other things to the Ramapo matter. 
The Ramapo scheme was called a “plot of water-right and 
water-option owners to exploit’? New York City through a 
“water system half public-owned and half privately con- 
trolled,” and it caused a great uproar when it was later spon- 
sored by Tammany Hall.4* Before Tammany Hall had be- 
come “interested,” General Tracy had cabled to Governor 
Morton asking him to sign the bill which gave this corpora- 
tion its powers. That consent was given. The “family 
law firm” was not so fortunate in another matter, namely, 
the Astoria gas “scandal,” for the bill which was designed 


2T yons Republican, April 1, 1910. 

18 Report, pp. 676, 681. See below, p. 311. 

14 Heaton, op. cit., p. 167. 

15 Assembly Doc. 1900, No. 26, p. 4660. (Report of the special 
committee to investigate the public offices and departments of the 
city of New York). The so-called “Mazet” committee. 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 247 


to confer certain privileges upon this corporation failed to 
pass the Senate.!® However, the services of the firm were 
of some value, for later on in the same year that this bill 
failed it took charge of the land patent forwarded by Gov- 
ernor Roosevelt which conveyed to the Astoria Company 
certain lands under water at the usual rate.!7 When Rich- 
ard Croker was hard pressed on the witness stand by the 
counsel of the “Mazet’? committee of 1899, he blurted out 
the following: 


The gentleman who put you here to examine us, go and 
examine his firm. They are at the bottom of all the cor- 
ruption in the city; there is more corruption in that firm 
than any where else. They are retained by mostly all the 
corporations in this city. You go and examine their firm; 
now, be fair, bring their books here.}8 


Platt had another son, who as vice-president of the Fidel- 
ity and Deposit Company of Maryland, was interested in the 
bonding business. It also appeared that Charles Raines, a 
son of “Uncle” John Raines, was also deeply interested in 
the same company.!® The connection is perhaps clear when 
it is remembered that the Raines Liquor Tax Law required 
that the liquor dealers should bond themselves for the strict 
observance of the law. The above mentioned surety com- 
pany did a “roaring business” in furnishing the bonds re- 
quired by the State Excise Department.?® The comptroller 
of New York City required two sureties on each city con- 
tract, and here, in co-operation with the “Croker” Surety 
and Bond Company, the “Platt” company found an excel- 


16 New York Tribune, March 26, 1899. 

17 New York Tribune, December 27 and 28, 1890. No aspersions 
on Roosevelt are here intended. : 

18 Report, I, 451. 

19 Nation, April 9, 1896, 

20 [bid,, May 7, 1896, 


248 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


lent field for its operation.’ Last but not least, was the 
“roaring business” which the Fidelity and Deposit Com- 
pany did in the supplying of bonds required of the canal 
contractors.? 

While Governor Roosevelt was writing books and making 
campaign speeches in the west, Senator Platt remained in 
New York working night and day with the buried wires 
which connected him with the local leaders. A diligent 
political manager could pick up some crumbs even under a 
reform governor. 


FEDERAL PATRONAGE 


Because of the location of the largest post office and the 
largest custom house of the country in New York City, the 
federal patronage played a large part in the politics of the 
state during the latter half of the nineteenth century. Since 
the Republican party was almost in continuous control of 
the government at Washingtoon during that time, the “fed- 
eral crowd” constituted one of the controlling factors in 
Republican state conventions. The civil servants of the 
United States government who held their legal residences in 
the state of New York made up a considerable political 
army. At the end of. President Harrison’s administration 
there were over eight thousand post office employees alone 
to say nothing of the two thousand custom-house workers 3 
and the some six hundred employees of other branches of 
the Treasury Department. The Brooklyn Navy Yard pro- 
vided jobs for at least sixteen thousand men.* All told 
there must have been over fifteen thousand New Yorkers 


1Mazet Committee, Report, I, 537. 

2 Canal Commission, Report, Appendix. 

3 Ninth Report of the United States Civil Service Commission, 
1891-02, “Civil List,” pp 291-92. 

#United States Civil Service Commission, The Executive Civil 
Service of the United States, 1896, p. 334. 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 249 


holding positions under the federal government, a consider- 
able portion of whom had grateful feelings toward the chief 
dispenser of political favors in the Empire State. 

As in the state civil service so in the federal civil service, 
the merit system made many offices useless for partisan pur- 
poses. It was one of the ironies of fate that in 1889 when 
Platt began to distribute some of the federal patronage 
through Senator Hiscock, Theodore Roosevelt was made 
civil service commissioner. Roosevelt began at once to 
make a searching investigation of the New York Custom- 
house and some of the New York post offices.2 This ac- 
tion was a bitter reminder to Platt of former humiliations 
connected with the New York Custom-house. On _ the 
other hand, some of the most sought for and the most re- 
sponsible positions in the federal offices in New York were 
“unclassified” or excepted from the rules requiring com- 
petitive entrance examinations. It was these posts that the 
“independent journalist” had in mind when he wrote to 
President Harrison; “On the Republican side the president, 
in cordial alliance with “Tom Platt’ is making arrangements 
to turn over all the federal offices and patronage to the 
‘Boys’ for the purpose of building up a Republican machine 
which shall carry everything before it.’® Platt was a dif- 
ficult man to please: he later called Harrison a “pouter 
pigeon” and the “White-House Iceberg” on the ground that 
as president he “either forgot or ignored the men most re- 
sponsible for his victory.”* The personnel of Republican 
state conventions in the early nineties, however, furnished 
proof that neither Harrison’s inaction nor Roosevelt’s ac- 


5 Bishop, Theodore Roosevelt and His Time, I, 46-47. 

6 Nation, April 11, 1889, p. 295. See also Alexander, Four Famous 
New Yorkers, p. 180. 

70, cit, pp. 210, 215, 252. 


250 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


tion eliminated the influence of the federal office holders 
upon state politics. 

In 1897 Platt did not have to contend with Roosevelt as 
civil service commissioner nor did he have to invoke the 
aid of the rule of “senatorial courtesy” through another. 
He found McKinley the “most tender-hearted man” in poli- 
tics, who, as president, invariably when an office was to be 
filled requested that he, as chief of the organization and 
United States senator, submit his choice. That choice, so 
Platt testifies, became the president’s except in rare cases.® 
Of this situation the reform journalist made the following 
complaint: “The president, by allying himself with Platt 
and his rotten machine at this time, has done all that he 
could to prevent the success of honest government for this 
city.’® During McKinley’s administration, Platt built up 
an organization which continued to be a factor in state poli- 
tics during Roosevelt’s two administrations as president of 
the United States. 

Outside of the selection of the cabinet officers, the presi- 
dent’s appointments to the diplomatic service probably at- 
tracted the most attention. During the period of Platt’s 
leadership both the diplomatic and consular services were 
beyond the pale of the Civil Service Law. It is likely that 
on this account Platt did not regret his support of Blaine in 
1884 when Blaine, as secretary of state in 1889, was be- 
sieged by New York politicians who wanted to “see the 
world.” New York was fairly well represented in the 
foreign service during Harrison’s administration. White- 
law Reid, the owner and editor of the New York Tribune, 
was appointed minister to France,!® Andrew D. White, 


8 Tbid., p. 398. 

8 July 8, 1897, LXV, 22. | 

10 Reid’s able biographer (Cortissoz, op. cit., II, 121-25) claims 
that Reid did not seek public preferment. 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 251 


minister to Russia,!! “Fred.” D. Grant,” minister to Austria, 
to say nothing of appointments to posts of lesser impor- 
tance. While Platt may not have been the “determining”, 
force in any one of these appointments, it is significant that 
he himself was offered the Spanish mission in 1890 which 
he declined ostensibly because of “numerous business en- 
gagements” but in reality, as he later claimed, because he 
suspected that Harrison was trying to “get him out of the 
country.” 28 Under McKinley, New York certainly did not 
fare worse as far as the important embassies were con- 
cerned; with Choate in London, Porter in Paris, White in 
Germany, and Woodford in Madrid, few could complain 
that New York was under represented abroad. It is true 
that Senator Platt consented to Choate’s appointment only 
because he hated the suggestion of Reid’s appointment," 
but Woodford can be regarded as a “stalwart.” © 

The Post Office Department was the center attraction for 
a state party manager because it furnished “rewards,” large 
in the aggregate and widely distributed. While the main 
body of the postal employees came under the civil service 
rules, the thirty-five hundred or so postmasterships in New. 
York were “exempt” during the time that Platt was most RE 
actively concerned in their distribution. Under Harrison, 
Platt had a “voice” in the selection of postmasters through 
Senator Hiscock and the New York congressmen. He 
probably did not complain when President Harrison held up 
the extension of the civil service rules to the railway mail 


11 Appointed in 1892. 
12 One of Platt’s close friends (the son of U. S. Grant). 


13 Op. cit., pp. 208-9. The letters showing the offer and its re 
jection are given. 


14T. G. Strong, Joseph H. Choate (New York. 1917), p. 81. Re- 
port of conversation with Choate. 


15 He presided over state conventions, 


252 . BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


service,!® nor is it likely that he objected to the displacement 
of the efficient H. G. Pearson by the “faithful” Van Coit in 
tthe New York City postmastership.17 Postmaster General 
Wanamaker, whose appointment was “suggested” by M. S. 
Quay, together with [irst Assistant Postmaster General 
Clarkson, Platt’s friend from Indiana, were able to find 
quite a few “places” for “worthy” Republicans.8 At least 
three-fifths of the presidential postmasterships were “ro- 
tated” in the proper direction. These changes were beyond 
the scope of Civil Service Commissioner Roosevelt’s power. 
McKinley’s postmaster general was another “man from 
Pennsylvania,” so it is not impossible to suppose that he 
played his part, especially when he was aided by the Presi- 
dent’s “liberal” order of April 29, 1899.48 Under this latter 
régime, Van Cott was restored to his old place in New York 
City, and Platt, as United States senator, was able to keep a 
somewhat stricter system of accounting. 

The Treasury Department was next in importance from 
the standpoint of New York “organization” Republicans. 
This was one of the reasons why Platt, himself, had sought 
to be the head of this department in 1889. The New York: 
Custom-house contained some of the richest “plums” in the 
state and the collectors of internal revenue were exempt un- 
til the middle of the nineties when President Cleveland put 
them under the rules. Although the displacement of Silas 
Burt from his position at the head of the New York Cus- 
tom-house alienated the reformers, Collector Erhardt, his 
successor proved “unacceptable” to the organization. One 


16C, R. Fish, Civil Service and Patronage (New York, 1905), 
Dui eons 

17 Nation, May 23, 1889. See also W. D. Foulke, Fighting the 
Spoilsmen (New York, 1919), p. 51. 

18 Foulke, op. cit., p. 60. 

19 House Documents, Fifty-fifth Congress, First Session, No. 1, 
D. eK 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 253 


of ihe reason’s for Erhardt’s failure to please Platt and the 
organization is revealed in the following explanation he. 
gave for his resignation in 1891: 


I have resigned because the collector has been reduced 
to a position where he is no longer an independent officer 
with authority commensurate with his responsibility. 

The recent policy of the Treasury Department has been 
to control the details of the customs administration at the’ 
port of New York from Washington, at the dictation of a 
private individual having no official responsibility. The 
collector is practically deprived of power and control, while 
he is left subject to all responsibility. The office is no longer’ 
independent, and I am. Therefore we have separated.?” ' 


The “private individual” was, of course, Thomas C, 
Platt and among the “details” was the removal or resigna* 
tion of some three hundred and seventy-five employees who. 
were for the most part Democrats.1_ This was another 
change which Roosevelt was powerless to prevent. J. 
Sloat Fassett was then made collector of the port of New 
York, and he held the position until he was nominated for 
governor two months later when Francis Hendricks’ name 
was sent in and confirmed for the position.? Judging from 
his actions, President McKinley did not neglect the interests 
of the Manager-Senator in the New York offices of the 
Treasury Department, for George R. Bidwell, a “man who 
represented nothing but the machine which Platt had built 
up,’ 8 was appointed collector and the total number of ex- 
cepted places was increased.* 

The work of acting as an employment agent for a politi- 


20 Foulke, op. cit., p. 291. 

1 Seventh Report of the Civil Service Commission, 1889-1890, p. 
10. See also the Nation, August 6, 1891. 

2 Nation, September 24, 1891, LIII, 226. 

3/bid., July 8, 1897; Platt, op. cit., p. 398. 

4 Eighteenth Report of the Civil Service Commission, 1900-1901, 
p. 564. 


254 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


cal party was not always pleasant, and it was probably the 
irksomeness of this task that led Benjamin F. Tracy, secre- 
tary of the navy under President Harrison, to adopt a regis- 
tration system for the employees of the navy yards.® It is 
surprising that such a step was taken by one so close to 
Platt, but responsibility sobers some party men and Gen- 
eral Tracy had other things to consider besides the “good of 
the organization.” John D. Long, McKinley’s secretary 
of the navy, presented another problem which possibly 
caused Platt some embarrassment. Theodore Roosevelt’s 
name was presented by Senator Lodge and others for the 
position of first assistant secretary of the navy, and Platt 
was asked to approve the selection. Roosevelt, the man 
who had caused him so much trouble as civil service com- 
missioner and police commissioner, could he ever get rid 
of this “disturbing element’? After listening to “Jack’’ 
Astor’s plea, Platt reasoned that Roosevelt was ‘“‘not essen- 
tially harmful” and could “probably do less harm to the or- 
ganization as assistant secretary of the navy than in any 
other office that could be named.” The desired consent of 
the Republican Senator from New York was given.® 

In 1890 and 1900 the Department of the Interior became 
a matter of prime importance to Thomas C. Platt, for in 
those years a federal census was taken, and the vast army 
of workers which was required to do this work was not 
_then under the civil service rules. In 1890 Platt’s expecta- 
tions with reference to the Census Office as a source of 
“gifts” began to rise when Robert P. Porter, editor of the 


5 Fish, op. cit., p. 224. 

6 For Lodge’s part in this appointment, see Bishop, op. cit., I, 
70-72. In an addenda to Platt’s Autobiography, (pages 539-41), a 
most interesting account of the way Platt “got Roosevelt a Federal 
Job” which the latter “needed to make both ends meet.” “Jack” 
Astor acted as Roosevelt’s spokesman and the significant thing tc 
aoe that McKinley had asked that he (the Senator) be “con. 
sulted.’ 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 255 


New York Press, a “stalwart”? Republican organ, was ap- 

‘ ay 
pointed as superintendent of the census.? The following 
circular, sent to the district leaders by C. H. Murray, the 
supervisor for New York City, shows how appointments 
were made to this important service: 


Dear Sir: You will please forward to this office a list 
of the applicants that the Republican organization of your 
district desires to have named as census enumerators. This 
list must be sent here on or before April 1st.® 


Grave scandals developed in the taking of this census, 
especially in New York City. The National Civil Service 
Reform League made an investigation of the enumeration 
of the population of that Democratic stronghold and con- 
cluded that the work was open to the suspicion of partisan 
considerations chief of which was the apparent intention of> 
reducing the representation of New York City in Congress? 
Another way in which the census enumerators were in- 
structed to do political work is illustrated by the following 
letter written by Congressman John Raines in ignorance as. 
he claimed of the law imposing secrecy: | 


My Dear Stir: As it is quite likely that you will in a 
few days be appointed enumerator for your district, I write 
you this in the strictest confidence. I would like very much 
that you should take the trouble, before you make your re> 
port to the supervisor of the census, and after you have 
taken all the names in your district, to copy in a small book 
the name and post office address of every voter on the list: 
After you have done so, I wish you to send the book to me 
at Canandaigua. I ask you to do this as a personal favor 
and to make no mention of the matter to anyone. What I 
want is a full list of all the voters in your enumeration dis- 


7 Nation, May 23, 1889. 
8 Foulke, op. cit., p. 66. 
9 Jbid., p. 68. 


256 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


trict. Will you please treat this matter as strictly confi- 
dential ? 1° 

Although fairly accurate, the Twelfth Census was ‘not 
altogether free from the sort of influences that had rendered 
the Eleventh Census uncertain. President McKinley ap- 
pointed Governor Merriam, of Minnesota, director, largely 
for political reasons, and Merriam considered for appoint- 
ments only those who had been recommended to him by 
congressmen.!! 

The federal judiciary also did not escape from the pres- 
sures which the Republican state organization brought to 
bear upon the other branches of the federal government. 
When President McKinley appointed Asa W. Tenney 
United States circuit judge of the Eastern District of New 
York, the Nation made the following comment: “Mr. Ten- 
ney 1s a working politician of the ‘Wheelhorse’ type, whose 
chief claim to the position is a lifetime of ‘loyal devotion to 
the party.’”?* Much wider opposition was encountered 
when State Committeeman John R. Hazel, of Buffalo, was 
recommended for a position upon the federal bench. A 
Republican paper, like the New York Tribune, noted with 
alarm “Mr. Hazel’s own patent lack of judicial qualities” 
and denounced the appointment as a “perversion” of a fed- 
eral judgeship to the use of a “Senatorial Patronage Trust” 
of which Platt and Depew were the most conspicuous bene- 
ficiaries.1% Since the federal judges held their offices for 
life, there were not many of them to appoint during the 
period of Platt’s leadership, but those who were on the 
bench could serve their party organization in many ways, 
among which was the appointment of prominent Republi- 


10 /bid., p. 66, note. 

11 [bid., pp. 76-77. 

12 July 8, 1897, LXV, 22. 

13 May 29 and June 4, 1900. 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 254 


cans to “fat”? receiverships. For example, State Com- 
mitteeman Dunn was made receiver for the Binghamton 
General Electric Company in 1893 and two years later he 
‘was made receiver for the Merchants’ Bank of Bingham- 
ton.4* Of course it cannot be charged that the Judge made 
these appointments because of Colonel Dunn’s political im- 
portance, nor can it be charged Judge Wallace that he ap- 
pointed Thomas C. Platt as receiver for the New York and’ 
New England Railroad at the request of the law firm of 
Tracy, Boardman and Platt because it was “good poli- 
tics.” © It only appeared that Republicans received theirs 
fair share of such desirable positions. 

There were many other expenditures of the federal gov- 
ernment, a portion of which were distributed in accoraance . 
with the principle, “To the victors belong the spoils.” The 
list would include such items as disbursements for veterans, 
pensions, payment to river and harbor contractors, costs of 
constructing and maintaining public buildings, money spent 
in erecting fortifications, expenditures for public printing, 
payments to the railroad companies for the transportation 
of the mails, and purchases of supplies for the army, the 
navy, the Post Office Department, and the other branches of* 
the federal government. It is impossible to estimate how 
much of these expenditures was “pork” and it is equally’ 
difficult to ascertain what was the share of the Empire State.. 
Only a few suggestions can be made. The scandals in con- 
nection with purchases made by the War Department in the 
Spanish-American War denounced so vigorously by Roose- 
velt occurred under Secretary Alger, who was defended 
and supported by Senator Platt. One authority upon our. 


14 Binghamton Press and Leader, October 20, 1911. In 1909 
Dunn was made receiver for the Hudson Valley Power Companies 
by Judge Ray, one of his former political lieutenants. 

15 New York Tribune, December 28, 1893. 

17 


258 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


national government estimated that in 1908, the last year 
that Senator Platt was chairman of the Committee on Print- 
ing, many millions of dollars could have been saved by 
ordinary precautions against waste.?® It is not here charged 
_that Senator Platt administered the affairs of this committee 
“in a corrupt manner,!” but rather that the traditions of the 
committee fostered inefficiency and extravagance. And so 
with the other appropriations, each Republican congress- 
-man from New York was expected to “take care of his con- 
stituents,” and if he failed to acquire facility in the art of 
“log rolling” he was eliminated by that process commonly 
called, the “survival of the fittest.” 

In 1903 several charges were made that frauds had been 
committed in the Post Office Department during the McKin- 
ley administration. Ina letter to Senator Lodge, under date 
of September 30, 1903, President Roosevelt described one 
of these alleged frauds as follows: 


I had a very ugly time over the indictment of a State Sen- 
ator of New York. He is a close personal, political and 
business friend of the Republican State Chairman, and of 
the State Comptroller. The Chairman is a heavy stockhold- 
er in the concern in behalf of which the crookedness was 
done, and he is very naturally bitter against me. Whether 
he himself was cognizant of the wrong-doing or not, I can- 
not say. It is greatly to be regretted that he is chairman of 
the state committee. The Comptroller came down to see 
me to explain that if the Senator were indicted it was his 
judgment that we should certainly lose the state next fall.%% 


The chairman of the state committee at this time was 
George W. Dunn, the state senator from Dunn’s district 


16H. J. Ford, The Cost of Our National Government (New York 
1910), p. 97. 

17 A. H. Lewis, “The Lesson of Platt,” Cosmopolitan Mag., XL 
(1906), 644. Lewis accused Platt of attempted favoritism. 

18 Bishop, op. cit., I, 254. 


Bc 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 259 


was George E. Green, former mayor of Binghamton, and _ 
the state comptroller was Nathan L. Miller, also from 
Dunn’s senatorial district.% The alleged fraud was “con- 
spiracy” between the purchasing officer of the post office and 
a firm manufacturing time checkers. George E. Green was 
acquitted upon two indictments but he lost all in lawyers’ 
fees and he also lost his health.2® No insinuations are here 
intended, the simple purpose being to show that Platt’s field 
marshals did have commercial relations with the federal’ 
government. 

Platt also did not refuse to do business with the depart-. 
ments of the federal government. As the Nation cynically 
put it: 


“Something equally as good” to Tom Platt as a seat in the 
Cabinet is a contract with the Treasury Department making 
the United States Express Company (T. C. Platt, presi- 
dent) the exclusive agent of the government for the trans- 
portation of all its moneys throughout the United States, 
and assigning to said express company rooms in the Treas- 
ury Department building at Washington for the transaction 
of their pa 


This contract was dated April 21, 1889, and it supplanted 
a contract which the department had made with the Adams 
Express Company during President Grant’s administration: 
It was pointed out later by a magazine writer that this was 
an “exceedingly profitable contract” and that Platt enforced 
it whether or not he actually carried the money, but it was 
not shown that the United States Express Company re- 


19 Legislative Manual, 1903. Miller was appointed comptroller on 
November 12, 1903, vice Knight, resigned and elected Nov. 4, 
1902. a 

20 New York Tribune, Dec. 19, 1903. 

1 April 25, 1889, XLVIII, 335. 





260 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


ceived any more than was customarily paid for such serv- 
ices.? 

The analysis which has been given in this chapter of the 
spoils system in New York State during the time that Platt 
‘was manager of the Republican organization has set off the 
local, state, and federal patronage into separate compart- 
ments. This has been a convenient way to handle the ma- 
terial, but it does not give an accurate picture of the manner 
in which the system actually worked. Generally speaking, 
the office of the state committeeman in each one of the 
thirty-four congressional districts was a clearing house for 
all sorts of patronage. Thus, State Committeeman Barnes 
believed in “rotation in office’ and any day the mayor of 
Albany might find himself in the postmastership of Albany 
or the state senator from Albany might land in the county 
clerkship.2 Barnes, himself, did not refuse an appointment 
as surveyor of customs,’ nor did he turn down any printing 
business because it was from the city of Albany and not the 
state of New York. The state committee, as a collegiate 
body, directed the entire process and sought Platt’s advice 
upon questions of first importance. When state conventions 
assembled, this committee did not refuse to seat any delegate 
because he was only a local officer and not a state or fed- 
eral employee; all office-holders alike were welcome. The 
delegates to the Republican State Convention at Saratoga 
in 1898 greeted the “old man” with just as prolonged cheers 


2A. W. Atwood, “The Great Express Monopoly,” Amer. Mag., 
LXXI (1911), 758. 

3 New York Evening Post, September 17, 1910. Article signed 
Wri ols 

4 Barnes v. Roosevelt, May 13, 1915, Barnes testifying as to the 
office which he held under Presidents McKinley and kKoosevelt, p. 
1888, 


« 





Ly 


THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE SPOILS 261 


as they greeted the hero of San Juan. Quigg said that they 
loved Platt because “age had mellowed him,” but a more 
cynical observer said that they loved him on the old princi- 
ple, “Blessed be the hand that gives.”*® Roosevelt, himself, 
had not refused some favors from that hand. 


5 Nation, October 6, 1898. 


CHAPTER X 
“THE CORRUPT ALIIANGES 


In a campaign statement published on July 22, 1914, 
Roosevelt charged William Barnes with working through a 
corrupt alliance between crooked business and crooked poli- 
tics.4 On the basis of this statement, Barnes sued Roosevelt 
for libel. Roosevelt won the suit which indicated that the 
jury regarded his charges as true. Barnes was one of the 
successors to the system which Platt built up during the 
nineties. While Roosevelt was governor of the state, this 
system was in a particularly flourishing condition. The ori- 
gin and development of the system came long before Roose- 
velt’s official career. During the seventies and eighties, 
when the tone of the state legislature was rather low, many 
prominent business men grew especially fearful of “strike” 
bills. A “strike” bill was a bill introduced for the purpose 
of extorting money from those whose interests would be 
injuriously affected by the passage of the bill. “Strike” bills 
were made use of most frequently by the “Black Horse 
Cavalry,” the “gang” or combination of legislators, Repub- 
licans and Democrats, which was ready to take money when- 
ever it could. The “Black Horse Cavalry” found the giant 
public utility corporations and the great fiduciary institu- 
tions particularly vulnerable. To protect and further their 
interests these corporations maintained expensive lobbies at 
the state capitol.? In the early nineties when the Democrats 


1 Barnes v. Roosevelt, complaint. 


2 City Reform Club, Annual Record of the Assemblymen and 
Senators from the City of New York, (1891). 
xy 262 


THE CORRUPT ALLIANCE 263 


gained control of the state legislature, the professional lob- 
byists were superseded in a measure by a political boss who 
undertook to deliver the party vote in the legislature in re- 
turn for contributions or services to the party. There is 
little doubt that the safety, security, convenience, and decor- 
um of this new system appealed to Thomas C. Platt who, by 
virtue of his strategic position, was able to apply it to his 
own organization when the fortunes of his party revived? 

The habits and traditions of the members of the “Black 
Horse Cavalry” were such that it was not possible to work 
out this new system in any complete or thoroughgoing 
fashion. The conditions revealed by the Allds investiga~ 
tion, cited above, are ample proof for this conclusion. It was 
alleged by Benn Conger, the agent for the bridge companies} 
that the bill which Allds and Nixon “put to sleep” for him 
in the Rules Committee in return for bribes of $1,000 each: 
was a “strike” bill. This bill was designed to put ad- 
ditional power into the hands of the state engineers and to 
require towns to vote upon all outlays above the $500 limit, 
a change which would have made it more difficult for the 
bridge companies to secure contracts for a class of work 
which had been a source of considerable profit. As one cor- 
respondent expressed it, “These bills, if passed, not only 
would have added a great deal of red tape and complicated 
the old fashioned method of dealing directly with local au- 
thorities, but went a long way toward eliminating the possi- 
bility of the bridge builders obtaining contracts by favorit- 
ism or bribery, rather than by open competition.” ® Alld’s 
attorneys contended that it was the bridge companies and 
not their client who had been corrupt, and they introduced 


$J. B. Bishop, “The Price of Peace,” Century Mag., XLVIII, 
671 (1894). 

4 Proceedings of the Senate, p. 332. 

5 New York Evening Post, January 18, 1910, 


264 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


evidence tending to show that a bridge “trust” had been 
formed which engaged in pernicious activities in several 
states.6 It is difficult to see how this line of argument bene- 
fited Allds’ case,’ but it is equally difficult to defend the ac- 
tion of the bridge companies. The next year (1902) the 
bridge companies were more “proper,” for they refused to 
“deal” with the individual legislators, turned their “‘contri- 
bution” over to the chairman of the Republican state com- 
mittee, and “asked him to make this an organization mat- 
ter and call off such strike legislation.” As long as this 
newer system was adhered to, the measures hostile to the 
bridge companies were not passed.® 

Of all corporations doing business in the state, the public 
utility corporations were perhaps the most sensitive to mat- 
ters of legislation. The work of furnishing the additional 
transportation facilities demanded by the growing popula- 
tion of the great urban centers of the state was left to pri- 
vate enterprises, which, on their part, were powerless to 
make extensions without action upon the part of the gov- 
ernment. After the privileges were granted which enabled 
the extensions to be made, it was the duty of the legislature 
to conserve the interests of the general public, a task which 
it found fraught with many temptations. Elihu Root, attor- 
ney during the eighties and nineties for one of the largest 
street railway combinations in New York City, said of con- 
ditions : 

8 Proceedings of the Senate, pp. 1095, 2077. In summing up one 


of them referred to “the plunder and robbery of the municipalities of 
the state under the law as it then existed.” 


7 They were trying to discredit Conger’s testimony. Allds, they 
held, had “killed” the bill because he had been ordered to do so by 
Platt, who in turn had been hoodwinked by the bridge companies. 

8 Proceedings of the Senate, pp. 705ff. 

9H. J. Carman, The Street Surface Railway Franchises of New 
York City (New York, 1919), chs. VI, VII, passim. 


THE CORRUPT ALLIANCE 265 


Many of us can now remember the dreadful days of the 
“Black Horse Cavalry” which came as an incident mainly, to 
the performance of this duty by the legislature. Further 
still, the fact that the great transportation companies were 
being attacked, the great public service corporations were 
being attacked in the legislature, justified them in their own 
minds in going into politics and electing, or furnishing the 
money to elect, members of the Senate and Assembly. Good, 
men, good citizens, honest lawabiding men, justified them- 
selves in the directorates of these railroads and other public 
service corporations in spending the money of the corpora- 
tions to elect senators and assemblymen who would protect 
them against strike bills. The whole system became a scan- 
dal and a disgrace, and it was to remedy that here in New 
York and all over the country that this separate regula- 
tion by a commission created by law was established.’ 


In 1910 the State Superintendent of Insurance came into 
possession of some ledgers of a former New York stock 
brokerage firm, Ellingwood & Cunningham by name, which 
in the hands of a subsequent legislative investigating com: 
mittee revealed many of the details of this “scandalous”’ 
and “disgraceful” system. It appeared that this firm had 
very close relations with one G. Tracy Rogers, who from 
1894 to 1903 was president of the Street Railway Associa- 
tion of the state of New York, an association whose osten- 
sible purpose was the acquisition and diffusion of scientific 
knowledge among its members. The membership of this 
association comprised nearly all the important street rail- 
way companies within the state, i. e., those in New York 
City, Buffalo, Rochester, Albany, Syracuse, Utica, and Bing- 
hamton.!4. The most important duty of the president of 


10 Addresses on Government and Citizenship, p. 188. Speech be- 
fore the Constitutional Convention on August 25, 1915. 

11 Assembly Documents, 1911, No. 30, I, 8. (Report of the Joint 
Committee of the Senate and Assembly of the state of New York; 
appointed to investigate corrupt practices in connection with legis- 
lation, and the affairs of insurance companies, other than those 


266 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


this association seems to have been the representation of 
the interests of the members in matters of. legislation at 
Albany. To aid him in this work a fund was raised by levy- 
ing assessments upon the various railroad companies which 
were members of the association in proportion to their gross 
earnings. Although the records of this association were 
either lost or destroyed, it is at least certain that a fund of 
not less than $25,000 was raised in this way in 1903. Of 
interest, perhaps, is the comment of the committee that “the 
distribution of this fund was wholly under the control of 
the president of the association and he was not called upon 
at any time to account, either to the executive committee or 
to the association, for the manner of its use.’ # 

What were some of the “strike” bills that the “Rogers 
Trolley Trust’? was interested in “putting to sleep’? Al- 
though Rogers admitted that “the best interest of the rail- 
roads” was a stronger actuating motive with him “the good 
of the public,” he claimed that “there was very little 
affirmative legislation desired, but there were a great many 
bills that would have made it impossible to have operated 
our roads.” !# Mr. H. H. Vreeland, the president of the 
largest combination of surface lines in New York City, said 
that what they wanted was “uniformity of legislation 
throughout the state.” #® On the other hand, a letter written 
by the secretary of this association probably comes as near 
as anything to a definition of the “legislative interests” of 
the “trust.”” Among other bills of “considerable importance 
to railroad interests,” was a bill extending the liabilities of 
employees for accidents to employees, a bill allowing any 


doing life insurance business. Hereafter this will be cited as “Cor- 
rupt Practices Investigation”). 

12 Tbid., p. 9. 

13 Tbid., p. 619. 

14 Tbid., p. 179. 

15 Tbid., p. 484, 


THE CORRUPT ALLIANCE 267 © 


Citizen to commence an action to compel a corporation to 
comply with the terms of its franchise, a bill relative to 
injunction and labor disputes, and Senator Grady’s bill to, 
compel street railroads to furnish adequate capacity for all 
passengers at all times and under all circumstances, under a 
$50 penalty. Undoubtedly several of the bills were intro- 
duced to badger the railroad corporations, but this does not 
necessarily hold true for all of them. It also appeared that 
Rogers had been interested in a bill, passed April 5, 1900,, 
which made it possible for the New York Transportation 
Company, a public service corporation operating bus lines 
and other transfers in New York City, greatly to extend its 
franchise.!” This was probably a little of that “affirmative 
legislation” that he sometimes desired. 

Even so efficient an association as the Street Railway As- 
sociation seems to have been did not escape the charges of 
the “Black Horse Cavalry.” It appeared that the firm of 
Ellingwood & Cunningham was used by Rogers during the 
years that he was president of the association as a clearing 
house through which to transfer money from the treasuries 
of the various railroads belonging to the association to the 
individual accounts of certain members of the legislature 
whom they deemed “useful.”?® The favored members of 
the legislature were either upon the Committee on Railroads 
or upon the Committee on Rules. Thus, the names of Allds, 
Nixon, and Raines appeared upon the books of Ellingwood 
& Cunningham.’ In addition to transfers of credit and 
stock, the firm furnished these men with valuable “tips” 
upon the stock market, one of which concerned the New 


16 [hid., p. 545. 
17 Tbid., p. 11. 
18 [bid., p. 12. 
19 Tbid., pp. 556, 560. 


268 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


York Transportation Company, benefited by the legislation 
cited above. 

Besides keeping on good terms with certain members of 
the legislature who occupied strategic positions, Rogers also 
‘employed the new system which called for campaign con- 
tributions to the party committees. In making the pay- 
‘ments to the political parties, he had recourse to the same 
firm of Ellingwood & Cunningham because he didn’t “think 
it would be wise to report campaign expenses for both par- 
ties.” 2° He said that he made payments to the state com- 
mittees of the two political parties because through these 
committees he “wanted certain men helped.” Then, too, 
he did not neglect the local committees although the amounts 
allotted to them were much smaller. The Broome County 
Republican Committee, his own local committee and also 
that of State Committeeman Dunn, received an annual con- 
tribution of $500 or more. Speaker Nixon’s county was 
also upon his list. That the method of making contribu- 
tions to the local organization was sometimes preferred to 
other expedients is shown by the following excerpt from a 
letter written by a traction man in Elmira to the secretary 
of the association: 


My DEAR Mr. ALLEN: I return your letter enclosed, and 
I am surprised at the condition which the Cassidy bill has 
gotten into, for I have certainly been assured by the leading 
men of the district that if a donation were made to the party 
about which I have already spoken to you, that the bill 
would be put through. The whole thing at the present 
time is whether the donation on the lines already suggested 
can be raised, if so I would be willing to take the matter up 


20 Tbid., p. 602. 
1Jbid., p. 604. 


THE CORRUPT ALLIANCE 269 


and push it. Otherwise, I am confident it would be thrown 
away and we can do nothing.? 


There were some counties, so Mr. Rogers testified, that 
did not need any help from the association. One of these 
counties was the county of Albany. Theodore Roosevelt 
threw some light upon the reason for this particular ex- 
ception when he’ said in effect that during the controversy 
over the franchise tax question Barnes came to him and 
protested against the measure on the ground that Mr. Rob; 
ert Pruyn and Mr. Anthony N. Brady who were connected 
with street railways and electric power companies in Albany; 
had been very heavy contributors to the Republican cam- 
paign fund.? When Roosevelt expressed surprise and said 
that he had always understood that Brady was a very strong 
Democrat, Barnes answered that Brady had contributed, 
not as a matter of politics, but as a matter of business, be- 
cause he could not have the great interests that he repre- 
sented exposed to attacks by demagogues and scoundrels in 
the legislature.* 

The Republican committee of New York County was 
another local committee that “didn’t need any help.” Chair= 
man Lauterbach, an attorney and director of the Third 
Avenue Surface lines, had been quite close to the source of 
supplies. Lemuel Ely Quigg, his successor as head of the 
local organization, came into the employ of the Metropoli- 
tan Company as “general adviser” of H. H. Vreeland in 


2Jbid., p. 540. The Cassidy bill referred to in this letter was 
a bill which referred to the operation of electric lighting companies, 
The letter was written on April 26, 1905. 

3 Barnes v. Roosevelt, pp. 215-16. 

4Jbid., p. 649. Roosevelt added, “I believe that the expression 
he used was that it would be unjust to the widows and orphans 
who had invested in the concerns of which he was the head.” 


270 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


1899.5 The leading luminaries in the Metropolitan Company 
were William C. Whitney, one of President Cleveland’s 
‘cabinet officers and later his campaign manager, and 
Thomas F. Ryan, one of Tammany’s main “contributors” 
‘and one of Alton B. Parker’s chief backers in 1904.8 It is. 
quite obvious that there was no “politics” in Quigg’s ar- 
rangement with the Metropolitan, his chief duties being, as 
he himself confessed, the representation of interests of his 
company in the lobby at Albany * and the manufacture of a 
public sentiment favorable to the schemes of his employers. 
This latter function Quigg called “accelerating public opin- 
ion,” ® and he admitted that he performed this duty very well 
even though it did cost the company over $150,000 for his 
services.2 The Whitney-Ryan-Brady traction syndicate in 
New York City, according to its nominal head H. H. Vree- 


5 Public Service Commission, First District, Investigation of the 
Interborough-Metropolitan Company and Brooklyn Rapid Transit 
Co., pp. 1397 ff. 

6For a characterization of Ryan, see B. J. Hendrick, “Great 
American Fortunes and their Making,” McClure’s Mag. XXX, 246. 

7 Investigation of the Interborough-Metropolitan, loc. cit. In an- 
swer to a question as to why he was in Albany in 1903, Quigg 
replied:: “I have no doubt that it was in connection with eithe: 
the promotion of legislation or the opposition to it.’ His work 
was done mainly in the committee room or with the chairman of 
committees and the speaker. 

8 Tbid., p. 1485. Quigg said, “I accelerated their eagerness.” 

9Tbid., p. 1411. Quigg said, “In their behalf, I caused to be 
organized in various parts of the city seven or eight, perhaps nine 
or ten, different associations of property owners and citizens whose 
property and business interests would be promoted by the adoption 
of the Metropolitan plans; caused them to appear from time to 
time before meetings of the commissions, before the Board of Esti- 
mate and Apportionment, before committees of the legislature and 
elsewhere, and to be represented by counsel.” On p. 1412, Quigg 
explains how the money was spent to manufacture a giant pett- 
tion, “I also caused to be prepared a petition which was circulated 
all over New York, and especially in the tenement districts, during 
the summer of 1904, and which cost well on to $50,000 I think 


THE CORRUPT ALLIANCE 271 


land, had contributed to the campaign funds of both the 
Democratic and Republican parties since 1893, and in 1903 
Mr. Vreeland knew from his own personal knowledge that 
$20,000 had been turned over to the Republican organi- 
zation through the medium of Quigg.” It may be that this 
action was necessary to drive off the charges of the “Black 
Horse Cavalry” but a careful student of the traction history 
of New York City has said, “The consolidation movement 
is a story featured with extravagant leases, rash expendi- 
tures, watered securities, and financial knavery, all of which 
have reacted detrimentally to public interests.” ! 
That the management of other public utility corporations 
in New York City, those furnishing water and light to por* 
tions of the great populace, did not escape charges of sim- 
ilar “scandalous” conduct is evidenced by the preliminary 
report of the counsel of the “Mazet Committee” which ap- 
peared in the newspapers before it had been “properly 
edited.” A portion of this “report” is given below: 


The presence of prominent members of both parties in 
these companies, based directly on state legislation by. 
special acts, and which are not designed to do business by 
themselves and without city support, causes public sus- 
picion that combinations exist to secure public action on 


” The petition expressed opposition to Belmont’s plans 


for a subway and endorsed the plans favored for the moment by 
the Ryan syndicate. 

10 This testimony first appeared in a Grand Jury investigation. 
See New York Times, April 23, 1908. It later appeared in the Cor= 
_ rupt Practices Investigation, op. cit., pp. 489ff and in the Barnes- 
Roosevelt libel suit, loc. cit., p. 921. 

11 Carman, op. cit., p. 220. His chapter on the “Era of Consoli- 
dation” roughly covers the period when Platt was still influentiat. 
His conclusions are well documented. Quigg resigned the presi- 
dency of the New York County Committee in 1900 but he continued 
to be active in Republican politics, 


272 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


both sides of the line of political division, and leads inevit- 
ably to scandal.” 


_ The development and expansion of the steam railroad 
lines in New York during the two decades following 1890 
could in no way compare with the expansion which took 
place in municipal traction systems during the same period,” 
but this does not mean that the directors of the steam rail- 
roads could relax the care with which they had watched af- 
fairs at Albany during the seventies and eighties when they 
had been active in making extensions. There were no 
scandals in the period under discussion like those which 
had occurred in the notorious “Erie war” of the seventies.* 
On the other hand, there were railroad men who were still 
interested in politics and one of these was Chauncey M. De- 
pew, nominal head of the New York Central lines,” who 
said of his work as Republican campaign orator, “The posi- 
tion which this activity gave me in my own party, and the 
fact that unlike most employers, I protected the employees 
in their liberty of political action, gave me immense help in 
protecting the company from raids and raiders.”’?® The 
New York Central Railroad was the most important single 
system in the state and therefore needed some sort of pro- 
tection. Depew’s relation to this railroad corporation and 
its affiliated lines changed from that of president to chair- 
man of the board of trustees about the time that he was 
elected to the United States Senate. As United States 
senator and a member of the advisory committee of the 
state committee, Depew was at least in a position to see that 


12 New York Tribune, December 27, 1899. See to the same effect 
the minority report of the committee above, p. 170. 

13 See above p. 6. 

14 Sowers, op. cit., pp. 88ff. See also C. F. Adams, Chapters of 
Erie and Other Essays (Boston, 1871). 

15 For summary of Depew’s corporate relations see above p. 67. 

16 Memories, p. 249, 


THE CORRUPT ALLIANCE 273 


the Vanderbilt lines were not discriminated against by the 
political authorities. 

Depew took part in the gubernatorial campaign of 1898. 
Whether he ever charged Roosevelt with ingratitude for 
the stand that the latter took as governor upon the franchise 
tax question is a matter of conjecture, but the following let- 
ter written by Platt to Roosevelt on May 5, 1900, is of inter- 
est in this connection: 


Our friends of the New York Central are very anxious to 
have you sign Senate bill 763, exempting from the fran 
chise tax grade crossing of steam railroads. I hope you 
can consistently do so. Senator Depew is very anxious. 


To this Roosevelt replied by a telegram, dated May 7, 
1900: 


I received your telegram and one from Ford yesterday. 
It was too late for me to act, as I had already published a. 
memorandum stating not merely that Ford was against the 
bill, but that the state tax commissioners opposed the 
bill.27 


Besides attempting to obtain tax exemptions for the New 
York Central, Depew tried “to make the New York Cens 
tral popular with the public without impairing its effici- 
ency.” #8 He granted a “great many passes’ each year to 
politicians, editors and others of political importance.’ He 


17 Barnes v. Roosevelt, p. 2481. 

18 Memories, p. 244. 

19 Before the constitutional amendment went into effect which 
prohibited the granting of passes to legislators, Depew said: “I. 
should say that on the average every legislator got 10 passes from 
us during the session, besides his personal pass.” New York Trib- 
une, Nov. 15, 1894. Testifying in 1905, Depew said that no requests 
for passes came to him from members of the legislature and he 
added, “The New York Central grants a great many passes,” 
Testimony taken by Legislative Life Insurance Investigating Com- 
mittee, 1906, TV, 3187. 

18 - 


274 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


spoke at all sorts of political banquets, commercial gather- 
ings, country fairs, and even workingmen’s meetings. He 
made annual contributions to the campaign funds of the 
state committee and the New York County Committee.”® At 
the same time he did not neglect to make recommendations 
regarding the appointment of a state superintendent of pub- 
lic works, the officer who had charge of a rival transporta- 
tion system. In this and other ways he protected the inter- 
ests of the greatest steam railroad system in the state. 

As president of the United States Express Company, 
Thomas C. Platt was himself in fairly close touch with the 
big railroad directors. The principal business of his express 
company in 1900 was with the following railroads: Balti- 
more & Ohio; Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul; Chicago, 
Rock Island & Pacific; Delaware, Lackawanna & Western; 
and Lehigh! The following letter shows that Platt as well 
as Depew was in the pass giving business: 


August 22, 1894 
My DEAR SENATOR PLATT: ; 

I have promised Manley to make four speeches in Mr. 
Reed’s district on Sept. 5, 6, 7, and 8. I want to get trans- 
portation from New York to Boston and thence to Portland 
and return. Can you help me in this matter? I wish you 
would if you can. 

Faithfully yours, 
Lemuet E. Quice.? 


There was no law of Congress, enforced in such a way 
as to prevent the practice illustrated in the letter above, un- 


20U. S. Sen., Testimony before a Subcommittee of the Commit- 
tee on Privileges and Elections, Sixty-second Cong., Second “Sess., 
p. 628 (The “Clapp” Committee on Campaign Expenditures). 

1 Moody’s Manual, 1900. The directorates of these railroad inter- 
lock. 

2L. E. Quigg, member of Congress, letter books relating to the 
affairs of his office and New York politics, April 15, 1894 to March 
2, 1895 (Manuscript room, New York [City] Public Library). 


THE CORRUPT ALLIANCE 275 


til some twelve years later.2 Several questions may be 
raised at this point. Why was Platt selected by the rail- 
roads as a dispenser of passes? Why did Depew ask Platt 
to intercede with Roosevelt in behalf of tax exemptions for 
the New York Central Railroad? Why was Platt so 
anxious to “call off” alleged “‘strike” legislation against the 
American Bridge Company?* It looks as though Platt was 
used as a political agent by certain corporations, especially 
utility corporations. This view is borne out by Roosevelt’s 
testimony. At the time the franchise tax question was be- 
ing discussed, Platt came to Roosevelt, so the latter claimed, 
and said that certain business men of great prominence in 
New York, who would be unfavorably affected by the pas- 
sage of the bill, had been heavy contributors to the Republi- 
can campaign funds and that since the party could not af- 
ford to cut off such valuable pecuniary support the. act 
should not be passed.® Who were some of these powerful 
financial men, “Democrats as well as Republicans,’ who 
were “irritated” by the franchise tax bill? The practice 
followed by the Metropolitan Street Railway Company and 
the New York Central Railroad has already been com- 
mented upon. When a similar question was asked of Theo- 
dore Roosevelt regarding the Republican campaign fund 
of 1904, he answered that E. H. Harriman’s enormous con- 
tribution that vear was made for state and not for national 
purposes. Before 1904, Platt must have known of Harri- 
man’s interest in protecting certain railroads, express com- 


3 See H. George, Jr., The Menace of Privilege (New York, 1906), 
p. 245. 

4Tetter given above, p. 159. 

5 Barnes v. Roosevelt, pp. 215-16. 

6 Roosevelt’s explanation of the letter he wrote to Harriman in 
which he said, “You and I are practical men.” Harriman’s contri- 
bution was $250,000. See Report of “Clapp” Committee on Cam-. 
paign Contributions, pp. 181-82. 


276 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


panies, and fiduciary institutions from the raids of fanatics 
‘and dishonest men in the national and state legislatures.” 
Platt’s “influence” with the governors gave him another 
way of insuring to the powerful financial men interested in 
‘public utilities the sort of “business man’s” government that 
they desired. On December 18, 1896 Governor Morton 
appointed as one of the three railroad commissioners of the 
state, Frank M. Baker, of Owego, “the superintendent of a 
‘one-horse’ railroad controlled by Mr. Platt.”® On Febru- 
ary 16 of the next year Governor Black appointed as rail- 
road commissioner, George W. Dunn, of Binghamton, the 
president of the Binghamton General Electric Company and 
the vice-president of the Binghamton Railway.? The New 
York Tribune made the following remark upon this condi- 
tion: “Mr. Platt thus has two of the three votes in the 
commission.” }®© Inasmuch as the term of a member of this 
commission was five years, Governor Roosevelt was not in 
a position to disturb these “two votes,” and even when 
Governor Odell, in a measure “broke” with Platt, State 
Chairman Dunn remained loyal to the “old man.” The ex- 
penses of this board were borne by the railroads, a plan 
which Governor Hughes regarded as “wholly indefensi- 
ble.” 11. The Railroad Commission had the power to exam- 
ine the books and affairs of all steam railroad and street 
surface railway corporations in the state. Did Commis- 


7In 1901 Harriman was a director of the Baltimore & Ohio Rail- 
road, the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company and other utility cor- 
porations. It later came out that he owned a large block of stock 
in the U. S. Express Company. See Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle, LXXXIX (1909), 100. Regarding his insurance busi- 
ness, see below. 

8 New York Tribune, Jan. 24, 1898. 

9W. S. Lawyer, Binghamton (Century Memorial Publishing Co., 
1900), and Binghamton Press, October 18, 1911. : 

107 os. cit. 

11C, E. Hughes, Addresses (New York, 1908), p. 92. 


THE CORRUPT ALLIANCE 277 


sioner Dunn discover many irregularities? He might have 
known where to look, as his own name appeared upon the 
books of Ellingwood & Cunningham.!* The commission 
also had the power to forbid the execution of mortgages, 
the increase or reduction of capital stock, and the construc- 
tion of new lines. These were important duties, but as far 
as effectual regulation was concerned Governor Hughes 
found the scheme “inadequate.” !% The railroad corpora+ 
tions, however, were not known to be loud in their com- 
plaints. 

In 1905 a quarrel between certain of these same railroad 
financiers for the control of the assets of the great life in+ 
surance companies “precipitated an investigation which 
threw a flood of light upon the relations between business 
and politics in New York. As business men of great prom- 
inence, the contestants had for a long time realized that the 
huge accumulations of life insurance companies were 
“readily convertible into money and susceptible of applica- 
tion to varied uses” and therefore the struggle was a bitter 
one and the rending of the veil complete.!* The legislative 
investigating committee, called the “Armstrong committee” 
from its chairman, was very fortunate in its selection of 
Charles E. Hughes as its counsel, for this brilliant lawyer 
conducted the inquiry with masterful skill. 

The president of one of the three largest insurance com- 
panies declared upon the witness stand that the insurance 
companies had been badgered by the introduction of bad 
bills in the state legislature and that they had been com- 


12 Corrupt Practices Investigation, pp. 554-55. 

13 State of New York, Public Papers of Governor Hughes, 1907, 
p. 30. 

14 Heaton, op. cit., chap. XVI “Equitable Corruption,” gives the 
New York World credit for starting this investigation. See Re- 
port of Legislative Life Insurance Investigation Committee (1906), 
pp. 69, 278-79, 


278 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


pelled to pay money to protect themselves against black- 
mailers. This plea sounds not unlike that made in defense 
of the public utility corporations. The following letter 
shows the sort of legislative matters in which the insurance 
companies were interested in: _ 


Jan. 23, 1903. 
Mr. A. C. Fields, 
C/o Mutual Life Insurance Company, 
32 Nassau Street, New Y ork City. 

DEAR Sir—Referring to Albany matters during the pres- 
ent session, please note that we will be interested in all 
banking and insurance measures, taxation schemes and bills 
affecting particularly the following interests: 

Safe deposit companies, banks, trust companies, street 
railways and all measures affecting Suffolk County, New 
York franchises, water rights, land under water, transpor- 
tation, etc. 

Yours very truly, 
(Signed) T. D. Jordan, CompTroLier.® 


It is difficult to see how measures affecting some of these 
matters could be regarded as “strike” bills against insurance 
companies as such. Some of the specific measures referred 
to in other memoranda to A. C. Fields seem even more re- 
mote from the legitimate sphere of life insurance companies. 
Why should they oppose an act to provide greater security 
in hotels, inns, taverns, and tenement houses, a bill to safe- 
guard the lives of patrons of amusement places, and a bill 
to cede to the Town of Islip certain water rights? The op- 
position to these bills becomes a little more intelligible when 
it is considered that bills endeavoring to protect the interests 
of the policy holders were even more violently opposed. 
The officers of the insurance companiess had become inter- 
ested in a great variety of legislative matters because of 


16 Tbid., p. 13. The other memoranda here referred to are given 
in the same place. 


‘ 


THE CORRUPT ALLIANCE 279 


their connections with subsidiary companies, a relation 
which they felt necessary to protect in a surreptitious man- 
ner.16 

A. C. Fields, it seems, represented both the Mutual and 
the Equitable in legislative matters and he maintained in 
Albany for this purpose a house which was jocosely styled 
the “House of Mirth.” Fields was also at the head of the, 
“Supply Department” of the Mutual which spent exorbitant 
sums each year for “stationery.” The cost of maintaining 
his “House of Mirth” was charged to “legal expenses.” 2” 
In his palatial abode he “entertained” the legislators with 
poker games and other pleasant pastimes. Listen to the way 
the Armstrong committee scored the body of which it was 
a part: 


The pernicious activities of corporate agents in matters of 
legislation demand that the present freedom of lobbying 
should be restricted. They have brought suspicion upon im- 
portant proceedings of the legislature, and have exposed its. 
members to consequent assault. The legislature owes it to 
itself, as far as possible, to stop the practice of the lavish ex- 
penditure of moneys ostensibly for services in connection 
with the support of or opposition to bills, and generally be- 
lieved to be used for corrupt purposes.’® 


Certain members of the legislature, however, were not 
the only organization Republicans involved in this investi- 
gation; there were some Republicans, higher up, who were 
also “exposed to assault.”” Among these was Senator 
Chauncey M. Depew, of railroad fame, who had received an 
annual retainer of $20,000 from the Equitable beginning 
about 1888 for “advisory services.” During this time he 
had been a director and a member of the executive com- 


16 [bid., pp. 278-79, 
17 Tbid., p. 9. 
18 [bid., p. 286. 


280 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


mittee, and the report claimed that he was unable to describe 
any services that he had rendered to warrant his retainer 
which the society was not fairly entitled to receive from him 
as director.!® In justice to Depew it should be said that he 
‘claimed his advice was worth many thousands of dollars to 
the company. Depew also made good his share of the “un- 
fortunate” loan of $250,000 made by the society to the De- 
pew Improvement Company. Since he was interested in 
both companies, he knew of this loan and when the reor- 
ganization scheme for the Equitable was hurried through 
he contributed his share to the reimbursement of the so- 
ciety.?? 

Governor Odell, the business man from Newburgh, was 
another one of Platt’s friends and Roosevelt’s advisers who 
faced the searching questions propounded by Charles E. 
Hughes. While governor of the state, Odell had seen no 
objection to the introduction of a bill repealing the charter 
of a company which owed him money. When it was public- 
ly charged that the object of introducing this bill was to 
force the company to “settle up” with the governor, he in- 
formed the introducer that “as desirable as he believed the 
legislation to be,’ he feared his “unfortunate connection 
with the Shipbuilding matter’ was of such a character that 
it would be better to “drop this legislation.”! In its report 
the committee concluded that “it may be that the fact of its 
introduction was sufficient to induce a fear on the part of 
the officers of the trust company that proceedings inimical 
to its interests might be taken, if those who could initiate 
them were not appeased.” *® Odell could hope for no mercy 
at the hands of Mr. Hughes, but he might have expected bet- 


19 [bid., p. 79. 
20 Thid., p. 85. See also D. G. Phillips, loc. cét. 
1 Jbid., p. 99. 
2 Ibid., p. 99. 


THE CORRUPT ALLIANCE 281 


ter treatment from his financial friend, E. H. Harriman. 
The most startling portion of Harriman’s testimony is given 
below : 


Q. Well, it has been openly charged that through your re- 
lations with Mr. Odell you have political influence. What 
would you say to that? A. Well, I should think that Mr, 
Odell had political influence because of his relations to 
me. 


It should not be supposed that the maintenance of a 
“House of Mirth” at Albany was the only precaution that 
the big insurance companies took against “improper and ill- 
advised” legislation. As in the case of the utility corpora- 
tions, resort was had to the “new. system” described at the 
beginning of this chapter. Thus, the usual contribution of 
the Mutual to the Republican state committee was $10,- 
000 * and that of the Equitable an annual contribution of 
the same amount,’ to say nothing of much larger contribu- 
tions made by these and other companies to the Republican 
national committee.6 These payments were concealed by 
devious methods, some of which would rival the device of an 
Ellingwood & Cunningham. The following extract from’ 
the testimony taken before the committee shows how Sen- 
ator Platt was taken off his guard and made a frank con- 
fession of what contributors expected of him: 


Q. If you have any opinion, of course, we should be glad 
to have it, but the point that I want particularly to get at 
is this, what suggestion was there to the insurance com- 
panies of any quid pro quo, what was the insurance com- 
pany to get out of the fact that they had made the contribu- 
tion? A. There was not any suggestion of any sort. 


8 Testimony, V1, 5154. Harriman later tried to qualify this bald 
statement. Odell denied all its implications. 

4 Report, p. 15. 

5 [bid., p. 79. 

6 Ibid., pp. 45, 239. 


282 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


Q. What advantage really could they get? A. They get it 


through me being connected with the state committee. 

Q. How could they get it through you? A. They would 
suppose that I would be very likely to defend them at any 
time when it was necessary, if I had occasion to do it. 

QO. What would that extend to, what would you mean by 
defending them if occasion made it necessary? A. I don’t 
know. 

©. What had you in mind in saying that? A. That they 


would expect me to support them naturally in anything that 
they naturally thought was right and that they were for. 


©. To see that the legislature, for example, did not enact 
legislation which they thought hostile to their policy hold- 
ers? A. That is what it would amount to. 

©. That is what it would amount to. How could you 
control that situation? A. I could not control it. 

Q. How could you in any way influence it? A. I might 
have some influence. 

QO. Through the disposition of the moneys in the election 
of legislators? A. Well, I could not say that. 

QO. Is not that the way it really comes about, Senator, 
that the use of these contributions in the election of candi- 
dates to office puts the candidates under more or less of a 
moral obligation not to attack the interests supporting? 
A. That is what would naturally be involved. 

Q. That is really what is involved, is it not? A. I should 
think so. 

Q. And that is what you meant when you said that they 
would expect you, through your relations to the state com- 
mittee, to defend them? A. Yes.’ 


Platt’s relations with these corporations could hardly be 
revealed in a more striking manner. The committee re- 
garded this practice as “wholly unjustifiable” and said that 
those who had engaged in it were open to “severe and just 
condemnation.” ®§ The money was evidently paid to Platt 


7 Testimony, IV, 3396-97, 
8 Report, p. 284. 


THE CORRUPT ALLIANCE. 283 


in cash; there were no express promises, there was no talk 
of special favors, for no pledges were needed; it was all a 
“moral obligation,” a “gentlemen’s understanding.” ® The 
aged Senator said that he did not know of the activities of 
the insurance company lobbyists; his influence in the matter 
was through his “being connected with the, state committee,” 
through his relations with Chairmen Hackett, Odell, and 
Dunn. 

If the actual operation of the Insurance Department can 
be taken as any criterion, this branch of the state govern- 
ment was also under implied “obligation” to defend the in- 
surance companies. The committee through its counsel Mr. 
Hughes found that the superintendent had had ample power 
to perform his duty of exposing abuses and assuring cor- 
rect administration, but year after year the superintendent 
had certified to false statements which concealed the enor- 
mous salaries paid to the officers of the societies, which cov- 
ered up the enormous syndicate profits which men like Har- 
riman 2° and Morgan were able to make through the use 
of the policy holders’ money, and which gave no clue as to 
the amount of money “improperly spent” to influence legis- 
lation through lobbyists and party committees.!* The super- 
intendent also failed to discover the “unique situation” 
which operated-beneficially for the officers of an up-state 
insurance company 78 of which Colonel Dunn was vice-presi- 


9 Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 275. 

10 Report, pp. 87, 101. The Equitable subscribed to $2,500,000 
worth of stock in one of Harriman’s railroad syndicates in a sur- 
reptitious fashion. 

11 Report, pp. 39, 51, 54, 57-58. Through G. W. Perkins, vice- 
president of the New York Life and a member of J. P. Morgan & 
Co., the New York Life participated in the Morgan steel, railroad, 
and navigation syndicates. 

12 Jbid., pp. 246 ff. The committee’s indictment of the department. 

13 [bid., pp. 177-78. 


284 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


dent.* Superintendent Hendricks tried to defend himself 
by saying that his duty did not extend beyond ascertaining 
whether the companies were solvent or not. Such things as 
the continuation of Fields’ clerk as examiner in the depart- 
-ment, the failure to make any examination at all of certain 
companies for long periods of time, the lax interpretation of 
the rules that the department made, and the making of an 
examination which the committee called “plainly a farce,” 
escaped the superintendent’s attention. It will be remem- 
bered that Platt was very anxious that Roosevelt “consult” 
him regarding the appointment of “Lou” Payn’s successor 
as state superintendent of insurance. Hendricks was an old 
“man, and even Hughes treated him gently. It was the sys- 
tem that was at fault. 

So far only the services that the state government was 
_ made to perform for the benefit of the directors of the great 
corporations have been discussed. It should be kept in mind 
that the insurance societies and the railroad corporations 
made contributions to the Republican national committee 
as well as to the state committee.14® The insurance com- 
panies also maintained lobbyists at Washington.” The 
money collected by the national committee was sometimes 


14 Testimony, V, 4415. 

15 Report, pp. 14, 86, 145, 151, 247, 253. 

16 President McCall and Vice-President Perkins of the New York 
Life and President McCurdy of the Mutual boasted about the con- 
tributions they had made out of the policy holders’ money to the 
Republican national campaign funds in 1896, 1900, and 1904. See 
Testimony, I, 751, 826; II, 1851. Harriman understood that for the 
money he raised in 1904 Senator Depew was to be made ambassador 
and that he (Harriman) was to be consulted upon railroad mat- 
ters touched in the President’s message. When these arrangements 
were not carried out he asked Webster, “Where do I stand.” See 


“Clapp” Committee on Campaign Contributions, pp. 183, 245, 
1% Report, p. 37. 


THE CORRUPT ALLIANCE 285 


used to aid the election of certain congressmen.48 What 
was “expected of” the New York senators and representa- 
tives and of the departments of the federal government? 
The “politics” of sugar industry will be taken as a typical 
illustration of the relations between big business and the 
members of the Republican state organization enjoying the 
federal patronage. 

As far back as 1894, Henry O. Havemeyer, president of 
the American Sugar Refining Company, testified that his 
company was in the habit of contributing to the campaign 
funds of both the Republican and Democratic parties in 
New York, and he added that whichever party won, “We 
expect protection from the police and fire department, and 
anything that the state and local organization can give.” 
The “Sugar Trust” had no politics but “only the politics of 
business.” 49 What were some of the things that the state 
organization could “give”? The giant “Sugar Trust” was 
not concerned with small “game” like the bounty granted by 
the state legislature during the years 1897 to 1908 to the 
struggling up-state beet sugar refineries which amounted 
altogether to only some $500,000; °° it was after the big 
“gifts” at the disposal of the federal government. Al- 
though Havemeyer called the tariff “the mother of all 
trusts,” he made one exception and that exception was the 
sugar refining industry.1 The New York congressmen in 
1897 voted “regular” upon the tariff schedule and thus did 


18 “Clapp” committee, p. 626 (Depew’s contribution to congres- 
sional campaign committee). 

19 Senate Reports, Fifty-third Congress, Second Sess., No. 606, 
X, 655ff. 

20Located at Lyons and Binghamton. These refineries were 
-charged with trying to corrupt legislators. See Corrupt Practices 
Investigation, p. 846. 

1 Industrial Commission, I, 101. 


286 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


their part toward enabling the “Sugar Trust” speculators to 
net millions of dollars. The indirect benefits of this tariff 
.were perhaps even greater, for until 1913 the duties on 
sugar restrained foreign competition and thus made it easier 
for the trust to maintain monopoly prices.? Not satisfied 
with practically writing the sugar schedule of the tariff, the 
“Sugar Trust” officials connived with the New York cus- 
toms officers to defraud the government of millions of dol- 
lars due in the form of duties on raw sugar.? At the trial 
.of the culprits instigated by President Roosevelt in 1907, it 
was shown that the practice of underweighing shipments of 
raw sugar had begun at least as early as 1901, that the com- 
pany’s superintendent exercised a large amount of influence 
in the New York Custom-house and that the company often 
procured the removal of “obnoxious” weighers.4 While 
Platt was not implicated in this matter, some of his “hench- 
men” were and the Secretary of the Treasury made the fol- 
lowing diagnosis: 


The study of the causes of the demoralization which has 
been revealed is still incomplete, but the main causes are 
evident. It is clear, for instance, that the influence of local 
politics and politicians upon the customs service has been 
most deleterious, and has promoted that laxity and low tone 
which prepare and furnish an inviting soil for dishonesty 
and fraud. Unless the customs service can be released from | 
the payment of political debts and exactions, and from 
meeting the supposed exigencies of political organizations, 


2F. W. Taussig, Tariff History of the United States (New York, 
1914), pp. 305-314. 

3 Over $2,000,000 was recovered by the government. See Annual 
Reports of the Attorney General, 1910, p. 2; 1911, p. 20; 1913, p. 27. 


* House Reports, Sixty-first Congress, Second Sess., Doc. No. 901, 
p. 8. 


THE CORRUPT ALLIANCE 287 


big and little, it will be impossible to have an honest service 
for any length of time.® 
The evidence which has been adduced so far to illustrate 
the relations between the political managers and the direc- 
tors of the great business and industrial corporations has 
been of a more or less definite character. As Platt con- 
fessed before the Armstrong committee it was not part of 
the code of politics to make these things definite, so the fact 
that there is any concrete information available at all on 
this topic must be explained by the existence of internal 
maladjustments. To describe the complete working of the 
system is, of course, impossible, but in view of what has 
been revealed it is significant that Thomas C. Platt was 
president of the United States Express Company through- 
out the entire period of his political domination and his sen- 
atorship. In 1880 a special committee of the New York 
legislature was investigating the subject of railroads and in 
its report it mentioned very casually the express companies,. 
whose “rates to the public were not for want of time in- 
quired into.”® The express business was extremely profit- 
able and a practical monopoly was enjoyed by four big com- 
panies: the Adams, the American, Wells-Fargo, and the 
United States Express Company. Platt’s company was the_ 
smallest of these four companies, but it was important 
enough to be considered by the great financiers who were. 
interested in transportation matters.” In 1891, John Wana- 
maker, postmaster general under President Harrison, said in ~ 


5 Annual Report of the Secretary of Treasury, 1919, p. 8. 

6 Report, p. 13. 

7 Interstate Commerce Commission, First Annual Report on Sta- 
tistics of Express Companies in the United States for the year end- 
ing June 30, 1909. See also A. W. Atwood, “The Great Express 
Monopoly,” American Mag., LXXI (1911), 764. 


288 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


his annual report, “In point of fact there are but four 
‘strong objections to the parcels post and they are the four 
great express companies.” ® ‘They continued to be “objec- 
tions” as long as Platt remained a power in politics. In fact, 
not only was there no parcel post until after Platt’s death, 
but the express companies were not even subject to investi- 
gation by the Interstate Commerce Commission until 1906 
when Platt’s power as a political manager had been broken 
and Roosevelt was securely in the saddle. In 1909 a suit 
brought against Platt by one of the stockholers of his com- 
pany showed that for half a dozen years or so his company 
had violated both the state and federal anti-trust laws.? 
Was there any prosecution by state or federal officers dur- 
ing this time? When this condition was revealed by the 
report of the Interstate Commerce Commission and the at- 
torney general of the state (who was a Democrat) threat- 
ened to bring a suit against the three companies which had 
pooled their interests, appearances were mended.!® Need- 
less to say this event occurred long after Platt’s political 
power had begun to wane. 

Senator Platt proudly dubbed himself the “Begging 
Chief” and asserted that, inasmuch as he had only a limited 
income, “it was therefore a duty and a pleasure, when party 
exigencies arose, to solicit donations from men abundantly 
able to give, and to whose vital interest it was that the party 
supremacy be sustained.’”’!4 There were none of Platt’s field 
marshals who showed any inclinations to dispute this dis- 


8 P. 114. 

9 Dudley v. Platt, 118 New York Sup. 1058. 
10 A. W. Atwood. loc. cit. 

11 Op. cit., p. 532. 


THE CORRUPT ALLIANCE 289 


tinction claimed by their chief; in fact, upon several occa- 
sions Odell made it emphatic that up to 1904 Senator Platt 
had always gathered the great bulk of the campaign funds, 
together.!* In describing his governorship, Roosevelt said: 


In New York State, United States Senator Platt was the 
absolute boss of the Republican party. “Big Business” was 
back of him; yet at the time this, the most important ele- 
ment in his strength, was only imperfectly understood. It 
was not until I was elected governor that | myself came to 
understand it. . .. But_big business men contributed tou. 
him large sums_of money, which enabled him to keep. his 
grip on as e machine and secured for them the help of the’ 
mac éy were threatened with advéerselesistation., 
fibtitions were given in the guise of contributions 
for campaign purposes, of money for the good of the party; 
when the money was contributed there was rarely talk of 
special favors in return. It was simply put into Mr. Platt’s 
hands and treated by him as in the campaign chest. Then 
he distributed it in the districts where it was most needed 
by the candidates and the organization leaders. Ordinarily 
no pledge was required from the latter to the bosses, any’ 
more than it was required by the business men from Mr. 
Platt or his lieutenants.¥ 






Qn t stood the government with favors to 
grant and with burdens to impose, while on the other_ stood. 
the corporations anxious for favors and not averse to escap- 
ing burdens. The government and the corporations were 
both forms of social organization in which the few tended 
to dominate. The temptations which confronted the leaders 
in politics and industry were many, especially considering 
the secrecy and freedom from restrain with which their 


12 Legislative life insurance investigation, Testimony, IV. 3154; 
Barnes v. Roosevelt, p. 1836. 


18 Op. cit., pp. 274-75. 
19 ; 


290 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


powers were exercised.4* Platt franklydeferded the sys- 
tem throughout his entire public career. Roosevelt-himself 


admitted that he did not understand the inner workings of 
the system in the early part of his career but in his later 


years he denounced it upon several occasions as the “corrupt 
alliance.” Se 

14 F. J. Goodnow, Politics and Administration (New York, 1900), 
252; Fuller, op. cit., p. 139; H. Croly, The Promise of American 
Life (New York, 1909), pp. 117ff. 


CHAPTER XI 


PLATT’S DECLINE AND ROOSEVELT’S CAPTURE 
OF THE ORGANIZATION 


In the closing weeks of the year 1900 Thomas C. Platt 
must have looked with some satisfaction upon his achieve- 
ments as leader of the Republican organization in the state 
of New York. Had not the troublesome Roosevelt been 
“shelved” in the vice-presidency? Had not Odell, an or- 
ganization man, been elected governor of the state? Had 
not McKinley, the “most tender-hearted man in politics,” 
been re-elected president of the United States for another 
term of four years? Were there not three years left to his 
own term as United States senator and did he not have the 
amiable companionship of Depew at Washington? Was 
not his tried and trusted friend, Colonel Dunn, who from 
his work as railroad commissioner knew every corner of 
the state; chairman of the Republican state committee? ? 
Had not his friend at Albany, Speaker Nixon, demonstrated 
his superior ability as a parliamentarian? Were not his 
friends in New York, who were “abundantly able to give,” 
making money faster than ever? Apparently he had no 
cause for worry about state or federal appointments, about 
legislation at Washington or Albany, about party primaries 
or the state committee, about campaign funds or election 
workers. What other matters concerned him as a manager 
of a state party? Like Hill in 1892 and like other “bosses’” 
of his own day, Platt thought in terms of his organization 
and failed to realize that his organization might defeat itself, © 


=e St was elected chairman in QOdell’s place on November 17, 


291 


292. BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


Platt had had his difficulties with Governor Roosevelt, but 
in December, 1900, little did he dream that Odell, the first 
“organization” governor that ‘he had ever “elected,” would 
cause him more trouble than any man he ever had in the 
governor’s chair. Platt had “breakfasted” with the Goy- 
‘ernor-elect Odell before his inauguration and evidently 
thought that matters would run smoothly. Since he was 
getting on in years, he had turned over many things to. 
Odell. Imagine his surprise when Governor Odell, in one 
of his first official acts, asserted his ‘ ‘independence”’ in un- 
mistakable. terms. rir had understood that he would be™ 

‘consulted” with reference to the selection of a superintend- 
ent of public works, but the governor appointed to this of- 
fice, Charles S$. Boyd, a personal friend of his, without a 
word to Platt beforehand. Even Roosevelt had not done 
anything like this. While Platt covered up this blow, he 
was unable to hide the damaging effect of the next. One of 
his “favorite” measures had always been a metropolitan 
police measure which vested the control of the New York 
Police Department in the state government, and in 1901 the 
scandals of “Deveryism” seemed to give an excuse for the 
passage of such a drastic act. Unlike Governor Roosevelt, 
Governor Odell refused even to “confer” over the matter 
and issued a public statement announeing that he would veto 
such a measure.2 Although the break was unmistakable, 
Platt kept on insisting that there was no “dissension” be- 
tween him and the Governor. 

~When Platt thought that he had “shelved” Roosevelt in 
the vice-presidency, he had evidently neglected for the mo- 


2 Platt, op. cit., p. 423. 


8 New York Tribune, March 22, 23, 1901; Nation, March 28, 1901, 
LXXII, 249; Platt, op. cit., pp. 424-30. 


4New York Tribune, December 29, 1901. 


PLATT’S:. DECLINE 293 


ment the possibilities of that office. Although the assassina- 
tion of Garfield some twenty years before had caused hith 
great embarrassment and grief, it is hard to see how the 
assassination of McKinley caused him any less. Theodore 
Roosevelt, president of the United States! What would - 
happen to the federal patronage in New York? To federal 
legislation affecting corporations and big business? Platt’ 
was not kept in suspense very long, for he and the new 
president soon clashed over the perennial source of fac- 
tional controversy, the New York Custom-house. The 
President informed the Senator that he had decided to let 
Collector Bidwell go. When Platt and Depew perceived’ 
that the president was determined, they did not appeal to 
“senatorial courtesy” nor did they threaten to resign. Platt 
had learned much in twenty years, and besides he was “con- 
sulted” with reference to Bidwell’s successor. The cases 
were “different.” 5 Shortly after this incident another dis- 
agreement occurred over the reorganization of the immigra- 
tion office in New York. The commissioner in charge of 
the station in Ellis Island and his deputy got into a quarrel 
with the commissioner general of immigration. Roose- 
velt resolved to make a clean sweep of both offices. Platt 
objected, but Roosevelt was again firm and the Senator’s 
“leadership” received another set-back.6 Less spectacular 
than these assaults upon Platt’s organization but neverthe- 
less of great importance to him were the extensions of the 
competitive system, the changes in the civil service rules, and 
the improved efficiency in the execution of the Civil Service 


5 Bidwell was retained until the expiration of his vacation ap- 
pointment on April 1, 1902. See New York Tribune, November 16, 
1901 and F. E. Leupp, The Man Roosevelt (New York, 1904), p. 
130. 

SLeupp, op. cit. p. 134 and New York Tribune, Mar. 15, Apr. 
13, 1902, ; 


294. BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


Law brought about by the new president.’?. These inroads 
‘into the federal patronage so weakened the Senator’s posi- 
tion in the city of New York that at the “suggestion” of 
President Roosevelt, he co-operated with the other anti- 
.Tammany elements in 1901 to bring about the election of 
Seth Low as mayor of Greater New York,® thus repudiating 
in part the position taken by the Republican organization 
in 1897. The new president, himself a New Yorker, began 
to wield a powerful influence in state affairs. As Platt 
said, Roosevelt in some of his methods of dealing with pub- 
lic problems was the “direct antithesis of McKinley.” % 

At the State Convention held in September, 1902, Platt, for 
the first time in fourteen years, failed to live up to Barnes’ 
definition of a state leader. He was not nor did he claim to 
be the “most active operating force” in that convention. 
About two and a half weeks before the convention met, it 
was announced in the papers that Platt and Odell had agreed 
upon the state ticket and that their choice for lieutenant- 
governor was George R. Sheldon, a New York banker.!® 
There was no question as to Odell’s renomination for gov- 
ernor. On the eve of the convention certain newspapers 
made comments upon Sheldon’s career as a “trust” pro- 
moter which tended to imperil his “availability.” Alarmed 
by the popular disproval of trusts that Roosevelt helped to 
foster, Odell let it be known that he would not run with 
Sheldon. But Platt held fast to the prearranged ticket and 
said to Sheldon, “If he (Odell) wants to get off the ticket, 
let him.” #4 Odell was willing enough to confer with Platt, 


7 Poulke, op. cit., chap. xii. 

8 Barnes v. Roosevelt, p. 756, Roosevelt's testimony with reference 
to conferences that he brought about between Low, Platt, and Odell 
with reference to the affairs of Greater New York. 

9 Op. cit., p. 402.4 

10 New York Hetald, September 6, 1902. 

11 New York Herald, September 24, 1902. 


PLATT’S DECLINE 295 


and it was said that he showed great tact in doing so. On 
the other hand, Platt did not show that command of himself 
which had been one of his striking characteristics, and when 
he saw that Odell had the upper hand, he became petulant. 
The newspapers said that Platt was forced to request Shel- 
don to withdraw; in his Autobiography, Platt maintained 
that he was “loyal” to Sheldon to the end and never made 
any such request. Whichever account is true, the central 
fact remained that Platt had been beaten openly upon the 
floor of the convention and had left no avenue for retreat: 
The federal and the state patronage had turned the tide 
against “the old man.” In the following election it was al* 
leged that Platt and those who clung to him “knifed” the 
Republican ticket,” but this seems improbable to the writer. 
Although Odell was elected by a very narrow margin of 
less than 8,000 votes, the Republican candidate for the Court 
of Appeals was defeated, an event which the Nation re- 
garded as a “direct slap” in Platt’s face.48 Besides, Platt 
could not have afforded to cut the head of the ticket without 
endangering the state legislature which was to elect a United 
States senator at the expiration of his term the following, 
year. 

At the beginning of year 1903, Platt could still say that he 
had some “influence.”’ He had had a conference with the 
Governor regarding the annual message to the legislature. 
With reference to the senatorship, State Chairman Dunn 
had said, “There is a tremendous sentiment in the Republi- 
can organization, which Mr. Platt will not resist when he 
realizes its magnitude.” * A year and a half before the 


12 Platt, op. cit., p. 440. In support of this claim it can be cited 
that Odell took charge of his own campaign a few days before the® 
election and that certain Platt organs in New York published scare 
stories regarding the outcome of the election, 

18 Nov. 6, 1902, LXXV, 253. 

14 New York Tribune, December 9, 1902, 


296 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


Senator had admitted that he was tired of his duties at 
‘Washington partly because of advancing age,’ but when he 
saw a chance to reassert his “leadership” by a re-election in 
1903, he fulfilled Chairman Dunn’s prophesy and responded 
to that “tremendous sentiment.” If there was any such 
“sentiment,” it failed to find expression in the caucus which 
selected him, for in that solemn meeting no speeches were 
given and a funeral atmosphere pervaded as if most of the 
legislators expected their nominee to die soon.’® Platt was 
not, as he claimed, the unanimous choice of all the Republi- 
cans when the final vote was taken in the legislature.” The 
fact that he was re-elected at all may be explained upon the 
ground that he was still in a position to “help certain men 
out” around election time. Then, too, Roosevelt and Odell 
\did not wish as yet to make a complete break with the man 
who had been so intimately connected with their political 
beginnings. 

If Platt thought that his re-election would be a vindica- 
tion, he was soon disappointed. The very legislature which 
had elected him turned around three months later and dealt 
him a “mortal blow.” When the term of Platt’s railroad 
commissioner, Frank M. Baker, expired in April, Odell sent 
Baker’s name to the state Senate for a reappointment, ac- 
cording to his agreement with Platt. The rejection of the 
nomination by the Senate was regarded by some as “conclu- 
sive proof of the ending of the domination of the old Repub- 
lican machine,” in that the governor had beaten Platt at his 
own game.}8 At any rate, Platt was not immediately suc- 
cessful in covering the wound, and he could not conceal the 


15 Jhid., June 16, 1901. 

16 New York Herald, January 20, 1903. 

17 Of the Republicans 111 voted for Platt and 3 for Root; the 
78 Democrats all voted for Stanchfield. For Platt’s assertion, see 
op. cit., p. 441. 

18 Nation, April 23, 1903, LXXVI, 325. 


FLAT EE SoDECLINE 297 


damaging effect that some of Odell’s appointments had upon 
his prestige.?® 

When the “vindicated” senator took up his senatorial 
duties again, he found a few more surprises in store for 
him. Among other things of a discouraging nature, he re- 
ceived a “letter of regrets” from President Roosevelt on the 
subject of a judicial appointment in New York, which ran 
in part as follows: 


You say that “if Mr. H.’s appointment follows this pro- 
test, I shall view it with absolute disgust. I shall, moreover, 
experience a diminuation of that interest in public affairs 
that has been for so many years a vital element of my life.’ 

This, my dear Senator, seems hardly worthy of you. I 
cannot believe that you seriously mean that if I should, after 
careful and conscientious thought, conclude to nominate a 
man recommended as Mr. H. is recommended, and standing 
as high as I know him to stand, you would feel like losing 
interest in public affairs. My life has been much shorter 
than yours, yet I have seen a good many appointments made 
to federal position, during the last twenty years, of which I 
by no means approve. But it never occurred to me, on ac- 
count of any or all of those appointments, to refuse longer 
to take an interest in public affairs. 

Finally, my dear Senator, you say: “TE you cherish the 
belief that Mr. H. will be able to accomplish the political re 
sults that you have in mind, I simply wish to express the 
opinion that he cannot, and, moreover, will not, meet your 
expectations.” 

IT am wholly at a loss to know what you mean by this sen- 
tence. The political results I shall have in mind if I ap- 
point Mr. H. are those that I hope will follow the appoint- 
ment of a first class man whom the community in general 
and the bar in particular will accept as a first class man in» 


19 An Odell adherent took Baker’s place. McCullagh, Platt’s head 
of the. New York Bureau of Elections also failed to receive gy re- 
appointment. Later on Baker was again nominated and his nomi- 
nation was confirmed. 


a 


298 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


point of character and ability, and whose aoe ee they 


will feel reflects credit upon the bench. 


One can imagine Platt saying, “Governor Roosevelt would 
never have written stich a letter.” To which an impartial 


observer might have rejoined, “Nor would you, Senator 


Platt, in those days have shown yourself so querulous and 


.peevish, nor would you have talked so openly of the ‘politi- 


cal results’ of a judicial appointment.” Things had changed. 
In connection with this very appointment Roosevelt wrote 
to another congressman, saying that he wanted to support 
both Platt and Odell and take the advice of both, but when 
he was convinced that the advice of both was wrong, he 
acted as he pleased! What constitutional right had a 
governor to be “consulted” with reference to federal ap- 
pointments? Senator Platt may have mused over this point 
when he thought that the federal patronage was used against 
him. 

Shortly after the letter cited above was written, another 
incident occurred which must have raised doubts in Platt’s 
mind as to whether he really was the senior senator from 
New York. In March, 1903, Platt persuaded Roosevelt to 
send in the name of William H. Plimley for the assistant 
treasureship at New York. The President later admitted 
that he knew nothing about Plimley until the Senator pro- 
posed his name. At the time this nomination was passed 
upon favorably by the Finance Committee, Aldrich, of 
Rhode Island, the chairman of the committee, was in New 
York. When he came back to Washington, he moved that 


the nomination be recommitted. Entirely off their guard, 


Platt and Depew agreed; whereupon, to their amazement, 
charges were filed against Plimley. Aldrich, of course, 
knew all the time this would happen. The adverse com- 


20 Bishop, op. cit., I, 235-36, 
1 Roosevelt, op. cit., p. 359. 





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PLATT’S DECLINE 299 


ment was so strong that Roosevelt withdrew Plimley’s name, 
and Platt had another reason for losing “that interest he had 
shown in public affairs.” ® 
In 1904 the collapse of Platt’s “leadership” was well- ~ 

nigh complete. As step by step he lost control of important 
elements in his old state organization, he tried desperately 
to cover up his humiliation. Thus, when Governor Odell’ 
supplanted Colonel Dunn as chairman of the state com- 
mittee, Depew and other extorted from the ‘“Governor- 
Chairman” an acknowledgment of Platt’s “active” leader- 
ship. This acknowledgment did not conceal the fact that 
President Roosevelt “recognized” Odell as the new head of 
the New York organization nor did it cover up the fact that 
the Senator had lost “influence” at Albany.* Similarly the 
New York delegation to the Republican National Conven- 
tion of 1904 was willing to choose Platt as its “head” and to~ 
applaud him as the “peerless leader,” but, when it came to< 
choose its national committeeman, it selected a man who was 
close to Odell. These and other inroads into the Senator’s 
powers account in part for the sweeping victory scored by 
the Roosevelt-Odell forces in the state convention held in. 
September. Platt had declared himself in favor of the nom- 
ination of Root for governor. Root declined to allow his 
name to be considered, and Platt then came out for Wood- 
ruff, one of the few remaining field-marshals of the old 
régime who had not been “dragooned” into Odell’s camp. 
As if to make the issue more clearly defined; Platt declared 
that any candidate with “an Odell tag” on his was fore- 
doomed to defeat. After consulting Hendricks, President 


2Leupp, op. cit., p. 128; Thompson, op. cit., pp. 120ff; New York 
Tribune, Mar. 11, 17, 15, 18 and 19, 1903. 

3 New York Tribune, Mar. 21, 1904; Platt, op. cit., p. 450. 

4Thompson, op. cit., pp. 104-5. 

5 Platt, op. cit., p. 454; Nation, December 22, 1904, 

6 Nation, Sept. 22, 1904, LXXIX, 227, 


300 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


Roosevelt’s trusted adviser in New York affairs, Odell 
‘ picked as his candidate Lieutenant-Governor Frank W. Hig- 
gins, who, according to Platt’s account, had stood long under 
‘Odell ‘without hitching.” Odell suggested a conference 
and asked Platt to attend, but the Senator hotly replied, 
“Not by a damned sight,” 7 so the two carried their struggle 
into the convention where all could see the old man’s “lead- 
ership” torn up by the roots. What chance had Platt 
against the “entire influence” of the national administra- 
tion? In the campaign, that followed, Odell assumed full 
charge of everything from the collecting of the funds to the 
making of a card index of the voters, and when his candi- 
date was elected, he declared that he had been “vindicated” 
in spite of the fact that the election turned largely upon the 
popularity of Roosevelt.§ 

When Odell was about to lay down his duties as governor, 
his political power seemed invincible; he was chairman of 
the state committee, he had “influence” in the state legisla- 
ture, and he had shown his mastery of two state conven- 
tions. What else did he need to establish his prowess as a 
political manager? A United States senator. Already he 
discovered a “tremendous sentiment” in favor of former 
Governor Black as Depew’s successor.? At this point Platt 
attempted his last display of his old time power. He began 
working for Depew by issuing interviews in his old style, 
seeing legislators, and reviving his “Sunday-school.” How 
much his activities actually influenced the situation, it is dif- 
ficult to say. The great financial powers were almost solidly 
behind Depew. When someone convinced Odell that he must 


7 Platt, op. cit., pp. 454-59. 

8 Nation, November 17, 1904. Although Higgins had a plurality 
of 80,560 he was nearly 100,000 votes behind Roosevelt. The figures 
were: Roosevelt 859,533; Parker, 683,981; Higgins, 813,264; Her- 
rick, 732,704. 

9 Nation, December 22, 1904, 


PLATT’S DECLINE 301 


retreat and come out for Depew, Platt was in a position to 
assert some of his former claims to glory. Harriman; 
Roosevelt, and Higgins have each been held responsible for 
Odell’s ignominious retreat upon the senatorship.® There 
is evidence that indicates that Roosevelt was one of those 
who made a sudden shift on this question. Whatever the 
“active operating force,” it was soon obvious that Odell’s 
retreat did not mean Platt’s advance, and the Senator openly 
declared that he had lost that interest in “public affairs” 
which had been such a vital element in his life. 

Odell assumed the leadership of the Republican state or- 


ganization tinder mtich-more-diffcult circumstances than had™ 


confronted his predecessor. The party had been in power 
long enough to accumulate a record which was very vulner- 
able in many spots. Of even more significance was the fact 
that Republican voters no longer viewed with complacency 
the claims and activities of the “organization.” Odell was 


stigmatized as the “Governor-Chairman” and placed by. 


some in a category along side of David B. Hill. The 
charges made regarding campaign funds aroused grave sus- 
picions. Moreover, the outcome of the struggle between 
Platt and Odell had left some bitter resentments. These 


feelings and suspicions furnished a fruitful soil for the 


growth of that popular revolt which followed the revelations 
of the life insurance investigation begun in the latter part of 
1905. The confessions of Senators Platt and Depew and 
of Chairman Odell before the Armstrong Committee dis- 
illusioned many, even in the most rock-ribbed Republican 
communities, as to the real nature of the system which their 


10 Platt claimed that Harriman was responsible, op. cit., pp. 460ff; 
but see the letter that Harriman wrote to Webster, Joc. cit. The 
Nation claimed that Higgins was responsible, Jan. 5, 1905. See 
also Thompson, of. cit., p. 107. 

11 George Kennan, &. H. Harriman: A Biography (New York, 
1927), 11, 181-97. 


302 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


votes had supported for so long. This material was seized 
‘upon eagerly by the type of journal which had already in- 
creased its circulation during Roosevelt’s administration by 
digging up exposures of other unsightly practices in business: 
and politics. While the Republican editors did not go as. 
ar in their denunciations of the old régime as some of the 
writers in McClure’s, they could not escape commenting 
upon uncontrovertible evidence. There were even demands 
that Senators Platt and Depew resign. President Roose- 
velt was not the one to ignore such an upheaval in public 
sentiment, and he therefore broke with Odell and chose as 
his representatives in the state, Governor Higgins, whom 
Odell had not found to be “subservient,” and Herbert Par- 
sons, the newly elected congressman from New York City, 
‘who owed nothing to the old organization except the sup- 
port that he had gained by coming out against it.1® 
The completeness of the change wrought by the events of 
1905 was revealed in the Republican caucus of 1906 which 
chose a successor to Speaker Nixon, who had died the pre- 
vious fall. Nuixon’s death was one of the causes of Odell’s 
decline in politics.4 Odell’s candidate for Nixon’s place 
received just fourteen votes. The election of Wadsworth as 
speaker was sufficient to convince men like Woodruff, Dunn, 
Barnes, and Fassett, who had once gone to the Fifth Avenue 
Hotel for instructions, to go thereafter to the White House 
or to Higgins for “advice.” The legislative session of 


12See the article by Phillips in the Cosmopolitan, loc. cit., B. J. 
Hendrick, “The Story of Life Insurance,” McClure’s Mag., XXVIU, 
36. For the attitude of the New York World, see Heaton, op. cit., 
chap. XIV, “Equitable Corruption.” ffl 

13 New York Tribune, July 11, 13, Nov. 17, 22, 26, 30, Dec. 7, 22, 
29, 1905. 

14 Interview with Professor R. C. E. Brown. 

15 New York Tribune, Jan. 3, 14, 22; May 6, 1906;. Thompsoti, 
op. cit., pp. 400-401. Wadsworth turned out to be an organization 
man. 


PLATT’'S DECLINE 303 


1906 passed several notable bills which were in themselves 
indications of a changing order. The way for the eighty/ 
cent gas bill, the insurance reform laws, and the corrupt; 
practices act had been carefully prepared by Charles E. 
Hughes, the able counsel for two legislative investigating » 
committees. Under these laws, greater protection was ex- 
tended to policy holders, corporations were prohibited from’ 
making political contributions, and the activities of lobbyists: 
were curtailed. 

Insurance reform not only marked Odell for defeat but 
it also made Hughes the logical candidate for governor. In’ 
his Autobiography Platt denies that he had any connection, 
with the events which took place at Saratoga in September, 
1906. Contemporary accounts, however, give evidence of 
an QOdell-Platt alliance in the months immediately preced? 
ing the memorable convention.® The primary elections 
clearly indicated that Odell and Platt were playing a losing 
game. As one Republican editor expressed it, “The Repub- 
lican primaries held in the large cities Tuesday resulted in 
a sweeping victory for Governor Higgins and President 
Roosevelt. and a crushing defeat for Chairman Benjamin> 
B. Odell and his followers throughout the state.” !7_ In New. 
York, Herbert Parsons, the new chairman of the county. 
committee, won a decisive victory over Quigg, backed by 
Odell and by what was commonly known as the “corpora- 
tion pirates.”#8 In Kings County, Woodruff, leading the 
Higgins forces, administered a stinging defeat to Dady who 
led the fight for Odell. The victorious Roosevelt-Higgins 
forces in other parts of the state were led by men like Butler 


16 New York Tribune, July 12, 13, 20, 1906; Platt, op. cit., p. 
462; Independent, August 9, 1906, LXI, 340. 

17 Lyons Republican, Sept. 21, 1906. Charles H. Betts, the edi- 
tor, denounced Odell in a meeting of the state committee, New 
York Tribune, Aug. 16, 1906. 

18 Buffalo Evening News, Sept. 10, 1906, 


304 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


_and Greiner of Buffalo, Barnes of Albany, Hendricks of 
' Syracuse, and Aldridge of Rochester. While the primaries 
- made it plain that one of these leaders would supplant Odell, 
it was not so clear that they would nominate Hughes until 
‘at the end of an all night deadlock Parsons brought a mes- 
,sage from Roosevelt to the effect that in Roosevelt’s judg- 
ment Hughes should be nominated for governor. The in- 
/ fluence of the national administration was decisive. The 
next morning Hughes was nominated by the convention, and 
‘the new state committee elected Woodruff as its chairman 
in place of the discredited Odell.”° 

The campaign of 1906 was somewhat different from the 
kind to which the organization Republicans had grown ac- 
customed and it is probable that they viewed it with some 
misgivings. Hughes started out by promising a discussion 
_of state issues only. He declared that the supreme issue of 
the campaign was not an issue of Republican principles or 
of Democratic principles, but “the vital issue of decent gov- 
‘ernment, an issue which should array on one side all lovers 
of truth, of sobriety, and of honest reform, whether they 
were Republicans, Democrats, or Independents” and that 
his only ambition was to give the state a “sane, efficient 
and honorable administration free from taint of bossism or 
of servitude to any private interests.” The politicians who 
had been accustomed to hide behind national issues in a 
state campaign could get little comfort from such words as 
these. Another innovation in this campaign was the direct 
appeal to the voters for funds to take the place of the con- 


\ 18 Butler was the editor of the Buffalo Evening News. For his 
attacks upon Committeeman Warren, editor of the Buffalo Com- 
mercial, who supported Odell, see issues of September 17, 22, 1906. 
Greiner was the Postmaster of Buffalo. 
20 New York Tribune, September 25, 27, 1906; Platt, op. cit., 
p. 462. 
1 Addresses, pp. 14-15; New York Tribune, October 3, 1906, 


PLATT’S DECLINE 305 


tributions obtained from corporations in previous cam- 
paigns.* The climax of this strange campaign came when 
President Roosevelt sent Elihu Root, his chief cabinet offi- 
cer, to attack William R. Hearst, the Democratic candidate, 
in a bitter speech at Utica. Thus aided by the power of the 
President, who was then at the summit of his popularity, 
Hughes was elected, but his Republican colleagues upon 
the state ticket, largely organization men, fell by the way- 
side.* 

The sort of campaigning that Hughes believed in did not 
end with election day. He was no sooner inaugurated tham 
he started to make speeches in various parts of the state 
upon the subject of adequate regulation of public utility 
corporations, agitation concerning which had been started in 
Governor Roosevelt’s administration. Hughes’ aim was to 
arouse the public consciousness so that the people would 
bring pressure to bear upon their representatives to pass 
such laws as would “remove the causes of unrest which lie 
in the abuse of public privilege.” * This method of making 
direct appeal to the people over the heads of the legislators 
was called “tyrannical” and “dictatorial” by Platt who had, 
been accustomed to less obtrusive practices. ‘“Dictatorial” 
or not, the Hughes tactics secured the passage of several 
thoroughgoing laws which placed the regulation of public 
service companies in New York upon a new basis. The first 
function performed by one of the commissions created by 
those laws was a detailed investigation of the New York 


2 New York Tribune, September 29, 1906. 


3. New York Tribune, November 2, 1906; Independent, Novem- 
ber 8, 1906, LXI, 1075. 

4 Hughes 749,002; Hearst 673,268; Hughes’ plurality 75,734. The 
Democratic candidate for lieutenant-governor won by a plurality of _ 
5,574 votes. 

5 Addresses, p. 101 et passim. 

6 Op. cit., pp. 464-65. 

20 


306 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


traction system, in which Quigg was brought forward as 
‘an “accelerator of public opinion.” Quigg’s methods, how- 
ever, like those of his employers, could not stand the kind 
‘of publicity that Hughes, aided by the muckrakers, was 
‘giving them. In fact, Quigg admitted that profits were not 
\ what they once had been.’ 

The next outstanding victory that Governor Hughes won 

by his “dictatorial” methods was the passage of the anti- 
race-track gambling laws. It will be remembered that the 
laws passed during Governor Morton’s administration os- 
tensibly to carry out the constitutional mandate upon this 
question had failed to provide for penalties. Governors 
Black, Roosevelt, and Odell had done nothing to change this 
‘situation. The race track gamblers had become thoroughly 
entrenched through an alliance with the agricultural socie- 
ties and with certain organization legislators, but many did 
not approve of the arrangement and a considerable number 
responded to the Governor’s ringing messages and speeches 
calling for action. Legislators were deluged with letters, 
some were denounced in public meetings, and some were 
made to see what they would fail of re-election if they did 
not uphold the reform program.§ Against the bitter oppo- 
sition of both the old-line Republicans and Democrats, the 
bills were finally passed. 

The events of Governor Hughes’ first administration so 
jolted the “Old-Guard” Republican organization that in the 
_ State Convention of 1908 there was no one who was a “most 

active operating force” in the sense that Odell and Platt had 
been. Instead there was a league of minor “bosses” who 
seemed unable to unite upon any common policy or to with- 


7 See above p. 270. 


8j. O. Hammitt, “An Awakening in New York State,” Inde- 
pendent, Oct. 1, 1908, LXV, 758. 


PLATT’S: DECLINE 307 


stand pressure from the national administration. As one of 
them put it a week before the convention: 


In the old days, I would go down to New York and see 
Senator Platt and find out what was going to happen. Then* 
I would come back and get the boys in line. But now I go 
to New York and I learn nothing. I ask the man who, ac- 
cording to the old system, ought to know and he tells me 
something. When I get on the train I find myself thinking 
it over, and likely as not when I am an hour out of New 
York I have made up my mind that the big man has told me 
wrong. 

Some of the “big men” of the party had boasted before 
the state convention that they would “turn Hughes down” as > 
they had in the national convention, but when they came to 
the test, they stood up one after another and voted for 
Hughes. What did they fear? There had been post card 
canvasses before the convention, the people were aroused, 
and again, Roosevelt’s endorsement of Hughes had exerted. 
great influence.!® Roosevelt had preferred Taft to Hughes 
for the presidential nomination, but he was too shrewd a. 
politician to let the “bosses” shelve so popular a candidate. 
In the election of 1908 more people in the state voted in the 
gubernatorial than in the presidential contest. Hughes’ plu- 
rality was considerably less than Taft’s, but Roosevelt could 
claim that he had had a part in preventing the “Old Guard” 
from doing to Hughes what it had done to him in 1900.% ~ 

The next year the official careers of Platt and Roosevelt 
ended. When Roosevelt retired from the presidency on 
March 3, 1909, he was at the peak of his popularity. The 


9 Jbid., p. 760. 
10 Heaton, op. cit., pp. 234, 237. 
11 President—Taft, R. ..... 870,770 plurality 202,602 
Bryan, D. ... 667,468 
Governor—Hughes, R. .. 804,651 plurality 69,462 
Chandler, D. 735,189. 


308. BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


tremendous Taft majority was, in part, an endorsement of 
/ his policies. On the other hand, Platt’s retirement from the 
United States Senate was practically unnoticed. For more 
‘than three years, Senator Platt had been a pathetic figure at 
/ Washington, old, infirm, unable to walk without assistance, 
neglected, without influence or prestige, an unwilling witness 
of the first stages of disintegration and decay in the organi- 
zation which had been the pride of his former days. As 
the aged Senator stepped down to make way for Elihu Root, 
he had to take what comfort he could in the memories re- 
‘vived by the Albany Evening Journal.® The papers which 
praised Roosevelt were hostile to the things which Platt 
represented. 
_ About the same time that Platt and Roosevelt were mak- 
‘ing their exit from American official life, Governor Hughes 
‘levied a vigorous attack upon the old convention system. 
The “dictatorial” Governor was pointing out the dangers of 
the game “on the political chess board” which Platt had 
played and Roosevelt had, up to that time, tolerated. He 
said in part: 


But the most serious consequences is to the people at 
large. To the extent that party machinery can be dominated 
by the few, the opportunity for special interests which de- 
sires to control the administration of government, to shape 
the laws to prevent the passage of laws, or to break the 
laws with impunity, is increased. These interests are 
ever at work stealthily and persistently endeavoring to per- 
vert the government to the service of their own ends. All 
that is worst in our public life finds its readiest means of ac- 
cess to power through the control of the nominating ma- 
chinery of parties. Party organization needs constantly to 
defend itself from these encroachments, and the people for 


12 Wheeler, op. cit., p. 124. 
138 March 4, 1909. 


PRALS: DECLINE 309 


their proper security must see that the defenses are built as 
strongly as possible.!* 


While Governor Hughes was waging a disheartening 
fight with the “Old Guard” in order to secure the passage 
of a direct primary law, ex-President Roosevelt was abroad 
hunting wild animals and courting European royalties: 
When Roosevelt returned to America, he was persuaded to 
join the fight for the direct primary in the state. The laws 
was not passed, but Roosevelt was committed to a struggle 
with the old order of party affairs which later led to the 
spectacular events of 1912, 

There were several events in 1910 which hastened the 
progress of party reform largely by way of discrediting the 
old style of party management of governmental affairs. The. 
first of these was the investigation demanded by Senator 
Jotham P. Allds. The charges against Allds developed out” 
of the struggle in the state Senate over the selection of @ 
successor to Temporary President John Raines, who had 
died the previous fall. Allds, who had been in the state 
legislature continuously since 1895, was selected as the or- 
ganization candidate for this place. There were murmurs 
against this choice and loudest among the objectors was 
Senator Benn Conger, who after the caucus, told a select 
group that he had seen Allds solicit and receive a bribe in 
1901 for staving off legislation adverse to certain bridge 
companies. On January 18, 1910, Conger reluctantly au- 
thorized a public statement of these charges, and thereupon” 
Senator Allds demanded an investigation.1® The Senate sat 
as a body to consider the charges and on March 29 voted, 


14 State of New York, Public Papers of Governor Hughes (1909), 
p37. 

15 Buffalo Commercial, October 30, 1909, furnishes an illustration_ 
of the suspicions that were aroused, 

16 New York Evening Post. 


310 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


forty to nine, to brand as a blackmailer the very man whom 
it had elevated to its highest honor two months before. 
Allds resigned, but he had been convicted before the bar of 
public opinion long before his resignation. In commenting 

_upon the testimony a month before, the Independent had 
said: 


,» Both men have testified fully and without contradiction, 
and everyone believes he has told the truth. To one man, 
now dead, $4,000 was given for distribution. To the speak- 
er of the house, Mr. Nixon, as testified to, $1,000 was paid, 
and as much to Mr. Allds. And this continued year after 
year and men chosen, in theory to make wise laws for the 
state, made trade of their office, and amassed fortunes. 
What worse crime, what more shameful perversion of a 
trust could be conceived.?” 


Thomas C. Platt died on March 6, 1910, while the Allds ~ 


trial was in progress. A few days before Platt’s death, 
Allds’ attorneys had been defending their client upon the 
basis of some letters that Platt had written urging that the 
bills adverse to the bridge companies be held in the Rules 
Committee.® As one newspaper put it, “It is a strange and 
.nothing less than tragic circumstance, that within a few 
days of Mr. Platt’s death the Republican machine, driven at 


‘bay by charges of civic betrayal, with cowardly coldblooded- 


ness sought to shift the blame on Platt. ‘He made me do it’ 
—he, the frail, worn-out old man, with ‘none so poor to do 
him reverence!’”?® Tragic or not, the Allds affair was 
coupled with Platt’s obituaries.2® Editorials on Platt’s 
career were used as indictments of the old system. 
Shortly after Platt’s death and while the Allds investiga- 


-1 February 24, 1910, LX VIII, 424, “Yellow Dogs.” 

18 See above, p. 159. 

19 Buffalo Commercial, March 7, 1910. 

20 See the New York Tribune for March 7, 1910 and New York 
Evening Post, New York Times, New York Sun, for the same date. 


Se 


PLATT’S DECLINE 311 


tion was still pending, the “Old Guard” received a jolt from 
another quarter. The State Superintendent of Insurancé 
began to inquire into the methods used by the representa- 
tives of the fire insurance companies to stave. off “strike” 
bills, and he soon discovered that they, like the life insurance 
companies, had had “legal expenses” at Albany. In par- 
ticular, he found that a bill had passed the legislature in 
1901 which cost the New York Board of Fire Underwriters 
some $13,311, of which $5,000 was given to the Republican™ 
state committee, while the remainder went to influential poli-- 
ticians. One of these influential politicians was State Com- 
mitteeman Aldridge who had accepted a check of $1,000 for 
the “benefit of the Monroe County organization.”! This 
disclosure did not deter Aldridge from nominating himself 
as the Republican candidate for the special congressional 
election which was held one month later. Flushed with a 
local victory that he had won the previous fall, Aldridge ~ 
thought that his organization was invincible. The campaign — 
that followed was one of unusual bitterness and heat and 
attracted nation-wide attention. At the polls, Aldridge, the 
“Old Guard” régime in the state, and the Republican tariff 
received a crushing rebuke.? 

Following the revelations made in the Allds affair and in 
the investigation started by the Superintendent of Insur- 
ance, Governor Hughes made a recommendation to the legis- 
lature that a wide sweeping investigation be made by a legis- 
lative committee into corrupt practices in the state past and 
present. Upon May 24 such an investigation conimittee 
was appointed and testimony was quickly brought forward 
showing that the Street Railway Association of the state 


1 New York newspapers, March 20, 1910. 


2 New York Sun, April 21, 1910; Owego Times, April 21, 1910; 
Independent, April 28, 1910, LXVIIL, 938. 


312 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


of New York had maintained its “isles of privilege” by 
“debauching” Republican legislators and politicians.® 
Although the accumulative effect of these disclosures was 
to greatly weaken the “Old-Guard” Republican leaders, it 
seemed impossible to dislodge them from their control of 
the governmental and the party machinery. The appoint- 
‘ment of Governor Hughes to the Supreme Court Bench in 
April, 1910, to be effective the following October, gave them 
renewed courage and they successfully blocked the Govy- 
ernor’s last fight for a direct primary bill. The organization 
leaders who had selected Allds for temporary president of 
the state Senate were still not without “influence” at Albany. 
Had not Thomas C. Platt said that Woodruff would have 
-made a “splendid governor” and that there was “no cleverer 
politician in the state’ than Barnes? It was Woodruff, 
chairman of the state committee, and Barnes, chairman of 
the executive committee, who led the battle against the “dic- 
tatorship” of Hughes.* , 

In his last struggle with the legislature over the reform of 
the nomination system, Governor Hughes had enlisted the 
powerful aid of ex-President Roosevelt. Roosevelt had let 
it be known that he was in favor of direct nominations, and 
once in a fight, he was not the one to back down. If the 
“bosses” were not willing to put through the direct primary, 


3 See above p. 265. 


4W. T. A. (Arnt) in the New York Evening Post, September 24, 
1910, said of Barnes: “His hostility to the Governor, which some 
‘people believe is monomania with him, reached its climax at the 

dinner of the Legislative Correspondents’ Association last winter, 
~when he openly insulted Mr. Hughes in his presence, drawing from 
the Governor in reply the most remarkable speech he ever uttered, 
and one which is credited with doing more to shake the Old Guard 
control in the Republican party than anything that has happened.” 

5On June 29th, Roosevelt was in Cambridge as president of the 
Harvard Alumni Association and he there met Hughes who re- 
quested his aid in the fight for primary reform. ; 


PLATT’S. DECLINE 313 


Roosevelt was willing to meet them upon their own ground, 
the state convention. It was widely proposed that Roosevelt. 
be made temporary chairman of the Saratoga Convention 
which was to nominate a Republican candidate for governor; 
When Barnes and Woodruff heard this, it is said that they 
chuckled and set the wheels of the state committee in opera 
tion to select Vice-President Sherman for the position of 
temporary chairman. President Taft’s assent to this pro- 
gram was given on the express condition that Roosevelt’s 
agreement to it should be secured in advance. Roosevelt, 
however, was not consulted in advance and the state com- 
mittee selected Sherman. “To the floor of the conven? 
tion,’ was then the cry of the Roosevelt supporters,® for it. 
was known that Sherman was not only opposed to direct 
nominations and kindred reforms, but he was constantly 
quoted as saying contemptuously that all the sentiment for 
primary election reform in the state of New York had been 
elevated to the United States Supreme Court Bench. 

Upon the eve of the convention, Roosevelt issued the fol- 
lowing statement : 


“The men, who, by trickery, kept control of the state com- 
mittee, and who now come here in the effort to dominate thé’ 
convention, are the very men who are responsible for the_ 
corruption which produced Allds, and for all that has been 
discreditable in the party management, and now these deep- 
ly discredited bosses resent the effort of the people, the 
effort of the plain people who make up the great bulk of the 
Republican party, to rescue that party from the factions 
which have used it only to further their own base and selfish 
purposes.’ 


Chairman Woodruff, according to the time honored cus- 
tom, opened the convention and amid scenes of disorder pre- 
sented the name of James S. Sherman for temporary 


6 Review of Reviews, XLII (1910), 516. 
7 New York newspapers, September 27, 1910. 


314 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


chairman. During the period of Platt’s domination of 

“ Republican politics in the state, the selection of the state 
‘committee for this position had invariably been the choice of 
the convention. This precedent was broken in 1910, for 
»Roosevent was nominated from the floor and elected by a 
vote of 568 to 443. While in this struggle Roosevelt had the 
‘aid of some federal office holders and a few former fol- 
lowers of Platt, the bulk of the “Old-Guard” leaders, the 
natural “heirs” of the “leadership” that had once been 
Platt’s, were opposed to him.’ In his “key-note” speech, 
Roosevelt sounded the battle cry against “the degrading 
alliance of crooked business and crooked politics.” 

The vanquished, thus assailed by Roosevelt, did not bolt 
the convention, but, as they expressed it “laid down cold” 
and let the “new boss” run his own course. While Roose- 
velt was making the “key-note” speech, while he was defend- 
ing the majority report of the committee on resolutions, and 
while he was advocating the nomination of Henry L. Stim- 
son for governor, the “Old-Guard” sat in silence and 
“sneered.” ® This “wrecker of parties,” let him win without 
their help if he could. What profited it a politician to win 
an election, if he had lost control of the nominating machin- 
ery? 

The “Old-Guard” Republican leaders probably took some 
grim satisfaction in the Republican defeat at the polls that 
fall. Theodore Roosevelt had assumed the “responsibility” 
for the first Republican disaster in the state for sixteen 
years. He had captured the organization, but he had not 


8 Tbid., September 28, 1910. 


. 2®One of the Old Guard leaders remarked: “Colonel Roosevelt 
was the star performer at every session of the convention. He 
forced his election as temporary chairman, he mixed it up over 
the platform, he used the steam roller and the big stick when it 
“came to the nomination. Roosevelt is written all over the con- 
vention,’ New York Times, September 29, 1910. 


PLATT’S DECLINE 315 


won over the Republican voters. Some of the Republican 
voters stayed away from the polls because it rained, some 
because there were no carriages to “take them out,” and 


> -“ 


others because they disliked “Rooseveltism.” Roosevelt’s* 


policies alarmed the business men. There were also voters 


who remembered the “fearful story of Republican wrong- 


9) 


doing at Albany,” who remembered the “shameful details” 
of the corrupt practices investigation, the fire insurance in- 
vestigation, the Allds investigation, the investigation of mu- 
nicipal accounts, the investigation of the New York traction 
system, and the life insurance investigation. Even Roosevelt 
could not blot out the memory of the stories that had in- 


volved influential Republicans like Allds, Conger, Aldridge, 


Raines, Nixon, Quigg, Depew, Odell, and Platt. The Re- 


publican ranks were split. For the first time since 1891 a~ 


Democratic legislature and a Democratic governor were 
elected in the state of New York.?? 

With the election of 1910, it may properly be said that a 
political cycle closed in the state of New York. In the early 
nineties the Republicans came into power in the state largely 
because of the popular upheaval against the excesses and 
blunders of the Democratic leaders; in 1910, the Republi- 
cans went out of power largely because of their own indis- 


cretions and dissentions. The political organization in New™ 
York which Thomas C. Platt brought so near to perfection~ 


in the late nineties was founded upon a complacent local’ 
sentiment. As Roosevelt put it, “the conscience of the 
people was in no way or shape aroused.” “Big business” 
was back of Platt; yet at the time this, the most important 
element in his strength, was only imperfectly understood.) 


Gradually by such appeals as Governo evelt made~ 


iS ah, laa ies | a Doane 
10 Dix, D. ............. 689,700 plurality 67,401. 

PAIGE RS law o's si e.8 622,299, 
11 Op. cit., pp. 274, 279, 


910 se ROSS tee A TE OANEMEIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


upon t the franchise tax question, by_such exposures as were 
*made in the insurance. investigation, by..such speeches a: as 
Governor Hughes made-upon the regulation of public 1 utili- 
‘ties, by the fight which both Roosevelt and Hughes made 
for the direct primary. and bythe p publicity. -given.to_all these 
matters in the-press, “the people began to wake up.more and 
more to the fact that the machine politicians were not giving 
them the kind of government. which.they..wished, OLaxtee 
form laws were passed, campaign funds were made public, 
the public utility corporations were brought under stricter 
governmental supervision, and the “isles of privilege’ be- 
came less numerous. While leadership of the managerial 
type is indispensable for any kind of political organization, 
/ the particular methods which Platt employed became dis- 
credited. Platt’s reputation as a political manager is there- 
fore likely to be short-lived. Roosevelt, on the other hand, 
although somewhat of a political manager himself, used 
methods that were frank and open. His championship of 
the cause of honesty in politics is already one of the prized 
heritages of the American people. 


CHAPTER XII 


PERSONAL QUALITIES OF PLATT AND 
ROOSEVELT 


There can be little question that Thomas Collier Platt was 
the established leader of the unofficial government of the’ 
state of New York during Roosevelt’s official headship of. 
that government. As governor, Roosevelt’s duties were 
for the most part set forth in the constitution, the stat= 
utes, and the judicial decisions of the state, but Platt’s duties 
as manager of the Republican party of the state depended 
merely upon party custom and upon personal connections 
with the members of the party hierarchy. Though less os-* 
tensible and less clearly defined than Roosevelt’s leadership, 
Platt’s leadership was nevertheless real. Did a local politi- 
cian want to know the program of the next state conven- 
tion? He went to Platt rather than to Roosevelt. Did a 
factional leader wish to have the stamp of “regularity” put 
upon his organization? He laid his case before Platt. Did 
a local committeeman desire some money to run a primary. 
or to conduct an election campaign? Was the chairman of 
the state committee pressed for funds? Platt handled such” 
matters without requiring vouchers or even receipts. Dida 
county chairman wish to place some of his influential con- 
stituents in state or federal offices? Did the editor of a party _ 
organ wish a diplomatic post? These men got in touch with 
Platt as well as with the official heads of the government. 
who nominally made the appointments. Governmental of- 
ficials as well as party workers were among those who saw 
Platt. A legislator who wanted to get upon a certain com- 

317 


318 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


mittee, who had certain bills which he wished to see passed, 
‘ or who wanted money for his campaign, made his needs 
and aspirations known to Platt. When Governor Roosevelt 
/wanted to know the qualifications of certain men for cer- 
tain administrative and judicial positions, when he was in- 
yterested in finding out in advance how certain parts of his 
annual message would be received, when he was concerned 
‘about the confirmation of a certain appointment which he 
wished to make, he, the chief executive of the state, saw 
Platt. Outside the governmental and the party machinery, 
there came to see Platt, representatives of various associa- 
tions and societies who wanted to see the party adopt certain 
policies or pass certain laws. Directors of corporations who 
wanted to suppress certain adverse legislation, or to secure 
exemption from certain sorts of taxation, or to obtain cer- 
‘tain valuable privileges, or to enjoy immunity from annoy- 
ing enforcement of the law, were among this number. The 
‘men who came to see Platt at the Fifth Avenue Hotel or at 
No. 49 Broadway did not always go away satisfied. Neither 
.did those who went to see the governor at the state capitol. 
However, during the late nineties, many people kept on com- 
ing to see both. 

Why was it that county and state committeemen, assem- 
blymen, state senators, congressmen, state and federal ex- 
ecutive officers, governors, secretaries of business men’s 
associations, reformers, ministers, prominent attorneys, di- 
rectors of large corporations, and all those seeking to 
achieve certain ends involving the use of the governmental 
machinery, came to see Platt, a man whose position with 
reference to that machinery was in no place set down in 
definite and concrete fashion? It may be well to consider 
first what there was in Platt’s personality and in his general 
behavior that led men to see him as well as Governor Roose- 


PERSONAL QUALITIES OF PLATT AND ROOSEVELT 319 


velt about things that were ostensibly in the hands of the 
popularly elective officials. ‘ 

Washington correspondents of McKinley’s time have said 
that visitors, coming to the capitol for the first time, have ex* 
claimed, when Senator Platt of New York was pointed out 
tothem: “That Tom Platt? Why, he looks very ordinary. 
He must be smarter than he looks!” Platt’s parchment-like 
skin and delicate looking figure presented a striking contrast 
to the ruggedness of Theodore Roosevelt. The Senator did 
not make a very prepossessing appearance as he hunched 
over his seat in the United States Senate chamber. He 
looked more like a New England college professor or a re= 
tired clergyman than he did like a seasoned political war- 
rior! Lemuel Ely Quigg, his faithful New York lieuten- 
ant, said that he was so little magnetic that even the act of 
shaking hands he performed listlessly.2 And yet this was 
the man who was successful for a while in directing some of 
the activities of the vigorous, the fascinating, a magnetics. 
Roosevelt. 

In dealing with persons important to his plans, Platt was 


usually courteous, quiet, conciliatory, diplomatic and care- << 


ful to avoid giving offense. Although seemingly indifferent 
to the impression that he made, he was always neat in his 
dress and smooth in his manner. When he talked, it was 
in a “soft and easy tone” and his voice was low. When 
conferring with his party leaders, it was his custom to ask_ 
them what they wanted and then to quietly request them to . 
indicate what they really expected to get, pointing out the 


1J. M. Rogers, “Thomas Collier Platt: A Study of the Easy 
Boss,” Booklovers Mag., IV (1904), 331; New York Sun, March 
7, 1910; New York Herald, March 25, 1996 - E. G. Riggs, “Thomas 
C. Platt” in Stealey, Twenty Years in the Press Gallery (1906), p 
392. 

2 Op. cit., p. 668. 


320 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


danger there might be in demanding too much.* William 
. Barnes admired Platt because “his dealings with men were 
as man to man, on the level of equals, never as between one 
-who arrogates to himself a superior plane and arbitrarily 
places others below.” * An admiring writer upon the New 
York Sun said that Platt’s “natural kindness enabled him to 
grant a reasonable request without humiliating him who 
asked, and to refuse an unreasonable one without offending 
him who was denied.”*® As he grew older he was some- 
times peremptory and irritable upon little matters, but on 
big occasions he was diplomatic and open to any suggestion 
that did not embarrass the ultimate at which he was aiming. 
Andrew Dickson White wrote of the interview in which 
Platt sounded him out on the governorship as follows: 
“Mr. Platt’s frankness in reply increased my respect for him. 

Mr. Platt was from the first to the last perfectly 
straighforward.”® Theodore Roosevelt, the aggressive, 
energetic, fighting executive, although often engaged in 
active warfare with the Senator, found him “always most 
kind and friendly in his personal relations.”’ In Platt’s 
non-resisting attitude is found one of the secrets of his suc- 
cess. He realized that he could not win in an open fight 
with a man like Roosevelt. 

Another reason for Platt’s success as a political manager 
is summed up in Roosevelt’s dry comment that he could not 
find that Platt had “any tastes at all except for politics, and 
on rare occasions for a very dry theology wholly divorced 


8H. C. Hansbrough, The Wreck (New York, ee Dees. 

4 Albany Evening Journal, March 7, 1910. 

5 January 14, 1897. 

6 Autobiography, hwsts 

7 Op. cit., p. 284. Mrs. Robinson, Roosevelt’s sister, who attended 
many of the Platt-Roosevelt conferences said Platt was “a most 
interesting and unusual personality,” C. R. Robinson, My Brother 
Roosevelt (New York, 1921), p. 81. 


PERSONAL QUALITIES OF PLATT AND ROOSEVELT 321 


from moral implications.”® Platt’s personal interests were 
narrow and his habits for the most part conformed to the 
mores of his native village, Owego, a small backward coun+ 
try town situated in central New York. His religious inter- 
ests did not interfere with his political aspirations. While 
in New York City, Platt attended Dr. Charles H. Park- 
hurst’s church until that worthy crusader against Tammany 
delivered a sermon one Sunday in which he made the start+ 
ling announcement that one Platt was worse than five Crokz 
ers. Platt indignantly changed his church affiliations.® In 
Washington as in New York, Platt lived in hotels, went out 
rarely into society, and spent most of his time on politics. 
While Roosevelt with his varied interests, his versatile tastes 
and exuberant spirits was finding a dozen different occupa-™ 
tions all interesting, Platt was absorbed by a single interest, 

his passion for politics. Platt’s narrow outlook enabled him 
to concentrate his efforts upon the details of New York poli-> 
tics without pining for other diversions and this quality 
made him the master of routine matters that Roosevelt, 

found boresome. 

To keep at the political game as long as Platt did re- 
quired some enduring qualities. His friends said that he 
was energetic, industrious, punctual, unyielding, tenacious; 
patient, persistent, and persevering. A hostile critic has 
called him an immovable, inexorable, grinding, persistent | 
“machine.” #9 Platt knew his political chess-board ; he spent 
an enormous amount of time and energy in studying the ex- 
act capacities of all his minor leaders," the size of the vote 
which they could deliver, the various factional quarrels that, 
cropped out now and then within the organization, the 


" 


8 Op. cit., p. 274. 
9 Nation, Jan. 17, 1895, LX, 4. 
10W. A. White, “Platt,” McClures Mag., XVIII (1901), 152. 
11 Thompson, op. cit., p. 103, 
21 


322 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


_ chances for dicker and intrigue, the relative purchasing pow- 
er of the dollar in the rural and the urban districts, and the 
various ways of supporting the rural press and other 
branches of the organization. This knowledge, so essential 
to his continued ascendancy, could not be obtained without 
a large amount of patient work and watchful waiting. Fol- 
lowing the famous “Me-Too” episode of 1881 in which he 
and Roscoe Conkling went down in disgraceful defeat, he 
put in sixteen years of hard, gruelling, discouraging work in 
order to secure a re-election to the United States Senate. 
‘Platt’s patience and persistency were often utilized by the 
impatient Roosevelt, who was prone to play the game which 
brought immediate results and who showed on many oc- 
casions an inability to stand through years of defeat for a 
success far distant in the future.” 

Besides his patience, another one of the “natural ele- 
ments” of Platt’s character was a “trait which led him to 


* consider that the retention of an enmity, the harboring of a 


grudge, the keeping alive of a resentment after the incident 
in which it had originated had passed and gone, was scarcely 
worth his while.” * For instance, he did not always remain 
hostile to all the state legislators who voted against his 
return to the United States Senate in 1881. Fourteen years 
after the memorable contest, he endorsed the appointment 
of one of them to an important state position.* In 1889 


12 After his defeat in 1886 Roosevelt went out West, but Platt 
remained on the job in New York. 

13 Quigg, op. cit., p. 673. 

14“Although I had voted against the return of Senator Platt 
nearly fifty times, and there was no reason why he should favor 
me, he proved a friend . . . I was ambitious to be superin- 
tendent (of public instruction) and I had no hesitation in con- 
ssulting Senator Platt. His prompt reply was: ‘Of course, I will 
support you,’ and he also favored my re-election in 1898 and 1901.” 
—C. R. Skinner, “A Memorable Senatorial Contest,” State Service, 
IV (1920), 30. 


PERSONAL QUALITIES OF PLATT AND ROOSEVELT 323 


Platt found it convenient to forget his former animosity 
toward Elihu Root, his “consistent opponent in New York 
state political affairs,’ and he made no objections to Root’s 
appointment as secretary of war in place of Russell A. Al 
ger.!5 There were many occasions upon which Platt over- 
looked Roosevelt’s past hostilities. In 1886 when Roosevelt 
was nominated for mayor of New York, Platt swallowed 
his resentment at Roosevelt’s course in the national conven- 
tion of 1884 and his irritation at Roosevelt’s opposition to~ 
Levi P. Morton’s senatorial candidacy in 1885. In 1897 
Senator Platt mollified his wrath at Roosevelt’s course as* 
New York police commissioner and consented to his ap- 
pointment as first assistant secretary of the navy. Fhe 
supreme test came in 1898 when Platt was willing to rele- 
gate to the background all the grievatices he had had with 
the annoying young reformer in order to save the state 
ticket. Roosevelt, himself, was not always able to be as’ 
magnanimous as Platt. Roosevelt was hostile toward his 
critics and tended to class all who opposed his policies as. 
personal opponents.?® 

Although he sometimes seemed to be generous toward his 
foes, Platt was not precisely of a forgiving disposition. The 
letter which he wrote to President McKinley arguing against 
the appointment of Whitelaw Reid as ambassador to Great 
Britain is extremely bitter and vindicative.!7 Platt never 
seemed to forget the vigorous attacks which Reid made 
upon him in the editorial columns of the New York Tribune 
during the early nineties. It was said that he carried one 
of these editorials around in his pocket and that he pro- 
duced it when he found someone before whom he could vent 


15 Alger was one of Platt’s close friends and advisers. 


16 See the article entitled “Mr. Roosevelt” in Atlantic Monthly, 
CIX (1912), 577. 
17 See above p. 132, 


324 .BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


his wrath against Reid. William Allen White said that 
‘Platt was not charitable but “made the virtue of generosity 
‘out of his impotence.” 48 While vindictive toward a few, 
Platt did not engage in as many personal controversies as 
did the combative Roosevelt. 

One of the qualities usually associated with leaders of 
both the official and unofficial type is courage.’ The kind of 
courage that Platt displayed was of entirely different sort 
than that manifested by Roosevelt. Roosevelt was aggres- 
sive, pugnacious, venturesome, daring, and audacious; Platt 
was unyielding, tenacious, and dogged. One editorial writer 
‘said that Platt had shown himself to be an indomitable un- 
yielding, and veritable tiger.?® Platt’s courage was of the 
feline variety rather than that of a full grown bull moose. 
In the Republican National Convention of 1896 Platt fought 
for the gold standard and against McKinley’s candidacy 
persistently although the odds against him were overwhelm- 
ing. For a politician this course was “courageous,” because 
it involved the danger of falling outside the breast works, 
but it is likely that Platt had some sly ulterior purpose in 
view. In election campaigns and in conventions, Platt was 
essentially a defensive fighter as opposed to the aggressive, 
offensive Rooseveltian type. 

In describing the American “boss,” M. Ostrogorski 
wrote: “Cultivated or without culture, the boss is, in any 
event a man of superior intelligence, but of an altogether 
special kind of superiority which shows itself in a very deli- 


18 Loc. cit. 

19 C. E. Merriam, The American Party System (New York, 1922), 
p. 48 and Introduction. 

20 New York Sun, January 11, 1897. 


1See above p. 114. Platt wanted to create the impression that 
McKinley could not carry New York on election day unless he had 
the co-operation of the Platt organization. 


PERSONAL QUALITIES OF PLATT AND ROOSEVELT 325 


cate appreciation of particular situations.” Platt had little 
of the mental energy and the mental exuberance possessed’ 
by Roosevelt. On the other hand, he was said to have a_ 
keen mind, clear judgment, admirable powers of concentra- ~ 
tion, a good memory for names and faces, and to be alert; 
sane, shrewd, and cunning. Quigg referred to his “unfail- 
ing good judgment at critical moment and in things of 
highest importance.” In party conferences he was plausible, 
persuasive, and resourceful. As one of the party committee- 
men put it: “He did not dictate the policy of the party, but 
in the committee meetings he listened to everyone’s opinion 
and if a better plan than his was presented he accepted it. 
If he thought that his plan was the best, he had a way of 
putting it up to the committeemen so logically, tersely and 
clearly that they were soon convinced that he had the best 
plan and went along with him.”* He had a genius for 
bringing together men of the most diverse ambitions and 
temperaments and conforming them to his own principal. 
ends. In concrete situations, he was able to turn the talents. 
of others to account. Roosevelt had all these qualities with 
the possible qualification that he was not as cautions, and in 
addition Roosevelt had a marvelous sensitiveness to political 
issues that would have a wide appeal.® Quigg wrote that 
Platt had “no very clear conception of the trend of publie 
sentiment on the issues of the day” and “no very keen re-_ 
spect for popular opinion even when he recognized its 
strength.” Roosevelt could not only formulate new prin- 
ciples and policies that showed unusual appreciation of. 
social and industrial tendencies, but he could also combine 
widely varying groups of men in a movement to carry out 


2 Democracy and the Party System, p. 253. 

3 Rogers, Hansbrough, White, Thompson and Barnes, loc. cit, 

4Tnterview with Hon. Charles H. Betts of Lyons, New York. 

5S. P. Sherman, Americans (New York, 1922), chap. X, “Roose- 
velt and the National Psychology.” 


326 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


those policies. Roosevelt’s “news sense” and his love of the 
dramatic constantly brought him on to the front part of the 
stage while Platt stayed behind the scenes and played the 
part of a wire puller, a diplomatic “gumshoer,” an intriguer, 
and a manipulator, a part for which his mental equipment 
fitted him. 

Regarding Platt’s ability as a political manager, Theodore 
Roosevelt wrote: “Senator Platt had the same inborn 
capacity for the kind of politics which he liked that many 
big Wall Street men have known for not wholly dissimilar 
types of finance.” ® Senator Depew was slightly more eulo- 
gistic in his expression of the same sentiment: “Senator 
Platt gave his whole life to politics and to the party his mar- 
velous talent for organization. If he_had devoted the same 


time and energy to business, with his skill in the handling of 

_men,he would have been one of the foremost business men 
in the United States.””?~ Senator Platt did-devete_part of 
his time and energy to the management of the United States 
Express Company, of which he was president from 1880. 
‘until the time of his death in 1910. Judged by the stand- 
ards of his time, he was not a successful business man. Ina 
time of great profits, his company did not pay high dividends 
nor give high salaries. In the early eighties when Platt 
was “out of politics” and devoting his energies to his busi- 


Op. cit., p. 277. 
7 Owego Times, March 10, 1910. 

§The details of his management of this company came out in 
an unsuccessful suit which one of the stockholders brought against 
him in 1909. Dudley v. Platt, 118 New York Supp., 1058. In 1909 
the company had an accumulated surplus of about $10,000,000 which 
was equal to the par value of the stock as it had stood since 1887. 
One half of the accumulated net earnings of the company accrued 
‘during the eight years when its interests were pooled with those of 
the other express companies, years when Platt was broken down in 
health and scarcely able to attend to his duties in the United States 
Senate. In the nineties the company’s dividends averaged less than 
3 per cent. 


PERSONAL QUALITIES OF PLATT AND ROOSEVELT 327 


ness, the fortunes of his company were at their lowest ebb. 
The company did not achieve a recognized position in the 
financial world until 1901, when, in flagrant violation of 
the charter and the laws of the state, the heads of the great 
rival express companies gained control of its directorate.® 
In the nineties, Platt’s salary as the president of this com- 
pany was only $18,000 a year, and when he died, his total 
estate was estimated to be not more than $200,000.2° In the 
days when “money was king,” he was numbered among the 
comparatively poor. He was not versatile enough to win 
fame along more than one line. Roosevelt attained success” 
along many lines. Business might well have been one of 
them. 

Another criterion by which a leader may be judged is his 
powers of expression. Platt was not a masterful advocate 
like Roosevelt. He could not make a speech, for one could> 
hardly call the essays which he read from time to time 
speeches. Unlike Roosevelt, he was not a brilliant conver- 
sationalist although he could keep the reporters amused by 
telling odd stories and could now and then “scorch” his en- 
emies by telling phrases. He called Carl Schurz a “lively 
German peddler of apples of discord and a retailer in vine- 
gar, manufactured from the juice of sour apples.” There 
is nothing, however, in this diatribe to compare with some of 
Roosevelt’s immortal phrases like “the muckrakers,” “the 
malefactors of great wealth,” “the lunatic fringe,” and “a 
cootie on the body politic.” During the seventies Platt did 
some political writing and throughout his life he was con- 
stantly writing letters, some of which show considerable 
force and vigor, but none of which would compare favorably” 


9 James C. Fargo, president of the American Express Company; 
Levi C. Weir, president of the Adams Express Company, and Fran- 
cis L. Stetson, counsel for the firm of J. P. Morgan. 

10 New York newspapers, March 8, 1910, 


328  #BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


with a random sample of the two hundred thousand epistles 
which Roosevelt left behind him. Both Platt and Roosevelt 
wrote autobiographies. There is more excuse for an official 
/leader to write a defense of his life than there is for an un- 
official leader. At the height of his power Platt realized the 
"value of secrecy, for he made the remark to some reporters: 
“Tf I ever become reminiscent please go to the nearest drug 
shop, get an ounce of cyanide of potassium, and I'll swal- 
low it at a gulp.” Platt had been a druggist, so he knew 
what this meant. The Senator’s autobiography is not en- 
tirely the product of his own efforts.4* It was written in 
his dotage, and the fact that he favored its production indi- 
cates that his judgment was failing. The book is full of in- 
accuracies because he and his editor put too much trust upon 
a memory which had begun to weaken and it naively reveals 
a philosophy and outlook which many of his contemporaries 
were condemning. In contrast to Platt’s curious jumble 
of fact, fable, and diatribe is Roosevelt’s masterful defense 
of his public career, a defense which is now constantly re- 
peated in biographies and histories of the period in which 
he lived. 

As to the moral qualities which the two leaders possessed, 
there is naturally great difference of opinion. Platt clearly 
believed in the philosophy that the end justified the means. 
There are some who say that Roosevelt did also.% Be this 
as it may, there was a vast difference between the moral 
fibre of the two men. Platt’s Autobiography gives many ex- 
‘amples of the brand of opportunistic politics which he prac- 
ticed. The account of President-elect Harrison’s selection 


11 Riggs, loc. cit. 

12Tt was edited by Louis J. Lang, now a political reporter and 
correspondent on the staff of the New York American. Mr. Liv- 
ingston Platt, Platt’s grandson, informed the writer on September 
27, 1922 that the Autobiography was not satisfactory to the family. 

13F. S. in the Atlantic Monthly, loc. cit. 


PERSONAL QUALITIES OF PLATT AND ROOSEVELT 329 


of a secretary of treasury is one.!* Platt was willing to give 
credence to a story which related the use of duplicity and 
deceit on the part of his followers. One reason why Platt 
was called the “Easy Boss” was the fact that he never ques- 
tioned the methods employed by his subordinates. These 
methods might be corrupt, mercenary, and ruthless, but as 
long as they got results, he was satisfied. Platt, himself, 
was not above sly, stealthy “moves,” as the way in which he 
thwarted Governor Roosevelt’s desire to appoint Judge Daly 
to the state judgeship demonstrates.4® He seemed incapable 
of using the frank, open fighting tactics which Roosevelt 
employed so effectively. 

The integrity of men in political life in America is always 
brought into question sooner or later. Roosevelt’s evident: 
sincerity has disarmed most of his foes on this point. As to 
Platt’s integrity it can be said that no critic has accused him 
of being dishonest in the sense of openly robbing the public 
treasury or appropriating campaign contributions to his own 
use.!® It is true that his express company obtained a lucra- 
tive contract from the United States Treasury Department 
in 1889, but it does not appear that he charged any more for 
the services rendered than the other express companies had_ 
been charging for similar services to the government.!” 
How should the “pulls” which Platt exercised in order to 
obtain government business for the “Platt family law firm” 
and the “Platt family bonding concern” be judged? These 
pulls were not much different from the sort of influences 


14Pp. 207-8. Alexander in his Four Famous New Yorkers, p. 
132, discredits the truth of this story, but the fact that Platt repeats 
it is significant. 

15 See above p. 207. 

16 This claim is made by Roosevelt, of. cit., p. 274; Thompson, 
op. cit., p. 95; W. A. White, loc. cit.; Quigg, loc. cit.; and by Platt 
himself, op. cit., p. 533. 

17 See above p. 259. 


330 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


which business men in general were accustomed to exercise 
in behalf of their sons. Did not the insurance investigation 
-show that the presidents of the three great life insurance 
companies of New York had been taking care of their sons 
and relatives? 48 Persons. closely connected with the game 
.of business and politics in the state of New York during 
‘the late nineties hesitated to throw stones at Platt. Roose- 
velt, himself, probably remembering some of the embarrass- 
ing questions that he had been asked about campaign con- 
tributions, stated in his Autobiography that Platt was 
recognized by the business men, the big contributors, as an 
“honorable” man; not only a man of his word, but a man 
who, whenever he received a favor, could be trusted to do 
his best to repay it on any occasion that arose.!® Platt’s field 
marshals made a feature of his “personal intergrity.”®° By 
personal integrity they simply meant integrity in money 
affairs. Not being a candidate for popular elective office 
after his second election to Congress in 1874, Platt did not 
need in his work of political management such a spotless 
record of domestic tranquility as Roosevelt possessed. 
However, Platt’s reputation and political standing were 
somewhat damaged by the circulation of reports which in- 
dicated certain irregularities in his domestic life.? 

It is difficult to find any man in public life who is not 
said to be loyal to some particular group. There are many 
testimonials as to Platt’s loyalty to his party and to his “or- 
ganization.” Andrew Dickson White wrote of him: “His 
pride and his really sincere devotion to the interests of the 
Republican party, as he understood them, led him to desire 


18 Report, pp. 12, 47. 

19-275. 

20 Colonel Dunn’s interview, New York Tribune, December 9, 
1901. 

1See above p. 28, and also see the Nation, November 22, 1906. 
Platt separated from his second wife whom he married late in life. 


PERSONAL QUALITIES OF PLATT AND ROOSEVELT 331 


above all things, a triumph over the Democratic forces, and 
the only question in his mind was, who could best secure the 
victory?” ® According to Quigg, “Mr. Platt’s third im- 
portant characteristic was his loyalty. . . . What he said 
he meant, and he went on meaning it, no matter how greatly 
the conditions changed nor how difficult it became to give 
effect. ”% Platt and Roosevelt both possessed the quality of 
loyalty. Platt’s loyalty differed from Roosevelt’s loyalty in 
its breadth and comprehensiveness. Roosevelt was loyal 
to many, Platt to a few; Roosevelt’s sympathies were so 
broad that he felt called upon to preach his ideals to the na- 
tion, Platt took a narrow view toward his duty to the public 
and assumed a cynical attitude toward idealists. William ® 
Barnes once wrote that Platt was staunchly loyal to all who 
trusted him and were his friends. There were many per- 
sons, Roosevelt included, who disagreed with what Platt re-~ 
garded as the essentials of friendship. 

It is hard to make an objective analysis of men in public 
life whether they belong to the official or the unofficial gov-* 
ernment because as soon as they become of any importance. 
a group of myths grow up about them which tend to obscure 
their real character. To those who opposed him, Platt be- 
came the symbol of an evil system, a modern Machiavelli, 
who grew out of a sinister alliance between corrupt busi- 
ness and corrupt politics. To those who made use of him, he 
was the personification of party loyalty, the head of an 
“efficient organization,” the manager of a “business man’s 
government.” After Platt’s death there were not many le- 
gends which grew up about him and his name tended to fall 
into obscurity, but Roosevelt’s death was the signal for a 
myriad of myth makers to begin their work constructing > 


2 Op. cit., p. 232. 
8 Loc. cit. 
4 Albany Evening Journal, March 7, 1910. 


332 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


phantasies about “the typical American.” Another obstacle 
in the way of any accurate analysis of the behavior of Platt 
vand Roosevelt is the fact that both men wrote autobiogra- 
phies. Historians and others are prone to judge men by 
what they say about themselves. Roosevelt’s Autobiography 
is in large part an elaborate defense of positions which he as- 
sumed during his public career. Platt’s Autobiography is 
also in the form of a defense reaction, a rather crudely con- 
structed one in places. Platt came to believe with the Al- 
‘bany Evening Journal that the word “Platt” did not mean 
Thomas C. Platt, the man who lived at the Fifth Avenue 
Hotel, but a “combination of the most active, earnest, and 
aggressive Republicans in every city, village, and hamlet in 
the state.” His Autobiography shows that he thought that 
‘his power to unite and organize contending men and conflict- 
ing interests and bring them to work together with a com- 
mon purpose for mutual benefit was probably not “possessed 
in like degree by any other politician in America.’ ® Even 
the unfavorable publicity which he received from certain 
metropolitan newspapers increased the public impression 
and his own impression that he was a man of importance 
and he could say, “One day everybody, friend and foe, began 
‘to call me ‘boss.’”® He was a “disinterested” politician, 
but he had great love for power, he took great satisfaction 
in thinking himself an “autocrat,” and he had a passionate 
fondness for the game of politics. He was quite willing to 
admit that he wrote his Autobiography because the great 
pride that he took in his “leadership” had been wounded. 
Nothing hurt him more deeply than the failure of his old ac- 
quaintances to do homage to his “leadership” when his ac- 
tual power was gone.’ He had the sincere conviction that 

5 Quotations cited in the New York Tribune, February 16, 1895, 
January 14, 1897 and January 15, 1897, 


8 Quigg, loc. cit. 
TOp. cit. pp. 519, 531. 


PERSONAL QUALITIES OF PLATT AND ROOSEVELT 333 


the Republican party of the state of New York could not get 
along without him. When broken in health and scarcely 
able to move around, he sought a re-election to the United 
States Senate. He then clung to his seat in that august 
body for the full six year term in spite of the fact that he 
could hardly attend to the routine duties of his office. He’ 
could not let go of this one remaining cachet of respectabil- 
ity. Needless to say, Roosevelt also did not lack in self- 
esteem. It was his ability to advertise himself and his works 
that has been in part responsible for the creation of a large’ 
and enthusiastic band of admirers. If Platt had been a little 
more skillful advertiser, his name might stand higher in 
the hall of notable New Yorkers to-day. 

Roosevelt’s reputation as a statesman is largely dependent 
upon that portion of his life that comes after 1901, a por- 
tion which has been scarcely touched upon in this book be- 
cause Platt’s influence upon it was practically negligible. 
Platt will be known as one of the state bosses and senator- 
managers of the McKinley era. Although Platt did not 
have the intellectual acumen and the speaking ability of 
David Bennett Hill, although he lacked the cleverness of 
Mathew Stanley Quay, although he did not possess the ag- 
gressiveness and the energy which characterized Marcus 
Alonzo Hanna, and although did not have that ability to, 
master all sorts of men possessed by Nelson W. Aldrich, he 
will be classed with these men_because-he was the managers 
of the Republican organization in the largest state of the 
Union where resources and men were plentiful. 


CHAPTER XIII 
THE TECHNIQUE OF PARTY MANAGEMENT 


The problem of the efficient management of the Republi- 
can party of New York was what brought Platt and Roose- 
velt together. Roosevelt’s talents were such that he could 
make himself felt in public life without having any “organi- 
zation,” but Platt never could have achieved distinction as 
a political manager if he had not gathered about him an 
able band of politicians to carry out his orders and to ad- 
vise him on important matters. He could not make a speech 
himself, but when there was need for some public speaking 
to be done he could rely upon the oratorical abilities of the 
mellifluent Depew or one of the many other “spellbinders” 
who belonged to the organization. Platt did not drink, but 
there were several of his field marshals who felt very much 
at home in a hilarious and bibulous company. Platt did not 
have a great deal of physical energy, but his chief of staff, 
“Ben” Odell was commanding, pushing, and aggressive. 
Platt did not understand the arts of publicity, but Quigg was 
known as an “accelerator of public opinion.” Because of his 
confining work in New York and Washington, Platt could 
not visit the up-state regions very often so he was practically 
compelled to delegate many important functions to his di- 
vision chiefs. In Monroe County he was fortunate in being 
able to rely upon Committeeman Aldridge, who was noted 
for his loyalty to the party, his “generosity,” his industry, 
and his great skill in organizing men.! William Barnes, 


1C, E. Fitch, Encyclopedia of Biography of New York (New 
York, 1916). 


334 


THE TECHNIQUE OF PARTY MANAGEMENT . 335 


the feudal lord of Albany, was unquestionably a man of 
great physical and mental force; big, brazen, florid, over- 
bearing, he looked like the bullying sort of “boss” that he 
was said to be.” Across the Hudson river, there was “Lou” 
Payn, with a political experience about equal to Platt’s and 
a “genius” for “handling things” in the state legislature. In 
the legislature itself, there was Senator “Uncle” John. 
Raines who, according to Elihu Root, “would rather go to. 
hell with the Republican party than dwell with other in tents 
of righteousness.” * In the lower house, there were Assem- 
blymen Allds and Nixon, both of whom were huge men 
with loud voices, quite capable of over-awing any noviates 
who happened to venture to the state capitol. The gover- 
nor’s chair was occupied successively by men of high stand- 
ing who put their prestige and abilities at the service of the 
organization. The oratorical abilities of Black and all the 
dramatic qualities of Roosevelt were used by Platt to main- 
tain his position. Roosevelt, on the other hand, used Platt 
as long as Platt held the reins of the party organization: 
Although these two men had widely divergent aims and 
methods, both put into practice the principle of the division 
of labor, so important in the complexity of modern society. 
Why was it that among so many able Republicans it was 
Platt “whose advice was taken quite largely, pretty largely, 
by the men of the political party with whom he was as- 
sociated?” * Platt was a man of superior organizing ability, 
and besides he was a man of superior knowledge..Because 
of his long training and experience, he was the natural heir, 
of the corporate tradition which had known up around 
Roscoe Conkling. In the fifties and sixties, Platt had been 


2B. J. Hendrick, “Governor Hughes and the Albany Gang,” Mc- 
Clure’s Mag., XXXV, 507. 

3 Lyons Republican, August 3, 1921, p. 24. 

4Barnes’ definition of a leader before the Bayne Committee, see 
Report, p. 120. . 


336 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


a minor cog in the organization built up by that master 
“strategist, Thurlow Weed. In the seventies .he had blos- 
‘somed out as Conkling’s chief of staff after he had held 
-every conceivable position in his party’s committee hierarchy 
ranging from the chairmanship of his county committee to 
a place upon the state, the congressional and the national 
committees. During his long period of service, he had at- 
tended some sort of Republican convention nearly every 
year and since around 18/0 there never had been a year 
when he was not “interested in the election of a Republican 
legislature.” He knew every local politician of any import- 
ance, he knew the dangers of factional quarrels, he knew 
all the party precedents that governed the conduct of 
primaries and conventions, he knew the strength of party 
custom, he knew the weaknesses of the sort of men who 
were attracted by the game of politics, and he knew how 
many voters there were who could be counted upon as 
“regular.” In the later eighties, Platt’s wealth of political 
information must have been very impressive to the younger 
men like Roosevelt, Aldridge, Barnes, Odell, Fassett, and 
Woodruff, but what can be said about “Lou” Payn, Chaun- 
cey Depew, and some of the other old political war-horses? 
Why did not one of these become the manager-in-chief of 
the Republican organization in the state of New York in- 
stead of Platt? Depew was very “popular” and Payn was 
very “skillful.” The only explanation seems to be that they 
were interested in other things. Depew, as president of the 
New York Central Railroad, was interested in making 
money for the Vanderbilts and in making a name for him- 
self in the financial world. Payn put in most of his time 
in the lobby of the legislature and in the stock exchange, 
working for certain “undisclosed principals.” Why did not 
one of the governors use the state patronage to build up a 


5 Depew, Memories, pp. 15, 227. 


THE TECHNIQUE OF PARTY MANAGEMENT — 337 


machine of his own? Governor Black made a beginning, 

but his attempt failed. Governor Roosevelt was more in-— 
terested in writing books, in learning how to box, and in 

campaigning in the West than he was in the details of. 
party management. As Quigg put it, Platt was the man 

who had the “interest” and he combined this interest with 

the requisite knowledge. 

Platt’s long experience had taught him that the first law _ 
of any political organization is self-preservation. He did 
not originate the methods which he used to preserve the. 
Republican organization of his state. Platt was no innovator 
like Roosevelt. Besides the lessons which he learned from . 
his former chief, Roscoe Conkling, and the technique that 
he had picked up as a member of Congress, sitting under 
Speaker James G. Blaine, Platt acquired many “tricks of 
the trade” and received many “warning lessons” from his 
political enemies. He was in New York City shortly after 
the downfall of the notorious Tweed. He studied the 
methods employed by Samuel J. Tilden, Daniel Manning, 
and David B. Hill, all well-known managers of successful, 
Democratic campaigns. When he came to the great metrop- 
olis, there he found much to admire in the ways, of Kelly 
and Croker, his Tammany Hall contemporaries. Upon the 
national field, Platt availed himself of the experience and, 
wisdom of Mathew S. Quay who in the neighboring state 
of Pennsylvania was solving problems of a sort very similar 
to those that arose in New York. As in business, it was 
difficult for any politician to keep a “trade secret” to him- 
self. The political heritage which was indispensable to 
Platt was accessory to Roosevelt. 

Political patronage was the cement that Platt saw was 
commonly used to keep political “organizations” together 
and he spent the greater part of his political career trying, 
to control and protect its sources of supply. Even the men 

; 22 


338 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


at the top like Roosevelt, Black, Aldridge, Barnes, Dunn, 
Odell, and Depew were “loyal” to the organization in part 
-because the organization had helped to elevate them to 
public office. As superintendent of public works, Aldridge 
enjoyed a comfortable salary and considerable “influence.” 
The same could be said for Dunn, as railroad commissioner, 
Depew undoubtedly enjoyed the distinction of being a 
United States senator. It would be hard to find a governor 
of New York who was not ambitious. Before these men 
were actually “placed” in public office, they had “expecta- 
tions.” There were, of course, other reasons why the “big 
men” in the party remained loyal to Platt and his organiza- — 
tion. Barnes admired Platt because he thought that the 
Senator was like his grandfather, and then Barnes was grate- 
ful because in a close primary fight the faction which he 
led had been recognized as “regular” by the state committee. 
Field marshals, who were loyal, could “get things done” at 
Albany and received pecuniary aid in hotly-contested 
primary and election campaigns. And then, these “higher- 
ups” had the satisfaction of wielding political power and 
the joy of winning elections, a joy not unlike that which 
comes to the champion sportsman or the victorious warrior 
after a successful contest. To Platt the distribution of the 
‘spoils of office was a serious business. Roosevelt, although 
he thoroughly understood the cohesive power of political 
patronage, often treated the allotment of offices as an amus- 
ing game. 

Field marshals who were “disloyal” or “insubordinate” 
were disciplined. As Platt put it: 


A political organization should be conducted upon the 
simplest principles of business. Merit and devotion should 
ibe rewarded. Demerit and treachery should be condemned 
and examples made of those guilty of them. I have always 


THE TECHNIQUE OF PARTY MANAGEMENT — 339 


maintained that-a—majority rather than a minority of anv 


organization should control the party and its policy. v 
During an experience of over fifty years in politics, I 


have learned that obedience to instructions and gratitude” 


are about as scarce as snow in the dog-days. In choosing 
my lieutenants and candidates, I invariably insisted upon 
the qualification that the man must know enough to “stand 


when hitched.” The list of those who have ignored or defied ~ 


this rule would fill a large volume. And that has made it 
necessary for me, as an organization chief, to reluctantly 
and sometimes mercilessly administer punishment to a sub- 
ordinate. Only in this way can the discipline of any body 
of men be enforced.® 


Reduced to other terms, the problem of discipline was, 
How could a local leader’s “majority” be turned into a 
“minority?” Because of J. Sloat Fassett’s refusal to with- 
draw from the preconventional gubernatorial campaign of 
1894, Platt “placed Colonel Archie E. Baxter in charge of 
the regular organization forces in the Chemung District, 
and for a number of years Fassett was an inconsequential 
factor in politics, where he had been a power.’ Because 
Jacob Worth, “boss” of the King’s County organization, 
supported Low for mayor of New York in 1897, “the state 
organization concluded to deputize Timothy L. Woodruff 
to ‘cut the ground under Worth’s feet.’” And so on, Platt 
gives examples of other “Holier than Thou’s” who were 
“punished.” 7 It seems that an unruly leader was disciplined 
by having the patronage, local, state, and national thrown 
against him and by having his primaries drenched with 
money in behalf of the new man who had been “deputized.” & 
The state committee then recognized the faction which had 
been created to oppose him and it seems that this body did 


ee 


not always have that love for “majority rule” that Platt. | 


6 Op. cit., pp. 501-3. 
7 Op. cit., chap. xxv, passim. 
8 New York Tribune, December 2, 4, 1897, 


340 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


_professed.® When Fassett saw the men that he had “made” 
turn against him, he probably agreed with Platt that grati- 
- tude” in politics was “about as scarce as snow in dog- 
, days.” As Platt admitted, the system was “military.” 
,When President Roosevelt began to “discipline” him, Platt 
tasted some of his own bitter medicine. 

. When a sufficient number of the local leaders were “loyal” 
‘the state leader did not have to worry much about state 
conventions. The delegates to these party assemblages were 
for the most part local office holders or other individuals 
who had been “handpicked” for the occasion by the state 
committeemen or some other local leader. For many 
.years the employees of the New York Custom-house had 
been very “influential” in state conventions.’* President 
Roosevelt did not ignore the fact in 1906, 1908, and 1910. 
The state conventions which met in these years were con- 
trolled by the delegates from the great cities of the state, 
principally from New York. Needless to say “reliable 
delegates” could be found among those who had done some 
‘work upon the canal.!2 The reason why it was always easy 
for the state leader to “get the Albany delegates” is in- 
dicated by the following statement, reputed to have been 
.made by Committeeman Barnes in answer to a request made 
by a prominent citizen of Albany regarding a certain ap- 
pointment : 


. I don’t want any person who wears a high hat and has 
his shoes blacked, and who could obtain pretty nearly what 
he wants. I want a candidate for this office who is down 


9 Jbid., August 26, 27, 1896. 

10 Alexander, Four Famous New Yorkers, p. 238. 

11 Rochester Herald, September 30, 1898. 

12 Nation, May 5, 1892, LIV, 332. 

13 New York Tribune, September 28, 1896. Aldridge was the 
highest candidate for several! ballots. 


THE TECHNIQUE OF PARTY MANAGEMENT 341 


and out, on his uppers, and has fringed clothes, then I can, 
hoist him into office and he will be mine. 


The preliminaries of the convention, the temporary of- 
ficers, the platform, and the “slate,” were all agreed upon in 
advance by Platt and his field marshals in a “Sunday school” 
session at the Fifth Avenue Hotel. When the convention 
met, it only remained for the “will of the party” to be™ 
expressed upon the decisions of the leaders. LEven if the” 
delegates had not been for the most part of the ‘“hand-- 
picked” variety, there was little danger that the “program” 
of the few would be rejected because the customs and. 
traditions which governed the procedure of the conventions 
discouraged any assertion of “independence.” The state 
committee made up the temporary roll and thereby prac- 
tically determined how the contests would be settled; it also’ 
“recommended” the appointment of the temporary chair- 
man, the officer who “made up” the committees of the con- 
vention upon the basis of the “suggestions” made by the 
local organizations. Nothing made Committeeman Barnes , 
more angry than the way Theodore Roosevelt “smashed 
these time-honored and “sacred” traditions in the State Con-, 
vention of September, 1910.4% Roosevelt’s tactics in 1906 
and 1908 had also upset the program of the pre-convention’ 
conference. In the late nineties, when Platt was at the 
height of his power, such violations of party precedents 
would have been inconceivable. 

The principal function of state conventions during Platt’s 
time was to arouse enthusiasm among the party workers. 
The way in which Platt acted during a convention showed \ 


14 Barnes v. Roosevelt, p. 173. 

15 Barnes v. Roosevelt, May 13, 1915, p. 1919, Barnes testified that 
“Mr. Roosevelt, in appointing the Committee on Resolutions did not 
accept, in every case, the man recommended by the delegation from 
the congressional district, which had been the custom for many 
Wek eee a . 


342 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


that he had a good deal of understanding of crowd psychol- 
ogy. He always endeavored to make things run off smoothly 
and “harmoniously” so that the delegates would get the im- 
pression that the organization was being “efficiently” man- 
-aged. In 1896 when Warner Miller who had been ruthlessly 
‘ruled out by the state committee, was being “howled down” 
“by a portion of the delegates, Platt rose in his seat and 
requested that Miller be given a chance to speak.'® This 
show of “fair play” immediately won the admiration of the 
“boys.” Usually, however, Platt remained silent and let 
his most popular “spell-binders” do their work. It is inter- 
esting to note that Roosevelt used exactly the opposite 
tactics in the State Convention of 1910. Platt endeavored 
to iron out all differences quietly behind the scenes, but 
Roosevelt fought openly for his platform and candidate. 
Platt carried with him to national conventions the same 
“Vittle band of able politicians” that ran his state conven- 
tions for him. He also had the close co-operation of Mathew 
S. Quay and a few of the other “manager-senators.” His 
style of tactics in national conventions called for the raising 
of a big “rumpus,” which in the nineties meant that he was 
dissatisfied with the way that the pre-convention campaign 
had been running and wanted to make it plain that he must 
be “propitiated.” Since he controlled a portion of the 
election machinery which was very crucial in presidential 
campaigns, this sort of strategy was more successful than 
it appeared upon the surface. Thus in 1896, although the 
fifty-five votes that he held in line for Morton did not 
count for much, his actions in the convention led Mark 
Hanna to “come around” during the campaign. In 1900, 
Platt’s organization made a good deal of the way that 
“Roosevelt had been kicked up-stairs.”” In the Republican 
National Conventions of 1904 and 1908, Roosevelt had no 


16 See above p. 105. 


THE TECHNIQUE OF PARTY MANAGEMENT — 343 


trouble with the organization which had “shelved him.” 
While he was president of the United States, he made the 
best of the imperfect national nominating system and effec- - 
tively prevented the delegates from New York from using 
guerrilla tactics. 

The state legislature was so “organized” that Platt could | 
influence its work through a clique of half a dozen men or | 
so in each house. This legislative clique worked in secret _ 
and it practically determined the course of legislation except 
when it was forestalled by vigorous action on the part of 
the governor. In maintaining his legislative control, Platt 
was greatly aided by the cult of party regularity. Legis- 
lators who “bolted” the caucus were marked for “discipline.” 
William Barnes once said to Roosevelt: 


You know yourself, Mr. Roosevelt, the Senator (or Mr. 
Platt) does not bully. He does not have to. That the man 
who went into politics and wanted to go ahead found out. 
for himself that he could not get ahead if he didn’t do what, 
the organization, what the leader, what the boss wished. 
That it was not necessary to give orders; it was quite suffi-_ 
cient to have it understood by example that the man that 
stood by the organization benefited because the organization, 
stood by him and that if he did not stand by the organiza- — 
tion he got punished and that the ordinary man found this- 
out for himself. If he declined to learn, then he got 
dropped; he failed to make a record, he could not satisfy, 
his constituents, that his bills were not passed or his work, 
failed in other ways, and that he did not get a renomination 
and he was eliminated.?” 


The Allds investigation of 1910 showed that in Platt’s © 
time the Assembly was controlled autocratically by a few’ 
men, who in themselves constituted a “corrupt clique for, 
the selling of legislation.” Fred Nixon, who was first 
elected speaker at the beginning of Governor Roosevelt’s / 


17 Barnes v. Roosevelt, p. 1316. 


344. BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


administration, appointed all the committees and was him- 
self the head of the Rules Committee which took complete 
charge of all legislation during the last weeks of every 
session. His chief aid was Floor Leader Allds. These two 
men took orders, of course, from Platt and his “Sunday 
school,” for there were state committeemen who “wanted 
things done” at Albany, but they also “levied blackmail” 
‘upon the side. When an election came around, the “organi- 
zation stood by them” by contributing to their campaign 
expenses. The corrupt practices investigation of 1910-11 
showed that this system had also crept into the state Senate. 
If the organization leaders themselves threatened to revolt, 
Platt drove them into line by threatening wholesale bribery 
prosecutions. As in party conventions, he ruled by appeal- 
‘ing to custom, gratitude and fear. Governor Roosevelt 
‘worked with Platt in legislative matters when he could and 
against him when he felt he must. In fighting for his legis- 
lative policies, Roosevelt employed all the arts of newspaper 
publicity and the popular appeal. 

At Washington where Roosevelt’s star shone brightest, 
Platt was eclipsed. To be sure the large Republican dele- 
gation from New York in the House of Representatives 
‘received ample recognition in the allotment of committees, 
and in 1899 one of its numbers became the floor leader of 
the House, but Platt was never more than the nominal 
leader of this delegation. He and Depew were in the United 
States Senate by virtue of the efficient “organization” which 
had been set up in the state legislature. New York con- 
gressmen had to engage in “log-rolling’”’ and had to struggle 
for their “patronage rights” pretty much the same as other 
congressmen. They were part of a national “system.” 
During his “Easy-Boss-ship” as well as at the time of the 
“Me-Too” episode, Platt’s chief concern at Washington was 
the strength of the time-honored custom of “senatorial 


THE TECHNIQUE OF PARTY MANAGEMENT = 345 


courtesy,” and a president who failed to “consult” him upon 
New York matters was warned about the next presidential 
campaign. President Roosevelt, however, repeatedly ignored 
these warnings. 

“Senatorial courtesy” at Albany meant that the governor 
should “consult” Manager Platt, or as it was euphemistically 
put, the “organization,” before any important appointment 
or gubernatorial message was sent to the legislative chambers 
for action. Governor Roosevelt paid his respects to this 
custom when he authorized his secretary to send a letter 
to the state committeemen welcoming suggestions regarding. 
appointments and other matters,!® when he had “breakfast 
conferences” with Platt regarding the more important ap- 
pointments, and when he sent Platt an advance copy of the 
message which he planned to send to the legislature. One 
of the causes of Committeeman Barnes’ bitter hostility to , 
Governor Hughes was the latter’s failure to observe party 
‘ custom in the matter of appointments. 

It was much harder for Platt to “discipline” a governor 
when he became “unruly” than it was for him to discipline 
any other state officer. The governor was a conspicuous. 
figure ; he worked in the open, he had important powers, and. 
in case Platt “affronted” him, he could “fire back” at the 
organization by a skillful use of the patronage, the special, 
message, or the veto power. On the other hand, Platt was 
not without his weapons in dealing with the governor. Did’ 
a governor want to make a “record” by the passage of some, 
laws “demanded by the people?” He could see Platt, who 
was for some purposes a “majority of the legislature.” 
Did he wish the state Senate to confirm some appointment 
which would “raise the tone of the administration?’ He’ 
could see Platt, who had an “iron-clad” arrangement with 
that body. Did he care anything about his political future? 


18 New York Tribune, January 18, 1899. 


346 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


_Platt was a man to be reckoned with. There is no doubt 
that Platt played upon the ambitions of every governor 
‘with whom he had “relations.” Governor Morton had 
presidential aspirations, Governor Black wanted a renom- 
“ination, and no one can deny that Governor Roosevelt was 
ambitious. In the second year of his governorship, Roose- 
yvelt was more enthusiastic about party harmony than he 
was about reform. As long as Platt controlled the primary 
and election machinery, Roosevelt thought it wise to stand 
in his good graces. 

Platt’s control over the finances of the party made him 
valuable to candidates for all state offices, especially the 
gubernatorial candidates. The appeals that Platt made for 
campaign funds to those “who were abundantly able to give” 
were of a very obvious sort. In fact, they were so clear 
that there was no need for spoken or written words between 
them. Platt learned the “system” by carefully observing 
the way the Democratic organization in the state raised 
money in the early nineties. There were some corpora- 
tions, like the public utility companies and the fiduciary 
institutions, which were constantly in touch with the legis- 
lative and administrative branches of the state government. 
Platt had a ES 
of these corporations had the “money craze.” The latter 
found that they could make money by obtaining certain 
exemptions and privileges from the various governmental 
agencies which were charged with the protection of the 
interests of the stockholders and the public. They went 
to Platt, they made huge contributions to the Republican 
campaign funds, and Platt supported them “naturally in 
anything that they naturally thought was right and that 
they were for” through his “being connected with the state 
-committee.” What was more “naturally right” than that 
they should make money? Platt took their cash contribu- 


THE TECHNIQUE OF PARTY MANAGEMENT — 347 


tions and distributed it among the local leaders and legis- 
lators who “needed help” around election time. These legis- 
lators were then “under moral obligations not to attack the. 
interests supporting them,” and the administrative officers 
also felt bound by the same rule. It was “matter of busi- 
ness not of politics” which led many corporation directors 
to see Platt. Roosevelt took part in many a campaign that~ 
was financed in this way. 

While Roosevelt had great confidence in his own abilities 
to win votes, he did not sneer at Platt who, like other 
political managers, put great faith in the organization as a 
vote-getter. With a “loyal” organization behind him and 
with plenty of money, Platt was well equipped during the 
late nineties to battle with the Democratic organization for 
votes upon election day. Platt tried to create an attitude 
in the voters’ minds which was favorable to his organiza- 
tion as well as toward the party candidates. He did this 
by liberally subsidizing newspaper editors and proprietors 
with offices, poets printing, government advertising, and 
other “favors.” The up-state Republican newspapers, the 
city dailies as well as the country weeklies, kept up a steady 
stream of party propaganda which undoubtedly had its 
effect. The great mass of up-state voters, many of whom 
were born and raised in the atmosphere of Republicanism, 
were given to believe that there was nothing wrong with 
the Grand Old Party. As a primary day or an election day 
drew near, Platt speeded up the work of his literary bureau: 
Country editors were given “boiler-plate” editorials or were 
paid out right to circularize their paper free to the voters, 
This and the other activities of Platt and his organization 
around election time centered upon the building up of that’ 
narrow margin which was necessary for success. Platt 
could count upon a huge block of “loyal” Republican voters, 
in the up-state; it was the stragglers who caused him trouble. 


348 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


To gather them in he selected candidates who represented 
different regional, religious, racial, social, and economic 
groups, and his party workers utilized all the well-known 
devices to interest these groups in the candidates and the 
/campaign. Upon election day the heavy power of the 
money bag was brought into play; thousands of party 
“workers” were hired for the day; thousands of farmers 
were paid for their time and the use of their teams in bring- 
ing voters to the polls; and there were thousands who did 
not bother with subterfuges in getting their “pay.” This 
machinery was much more essential for state than for na- 
tional campaigns as Roosevelt discovered in the guberna- 
torial contests of 1898 and 1910. 

The sources of Platt’s political power and Roosevelt’s 
political influence were quite different. The mechanical 
elements of Platt’s autocratic power were: first, control over 
the nomination and the election machinery through his co- 
operation with the state committee; second, control over 
the state legislature through his relations with the oligarchy 
‘ruling that body; third, control over the patronage through 
whatever influence he had with the president, the governor, 
and the federal, state, and local administrative officers; 
fourth, his control over the party campaign funds through 
the relations which he maintained with the directors of 
‘certajn corporations who were high in financial circles; and 
lastly) control over the minds of the voters through his 
intimate relations with party editors and men of influence 
in the business and political worlds. By checking off these 
levers one against the other he was able to play upon the 
habits, customs, traditions, ambitions, rivalries, gratitudes, 
greeds, and fears of those with whom he had dealings. He 
was a fit leader for a rivalrous, egotistic organization like 
the Republican machine in New York during the late 
nineties. Roosevelt, on the other hand, owed his political 


THE TECHNIQUE OF PARTY MANAGEMENT — 349 


influence to his fearless use of the various official positions 
which he held. As governor of New York, he consulted” 
the party organization, but he made it clear to the public ~ 
that he was not afraid to make independent use of the 
governor’s message power, the governor’s appointing power, 
and the governor’s position as the official leader of the state, 
government. When Roosevelt became president of the 
United States, he went much farther in exalting the im-. 
portance of the executive, and he assumed a position of — 
leadership in the Republican organization, state and national. 
In state affairs he intervened in the selection of the chair- 
man of the state committee, he made suggestions to the 
state nominating conventions, he used his influence in legis- 
lative matters, and he recognized his friends in the dis- 
tribution of the federal patronage in New York. Roosevelt’s 
interference in these matters ended for a time the control . 
of the state government by any single unofficial leader of 
Platt’s type, thus showing the importance of these elements 
to that kind of party management. Against such usurpa- 
tions of party powers and against the direct appeals that, 
Roosevelt made for popular support, the old régime had not 
constructed any adequate defensive armor. 


CHAPTER XIV 
CONCLUSION 


Theodore Roosevelt began to exalt the importance of the 
official leadership of the state government at a time when 
Platt’s power as the unofficial leader of the state govern- 
ment seemed to be complete and arbitrary. Each of these 
“men became very powerful in his own way, but neither 
could control the affairs of government outside the limits 
imposed upon them by the social and economic conditions 
of the period. The party organization which they led was 
a delicate mechanism, and the parts were so interrelated 
that the slightest disarrangement in one of them was liable 
to wreck the others. The larger society in which the party 
organization functioned was infinitely more complex and 
finely adjusted than the party itself. Only as long as the 
political leaders of New York during the nineties fitted into 
‘their time and place situation did they retain their posi- 
tion of ascendency. 

One of the conditions of political control over a large 
area is the existence of local political organizations whose 
leaders come more or less as a matter of habit to look to the 
central organization for advice. A state party manager 
like Platt could discipline some of the local political leaders 
‘who did not listen to his advice, but there were others so 
firmly entrenched in their social situations that he realized 
it would be useless for him to try to root them out. Suc- 
cessful local chieftains like Barnes or Aldridge were fac- 
tors with which the central leaders had to reckon at all 
times. ‘Their contacts with local business men, local labor 
leaders, and local groups having political influence were 

350 


CONCLUSION 351 


such that they could not be easily severed by one working 
from the outside. When some of the local leaders began 
to look to Odell and Roosevelt for advice, Platt’s days as a. 
political manager were numbered. 

Beyond the inner group of party managers, stood the great 
body of active party workers whose loyalty to the organiza- 
tion depended in part upon the existence of a large number- 
of public offices available for their use. Neither Platt nor, 
Roosevelt created the thousands of elective and appointive 
positions in the government services which came to be looked- 
upon as the spoils of party victory. On the contrary, both 
men had something to do with the movement which madé 
the sources of patronage more inaccessible for partisan uses. 
Platt’s resignation from the United States Senate with 
Conkling in 1881 in order to vindicate the spoils principle 
not only gave him the title, “Me-Too,” but it also gave an 
impetus to civil service reform in both the state and the 
nation. When he began to regain power in the nineties, he 
felt the pinch of this reform. Theodore Roosevelt as one 
of President Harrison’s civil service commissioners lessened 
the amount of federal patronage available, and the new state 
constitution of 1894 gave Governor Roosevelt a chance to 
protect the merit system in the state civil service. One sav- 
ing element in the situation from the point of view of the 
organization was the great increase in the number of execu- 
tive appointments due to the expansion of the social and 
economic functions of the government. The organization 
was recognized in most of the appointments made by Gov- 
ernors Morton, Black, and Roosevelt. Roosevelt, however, 
staged several dramatic fights before certain important state 
positions were filled and thus brought the organization tc 
name the man whom he regarded as its best candidate: 
Roosevelt also had a part in the independent movement in 
municipal politics which threatened the bipartisan system 


352 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


which had been established in the cities of the state for the 
‘purpose of dividing local spoils between the two party 
machines. In national affairs, President Roosevelt was not 
as “kind hearted” as McKinley had been. With the aid of 
Governor Odell he made great inroads into the body of 
Platt’s friends among the state and federal services. In 
endeavoring to control primaries and nominating conven- 
tions, Roosevelt as well as Platt relied upon the support of 
an active body of party workers. 
_ In election campaigns the chief reliance of both Platt and 
Roosevelt was the great block of habitual Republican voters 
in the state. As manager of the party organization, one of 
Platt’s chief concerns was the delivery of this vote upon 
election day. It was his duty to see that the confirmed 
Republican voters came to the polls and voted. Considering 
‘the blind allegiance of the great mass of up-state farmers 
yand shop-keepers to the Republican tradition, this was an 
important function. There were hundreds of thousands of 
voters who, because of their early training and environment, 
their anti-urban prejudices, or their business and social con- 
nections, could be counted upon to vote the Republican 
ticket if they voted at all. These voters constituted perhaps 
the most essential basis of Platt’s political power. Their 
unquestioning loyalty to the candidates and issues bearing 
the Republican label was the sine qua non of Republican 
successes. In campaigns for the control of the state legisla- 
ture, Platt found their prejudices together with the con- 
‘ stitutional gerrymander an almost unbeatable combination. 
In his campaign for the governorship, Roosevelt made a 
wide appeal for votes, but he addressed himself primarily to 
the native American, up-state Republicans. 
Large as the habitual Republican vote was in New York, 
it could not be relied upon alone for state-wide victories. 
The state contained an equally numerous and immovable 


CONCLUSION 353 


block of Democratic voters located for the most part in 
New York City. In state elections the Republican organiza- 

‘tion vote was largely offset by the machine vote of the 

Democrats, and the result was likely to turn upon the at- 

titude of the independent voters. The overwhelming Re- 

publican victories of the middle nineties were brought about” 
by those who broke away from the old party traditions” 
After 1896 the Republican leaders had an up-hill fight in| 
state-wide elections that were not overshadowed by national 
issues. The decline of the rural population and the rapid 
growth of the population of New York City made inroads 

into the Republican strength. In order to limit the Demo-_ 

cratic vote, the Republican managers secured the adoption’ 

of drastic ballot reform laws for the great metropolis, but in 

order to increase their own vote they were compelled to . 
make appeals to the independent voters. It was the neces- 

sity of combining both the Republican and the independent , 
vote that brought Platt and Roosevelt together. Platt knew . 
that the man who had rigorously enforced the Sunday clos-. 

ing law in New York City and who had been a champion’ 

of civil service reform at Washington would not be a sub-” 
servient governor. Roosevelt knew that the organization 

which Platt represented did not always practice the kind of” 

political morality that he preached. In order to produce a 

vote winning combination, these two men entered into a’ 

makeshift partnership which had its drawbacks on both’ 

sides. Both defended this partnership on the ground that, 
the exigencies of the political situation demanded it. 

In legislative matters, the power of the official and also ~ 
the unofficial leader depended largely upon the strength of 
the social groups that could be lined up in favor of particular 
measures. Platt was by no means an arbitrary law-maker. 
In the face of the governor’s vote, the opposition of the’ 
press and the hostility of several civic associations, he was 


354 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


unable to force through the legislature two of his favorite 
“measures, an anti-caricature bill and a metropolitan police 
bill. The passage of the Raines Liquor Tax bill was looked 
upon as one of the great accomplishments of Platt and his 
organization. However, the bill passed largely because 
,more powerful interest groups were marshalled in its favor 
than were marshalled against it. A majority of the organi- 
zation men favored the bill because of its patronage features, 
and the up-state farmers were pleased with the revenue rais- 
ing provisions which rested more heavily upon the urban 
than upon the rural communities, but it is also true that the 
moralists, the preachers, the temperance men, and the pro- 
hibitionists favored the bill because it lessened the number 
of saloons and weakened the saloon power of Tammany 
Hall. In like fashion, the Greater New York bill was passed 
because a sufficient number of people were interested enough 
either in the patronage possibilities, in the commercial op- 
portunities, or in the civic potentialities that would be created 
by the formation of the greater city to get behind the bill 
and override those who were opposed. The limitations of 
the control which the organization exercised over the law- 
making process came out very clearly during Roosevelt’s 
administration as governor. When Governor Roosevelt 
aroused the farmers, the market gardeners, the mechanics, 
and tradesmen having small holdings, and the real estate 
associations to the full realization of the fact that they were 
‘paying an improper and excessive portion of the general 
taxes, Platt and his legislative cabal did not dare block the 
“passage of the Franchise Tax Law. Roosevelt was also able 
to persuade the legislature to enact much social and economic 
legislation which was opposed by the large corporations. 
The growing power of the labor unions, the increasing num- 
ber of civic associations, and the development of reform 
societies were factors which the Republican organization 


CONCLUSION 355 


could not afford to ignore. Roosevelt learned to marshal_ 
these groups much more effectively than did the organization- 
leaders. 

The politico-industrial system with which Platt was iden- 
tified was working so smoothly during the McKinley ad- 
ministration that even Roosevelt was not fully aware of 
some of its unfortunate by-products. Platt did not try to 
initiate any great policies but was content to act as the agent 
for any social or economic group which was powerful 
enough to make itself felt in a political way. When the in-~ 
terests of several powerful groups conflicted, he brought _ 
about the best sort of a compromise that he could. The 
financiers or capitalists, the most highly organized indus-* 
trial group, got in the main what they wanted from Platt. 
but not always, because Platt sometimes saw that their de- 
mands, if carried out, would alienate a sufficient number of 
voters to endanger his position. Several financiers were 
disappointed when the Franchise Tax Law was passed. The 
directors of the utility corporations were opposed to the 
law, but Platt felt that he could not openly adopt their view 
without undermining his own political power. That his 
power as a political manager was something worth con-, 
serving seemed to be the opinion of the most influential 
capitalists. At least they were willing to trust him with the 
enormous campaign contributions that were so necessary to. 
the smooth working of the Republican organization. The 
New York Republican organization rendered valuable serv-. 
ice to the financiers in advocating the gold standard in 1896 
and in supporting the Dingley Tariff Bill of 1897. These. 
general services as well as many other less conspicuous spe- 
cial services deserved their reward. The insurance investi- 
gations showed that the directors of the great corporations 
did not regard it as improper for them to use the corporaté~ 
funds to help out both of the two major parties. The period~ 


356 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


of the Platt régime was one of great lavishness in all direc- 
tions. The rapidly growing population of the Empire State 
created an ever growing need for better means of transpor- 
tation, communication, and marketing, and for newer and 
more specialized types of work. Great investments of cap- 
ital were required to meet these needs. The investment 
‘bankers were therefore in a strategic position, and they 
made the best of the traditional philosophy that the pub- 
lic interest was promoted by stimulating individual economic 
activity. As long as this situation continued, Platt could 
‘rely upon huge campaign funds provided also that his 
charges for favors were not too high and that the services 
which he rendered were reasonably efficient. He himself 
was wholly in sympathy with the view which postulated the 
“right of a man to run his own business in his own way, 
with due respect of course to the Ten Commandments and 
the Penal Code.” He, like the financiers, was inclined to 
take a rather narrow view as to what the Ten Command- 
‘ments meant and as to what should go into the Penal Code. 
Tt was difficult for him and the money kings who used him to 
‘realize that their activities were injuring others. Roose- 
velt delivered few attacks against the evils of this system 
before he became president of the United States. The 
Franchise Tax bill which he pushed through the legislature 
in such dramatic fashion was not as revolutionary a meas- 
ure as Platt tried to make it appear. A similar law had been 
upon the statute books before. When Roosevelt laid down 
his tasks at Albany, he admitted that he was leaving many 
ragged edges behind. 

. The insurance investigation was one of the events which 
helped to lift the fog which had surrounded the old in- 
'dividualistic system. The corporation heads then sensed 
the anger of the policy-holders and the stock-holders who 
felt that they had been robbed. The public which had 


CONCLUSION 357 


formerly admired, respected and idolized the successtul busi- 

ness man now purchased eagerly the magazines and papers 

which pictured some of the great millionaires as “male- 

factors of great wealth.” The growing scarcity of natural 

aml artificial opportunities tended to increase the discon- ~ 
tent that was felt with the traditional alliance between big. 
business and politics. It was this discontent that Roosevelt 
capitalized so successfully as president. When he preached 

executive reponsibility and the need for a government which, 
would do things, the people went along with him. 

In the election of 1896 the voters of the United States 
were presented with a more clearly defined issue than they’ 
had had in thirty-six years. In the state of New York, for, 
various reasons, Platt’s candidates, McKinley’s personality, 
and the Republican policies and traditions appeared more 
attractive to a majority of the voters than did the Hill- 
Croker candidates, Bryan’s policies, and the Democratic 
traditions. The momentum of this election helped to con- 
tinue Platt’s organization in power for fourteen years. Dur- 
ing this time the monetary question ceased to be a live issue, 
and the seeds of corruption began to grow in parts of the 
Republican organization. Until the extent of this corruption 
was revealed by several investigations, the voters in the up- 
state regions were fairly complaisant. They had no means 
of knowing what was going on within the government. As 
long as their own interests were not directly affected, they 
were indifferent to political issues and events. The upward 
trend of the business cycle tended to create a feeling of 
satisfaction with existing arrangements among all classes» 
While the farmers did not gain a proportionate share of this 
prosperity, the prices of their products did rise and they 
could boast of a semblance of good times. In such an era, 
who was willing to keep alert day and night in order to hold* 
. the many headed government to account for the charges ~ 


358 BOSS PLATT AND HIS NEW YORK MACHINE 


committed to it? There was Platt busily engaged behind 
the scenes doing his part to bring about some sort of con- 
tinuity out of a disintegrated administrative system, to 
choose the least objectionable of the office-seekers, and to 
sectire the co-operation of the governor and a two-cham- 
bered legislature made up of two hundred localists. Until 
Roosevelt and others tried to do some of these things openly, 
the Easy Boss was able to cling to his place as an agent of 
the properties classes, a retailer of franchises, government 
contracts, and special legislation. 


INDEX 





INDEX 


Albany Argus, on Odell as a 
legislative agent, 165-66; on 
Platt’s withdrawal from the 
senatorial contest, 28. 

Albany, investigation of the 
county and city of, 224-29, 
244-45. 

Albany Evening Journal, Barnes, 
editor of, 63-64, 100, 136, 228, 
308; Weed, editor of, 15. 

Aldrich, Nelson, United States 
senator, 178-79, 298-99, 333. 

Aldridge, George Washington, 
“boss” of the city of Rochester, 
62, 76, 96, 110, 161-62, 221, 311, 
334, 350; state superintendent 
of public works, 205-6, 208, 
216, 238-40, 244, 338. 

Alexander, De Alva S.,, 
gressman, 174. 

Alger, Russel A., on Platt, 257, 
323; on Platt and Dana, 134. 
Allds, Jotham P., floor leader of 
Assembly, 157-59, 198, 267, 335, 
344; state senator, investiga- 
tion demanded by, 245-46, 263- 

64, 309-10, 343. 

Allds investigation. 
Allds. 

“Amen Corner,” significance of, 
57-58. 

Appointments, made by gover- 
nor, 205. 

Armstrong insurance investiga- 
tion. See Insurance investiga- 
tion. 

Arthur, Chester A., nomination 
to vice-presidency, 24; and 
Platt, 26, 28; removal from 
collectorship, 23. 


con- 


SGA Bi 


361 


Assembly, organization of lead- 
ership in, 154 ff. See state 
legislature. 

Astor House, meeting place for 
Weed conferences, 15; 56. 


Astoria Gas Company, 247. 
“Availability,” 95-97. 


Baker, Frank M., railroad com- 
missioner, 276, 296. 

Barnes, Thurlow Weed, 63, 103. 

Barnes, William, Jr., “boss” of 
Albany, 63-64, 76, 82, 107, 
139, 162, 224-29, 244-45, 260-62, 
DO S0Z-4 S12 55 yt Os oo, 
338, 340-43, 350; relations with 
Roosevelt, 244-45, 262, 304, 341. 

Bere onsEy elt libel suit, 245, 


Bayne Committee, 226-29, 244, 
See Albany. 


Bidwell, George R., collector of 
port of New York, 253, 293. 


Binghamton Leader, on Platt’s 
convention leadership in 1898, 
100-101. 


Binghamton Republican, Dunn 
manager of, 61, 135. 


Bipartisan system in.New York 
cities, 225, 352. 


Black, Frank S., governor, 94-98, 
184; relations with Platt, 188- 
89, 194-96, 202-4, 206-7, 216- 
17, 235, 238, 276, 346; sena- 
torial candidate, 300-301. 


Black Horse Cavalry, 262-65, 
267, 271. 


Blackmail. See “strike” bills. 


362 INDEX 


Blaine, J. G., presidential candi- 
dates c0-21 32, ehie, 2105-435 
speaker, 19, 337; on Congress- 
man Platt, 20. 

Bliss, Cornelius N., advocate of 
primary reform, 84-85; candi- 
date for vice-presidential nom- 
ination, 119. 

Bonding business, 247-48. 

Boss, the Easy, 289, 329, 332, 344, 
homey sad Wah Ged af thao 

Brady, Anthony N., Albany busi- 
ness man, 2609 

Bribery in_ elections, 
Quigg on, 146. 

Bridge companies, legislative ac- 
tivities of, 263-64. 

Brooklyn Freie Presse, Repub- 
lican newspaper, 135. 

Brooklyn Times, Republican 
newspaper, 135. 

Broome, county of, 222-24. 

Bryan, William Jennings, in the 
campaign of 1896, 54, 357. 

Bryce, James, quoted, 234. 

Buffalo Commercial, Republican 
newspaper, 66. 

Buffalo Evening News, on 
Platt’s convention leadership, 
101. 

Business and politics, corruption 
in, 262 ff., 346-47, 355-57. 

Butler, Nicholas Murray, promi- 
nent Republican, 232. 


Campaign finance, 144-48, 264, 
268-71, 281-84, 287-90. 


Campaign methods, 138 ff.; “get- 
ting out the vote,” 145-46. 


Canal “scandal,” 236, 239, 243- 
44. 


145-48 ; 


Carnegie, Andrew, member of 
Republican party, 127; on pri- 
macy of New York City in 
business, 5. 


> 


Caucus or primary, 81-83. 
Census Office, spoils in, 254-56. 


Choate, Joseph H., ambassador 
to Great Britain, 251; member 
of Republican party, 128, 232; 
Platt’s senatorial rival, 171-72. 

Citizen’s Union of New York 
City, effect of primary law on, 
87, 232-34. 


Civil Service Commission, 239. 


Civil Service Law, United States, 
250, 293-94. 


Civil service reform, Black on, 
242; Morton on, 195; Platt on, 
22; Roosevelt on, 200. 


Clarkson, James S., and Platt, 
£12-114)282. 


Cleveland, Grover, governor, 31, 
183; president, 44-45, 252 


Commercial and Financial Chron- 
icle, on Platt and the gold 
plank, stliniz 


Committee on Rules, Assembly, 
157-58, 198, 263, 267. 


Committees (party), 77-78, 80- 
1, 88. 


Conger, Benn, state senator, 245, 
263, 309-10. 


Congress, in 1872, hae Platt's 
relation to, 172 ff 


Congressional a Platt’s 


speech in, 177. 
Congressmen, New York See 
Republican congressmen. 
Conkling, Roscoe, Platt’s mentor, 
17, 20-24, 26-28; 755. 4335-324 
resignation from the United 
States Senate, 26-28. 


Constitution of 1894, 214, 351. © 


Constitutional Convention, of 
by 2, 50-52, “2383S 0b aw 
41, 


INDEX 363 


Conventions, nominating, 89-92; 
Hughes on, 308-9. See also 
Republican state and national 
conventions. 

Cornell, Alonzo B., naval officer 
of New York, 21, 33; gover- 
nor, 23, 30. 


Corporations in politics. 
business and politics. 
Corrupt practices investigation, 

cited, 265-72, 311-12, 344. 

Corruption in business and poli- 
tics. See business and politics. 

County committees, organization 
of, 76-78. See also committees. 

County, civil service, 221-22; 
elective officers, 220-21; spoils 
system, 222-25. 

Croker, Richard, “boss” of Tam- 
many Democracy, 41, 49, 143; 
legislative “deals” with Platt, 
167-70, 207-8, 229-34, 247. 

Croly, H., on Platt and the gold 
plank, 115 

Curtis, George William, 22. 


Dana, Charles A., relations with 
Platt, 111, 133-34. 

“Deals,” political, 167, 203, 229. 
See Platt and Croker. 


Democratic National Convention, 
of 1892, 44-45; of 1896, 52-54. 

Democratic party, composition 
of, in New York, 41, 126, 353; 
dissentions within, 54. 

Depew, Chauncey M., and Ald- 
ridge, 205; on Platt, 58-59, 
326; president of New York 
Central Railroad, 67, 272-74; 
prominent Republican, 34, 75, 
108, 110, 128, 334, 336; United 
States senator, 178-79, 256, 291, 
293, 298-303, 338, 344. 

os Sy a bill, 174, 176, 285- 

Discipline, party, 338-46; Platt 
on, 338-39, 


See 


- Erhardt, J. B.. 


District attorney, connection with 
spoils system, 225, 227-28. 

Dunn, George W., chairman of 
state committee, 258, 291, 295, 
299; and corrupt practices in- 
vestigation, 268; leader of Re- 
publican party in Binghamton, 
61-62, 206, 222, 302; railroad 
commissioner, 276-77, 338. 


Election law, 104, 146-47. 
Elections, factors controlling, 
148-49, 304, 314-16, 357. 


Elective offices in New York, 
220. 


Elkins, Stephen B., 34. 


Ellingwood & Cunningham, New 
York brokerage firm, relations 
alt legislators, 267-69, 277, 


Ellsworth, Timothy E., Platt’s 
lieutenant in Lockport, 66; 
president pro tem of Senate, 

Elmira Advertiser, Fassett, di- 
rector of, 135-36. . 


Enrollment, party, 81, 85. 
collector of the 
port of New York, 252-53. 


Fassett, J. Sloat, collector of the 
port of New York, 253; dis- 
ciplined by Platt, 339-40; 
eubernatorial candidate, 94-95 ; 
Republican leader in Elmira, 


“Fassett” committee, 246. 
Federal civil service, 248-50. 
Federal patronage, 248-61. 


Fenton, Reuben E., Republican 
governor of New York, 16-17. 


Fidelity and Deposit Company, 
247-48. 


Fields, A. C., life insurance lob- 
byist, 278-79, 


364 INDEX 


Fifth Avenue Hotel, campaign 
headquarters, 139; meeting 
place for “Sunday school,” 56- 
59, 74, 156, 318. 

Fish, Hamilton, speaker of As- 
sembly, 154. 

Flower, R. P., governor, 49. 

Ford, John, state senator, 196. 

Fox, Reuben L., clerk of state 
committee, 75. 

Rana Tax bill, 196-99, 355- 


Garfield, President, assassination 
of, 28-29 

German voters, 126, 141-42. 

Goff, John W., 48. 

Goodrich, M. W., 
Plattocis 

Gould, Jay, and Conkling, 30-31; 
and “Lou” Payn, 60 

Government contracts, 243. See 
spoils system. 

Governor, powers of, 182, 200, 
214-17; Platt’s relation to, 188 
ff. See also Black, Odell, Mor- 
ton, and Roosevelt. 

Grady, Thomas F., Democratic 
state senator, 212. 

Grant, F. D., minister to Austria, 
251; police commissioner, 230. 

Grant, Hugh J., Democratic can- 
didate for mayor of New 
NOL cok, 

Grant, President, 18, 24. 

Greater New York bill, 165, 167, 
191-92, 201-3, 232, 354. 

Greeley, Horace, contempt of 
Conkling for, 18; editor of 
New York Tribune, 16. 

Green, George E., state senator, 

58-59. 


relations with 


Hackett, Charles W., chairman 
of state committee, 74-75; leg-« 
islative agent, 164, 189. 


Half-Breeds, 20, 24, 26. 

Hanna, Mark, Republican cam- 
paign manager, 52-53, 114-16, 
a 342; and Roosevelt, 119- 


Harper’s Weekly, on the Demo- 
cratic party bosses, 47. 

Harriman, E. H., compaign con- 
tributor, 275; before insurance 
committee, 281, 283; and Odell, 
65, 281, 301. 

Harrison, Benjamin, president, 
relations with Platt, 34-35, 112, 
249-55, 328-29. 

Havemeyer, Henry O., sugar re- 
finer, 8, 285-87. 

Hazel, John R., Platt’s Buffalo 
representative, 65-66; United 
States district judge, 256. 

Hearst, William R., 130, 305. 

Hendricks, Francis, collector of 
port of New York, 253; Platt’s 
lieutenant in Syracuse, 66, 208; 
President Roosevelt’s adviser, 
299-300; state superintendent 
of insurance, 210-11, 284. 

Hewitt, Abram S., mayor of 
New York, 229. 

Higgins, Frank W., lieutenant- 
governor and governor, 300- 
304; state senator, 163-64 

Hill, David B., leader of up-state 
Democrats, 35-46, 50, 53, 333, 
337. 

Hiscock, Frank, United States 
senator, 33-34, 75, 249, 251. 
Hoar, G. F., on Republican par- 

ty, 125~26. 

Hooker, W. B., 
ea 


Hughes, Charles E., appointed to 
Supreme Court, 312; counsel 
for insurance committee, 277- 
&, 303; governor, 304-13 : on 
oe party, ayaten 107, 151, 214, 


congressman, 


-INDEX 365 


Iglehart, F. C. (Rev.), nomina- 
tion of Roosevelt urged by, 99. 

Immigration Office, reorganized 
by Roosevelt, 293. 

Independent, on Allds, 310. 

Insurance Department, 283-84. 

Insurance investigation, 277-84; 
cited, 278-79, 281-82, 301-2, 
356-57. 

Interest on public funds, misuse 
of, 224, 226. 

Interstate Commerce Commis- 
sion, on express business, 288. 

Irish voters, 126, 141-42. 

Issues, in state campaigns, 103-4, 
138, 142-44, 304-5, 315. 

Italian voters, 126, 141-42. 


Judicial spoils, 240-41, 256-57. 
See spoils system. 


Aa ed E, R., and Aldridge, 
161. 


Lauterbach, Edward, leader of 
Republican organization in 
New York City, 67, 75, 84-85, 
115-16. 233; legislative agent, 
164, 269. 

Law making, influence affecting, 
353-54. 

Leadership, party, Barnes on, 92; 
Cooley on, 55; discussion of, 
215-18, 331-50;. Merriam on, 
xii-xxiv; Michels on, xvi-xv; 
of Odell, 300 ff.; of Platt, 55- 
59. 69-72, 123, 217-18, 289-92, 
299-300, 315-19,. 334-49; of 
Roosevelt, 124 ff., 315-17. 

Lexow committee, 47-49, 168-69, 
202, 230. 


Lientenant-governor, duties of, 
155: 


Life insurance investigation. See 
insurance investigation. 

Lincoln, Abraham, .and the Re- 
publican party, 16, 125. 


Liquor interests in New York, 
41, 354 


ae 262-63, (270, 279-84, 


Lodge, Henry Cabot, and gold 
plank, 116; letters of Roose- 
velt to, 117-18, 258. 

Long, John D., secretary of 
navy, 254. 

Low, Seth, mayor of New York, 
294; prominent Republican, 
126 7;252-00, 

Lyman, H. H., state excise com- 
missioner, 206, 240. 


McClave, John, police commis- 
sioner, 230. 

McClure’s Magazine, 302. 

Machiavelli, xiii, 331. 

Machine, New York Republican, 
30, 51, 66, 75 ff., 148, 150, 197, 
233-34, 238, 249-50, 316, 348. 

McKane, John Y., 46-47. 

McKinley, William, president, 
53-54, 112,. 131-33, 250-56, 291= 
93, 324, 352. 

McLaughlin, Hugh, Brooklyn 
“boss,” 41, 46. 

Manley, Joseph, opposition to 
McKinley, 113. 

Maynard, I. H., 43, 46. 

eas committee, 168-70, 247, 


Metropolitan Street Railway 


Company, 270-71. 
Milholland, John E., on New 
York primaries, 81-82, 84. 
Miller, Nathan L., state comp- 
troller, 258-59, 


Miller, Warner, gubernatorial 
candidate, 35-36; and Platt, 
105-6, 110, 342. 


Morgan, J. P., campaign fund 
contributor, 145; financier, 7, 


366 INDEX 


Morton, Levi P., financier, 24; 
governor, relations with Platt, 
93, 183-84, 194-06, 200-202, 206, 
238,246, 276, 346; presidential 
candidate, 112-13, 116; sen- 
atorial candidate, 33. 

Murphy, Edward, United States 
senator, 45-46. 

Murray, C. H., supervisor of the 
census, 255. 


Nation, on Platt, 22, 295. 

National Civil Service Reform 
League, 255. 

New, John C., Harrison’s con- 
vention manager, 113. 

New York Central Railroad, 6, 
272-74. 


New York City, population, 2; 
concentration of capital in, 7; 
spoils system in, 47-48, 229-34. 


New York Civil Service Reform 
Association, 238. 


New York County Republican 
Committee, 79-80, 131. 


New York Custom-house, 21, 
23, 26, 249, 252, -286-87, 293, 
340. 


N Ap hers Herald, on Roosevelt, 
124. 


New York Journal, 129-30. 


New York Mail & Express, Re- 
publican newspaper, 135. 


New York Press, Quigg, editor 
of, 69, 134, 164. 


New York State, agricultural 
growth of, 9-10; financial im- 
portance of, 7-8; industrial 
growth of, 4-7; labor move- 
ment in, 8-9; politics of, 39 ff.; 
population of, 1-3. See also 
Republican party. 


New York Sun, on Platt, 116, 
133-34, 320; on Quigg, 105. 


New York Tribune, and Platt, 
122, 131-33, 180, 236-37, 276, 
323; on the primary law, 87; 
on Quigg, 68; on Nixon, 155. 

New York World, 44, 129. 


Nixon, S. Fred, letter of Platt 
to, 160; speaker of Assembly, 
155, 246, 263, 267-68, 291, 302, 
35: 

North, S. E., on party caucuses, 


nt 


O’Brien, Morgan J., judge, 207. 

Odell, Benjamin B. Jr., as a 
campaign manager, 139 ff.; de- 
cline of, 303-4; governor, 93, 
96, 108, 291 ff.; Platt’s chief 
of staff, 64-65, 75, 165-66; 276, 
280, 334; and Roosevelt, 99, 
101, 189; successor to Platt, 
300-304.. 

O’Grady, James M. E., speaker 
of Assembly, 154, 

ret Guard,” 24, 306-7, 311-12, 

Owego, Platt’s home, 13, 15-16. 


Parker, Alton B., 270. 

Parkhurst, Charles H., on Platt, 
321; on Republican enrolment 
frauds, 85; on Tammany, 47. 


Parsons, Herbert, Republican 
leader in New York, 302-4. 


Partridge, John N., superintend- 
ent of public works, 209. 


Patronage, local, 219 ff. 


Payn, Louis F., relations with 
Platt, 28, 59-61, 335-36; state 
superintendent of insurance, 
207, 209-11, 240, 284. 


Payne, Senero E., congressman, 
105, 173°. oor feaderaror 
House, 174-75. 


Perkins, George W., and Roose- 
velt’s nomination for vice- 
president, 121. bg ¥ 


INDEX 367 


Phillips, James, Jr., editor of the 
New York Press, 134. 


Platt, Frank H., Senator Platt’s 
son, 120, 246. 


Platt, Thomas Collier, Auto- 
biography, cited, 164, 202, 241, 
Ba; O03, 325; 300; 532,) 300739 | 
as a campaign manager, 51-52, 
54, 124 ff.; congressman, 18- 
20; and Conkling, 18, 22, 24- 
29; control over law making, 
150 ff, 343-45; as a convention 
manager, 31-33, 92 ff., 104, 109 
ff., 340-43; and the corpora- 
tions, 262 ff.; courage of, 324; 
and Croker, 167-70, 229-234; 
decline of, 291-316; and De- 
pew, 273-74, 344; as a dis- 
ciplinarian, 338-46; and the 
distribution of the spoils, 219 
ff., 337-38; and federal patron- 
age, 248 ff., 257, 259; and Fen- 
ton, 16; flexibility of, 322-23; 
and the gold plank, 114-17; 
influence upon Raines bill, 
163-65 ; intellectual qualities of, 
324; leadership of, 69-75, 78- 
79, 88, 89, 315-19, 334 ff.; let- 
ters of: to Allds, 159; to 
country editors, 137; to local 
leaders, 78-79; to Morton, 191- 
92; to Nixon, 160; to Roose- 
velt, 190, 212-13; letter of 
Quigg to, 274; letters of Roose- 
velt to, 193, 198-99, 297-98; 
limits of his power, 348-58; 
and McKinley, 250; and Mil- 
ler, 35-36; moral qualities of, 
328-33; New York quarantine 
commissioner, 241; and Odell, 
292-303; and party finances, 
144-48, 275-90, 301-2, 346-47, 
356; patience of, 321-22; per- 
sonal appearance of, 319-20; 
political training, 12-38, 335- 
37; powers of exoression. 327- 
28; president of United States 
Express Company, 23, 274-75, 
287-88, 326-27; and the press, 
129-38; and the primaries, 88- 


89; relation to, Congress, 172 
ff.; relations with the gover- 
nor, 188 ff., 345-46; resignation 
from the United States Seu- 
ate, 25-29, 351; rise“to power, 
55-59; and Roosevelt, 117-23, 
124) ff..°207—10,..323,.°335, -342- 
43, 347-8; Roosevelt on, 289; 
self esteem of, 332-33; social 
background of, 1-14; and his 
sons, 246-48; and state patron- 
age, 234 ff.; tastes of, 320-21; 
United States senator, 170-82, 
344-46, 295-96, 

Platt’s “Sunday school,” 57 ff., 
129, 180-81, 300. 


Plimley, William H., 298-09. 
Police graft in New York City, 
229-31. 


Polish voters, 126, 141-42. 


Porter, Robert P., editor of the 
New York Press, 134; super- 
intendent of the census, 254-55. 


Post Office Department, spoils 
in, 251-52; 257-59. 


Precinct captains, 78-79. 
Primaries, 80 ff. 


Primary Election Law, 85-88, 
91-92, 140. 


Printing “graft” in Albany, 228, 
244-45; in the federal gov- 
ernment, 258. 

Pruyn, Robert, 269. 


Quay, Mathew S., relations with 
Platt, 35, 112-14 119-22, 333; 
SY dati © Pde 


Quigg, Lemuel E., congressman, 
174, 176; lobbyist, 269-71, 306; 
on Platt, 146-47, 319, 325, 331; 
Platt’s lieutenant in New York 
City, 68-69, 79-80, 169, 334; 
and Roosevelt, 97-99, 118, 212. 


Race track gambling, 306. 


368 INDEX 


Raines, John, congressman, 255- 
50; death of, 309; floor leader 
of state Senate, 157; and legis- 
lative spoils, 267; and liquor 
tax, bill, 163; and his son 
Charles, 247. 

Raines Liquor Tax bill, 162-65, 
201, 247, 354. 

Ramapo Company, 246. 

pa George W., congressman, 


Reid, Whitelaw, editor of New 
York Tribune, 250; letter of 
Platt<70n, 3233 sanmister. to 
France, 250-51; and Platt, 131- 
33; on primary reform, 84. 

Republican congressman from 
New. York, character and 
training of, 173-76. 

Republican (state) legislators, 
character and training of, 152- 
54; power of, as individuals, 
158; relations with Democratic 
colleagues, 167-69. 

Republican newspapers in New 
York, 131 ff.; patronage given 
to, 137-38. 

Republican National Convention, 
of 1880, 24; of 1884, 31; of 
1888, 34-35; of 1892, 110, 112, 
116; of 1896, 111-117, 324; of 
1900, 117-123, of 1904, 299. 


Republican Party in the state of 
New York, 13, 124-38, 315-16, 
Bae. 


Republican state committee, 73, 
74; Platt’s relation to, 282-83. 


Republican State Convention, of 
1870, 2172008 187 7,°2126t 1887, 
30; of 1898, committees of, 
104-107 ; of 1898, 104-107, 260- 
61; of 1902, 294-95; of 1904, 
299-300; of 1906, 303-4; of 
1908, 306-7; of 1910, 313-14; 
organization and functions of, 
93 ff.; and federal patronage, 
248. 


Riggs, Edward G., on Platt and 
the gold plank, 111; relations 
with Platt, 133-34. 

Robertson, William H., collector 
of port of New York, 26, 32. 


Rochester Democrat & Chron- 
fae Republican newspaper, 
36, 


Rockefeller, John D., member of 
Republican party, 127. 


Rogers, G. Tracy, president of 
the Street Railway Associa- 
tion, 265 ff. 


Roosevelt, Theodore, assembly- 
man, 29-30; assistant secretary 
of navy, 254; Autobiography, 
cited, 328, 330, 332; and Barnes, 
262, 341; breakfasts with Platt, 
189-90; civil service commis- 
sioner, 249, 252-53, 351; con- 
vention career of, 31-33, 118- 
23, 307, 313-14, 343; governor, 
183, 185-88, 196-99, 204-5, 208- 
17, 351; gubernatorial candi- 
date, 93 ff., 124 ff., 141-44; and 
Harriman, 275; and Hendricks, 
284; and Hughes, 305; letters 
of, to Lodge, 258-59; letters 
of Platt to, 190, 212-13, 297— 
98; on industrial growth, 4; 
mayoralty candidate, 33; nom- 
ination for vice-president, 117- 
23; and the organization, 49, 
88, 295, 340-49; personal char- 
acteristics of, 320-25; and 
Platt, 335; on Platt, 289, 320- 
21, 326; president, 292-308, 
340; police commissioner, 230- 
31; and the spoils system, 219, 
230-41, 242-44, 247-48, 269, 286, 
289, 338. 


Root, Elihu, on the “Black Horse 
Cavalry,” 264-65; on the in- 
visible government, 70-72; on 
Payn, 207; ~Platth one soees 
prominent Republican, 128-232, 
ae speech against Hearst, 


INDEX 369 


Ryan, Thomas F., New York 
financier, 8, 270. 


Schurman, Jacob G., member of 
Republican party, 128. 

Secretary of the treasury, on the 
sugar frauds, 286-87. 

Sheehan, William F., lieutenant- 
governor, 41, 43, 45-46. 

Sheldon, George R., New York 
banker, 294-95. 

Sherman, James S., congress- 
man, 173, 175; vice-president, 
313-14. 

Sherman, John, cabinet ofiicer 
and United States senator, 21, 
go, 1/2. 

Speaker of Assembly, 154-55. 

Spoils system, contracts, 242-45; 
and the corporations, 262-290; 
judicial, 240-41, 256-57; legis- 
lative, 245-47; local, 219 ff. 

Stalwarts, 20. 

State Administrative organiza- 
tion, 215. 

State Bank of Syracuse, 224. 

State civil service, 237. 

State comptroller, investigation 
of municipal accounts, 221-24, 
27: 

State legislature, committees in, 
156-58; organization of, 154 
ff.; party voting in, 166-67; 
presiding officers, 154-55; 
spoils system in, 245-47, 

State patronage, 234-48. 

Street railway companies, legis- 
lative activities of, 264-71. 
State Senate, control over ap- 

pointments, 209-10. 

State superintendent of insur- 

ance, 311 


State Trust Company, 211. «= 


Stimson, Henry L., candidate for 
deere 314, 


“Strike” bills, 262, 266.' « , 
Strong, William L. mayor of 
New York, 49, 202. i, 
Sugar trust frauds, 285-87. 
Sutherland, William A., counsel 
for Lexow committee, 48; na- 
tional committeeman, 114. 
Syracuse Journal, on Platt, 25; 
Republican newspaper, 136. 


Taft, William H., 307-8. 
Tammany Hall, 84, 229, 234, 246. 
Technique of management, 334- 


Site 

Tenney, Asa W.,~United States 
circuit judge, 256. 

Tibbits, L. C., state senator, 86. 

Tioga County, Platt’s home 
county, 16, 83-84, 124. 

Tracy, Benjamin F., mayoralty 
candidate, 232; prominent New 
York Republican, 66-67, 246; 
secretary of Navy, 254. 

Tracy, Boardman and Platt, law 
firm, 246, 257. 

Treasury Department, Platt’s 
contract with, 259-60; spoils 
in, 248, 252-53, 286-87. 

Troy Times, Republican news- 
paper, 138; on Roosevelt, 143. 

“Trusts” in politics. See busi- 
ness and politics. 


United States Express Company, 
contract with Treasury De- 
partment, 259; favored by gov- 
ernment, 287-88; Platt, presi- 
dent of, 57, 326-27. 


Van Cott, Cornelius, postmaster 
of New York, 252. 


Van Wyck, Augustus, Demo- 
cratic candidate for governor, 


124. 


Van Wyck, Robert A., mayor 
of New York, 231-33, 


370 INDEX 


Veto, “omnibus,” 200. 


Vreeland, H. H., president of In- 
terborough-Metropolitan Com- 
pany, 266, 269-71. 


Wadsworth, James W., congress- 
man, 173, 175-76. 


Wadsworth, James W., Jr., 
Siege of the state Assembly, 
02. 


Wanamaker, John, postmaster 
general, 252, 287-88. 


War Department, spoils in, 257. 


Ward, William L., congressman, 
174, 176. 


Warren, William C., editor of 
Buffalo Commercial, 66. 


Weed, Thurlow, on decline of 
Congress, 19; Platt on, 14-16. 


White, Andrew D., conversation 
with Platt over governorship, 
94-95; 330-31; minister to 
Russia, 250-51. 


White, William Allen, on Platt, 
324. 


Whitney, William C., Cleveland’s 
campaign manager, 45; New 
York financier, 8, 270; and 
State Convention of 1894, 50. 


Witter, D. P., state assembly- 
man, 193-94. 


Woodford, S. D., 
Spain, 251. 

Woodruff, Timothy L., chairman 
of state committee, 304, 312; 
leader of Brooklyn Repub- 
licans, 68, 339; lieutenant- 
governor, 103, 155; and Platt, 
[21 279;..500. 


Worth, Jacob, county clerk, 206; 
disciplined by Platt, 339. 


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